EDITORIAL: Macron, July 13, and Europe finally reclaiming its place on Ukraine

The first E5 summit at heads-of-state level

On June 24, 2026 in Berlin, something happened that deserves to be named for what it is: a moment of European geopolitical maturity. For the first time since the format was created, the five largest military powers in Europe — France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland — gathered at the level of heads of state and government within the E5 framework. Friedrich Merz hosted Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer, Giorgia Meloni, and Donald Tusk. On the agenda: coordinating their positions before the NATO Ankara summit on July 7 and 8, and preparing the Coalition of the Willing meeting announced by Macron for July 13.

This is not an ordinary summit. It is the signal that Europe, after years of fragmentation, American dependence, and strategic hesitation, is seriously trying to constitute itself as a coherent actor on the Ukraine file. Coordinating positions on long-range weapons, air defense, and military artificial intelligence — three domains where Ukraine has critical needs — represents a qualitative step beyond the statements of principles that had dominated European summits until now. And setting July 13 as the date for the Coalition of the Willing creates a calendar pressure that demands concrete decisions, not just intentions.

I am a columnist, not a cheerleader for European institutions. But this Berlin summit deserves to be recognized for what it represents: Europe trying to behave like a geopolitical adult. It is not yet a done deal. It is a beginning. And in the context we are in — with Putin testing Western resolve with every strike — a beginning that counts.

A collective signature on Ukraine

Macron described the G7 at Évian as the first time in 18 months that "all G7 members, including the United States, jointly signed the same text" supporting Ukrainian territorial integrity, military aid, and sanctions against Russia. That formulation deserves careful weight. 18 months of public divergences within the G7 on Ukraine — 18 months of ambiguous texts, American reservations, and softened language — and now a joint declaration including Washington. This is not a revolution. It is the restoration of a minimal consensus that had been badly frayed.

The context of this restoration is that of a Donald Trump who remains a necessary evil for the West: unpredictable in his rhetoric, but pragmatic when American interests are clearly articulated. European diplomats describe the package of 70 billion euros in military aid for Ukraine — borne by NATO allies excluding the United States and submitted to the Ankara summit — as an "olive branch" to Trump, designed to show that Europeans are shouldering their share of the burden. If Europe pays for Ukraine's defense, the American argument about structural dependence collapses. It is a smart diplomatic strategy — insofar as it is genuinely followed through.

The 70 billion and what it says about Europe

NATO allies — excluding the United States — were preparing at the Ankara summit to confirm 70 billion euros in military aid to Ukraine and to pledge at least as much for the following year. This figure, initially proposed by Germany in May, is significant on several counts. First, it comes without American participation — marking a break with the structure of Ukrainian defense funding since 2022. Second, it is accompanied by a commitment from European allies and Canada to reach 3.5 percent of GDP in defense spending by 2035. Within a decade, Europe has accepted a level of rearmament it refused to even consider five years ago.

Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General, underlined that European allies and Canada had spent $139 billion more on defense the previous year than in 2024 — an unprecedented surge in relative peacetime. This rearmament is the practical response to the six-month review of American military presence in Europe announced by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Europeans are reading the message: if the United States reduces its presence, Europe must fill the gap. That realization — painful in principle — is finally producing concrete budget decisions.

Europe committing 3.5 percent of GDP to defense by 2035 — that was inconceivable to say aloud ten years ago. It is now inscribed in draft Ankara declarations. Putin will have succeeded where decades of American pressure had failed: forcing Europeans to take their own security seriously. That is the bitterest irony of this war.

Security guarantees, not just weapons

The Coalition of the Willing — the network of countries actively supporting Ukraine beyond the formal structures of NATO — holds its next meeting on July 13, 2026 according to Macron's announcement. The central subject: security guarantees for Ukraine. This is not the same as military aid or weapons deliveries. Security guarantees raise the fundamental question of what happens after a possible ceasefire: how to prevent another Russian act of aggression without Ukraine becoming a NATO member — something Moscow has made its red line and that Washington is not prepared to grant.

