DECODING: Istanbul 2022: why Putin's peace is capitulation

DECODING: Istanbul 2022: why Putin's peace is capitulation

Introduction: When "negotiate" means "surrender"

Putin relaunches the Istanbul argument — and it is a trap

On June 23, 2026, Vladimir Putin declared that Russia was "ready to negotiate" with Ukraine — on the basis of the Istanbul agreements of 2022. The formulation was picked up by Pravda Ukraine, Meduza, and analyzed in depth by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). At first glance, this might appear to be a diplomatic opening. It is not. It is the reformulation of a conquest ultimatum presented in diplomatic language.

To decode this maneuver, we must return to the sources: what did the draft Istanbul agreements of March–April 2022 actually contain? What was Russia demanding at the time? And above all, in what context were those discussions taking place? The answers to these questions explain why the ISW and pro-Ukrainian analysts see in this declaration not a peace offer, but a reaffirmation of Russia's 2022 war objectives.

The ISW rules: a reaffirmation of war aims

In its assessment of June 23, 2026, the ISW is unambiguous: Putin's and Lavrov's positions constitute a "reaffirmation of 2022 war aims" — in other words, a demand for total Ukrainian capitulation. No compromise, no mutual concession — a demand that Ukraine accept terms dictated by Russia, implying forced neutrality, limits on its armed forces, and implicit recognition of Russian territorial conquests.

This reading is fundamental. Because the dominant discourse in certain Western media tends to present any Moscow declaration on "negotiation" as a positive development. That is an analytical error. When Putin says "peace on the basis of Istanbul," he is not proposing a compromise. He is proposing a surrender dressed up as a treaty.

The Istanbul 2022 agreements: what they actually contained

March–April 2022: discussions in the shadow of the defeat at Kyiv

The Istanbul talks took place in March and April 2022, in a very particular context: Russia had just failed to take Kyiv and was withdrawing from northern Ukraine. The negotiations were therefore not conducted in a situation of balanced forces. Russia, despite its tactical withdrawal, was seeking to diplomatically lock in territorial and strategic gains that it had failed to obtain militarily.

The draft treaties have since circulated in partial versions and differing accounts from both sides. But several fundamental elements emerge from published documents and the testimonies of Ukrainian negotiators: Russia demanded constitutional neutrality for Ukraine (a ban on joining NATO), a drastic limitation of Ukrainian armed forces, and implicit recognition of territorial conquests from 2014 and 2022. This is not a peace treaty — it is a capitulation with diplomatic clauses.

Why Ukraine left the negotiations

Ukraine suspended the Istanbul negotiations after the discovery of atrocities committed by Russian forces in Bucha in April 2022. Civilians assassinated, evidence of systematic war crimes — it was politically and morally impossible for Zelensky to continue negotiating with the author of those crimes. But beyond the moral factor, there was also a strategic reality: the terms proposed by Russia were unacceptable. An agreement on those terms would not have brought peace — it would have prepared the next war.

Certain observers, notably voices in Western countries most inclined toward mediation, have claimed that Ukraine missed a peace opportunity. This reading is historically and strategically wrong. Ukraine did not miss a chance for peace — it refused to sign its own capitulation. The distinction is essential.

The "Anchorage modalities": another layer of maximalist demand

Anchorage: when Putin adds conditions

By adding the "Anchorage modalities" to his negotiating conditions in 2026, Putin refers to discussions that allegedly took place during meetings with American intermediaries — the name refers to Anchorage, Alaska, where geopolitical discussions between American and Russian officials allegedly touched on questions relating to Ukraine. The precise interpretation of these "modalities" is contested.

What ISW analysts and other institutions understand from Russia's use of this term is an attempt to naturalize territorial and strategic gains even more extensive than those of the original Istanbul demands. By invoking these "modalities," Russia claims that its maximalist demands were, at least partially, endorsed during informal discussions with American representatives. It is a classic tactic: diplomatically anchoring Russian maximalism by having it referenced in other contexts.

The "realities on the ground": disguised annexation

The phrase "realities on the ground" may be the most revealing in Putin's diplomatic lexicon. Translated into plain language, it means: Russia occupies part of Ukrainian territory, and any negotiation must start from that premise. The four illegally annexed regions in September 2022 — Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson — which Russia does not even fully control — must, according to Moscow, be recognized as Russian.

This demand violates international law in the most blatant manner. It asks Ukraine to renounce not only territories seized by force, but territories on which war crimes were committed by the occupier. No legitimately elected Ukrainian government can accept this. No Western government that claims to defend international law should demand it of Kyiv.

