EDITORIAL: Gripen for Ukraine — when Sweden gives Kyiv the wings of its survival

Uppsala, May 28, 2026 — a date that will enter history

On May 28, 2026, at a military base in Uppsala, Sweden, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and President Volodymyr Zelensky shook hands in front of a JAS 39 Gripen fighter jet. The gesture was simple in form but monumental in consequence. Ukraine will acquire up to 20 Gripen E/F aircraft and receive as a gift up to 16 Gripen C/D jets drawn directly from the active stocks of the Swedish Air Force. This is not one more declaration of intent. It is a concrete transformation of Ukrainian air capability — and a signal sent to Moscow, to Washington, and to every European chancellor still wavering.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war in 2022, Ukraine has demanded Western combat aircraft. It received F-16s — laboriously, after months of refusals and delays. It will receive French Rafales — 100 in total, per established commitments. And now the Swedish Gripen enters the equation. These three aircraft — the F-16, the Rafale, and the Gripen — together represent an aerial revolution for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a qualitative leap that reshapes the dimensions of the war in the skies.

Why the Gripen? An aircraft designed to survive Russia

The Gripen is not just any fighter jet. It was designed by Sweden during the Cold War around a single obsession: surviving a Russian strike on Swedish airfields. That is why it can take off and land on ordinary roads, temporary strips, in a matter of a few hundred meters. It was built for dispersed operations, high availability, and simplified maintenance under degraded conditions. These characteristics are not technical footnotes — they are the heart of its relevance to Ukraine. When Russia targets Ukrainian airfields, an aircraft that does not need an airfield to operate radically changes the strategic equation.

Saab CEO Micael Johansson put it plainly: "I am very proud of today's announcement that Sweden and Ukraine, together with Saab, are taking new steps toward Ukraine's access to the Gripen — the world's most advanced combat aircraft. We look forward to supporting Ukraine's Gripen acquisition." This is not marketing copy. It is a strategic declaration from a weapons manufacturer that knows precisely what its product can do against the Russian threat.

On May 28, 2026, Sweden offered Ukraine more than aircraft. It offered a doctrine — the doctrine of a country that devoted its entire industrial existence to making a Russian invasion as costly as possible. Ukraine is now receiving the fruits of fifty years of Swedish strategic thinking. And Ukrainian pilots will transform that lesson into victories in the sky.

The Gripen was designed to survive Russia. Not to perform at airshows or impress at Farnborough — to operate when runways are destroyed, when hangars are burning, when enemy radar is hunting you down. For Ukraine, that is exactly the aircraft profile needed. Zelensky knows it. Kristersson knows it. And Putin knows it too.

The Gripen C/D donation: an operational squadron by 2027

The first component of the agreement is a gift: Sweden transfers up to 16 Gripen C/D jets directly from its Air Force's active inventory — not reserves, not retired airframes. These aircraft represent roughly one-sixth of Sweden's 94 operational Gripen C/Ds, the equivalent of a complete tactical squadron. Deliveries are expected to begin in early 2027, once Ukrainian pilot and technician training is well underway. That training has already begun in 2026 on Swedish soil, with an expansion planned for autumn.

The donated Gripen C/Ds are not stripped airframes handed over without weapons. They come with a complete armament package including Meteor missiles (long-range, beyond visual range), AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, and IRIS-T for close-range engagements. They are equipped with the NATO-compatible Link 16 tactical data link and standard Western IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) systems. This is not a second-tier capability. It is genuine combat capability, fully integrated into NATO's air network and able to interact with the F-16s and Patriot systems already in Ukrainian service.

The Gripen E/F acquisition: financing the future with European money

The second component is a commercial acquisition: Ukraine will purchase up to 20 Gripen E/F jets, the latest production variant. Negotiations are ongoing to finalize the terms, with delivery structured in successive batches. Financing comes through the European loan mechanism for Ukraine: Zelensky confirmed that his country will use a portion of the €2.5 billion allocated from the EU envelope to fund the first batch of Gripen E/F jets. This financial arrangement — warplanes bought with European Union loans — marks another historic rupture in the story of continental defense policy.