The model circulating in European capitals for months is one of bilateral and multilateral guarantees — NATO member countries individually committing to defend Ukraine without triggering Article 5. This is a complex architecture, legally fragile and politically difficult to maintain. But it is the only available framework under current circumstances. The Coalition of the Willing on July 13 will need to start putting flesh on these bones — precise commitments, triggering mechanisms, designated forces. The less vagueness that remains in these guarantees, the more credible their deterrent effect on Moscow will be.

Macron, architect of a fragile cohesion

Emmanuel Macron described the G7 at Évian as proof that "the Ankara summit will further strengthen this common position." That declaration reflects a clear ambition: to build a coherent sequence — E5, G7, NATO Ankara, Coalition of the Willing — that creates a diplomatic accumulation effect in favor of Ukraine ahead of any peace process. Each summit must reinforce the commitments of the previous one, reduce the room for hesitant allies to back down, and send Moscow the signal that Western solidarity is durable, not situational.

This sequencing strategy is the most significant contribution of French diplomacy on this file in 2026. It is not perfect — Spain under Pedro Sánchez was excluded from the Berlin summit for refusing the 5 percent of GDP defense spending target, revealing persistent fractures in European cohesion. And the likely successor to Keir Starmer in the United Kingdom — who resigned the week of the summit under pressure from his own party — had not yet expressed his positions on these commitments. The European "common position" is more fragile than it appears.

Macron has been patiently building a diplomatic architecture on Ukraine for two years, with mixed results. July 13 will be a real test: can the Coalition of the Willing move from intentions to contractual commitments? I maintain cautious optimism. Macron's announcements have a historical tendency to be stronger in form than in substance. Let us hope 2026 is different.

Washington reluctant, Europe pushing

The most sensitive subject in the negotiations over the draft Ankara declaration was that of long-range strike capabilities. Europeans wanted to develop and deliver them to Ukraine to deter further Russian aggression. Washington remained reluctant — the Pentagon had recently refused to transfer Tomahawk missiles to Germany, arguing that Moscow could see it as escalation. That refusal illustrates the structural tension between a Europe that understands arming Ukraine sufficiently to deter renewed aggression, and a United States that is simultaneously managing multiple fronts and fears uncontrolled escalation.

For Ukraine, the question of long-range weapons is not theoretical. Storm Shadow, SCALP missiles, and extended-range variants are precisely what Kyiv needs to strike Russian supply lines deep in the rear, degrade Russian command capabilities, and create a military cost high enough that Moscow prefers negotiation to prolonging the conflict. Restricting the range of weapons delivered to Ukraine out of fear of escalation is effectively giving Russia a safe zone behind its lines where it can prepare its next offensive undisturbed. It is a strategic limitation for which Kyiv pays the price.

Military AI and air defense — the concrete priorities

The domains where E5 coordination is most advanced and most concrete are air defense and military artificial intelligence applications. On air defense, Ukraine has repeatedly documented that its greatest operational shortfall is the capacity to intercept waves of Russian drones and missiles — a capacity that erodes as munitions for Patriot and IRIS-T systems are consumed faster than they are replaced. E5 coordination on this subject could translate into bulk orders, accelerated production, and ammunition-sharing between allies that would sustain Ukraine without emptying national stockpiles.

On military AI, the most promising applications for Ukraine are those improving target recognition, swarm drone coordination, and analysis of adversary missile debris. These are precisely the capabilities that European and American defense companies are actively developing. The Coalition of the Willing on July 13 could be an opportunity to accelerate the transfer of these technologies to Ukraine — not as finished weapons, but as tools that multiply the effectiveness of existing Ukrainian forces.

Long-range weapons blocked by Washington, insufficient air defense, military AI struggling to reach the front — Ukraine has precise and documented needs. What frustrates me is that our political structures seem designed to slow decisions at precisely the moment when execution speed is a matter of life or death. Bureaucracies do not win wars. The will to win them does.

EU membership as a stabilizing horizon

On July 1, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky was in Dublin for the start of the Irish presidency of the Council of the European Union. He declared having "good chances" that the five remaining clusters in Ukraine's EU accession negotiations would be opened in July. That statement fits into the context of the opening of the first "fundamentals" cluster on June 15, 2026. Ukraine's accession process, which seemed out of reach in 2022, is advancing at a pace that even the most optimistic Ukrainians would not have predicted.