The ISW as compass: reading between the diplomatic lines

Why ISW analysis is indispensable

The Institute for the Study of War has published daily battlefield assessments and regular diplomatic analyses since the conflict began. Its report of June 23, 2026 on Putin's and Lavrov's statements is particularly important because it recontextualizes what less specialized journalists risk presenting as a positive evolution in Russia's position.

The ISW possesses years of accumulated expertise on the conflict, sources on both sides, and recognized analytical rigor. When it says that Russian declarations in June 2026 are a "reaffirmation of 2022 war aims," this is not partisan reading — it is a factual analysis of the continuity of Russian positions. The diplomatic vocabulary has changed. The strategic objective has not.

The labels game: "talks" versus "capitulation"

The battle over words is central to this conflict. Moscow has mastered the art of recycling positively charged words — "dialogue," "negotiation," "peace" — to describe what is in reality demands for capitulation. This strategy is effective because it creates pressure on Ukraine and its allies: if you refuse to "negotiate," you are the one rejecting peace.

Deconstructing this rhetoric is an urgent political and intellectual task. It must be repeated incessantly: Ukraine is not rejecting peace. It is rejecting a peace that is no peace — one that prepares the next invasion, rewards aggression, and violates international law. The real question is not "does Ukraine want peace?" but "on what terms, and who defines them?"

Kyiv's position: negotiate on the basis of law, not force

The Ukrainian peace formula as a counter-proposal

Volodymyr Zelensky has proposed his own ten-point "peace formula," which includes the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, the release of all prisoners of war, the creation of an international tribunal to try war crimes, and real security guarantees for Ukraine. This formula is grounded in international law. It is therefore incompatible with the demands of Istanbul.

This is not an intransigent posture on Kyiv's part. It is a position of principle: you do not negotiate from the premise that the aggressor keeps its gains. If this principle were abandoned, it would be the end of the international system as it has existed since 1945. And it would be a signal to all the revisionist powers of the world — China, Iran, North Korea — that territorial conquest works.

Security guarantees: the heart of the problem

Beyond territorial questions, there is the question of security guarantees for Ukraine. The imposed neutrality that Putin demands within the "Istanbul" framework is exactly the opposite of a security guarantee. A disarmed Ukraine unprotected by NATO would be a Ukraine exposed to a future invasion the moment Moscow judges its forces sufficiently rebuilt.

The history of guarantees given to Ukraine and not honored is eloquent. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994, through which Ukraine had renounced its inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom — those guarantees turned out to be worthless paper. Kyiv cannot and must not be fooled twice in the same way.

International mediation: who can actually help?

The United Arab Emirates and management of prisoner exchanges

If genuine peace negotiations are deadlocked, another diplomatic channel is functioning: mediation for prisoner of war exchanges. The United Arab Emirates have played a facilitation role in several exchanges, including the 76th exchange of June 26, 2026, according to the Kyiv Independent. This role is valuable and maintains a minimal communication channel between Kyiv and Moscow.

But it must be clear about the nature of this mediation: the UAE facilitates humanitarian exchanges, not peace negotiations. Their influence over the fundamental positions of both parties is limited. They maintain relations with both sides — which enables them to play this intermediary role — but cannot impose a diplomatic solution to a conflict whose stakes exceed their geopolitical weight.

China: a facade mediator or supporter of Moscow?

China has displayed a posture of "neutral mediator" in the Ukrainian conflict, while continuing to supply Russia with dual-use components and commercial goods sustaining its war economy. This duplicity is well documented. Beijing plays both sides: displaying a peace posture to improve its international image, while ensuring that Russia remains dependent and weakened — but not defeated, which would also be destabilizing for China.

Any Chinese mediation proposal must be read with this reality in mind. A mediator that supports one of the parties cannot be neutral. And a "peace" negotiated under Chinese auspices would risk resembling an agreement favorable to Beijing's strategic interests rather than a just and durable resolution of the conflict according to international law principles.

The warning signs the West must not ignore

Repetition as an attrition tactic

When Putin repeats the same maximalist demands since 2022 while simply changing the packaging, he is practicing diplomatic attrition. The goal is to progressively normalize his positions in international discourse. What was considered unacceptable in 2022 must become "discussable" in 2024, then "a starting point" in 2026. Each repetition, each cycle of declarations, erodes the clarity of red lines.

To resist this erosion, the West must maintain precise institutional memory of initial Russian positions and refuse to let the "field of possibilities" imperceptibly drift toward Moscow's demands. The archives of Lavrov's and Putin's declarations since 2022 show absolute continuity of objectives behind surface rhetorical variation. This documentation is a diplomatic weapon that Western governments must actively use.