The Gripen E/F is a different machine from its predecessors. It incorporates a next-generation AESA radar (Active Electronically Scanned Array), an enhanced electronic warfare suite, a more powerful American engine, a built-in cannon, and additional hardpoints for weapons. Saab produces between 20 and 30 Gripen E aircraft per year — a pace that means Ukraine's first 20 jets will take several years to arrive, with timing contingent on contract finalization. The target date for the first Gripen E/F deliveries is 2030, with the Gripen C/Ds bridging the gap in the interim.

The financing arrangement says something profound: Europe is lending money to Ukraine to buy Swedish warplanes. This is no longer humanitarian aid, nor political sympathy. It is full-scale strategic, industrial, and military cooperation. Europe is becoming a partner in war. It was past time.

October 2025 to May 2026 — a trajectory that accelerated rapidly

The May 28, 2026 agreement did not emerge from nowhere. It is the culmination of a process launched in October 2025 in Linköping, when Zelensky visited Saab's headquarters and signed with Kristersson a letter of intent on air defense cooperation. At that point, the stated ambition was already sweeping: 100 to 150 Gripen aircraft for Ukraine, potentially the largest export contract in Saab's history. But a letter of intent is still only a letter of intent. Between grand declarations and signed contracts, there is often a chasm.

That chasm closed quickly in 2026. In February, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson confirmed that Ukraine intended to use funds from the European €90 billion loan to buy Gripens. In March, Zelensky announced that Ukraine was preparing a first payment. In May, Saab CEO Micael Johansson predicted a deal "within the coming months." And on May 28, the official announcement at Uppsala turned what had been ambition into execution. The speed of this progression — seven months from intent to initial delivery framework — is remarkable for an armament program of this scale.

The pre-summit visit: Ukraine proposes "Brave Sweden"

Ahead of the Uppsala summit, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov traveled to Sweden for a round of preparatory meetings. He met with Kristersson, Jonson, parliamentarians, and the teams at Saab and Ovzon. The stated objective: finalizing preparations for the Gripen contracts. But Fedorov also proposed launching "Brave Sweden" — a joint Ukraine-Sweden platform for developing defense technology startups, built on an exchange of real combat experience. This proposal reveals the Ukrainian vision of the partnership with Stockholm: not merely buying aircraft, but co-building a shared defense industry grounded in Ukraine's irreplaceable battlefield knowledge.

This industrial dimension is critical. Ukraine aims to localize Gripen production on its territory by 2033. If that ambition is realized, Sweden and Ukraine would become long-term industrial defense partners — a structural relationship far deeper than a straightforward arms sale. It would also create a Ukrainian military aeronautics industry with its own viability, capable of supporting, modifying, and eventually exporting variants of the aircraft. It is an ambitious long-term vision, but it is coherent with the industrial reconstruction strategy Kyiv has been pursuing since 2022.

"Brave Sweden" is not a military codename. It is the expression of a political vision: Sweden and Ukraine as co-builders of a safer Europe. This partnership will not end when the Gripens are delivered. It begins with the aircraft and finishes — if both countries truly want it — with a shared defense industry. That is what a real ally looks like.

The missiles that make the Gripen a genuine combat fighter

A fighter jet without missiles is worth very little. The Swedish package for Ukraine includes Meteor missiles, widely regarded as one of the most advanced long-range air-to-air weapons in the world. The Meteor uses a variable-thrust ramjet motor that keeps it at lethal speed throughout its entire intercept — unlike conventional missiles that decelerate after burnout. Its No Escape Zone (NEZ) is two to three times wider than those of competing missiles. For a country that must protect its cities from Russian missiles and drones, the Meteor is a decisive force multiplier.