EU membership is, for Ukraine, more than an economic prospect. It is an institutional anchor that would make any future Russian annexation incompatible with European law and would automatically activate the Union's solidarity mechanisms. It is also a signal to investors: that Ukraine is on a trajectory of legal normalization, institutional reform, and integration into the world's most important economic space. Post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine will be infinitely faster and more solid if it takes place within the framework of the European single market. That is a strategic argument that EU enlargement skeptics do not take seriously enough.

Territorial integrity in the G7 text

The fact that the G7 Évian text explicitly mentions support for Ukrainian territorial integrity — including the American signature — is more significant than it appears. Under the Trump administration, influential voices in Washington had floated peace scenarios that would have de facto accepted Russian annexations in exchange for a ceasefire. Inscribing territorial integrity in a collective G7 text signed by Washington formally closes — at least temporarily — that rhetorical window. Zelensky and his European allies obtained something concrete, even if the reality on the ground remains far from the internationally recognized borders.

The tension between the principles stated in diplomatic texts and the military realities at the front is the fundamental contradiction of this conflict. Ukraine still controls territories over which Russia has claimed sovereignty since the illegal annexations of 2022. The contact lines shift. Casualty figures are massive on both sides. No G7 text changes that mechanical reality. But texts create political constraints — and in diplomacy, political constraints have real strategic value. What allies have jointly signed is harder to walk back unilaterally.

Zelensky in Dublin, talking about EU accession, while his soldiers hold the front — I find something deeply moving in that parallel. A country at war that simultaneously prepares its legal reforms to enter a rule-of-law bloc, that documents sanctions violations while defending itself. That is the portrait of a democracy that refuses to let war define everything it is.

"Burden-shifting" as the new doctrine

The central concept in the draft Ankara declaration as described by diplomatic sources is "burden-shifting" — the transfer of European defense responsibility from America to Europe. This is not American isolationism. It is a reconfiguration of the Alliance toward an architecture where Europeans carry the defense of the continent while the United States maintains its presence in the Indo-Pacific to face China — the threat Washington judges the priority for its own long-term security.

For Ukraine, this reconfiguration cuts both ways. On one hand, it pushes Europeans to arm up more and more actively support Kyiv — which is positive. On the other, it creates the risk of a gradual American disengagement from the European theater that, if poorly managed, could reduce NATO deterrence credibility against Russia before Europeans have filled the capability gap. The timing of this transition is crucial. And the fact that Pete Hegseth's six-month review of American military presence in Europe is announced while the war in Ukraine is ongoing creates uncertainty that Moscow will watch carefully for strategic conclusions.

Iran and Hormuz in the Ankara declaration

The draft Ankara declaration also contained a call to Iran to guarantee freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz — presented by diplomats as an "olive branch" to Trump, irritated by the lack of European support for his military actions against Tehran. This insertion reveals the Alliance's internal mechanics: Europeans must simultaneously manage their support for Ukraine, their relationship with a Trump who punishes dissent, and their own economic interest in Gulf stability. Including Iran in the NATO declaration is a way of showing Washington that Europe understands its Middle Eastern priorities — even when it does not fully share them.

The explicit mention in the text that Iran must "never" be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons is a firmer signal than NATO's usual formulations on this subject. In the context of the events in the Strait of Hormuz on June 26–28, this joint NATO position on the Iranian nuclear program reinforces the pressure framework on Tehran that American-Iranian negotiations must navigate.

NATO talking about Iran in its declaration on Ukraine, about China in its burden-sharing discussions, about AI in its defense committees — that is the sign we have entered an era of simultaneous and interconnected threats that structures designed for the Cold War do not manage easily. The Alliance is adapting. It should adapt faster.

Sánchez outside the circle

The Berlin summit highlighted a fracture that the rhetoric of European unity tends to mask: Spain under Pedro Sánchez was excluded from the E5 meeting, in part because it refused to push defense spending to 5 percent of GDP — the target accepted by the other four participants. This exclusion is not a simple budget disagreement. It reflects a deeper divergence of vision between one strand of the European left, which views accelerated rearmament as a risk of escalation, and partners who consider that underspending on defense is precisely what led Russia to believe Europe was not serious about its resistance.

