ANALYSIS: The SBU's 40-day campaign — Zelensky wants to compel Russia to peace through pressure

ANALYSIS: The SBU's 40-day campaign — Zelensky wants to compel Russia to peace through pressure

Introduction: An operation of unprecedented scope approved on June 25

Zelensky's announcement and his precise words

On June 25, 2026, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky announced that he had approved a "40-day influence operation" by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), officially designated in Ukrainian as the SSU. The stated objective is unambiguous: "compel the aggressor state to end the war." These words are not rhetorical formulas. They describe a deliberate, planned strategy formally authorized at the highest level of the state.

The decision followed a meeting with Lieutenant General Yevhenii Khmara, acting head of the SBU, who presented Zelensky with "our plan of long-range sanctions, medium-range sanctions — meaning strikes — and the results achieved by the SBU." The phrasing itself is telling: strikes are no longer presented solely as defensive operations, but as "sanctions" — a term drawn from the register of diplomacy and grand strategy.

The logic of a fixed-duration operation

Forty days. This number is not arbitrary. It corresponds to a strategic window long enough to accumulate cumulative effects on the Russian war economy, yet short enough to sustain operational intensity and psychological pressure on Moscow. Ukraine is coming off a record series of strikes in June: the VZPP-S semiconductor plant in Voronezh, the Azot chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, the Moscow Oil refinery.

These strikes are not accidents. They are the opening chapters of a coherent plan. The 40-day campaign formalizes what was already underway and gives it a framework, a timeline and measurable objectives. It is a signal sent simultaneously to Moscow, Western allies and the Ukrainian population.

The SBU as the armed instrument of strategic pressure

The SBU's capabilities in 2026

The SBU is not merely a counterintelligence service. Since 2022, it has developed strike capabilities that make it a full-fledged military actor. Its Special Group Alpha is cited by Zelensky himself as ranking first in terms of "strikes on the personnel and equipment of the occupation forces." This unit combines human operations, drones, and coordination with regular armed forces.

For "several consecutive months," in Zelensky's words, the SBU has demonstrated the highest performance indicators in protecting Ukrainian front-line positions through the use of various types of drones. This public acknowledgment is significant: it signals that the SBU is now an operational pillar of Ukrainian military strategy, not just a domestic intelligence service.

Three axes of action: long range, medium range, front line

Khmara's presentation to Zelensky identifies three axes of action. The "long-range sanctions" target the deep infrastructure of the Russian war economy — refineries, component plants, energy installations thousands of kilometers from the front. The "medium-range sanctions" — explicitly designated as "strikes" — target logistical and defense infrastructure in the depth of Russian territory. The front-line axis maintains direct pressure on the occupation forces.

This three-tier architecture is that of a simultaneous economic and military warfare strategy. It does not aim to capture territory week by week — it aims to make the war economically unbearable for Moscow.

The Crimea campaign: the operational reference model

How the "middle strike" strangled Russian logistics

The Kyiv Independent describes Ukraine's campaign against occupied Crimea as the reference model for the new 40-day operation. This "middle strike" campaign "strangled logistics in the peninsula," cutting crucial Russian supply routes while striking critical infrastructure.

The results of the Crimea campaign are documented: fuel depots destroyed, air defense systems degraded, supply lines disrupted, air bases partially neutralized. Crimea, which Putin had presented as an impregnable sanctuary since 2014, became a zone of permanent logistical vulnerability. The new 40-day campaign aims to replicate this model at the scale of the entire Russian territory.

Moscow struck in June: fuel shortages as the result

Consecutive drone strikes on Moscow forced the temporary closure of the Moscow refinery — one of the Russian capital's primary fuel supply sources. This closure worsened an already developing fuel crisis in several Russian regions. Queues at gas stations were documented in cities such as Bryansk, Krasnodar and Rostov-on-Don.

The correlation between Ukrainian strikes on refineries and fuel shortages in the Russian rear is no longer theoretical — it is measurable. Putin himself acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes were contributing to fuel tensions in Russia, in a statement reported by The Guardian on June 28. That is an extraordinary admission.