The role of Asian allies: Japan, South Korea, Australia

The diplomatic configuration around the Ukrainian conflict does not reduce to Europe and the United States. Asian democracies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia have adopted firmly anti-Russian positions and participate in the sanctions regimes. Their engagement is strategically valuable because it demonstrates that opposition to Russian aggression is not exclusively "Western" — it is shared by democracies across the globe.

This reality contradicts the Russian narrative that sanctions are an expression of Western imperialism. When Japan sanctions Russia, when South Korea supports Ukraine with non-lethal equipment, when Australia participates in support efforts — the coalition opposing Russian aggression is global. This signal must be amplified, not minimized, in Western diplomatic communication.

Security guarantees that work: NATO versus paper promises

Why NATO is the only credible guarantee for Ukraine

The question of security guarantees for Ukraine is central to any conflict resolution scenario. History has taught Kyiv the bitter lesson of the Budapest Memorandum: non-institutional guarantees are worthless against a power resolved to violate them. The only genuinely deterrent guarantee is NATO membership — or bilateral defense commitments binding enough to be equivalent to NATO-type protection.

This Ukrainian demand is reasonable and well-founded. It is not maximalism — it is geopolitical realism drawn from historical lessons. Countries that benefit from NATO guarantees — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland — have not been invaded by Russia despite repeated provocations. Countries that do not benefit — Ukraine, Georgia — have suffered Russian aggressions. The correlation speaks for itself.

Bilateral security agreements: an interim solution?

Pending formal NATO membership — which remains a long-term goal blocked notably by the positions of certain allies — Ukraine has concluded several bilateral security agreements with member states, including France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States. These agreements provide for military support guarantees and weapons supply.

These bilateral agreements are an important step, but they do not replace the Article 5 guarantees of the North Atlantic Treaty. Their value depends on the political will of each signatory to honor its commitments — a will that can evolve with governments. That is precisely why formal NATO membership remains a non-negotiable Ukrainian objective that Putin seeks to permanently block within his "Istanbul" demands.

Conclusion: Istanbul 2022 will never be a just basis

Returning to the origins of the aggression

Returning to the Istanbul 2022 agreements as a basis for negotiation means returning to the demands Russia formulated when it believed it could conquer Kyiv in a matter of days. Those are the demands of a victor presented at the moment of an anticipated victory that never materialized. Ukrainian resistance, Western support, and Zelensky's determination invalidated that victory. It would be absurd to retroactively honor it in a treaty.

Peace in Ukraine is possible. But it will have to be grounded in principles that do not reward aggression, that genuinely guarantee Ukrainian security, and that respect the sovereignty of a nation that has paid with its blood for the right to choose its destiny. Any other "peace" is merely an armistice before the next invasion.

What the West must refuse

The West must resist the temptation of "peace at any price." A peace that validates Russian territorial conquest, imposes neutrality on Ukraine, and leaves a country neighboring Russia without genuine security guarantees — that is a peace that prepares the next war in five or ten years. This is not an acceptable legacy for our democracies.

Zelensky holds out his hand to negotiation — but on terms that respect international law. Putin responds by brandishing terms equivalent to capitulation. The difference is fundamental, and it is up to the West to name it clearly, unequivocally, and without being lulled by the Kremlin's diplomatic vocabulary.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My positioning on the conflict

I am explicitly pro-Ukrainian and in favor of a firm Western stance against Russian demands. I believe Zelensky embodies legitimate resistance to an illegal aggression. This positioning influences my interpretation of diplomatic declarations. I acknowledge it and encourage readers to cross-check this analysis with other sources.

This positioning leads me to apply critical scrutiny to Russian claims and greater trust to Ukrainian official sources, while verifying both against independent reporting.

Limits and method

I do not have access to the full text of the Istanbul 2022 documents in their final version — these documents have not been published in their entirety by both sides. My analysis is based on available accounts, the ISW analyses of June 23, 2026, the declarations from Meduza and Pravda Ukraine of the same day. On the most opaque aspects of informal American–Russian diplomacy, I admit my ignorance of the precise details.

I do not have access to the full text of the Istanbul 2022 draft agreements, only to reporting and analysis by organizations that have reviewed portions of them.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Assessment of Putin/Lavrov positions = reaffirmation of 2022 war aims — June 23, 2026

Pravda Ukraine — Putin ready for talks on basis of Istanbul 2022 agreements — June 23, 2026

Meduza — Putin says Russia ready to negotiate on basis of Istanbul agreements — June 23, 2026

Kyiv Independent — 160 Ukrainian prisoners released in latest exchange — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Interfax-Ukraine — Zelensky: 1,596 Ukrainians have returned since the start of 2026 — June 26, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine and Russia complete third phase of 160/160 exchange — June 26, 2026

1lurer — Russia and Ukraine carry out prisoner exchange on principle of 160 for 160 — June 26, 2026