The integration of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles — NATO's standard American weapon — guarantees perfect interoperability with the F-16s already in Ukrainian service. Crews could in theory exchange munitions between the two fleets, simplifying operational logistics. The Swedish-German IRIS-T rounds out the arsenal for short-range engagements. Together, these three weapons systems give the Ukrainian Gripen a complete spectrum of capabilities, from very close-range combat to beyond-visual-range interdiction.

Pilot training: already underway, expanding this autumn

Training a combat pilot takes years. Sweden and Ukraine anticipated this constraint: Ukrainian pilot and technician training on the Gripen began in 2026, well ahead of the first deliveries. The Gripen D two-seater — the operational training variant — plays a central role in this phase, allowing Ukrainian crews to advance their learning curve without waiting for the single-seat combat variants. An expansion of this training program is planned for autumn 2026, per official Swedish announcements.

Sweden has solid institutional experience training foreign pilots on the Gripen: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand, and Brazil have all benefited from similar programs. This institutional expertise is a significant asset for Ukraine, which must build proficiency rapidly while sustaining its current combat operations. The rotation between F-16 operations and Gripen training represents a genuine human and logistical challenge — but the Ukrainian Armed Forces have demonstrated their ability to manage challenges far more complex than this one.

Training a Gripen pilot takes time. But the fact that training began in 2026, before the first aircraft is even delivered, says something essential about the seriousness of Sweden's commitment. This is not a symbolic gift for the cameras. It is a real military program — with instructors, simulators, flight hours. It is concrete. It is happening now.

The 22nd Swedish military aid package

The Gripen announcement is part of Sweden's 22nd military aid package for Ukraine, valued at 25.2 billion Swedish kronor (approximately €2.3 billion). This package includes the donation of 16 Gripen C/Ds, authorization to open negotiations for the sale of 20 Gripen E/Fs, and funding for Sweden to replace its donated aircraft from its own stocks. Sweden has also announced the allocation of funds to replace the donated Gripen C/Ds with new Gripen E/Fs for its own Air Force — ensuring that its act of solidarity with Ukraine does not weaken Swedish national defense.

Zelensky described the full Swedish aid package as worth $2.7 billion, with $2 billion allocated to aircraft and approximately $400 million to drone production. The Ukrainian president said he hopes to receive the first Gripens "within the next ten months" — putting the expected delivery window around December 2026 or January 2027. That calendar ambition depends on the pace at which Swedish administrative procedures can be finalized. For Gripen C/Ds drawn from active stocks, it is technically feasible if political will holds.

Ukraine's reaction: a direct response to Russian glide bombs

Zelensky was explicit about what the Gripens will change in the aerial balance of power: the aircraft will arrive with a full armament package capable of defending against Russian guided aerial bombs. These weapons, dropped from long range by Russian Su-34 and Su-35 jets operating beyond the reach of existing Ukrainian air defenses, caused massive destruction across front-line cities in 2024 and 2025. A Gripen armed with Meteor missiles and positioned to interdict Russian bomb-drop zones could substantially reshape that equation.

Ukraine's long-term ambition — 100 to 150 Gripen in total — is tied to this operational necessity. Sixteen or twenty aircraft do not change a war. But they establish a proof-of-capability, train crews, build logistical support structures, and prepare the ground for future deliveries. Analyst Vadym Kushnikov notes realistically that at Saab's production pace (20 to 30 per year), Ukraine will not have all its Gripen E/Fs before 2030 in the best-case scenario. The war sets its own timetable — but it also sets the urgency of starting.

Russian glide bombs devastated entire city blocks for months, dropped from aircraft that stayed beyond Ukrainian air defense range. If the Gripen can push those launch platforms back beyond their safe drop zones, it will save civilian lives — not in the abstract, but concretely, building by building, school by school. That is the operational value of a combat aircraft in this war.