The strike on the Vtorovo pumping station — Vladimir region

June 27: an energy infrastructure hit in the Vladimir region

On June 27, 2026, two days after the official approval of the 40-day campaign, the Vtorovo pumping station in the Vladimir region was struck. This region lies more than 200 kilometers northeast of Moscow, well outside the combat zone. The strike illustrates concretely what Zelensky means by "long-range sanctions" on Russian energy infrastructure.

Pipeline pumping stations are critical nodes in Russia's hydrocarbon distribution network. Their destruction or damage disrupts the flow of fuel to affected regions, compounding the supply tensions already created by strikes on refineries. This strike follows systemic logic: every link in the Russian energy chain is a potential target.

Strategic depth as a political message

Reaching the Vladimir region sends a message that Russia's "strategic depth" — long considered a structural advantage — is no longer a refuge. Ukraine does not have the means to invade Russian territory, but it can demonstrate that no one in Russia lives beyond the reach of this war. This represents a major psychological and political shift in Russian society, which had been largely shielded from the direct consequences of the conflict until 2025.

The three target categories: mapping the Russian war economy

Energy infrastructure: refineries, pipelines, depots

Energy infrastructure constitutes the first priority target category of the 40-day campaign. Russia finances its war machine with oil revenues. Reducing its refining capacity simultaneously reduces its export revenues and the fuel supply of its armed forces. The Moscow refinery, the Slavyansk ECO refinery in Krasnodar, the Vladimir pumping station: a systematic map of the Russian energy sector is being redrawn by Ukrainian strikes.

Russia operates numerous refineries and can partially redistribute the load. But every successful strike creates additional tension in the system. Russia's cumulative refining capacity is not unlimited. The 40-day campaign is built on the conviction that accumulated damage will eventually create ruptures in the military supply chain.

Logistical and defense infrastructure: plants, depots, transport hubs

The second category targets weapons component plants (VZPP-S in Voronezh), chemical component plants for explosives (Azot in Novomoskovsk), and Russian military logistical infrastructure. These targets are chosen for their role in the military supply chain: without electronic components, without explosives, without fuel, Russian forces at the front cannot fight indefinitely.

The third category, the most direct, is pressure on the personnel and equipment of the occupation forces at the front, delivered by the SBU's Special Group Alpha and its drones. These three axes reinforce each other: weakening deep logistics degrades the army at the surface.

Diplomatic implications: pressuring Moscow before the NATO summit

The NATO summit in Ankara: July 7–8, in the middle of the 40-day campaign

The 40-day campaign approved on June 25 covers exactly the period of the NATO summit in Ankara, scheduled for July 7–8, 2026. This overlap is probably not coincidental. By demonstrating concrete results during discussions on military aid, Ukraine strengthens its negotiating position for an aid package estimated at 70 billion euros.

The strategic message is clear: Ukraine is not asking its allies to fight on its behalf. It is fighting — and demonstrating that the tools its allies have provided work and are hurting Russia. This is the most powerful argument for justifying additional deliveries of long-range missiles and other deep-strike capabilities.

Moscow's response and its communication constraints

Russia faces a communication dilemma: admitting the damage caused by Ukrainian strikes means acknowledging the vulnerability of its territory and war economy. Denying the strikes means losing credibility in the face of satellite imagery and testimonies from Russian residents spreading despite censorship. Putin has chosen a third path: acknowledging the fuel effects without recognizing the strategic scope of the campaign.

This Russian communication management reveals genuine pressure. When an authoritarian regime begins acknowledging domestic supply problems, it is because concealment is no longer possible. The 40-day campaign aims to make that pressure untenable.

Risk analysis: escalation, limits, uncertainties

The risk of Russian escalation

A 40-day campaign of deep strikes on Russian territory carries escalation risks that must not be minimized. Russia could respond by intensifying its own strikes on Ukrainian cities, by cyberattacks against Western critical infrastructure, or by provocations against the Baltic states or Poland — which Western intelligence already identifies as a real risk.

However, analysis of the preceding months suggests that Russia has already been striking Ukrainian infrastructure at maximum capacity. Its missile arsenal is constrained by damage to production plants. Escalating further would require resources that Moscow may no longer freely hold.