Europe cannot afford this fracture at a critical moment. Sánchez represents a real political current in southern Europe — not an aberration. If the architecture of support for Ukraine rests on a volunteer club that excludes budgetary dissenters, it will be structurally fragile with every change of government in a member country. The robustness of support for Ukraine requires a broad coalition, not an exclusive one. That is the challenge French and German diplomacy will need to resolve before and after July 13, if it wants to transform the Berlin dynamic into something durable.

Excluding Sánchez sends a discipline signal — and that is understandable in context. But a Europe divided on its defense targets is a weakened Europe against Moscow, whatever firmness the club of five projects in its discourse. European unity is not a slogan. It is an operational constraint. It requires time, negotiation, and patience — scarce resources in wartime.

Dublin as a strategic partner for Kyiv

The visit of Zelensky to Dublin on July 1, 2026 for the start of the Irish presidency of the Council of the European Union is rich in symbolism. Ireland — historically non-aligned, an EU member since 1973, long reluctant on questions of collective defense — was hosting the president of a country at war that wants to join the club. That image says something about the evolution of Europe: even the countries most wary of the military implications of enlargement now understand that leaving Ukraine without a membership prospect is more dangerous than welcoming it.

The Irish presidency of the EU Council will run until December 31, 2026. During that semester, Ireland will have to steer the Ukrainian accession negotiations, including the opening of the remaining clusters that Zelensky hopes to see happen in July. Ireland is also a country that understands the cost of dependence — political and economic — on a powerful neighbor. What Dublin grasps intuitively about the Ukraine-Russia relationship, other European capitals are still learning. The Irish presidency could be a useful accelerator for the Ukrainian accession agenda, if the political will is there.

Ukraine preparing its constitutional revisions to integrate European law, while its soldiers hold the front — that is the image of a country that refuses to be defined entirely by the war being imposed on it. Zelensky in Dublin says more about Ukrainian resilience than any solidarity speech. He is there, negotiating, building the post-war future. Europe should be equal to that energy.

Commitments that will need to be kept

The diplomatic sequence announced by Macron from Berlin — E5, G7 Évian, NATO Ankara, Coalition of the Willing on July 13 — is ambitious and logically constructed. It creates a momentum of accumulating commitments that makes each retreat more politically costly. It is intelligent diplomacy in a difficult environment. But the history of Western commitment to Ukraine is dotted with solemn announcements followed by imperfect execution — weapons systems delivered too late, munitions in insufficient quantities, training programs that took longer than expected.

The test of July 13 is not whether the Coalition of the Willing convenes. It is whether it produces precise, verifiable, and binding contractual commitments on security guarantees for Ukraine. If so, it is a historic step forward — the first toward a post-conflict security framework that makes renewed Russian aggression more costly. If the commitments remain in general diplomatic language, July 13 will be a missed opportunity that Russia, attentive to every signal of Western weakness, will know how to exploit.

Zelensky deserves more than speeches

Volodymyr Zelensky has been leading his country at war for more than four years. Under Russian strikes, with a devastated economy, with human losses that statistics cannot honor at their true value. He has kept his armed forces in fighting condition, conducted major institutional reforms during wartime, and positioned Ukraine as a serious candidate for European membership. He deserves Western partners who honor their commitments with the same rigor with which he honors his. July 13 is an opportunity for Europe to prove it is equal to the man it claims to support.

The Coalition of the Willing, the G7 Évian declaration, the 70-billion Ankara package — together these form the most solid framework of Western support for Ukraine since the start of the war. Maintaining it, strengthening it, and translating it into concrete military capabilities is the collective task of the West for the weeks ahead. Not in ten years. Now, while the war continues and every day of delay carries a real and documentable human cost.

I end this editorial with a simple conviction: Ukraine cannot lose this war without the liberal international order emerging from it lastingly weakened. That is not sentimentalism. It is a cold strategic calculation. If Putin's Russia wins in Ukraine, every autocrat on the planet will conclude that military force pays. The Europe of July 13 must understand that what it decides there is not only for Ukraine. It is for itself.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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