From Swedish neutrality to Atlantic solidarity

Sweden joined NATO in March 2024, ending more than 200 years of neutrality. That historic shift had immediate consequences for Swedish defense policy: Stockholm can now cooperate without the constraints neutrality imposed — supplying offensive weapons, entering strategic partnerships with nations at war. The donation of Gripens to Ukraine is inconceivable under Sweden's former posture. It is an act of assumed strategic power that would not have been possible outside the NATO framework.

Sweden has a long tradition of Gripen exports: Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand, South Africa. But delivering Gripens to a nation in active war against Russia is of a fundamentally different nature. It is a political act as much as a military contract. Kristersson owned it without hesitation: Ukraine's security is in Sweden's direct interest. A safe European continent begins in Kyiv, not in Stockholm.

The signal sent to Moscow — and to the hesitant

For Moscow, the Gripen deal is an escalation signal — at least, that is how the Kremlin will attempt to frame it. Russian rhetoric about "red lines" around Western combat aircraft being delivered to Ukraine has proven hollow since F-16s joined Ukrainian forces. Each aircraft delivered demonstrates that these so-called red lines are not real limits but attempts at psychological deterrence. The Gripen deal confirms that Western democracies have decided to stop self-censoring in the face of Russian threats.

For European partners still wavering — some, like Fico's Slovakia, still refusing to contribute aid to Ukraine — the Swedish agreement is a political lesson. Sweden, smaller than Germany or France, smaller than Italy or Spain, is making major strategic decisions with a clarity and speed its larger neighbors have not always shown. It is donating combat aircraft. It is training pilots. It is funding replacement of its own donated stocks. If Stockholm can do this, who has a credible excuse left?

Russia spent two years waving the specter of escalation to deter the West from sending aircraft to Ukraine. NATO finally decided that this fear was a manipulation tool, not a genuine strategic constraint. The Gripens will fly over Ukraine. The skies above Kyiv will be defended by Swedish fighter jets. Putin wanted to keep air dominance as a comparative advantage. He is losing it.

Three aircraft, one modernized air defense doctrine

Ukraine is moving toward a combat fleet made up of three Western aircraft types: American F-16s, French Rafales (100 committed under existing agreements), and now Swedish Gripens. This diversity is not ideal from a logistics standpoint — each aircraft requires its own parts, its own maintenance procedures, its own crew training pipelines. But it reflects the political reality of allied contributions: each country gives what it can, with the capabilities it has.

Operationally, these three aircraft are complementary rather than redundant. The F-16 is the NATO standard par excellence — widely supported in terms of spare parts and logistics. The Rafale offers extreme versatility and integration with French intelligence systems. The Gripen brings its unique road-operating capability, logistical lightness, and resilience against strikes on fixed airfields. Together they constitute a modern, resilient combat air force — far harder to neutralize than a single-type fleet dependent on fixed bases.

The question of timelines: when urgency meets industrial realities

Zelensky hopes to receive the first Gripens in December 2026 or January 2027. Military analysts, including Professor Andrii Kharuk of the National Academy of Ground Forces, are more cautious: the industrial reality of deliveries, crew training, and Swedish approval procedures all represent potential obstacles. For Gripen C/Ds — existing aircraft in active Swedish inventory — timelines are relatively short. For the Gripen E/Fs ordered new, Saab's production rate cannot respond immediately to a large-scale order.

The ambition of a 150-Gripen fleet in total — a path opened by the October 2025 letter of intent — is a 10 to 15-year objective by Kristersson's own words. This is not a promise of immediate delivery. It is a commitment to strategic partnership over the long term. For Ukraine, this means that rebuilding its air force will span an entire generation — a national defense project whose benefits will extend well beyond the end of the current conflict.

150 Gripens over 10 to 15 years — that sounds like a long wait when the bombs are falling. But that is the industrial reality. What matters today is that the process has started. Pilots are training. The first aircraft will arrive before year's end according to Zelensky. And every aircraft delivered is a victory against the idea that Ukraine must fight with less than its adversaries.