The limits of the strategy and the open questions

Can the 40-day campaign truly "compel Russia to peace"? The honest answer is: probably not on its own. Putin has shown no sign of willingness to negotiate since the failed attempts of 2022. But the strategy may not be aimed at immediate capitulation — it aims to durably degrade Russian combat capacity and to raise the domestic cost of the war for the regime.

The preliminary results of the 40-day operation

Initial strikes and the first documented effects

Within days of Zelensky's formal approval of the 40-day operation on June 25, Ukrainian armed forces intensified their strikes deep into Russian territory. The Vtorovo pumping station in the Vladimir region, struck on June 27, is among the first targets of this phase — a critical energy infrastructure feeding industrial zones linked to military production. The Slavyansk refinery in Krasnodar, burning through the night of June 27–28, is another concrete example of this strategy in action.

These strikes represent a measurable increase in intensity over preceding weeks. The number of drones deployed per night, the distances covered, the sophistication of approach trajectories — all indicate that Ukraine has mobilized additional resources for this operation. Satellite images published by open-source analysts confirm damage to multiple targets and allow realistic assessment of their scale. This transparency, forced by commercial imagery, is itself an element of Ukrainian strategic communication.

Russia's response and its limits

Russia has responded to Ukrainian strikes on its territory with a combination of aggressive rhetoric and practical defensive measures. Rhetorically, Moscow has described these strikes as terrorist acts justifying proportional reprisals — without specifying how those reprisals would differ from its routine strikes against Ukraine. Practically, Russia has reinforced its air defenses around the most valuable industrial installations, deployed additional electronic jamming systems, and multiplied surveillance patrols.

These defensive measures have yielded partial results. Some Ukrainian drones have been intercepted. Some trajectories have been disrupted by jamming. But penetration remains significant: from swarms of 50 to 100 drones, even if 70 percent are intercepted, the remaining 30 percent still represent a destructive strike force. And Ukraine continues to improve its techniques to circumvent Russian defenses — varying altitudes, trajectories, attack windows, radar signatures. This adaptation competition is permanent. And Ukraine, for now, maintains its edge.

Conclusion: The SBU enters a new strategic dimension

What the 40-day campaign reveals about Ukraine in 2026

The decision of June 25, 2026 marks a profound transformation in Ukrainian strategic posture. Ukraine is no longer fighting only for its survival — it is fighting to impose its terms. By approving a 40-day influence operation targeting the Russian war economy thousands of kilometers from the front, Zelensky demonstrates that his country has the capabilities, the will and the doctrine to wage a sustained long-term strategic pressure campaign.

This transformation has been made possible by three factors: long-range weapons supplied by allies, the growing operational expertise of the SBU, and the political determination of a commander-in-chief who has never stopped seeking the initiative. This is not the end of the war. But it may be the beginning of the end of the Russian illusion that it can last indefinitely without consequences on Russian soil.

40 days to change the equation

At the time of this analysis, the 40-day campaign is underway. Results are accumulating: refineries damaged, component plants destroyed, pipelines disrupted, fuel crises documented in several Russian regions. Zelensky has told Moscow — and the world — that Ukraine has a plan and will execute it. Putin no longer has peace at home.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial positioning

This analysis is based on official sources and verified reporting. The author supports Ukraine in its resistance against Russian aggression and examines the SBU's 40-day campaign from a strategic perspective. Assessments regarding the long-term impact of the campaign are the author's, based on open-source data, and are not certainties.

Sources and limits

Zelensky's statements are reported as cited in primary sources. The identity of specific targets and damage assessments come from verifiable journalistic sources. Classified operational information may exist beyond what is publicly accessible.

Sources

Primary sources

Kyiv Independent — Ukraine's SBU 40-day pressure campaign — June 25, 2026

Pravda Ukraine — Zelensky approves 40-day SSU operation — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

The Guardian — Zelensky 40-day Russia blitz briefing — June 26, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Ukraine strikes Orenburg helium and gas complex — June 24, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Strike on Voronezh VZPP-S factory — June 22, 2026

Militarnyi — Drones strike Azot Novomoskovsk — June 26, 2026