The largest potential export contract in Saab's history

A contract for 150 Gripens would double Saab's current production requirements. The company has already invested in additional production capacity, including in Brazil where an assembly line was established. In Sweden, Saab is preparing capacity expansion to handle an order of this magnitude. This potential contract, if fully realized, would become the largest export contract in the company's history and would make Ukraine the second-largest Gripen operator in the world after Brazil.

The economic benefits for the Swedish defense industry would be substantial: jobs, skills development, export revenues, accelerated R&D. Sweden would gain a privileged industrial relationship with an Ukraine that will be, after the war, one of the world's largest buyers of armaments. Investing in this partnership now — at the moment Ukraine needs it most — is also a long-term economic calculation, not merely a humanitarian gesture.

Ukrainian localization: a structuring industrial ambition

Ukraine's goal of localizing Gripen production starting in 2033 is the most ambitious element of the agreement. It would require substantial technology transfers, construction of specialized industrial infrastructure, and the training of thousands of Ukrainian technicians and engineers. Saab has already set a precedent with Brazil — where a partial assembly line was established. Ukraine, with its Soviet-era aerospace industrial heritage (notably the Antonov factories), has a base of expertise on which to build.

If this localization is achieved, it would transform Ukraine into a producer of advanced aeronautical weapons systems — a major strategic and economic asset for post-war reconstruction. This is no longer a country that buys weapons to defend itself. It is a country internalizing the technologies, skills, and industrial capabilities to become autonomous in a critical domain. It is the difference between a client and a partner. Ukraine is choosing to be a partner. And Saab, apparently, is willing to make the journey together.

Localizing production of a cutting-edge combat aircraft on the territory of a country at war — that is the kind of industrial audacity that tells you everything about Ukraine's vision of the post-conflict era. This is not naivety. It is a reconstruction strategy built on the premise that Ukraine will win. And that in victory, it will build a sovereign nation capable of defending itself.

Logistics as a strategic variable

Ukraine already operates F-16s and will soon face the simultaneous management of F-16s, Rafales, and Gripens. Each aircraft requires specific parts, distinct maintenance tooling, and separate crew training pipelines. The logistical complexity of managing three different fleets under combat conditions is real. The most experienced armies in the world generally avoid this kind of diversification. Ukraine has not had the luxury of that choice: it takes the aircraft its allies are willing to provide.

A partial solution lies in armaments standardization: all three aircraft can fire AMRAAM missiles, IRIS-T, and other common munitions. This weapons interoperability reduces logistical complexity even if the platforms themselves remain different. Over time, if Ukraine succeeds in building internal maintenance industries for each aircraft type, operational costs will stabilize. But in the near term, this is a military management challenge that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have to handle with the creativity that has defined them throughout the conflict.

Continuous training as the absolute priority

The real bottleneck is not mechanical — it is human. Training a combat pilot takes time. Training pilots capable of exploiting the full capabilities of the Gripen in real combat takes even longer. Sweden began in 2026, using its own training infrastructure. But multiplying aircraft types also multiplies training requirements — for instructors, for simulators, for flight hours. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have shown remarkable absorption capacity since 2022. The question is whether that capacity can extend simultaneously to three different air platforms.

The short answer is: probably, but not without considerable effort. Ukraine needs its allies not only to deliver aircraft but to provide a sustained infrastructure of training and support. The defense cooperation agreements signed with Sweden, France, and the United States all include dimensions of training and operational readiness maintenance. It is that long-term support architecture that will determine whether these investments translate into durable capability — or into degraded equipment for lack of adequate maintenance.

Three aircraft types, three maintenance chains, three training pipelines. On paper, that is a logistical nightmare. In Ukrainian terms, it is called "making do with what you are given." Ukraine has learned since 2022 to function under conditions that any Western army would consider inoperable. That is their strength. And their partners should keep giving them the means to exercise it.

The complementarity of Swedish and Ukrainian interests

The Gripen deal is not an act of unilateral Swedish generosity toward Ukraine. It is a convergence of mutual strategic interests. For Sweden, a strong Ukraine capable of defending itself is the best guarantee against a Russia that would not stop after a hypothetical victory in Kyiv. Stockholm calculates correctly: if Russia wins in Ukraine, it will not stop. The Baltic states, Poland, Finland, and potentially Sweden itself would be next. Supporting Ukraine is not altruism — it is anticipatory self-preservation.

For Ukraine, Sweden brings something unique: an aircraft designed specifically to withstand Russia, a nation that understands the nature of the Russian threat intimately, and a credible long-term industrial partner. Zelensky has made clear that Ukraine views its defense partnerships not as temporary arrangements dictated by war, but as the foundations of its post-conflict security architecture. The Gripen fits that vision of a Ukraine integrated into the Western defense space in a structural and irreversible way.

The defense declaration signed at Uppsala

Beyond the aircraft, the two countries signed at Uppsala a declaration deepening defense cooperation. This document goes further than a straightforward arms sale: it establishes a framework for cooperation in defense technology, intelligence sharing, joint training, and shared industrial development. It is a structural strategic partnership that must survive — and will need to survive — changes of government on both sides, fluctuations in threat perceptions, and the uncertainties of international politics.

This declaration echoes the bilateral defense cooperation framework signed in Linköping in October 2025, which first opened the path to a binding contract on the Gripens. The chain is clear: letter of intent (October 2025) → defense cooperation declaration (May 2026) → first deliveries (2027) → full fleet (2030+). This is not an improvised roadmap. It is a carefully constructed partnership architecture, built step by step, with shared objectives stated openly.

Two countries that understand each other. Two nations that looked at history and decided it was too dangerous not to be allies. Sweden and Ukraine did not always have deep ties. But Russia brought them together as only a shared existential threat can. Sometimes the strongest partnerships are forged in adversity.

100 Rafales, 150 Gripens — rebuilding an air force

The Gripen announcement fits into a broader picture. In February 2026, Zelensky revealed that Ukraine had commitments for 250 Western combat aircraft: 150 Gripens and 100 Rafales. These two commitments, combined with F-16s already in service, outline the contours of a transformed Ukrainian air force, capable of competing with Russian aviation on key dimensions of aerial combat. This is no longer the Ukraine of 2022 losing its Soviet aircraft for lack of spare parts. It is an air force on its way to becoming one of the most modern in Europe.

France has not yet delivered any Rafales, but negotiations are advancing. The French ambassador to Ukraine confirmed active discussions on delivery modalities. The timeline is more difficult than for the Gripen — France operates its Rafales in limited numbers, and every aircraft delivered to Ukraine reduces its own capability — but the political commitment is there. If the 100 Rafales and 150 Gripens arrive on schedule, Ukraine will have by 2030 a combat air force of a quality and scale unprecedented in the recent history of a country at war.

NATO's central role: training and support infrastructure

Neither Sweden nor France can alone sustain the training and maintenance needs of a fleet this large. NATO plays a growing role in coordinating this support. The Ankara summit on July 7–8, 2026 is expected to validate a €70 billion military aid package for Ukraine, likely including specific provisions for supporting the new combat aircraft fleet. NATO training mechanisms, interoperable standards, the allied logistics chain — all of this is being mobilized to ensure that delivered aircraft remain operational over time.

NATO also has a direct stake in the success of this program: if Ukraine successfully operates NATO aircraft, it will demonstrate its capacity to integrate into Alliance procedures and standards — a powerful argument for future membership. Every flight hour logged by a Ukrainian pilot on a Gripen or Rafale brings the Ukrainian Armed Forces closer to NATO standards. This is not a coincidence. It is precisely the objective sought by the architects of this armament strategy.

250 Western combat aircraft for Ukraine. Three years ago that figure sounded like science fiction. Today it is written into official agreements signed between heads of state. It is proof that when democracies decide to stop being afraid, they can achieve things no one believed possible. Ukraine deserves it. And Europe has everything to gain.

A training infrastructure already built

Before the first Gripen has even landed on Ukrainian soil, Sweden made a foundational decision: begin training in 2026. Ukrainian pilots are already in training in Sweden, using Gripen simulators, twin-seat D variants, flight manuals, and instructors from the Swedish Air Force. This decision — train before delivery — reflects a lesson learned from the F-16 experience: training timelines are often the limiting factor, not aircraft production timelines.

Sweden has internationally recognized institutional expertise in training foreign pilots on the Gripen. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand, and Brazil all benefited from these programs. Each country learned to adapt its procedures to Saab's standards, to maintain its aircraft according to Swedish norms, and to fully exploit the fighter's capabilities. For Ukraine, that experience is invaluable: it means Sweden is not delivering an aircraft and leaving Ukrainians to figure it out. It is building a durable training partnership.

The planned autumn 2026 expansion

The training program expands in autumn 2026, with new cohorts of Ukrainian pilots and technicians arriving in Sweden. The Gripen D two-seater — the operational training variant — plays a central role in this phase. It allows Ukrainian crews to advance their learning curve without waiting for combat aircraft, familiarizing them with controls, weapons systems, and emergency procedures. Maintenance technicians are learning to work on Gripen engines, avionics, and navigation systems — skills that will be indispensable when the aircraft arrive in Ukraine.

This gradual buildup is designed so that, when the first Gripen C/Ds are delivered in early 2027, Ukrainian crews are already prepared to bring them into service quickly. This is not an optimistic timeline — it is a structured program with defined milestones, allocated resources, and the bilateral commitments to sustain it. Swedish rigor in military planning is well established. Ukraine will benefit from it directly.

Train before you deliver — a logic that seems obvious but too few allies applied in this conflict. The F-16 suffered from training delays that postponed its combat deployment. The Gripen program starts on the right foot: pilots are training now. When the aircraft arrive, they will be ready. That is the difference between a partner who thinks ahead and a partner who only reacts.

Countering Russian bombers and glide bombs

The most immediate operational utility of the Gripen in Ukraine is its capacity to interdict the drop zones of Russian Su-34 and Su-35 bombers. These aircraft release FAB glide bombs — guided munitions that, dropped from altitude and at long range, allow Russian pilots to stay beyond the reach of existing Ukrainian air defenses. The results have been devastating for front-line cities in eastern Ukraine. A Gripen armed with Meteor missiles, capable of engaging targets at long range with an unmatched No Escape Zone, can push those bombers well beyond their optimal drop positions.

The Meteor missile included in the Swedish package fundamentally changes the equation. Its variable-thrust propulsion maintains lethal speed throughout the entire intercept, unlike conventional missiles that decelerate. Its No Escape Zone (NEZ) is two to three times wider than those of competing missiles. For a Russian bomber seeking to position for a FAB drop, the threat of a nearby Gripen armed with Meteor makes the operation prohibitively risky. That is precisely the kind of risk/benefit recalculation Kyiv seeks to force in its favor.

Resistance to airfield strikes — the decisive operational advantage

Russia systematically targets Ukrainian airfields to prevent F-16 operations. That is exactly why the Gripen's ability to operate from ordinary roads is a revolution for Ukraine. Strips of a few hundred meters are sufficient — any straight highway section, any prepared forest track can become a temporary base. This operational dispersal makes neutralizing the Ukrainian fleet infinitely more complex for Russian planners: the task is no longer destroying a few fixed airfields, but locating and striking aircraft dispersed across hundreds of potential sites.

Sweden has tested and refined this concept of operational dispersal over decades of intensive training. Its pilots master takeoffs and landings from roads — regular exercises like Cold Response and Arctic Challenge have turned this capability into institutional reflex. Transferring this expertise to Ukraine means transferring fifty years of aerial survival doctrine. For a Ukrainian Air Force that has lost aircraft on fixed airfields, this doctrine is potentially life-saving.

An army planning for victory, not only for survival

Buying Gripen E/Fs means planning for an army that wins the war and then builds its defense in peacetime. The donated Gripen C/Ds serve immediate needs. The purchased Gripen E/Fs serve the Ukraine of ten years from now. This temporal distinction reveals the strategic vision of Zelensky: he is not managing a crisis, he is building a nation. Every defense contract signed today is an investment in Ukrainian sovereignty after the conflict. Every pilot trained on a Gripen today will be an experienced officer in a modern Ukrainian Air Force five years from now.

This vision is all the more remarkable for being sustained under the most brutal conditions: under bombardment, with daily losses, with an economy partially in ruins and a dependence on external aid to fund ongoing operations. Continuing to plan for the future when the present is this brutal — that may be the most extraordinary characteristic of Ukrainian leadership since 2022. And the Gripen deal is its most concrete expression.

Industrial reconstruction as the condition of lasting sovereignty

The ambition to localize Gripen production in Ukraine by 2033 is not a metaphor. It is an industrial policy. To achieve it, Ukraine must maintain and develop its Soviet-era aeronautical engineering capabilities — the Antonov factories, the design bureaus, the technical training institutes. These capacities have been partially degraded by the war. The partnership with Saab, which includes progressive technology transfers, is designed to rebuild and modernize this industrial base rather than simply replace it.

This approach to partnered industrial reconstruction is one of the most effective forms of long-term assistance. Rather than simply delivering finished aircraft, Sweden is committing to a process of building Ukrainian industrial capacity. This is costly in time and institutional resources for Saab. But it is also the strongest guarantee of a lasting commercial and strategic relationship — a Ukraine capable of producing Gripens in part through its own industry will be a client and partner for decades. The calculus is favorable on both sides.

Localizing cutting-edge weapons production in a country devastated by war — that is the most audacious bet Ukraine has dared to make. But it is also the most logical. Without its own defense industry, a nation always remains at the mercy of its allies' generosity. With such an industry, it becomes genuinely sovereign. That is where Zelensky is taking his country. And I believe he will get there.

More than an aircraft: a civilizational commitment

The Gripen delivered to Ukraine is not simply a combat aircraft. It is a civilizational commitment. Sweden is telling Ukraine: we are betting that you will win, and we are investing in that victory. The European Union is saying with its loans: we are financing your strategic independence because your independence is also ours. NATO is saying with its support mechanisms: you belong to our strategic family, and we are giving you the tools that prove it. These messages, expressed in aircraft and euros rather than declarations, are the most powerful kind.

Ukraine is fighting to survive, yes. But it is fighting for something broader as well: to demonstrate that nations choosing democracy and freedom can resist those choosing empire and force. Every Gripen that takes off from a Ukrainian road, bearing the insignia of the nation's Air Force, will be an affirmation of that principle. And that principle — as precious and as fragile as it appears — is worth 16 donated aircraft and 20 purchased ones. It deserved more. But it is a start.

What history will remember about May 2026

In twenty years, when historians write the chronicle of Ukrainian resistance and the Western support that made it possible, the military base at Uppsala on May 28, 2026 will be a date. Not the most decisive date of the war — the battles on the ground will hold that place. But a date that symbolizes the moment when Europe decided to stop being afraid to fully support Ukraine. When combat aircraft — not helmets or field stoves — began making their way from a Scandinavian democracy to a democracy at war. When Zelensky and Kristersson stood together before a Gripen and decided that this sky was worth defending together.

History is being made here. Not in speeches but in hangars, on runways, in the cockpits of Ukrainian pilots learning today to fly the aircraft they will defend with tomorrow. Ukraine's future is being built, aircraft by aircraft, pilot by pilot, courageous decision by courageous decision. And Sweden, with the Gripen, has taken its place in that story. It is not about to leave it.

Sweden waited two hundred years to join a military alliance. And when it did, it did not hesitate to draw all the consequences — up to giving its own fighter jets to a nation at war. This is not an ordinary gesture. It is a civilizational commitment. And history will recognize it as such.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.