EDITORIAL: Europe Is Funding Ukraine at €45 Billion — and Should Be Proud, Not Ashamed

Introduction: Aid Fatigue Is a Luxury We Cannot Afford

Funding as a weapon — not as charity

On June 22, 2026, at a joint meeting of the European Parliament's committees on international trade, security and defense, and the budget, the representative of the European Commission uttered a sentence worth remembering: the Ukraine Support Loan (USL) is not "a financial instrument." It is "a weapon." This formulation, direct to the point of discomfort, tells the truth in a way that conventional diplomacy strives to avoid. European financing of Ukraine — 45 billion euros for 2026 alone, 60 billion over two years — is not international philanthropy. It is an investment in Europe's collective security.

And yet, in certain European capitals, this funding is the subject of stormy debates tinged with "aid fatigue." Voices are heard asking how much longer Europe will have to pay. Politicians brandishing the raw figure — 200 euros per European citizen — as though it were a scandal. Narratives presenting support for Ukraine as a burden for European taxpayers rather than an insurance premium for their own security. This editorial takes the opposite view. It argues that Europe should embrace its financing of Ukraine with pride — because this funding is the most important and most justified strategic decision the European Union has ever made.

The cost of not helping — a question no one asks

The debate over the "cost of supporting Ukraine" suffers from a fundamental analytical bias: it focuses on the cost of aid, but never on the cost of not aiding. What would have happened if Europe had abandoned Ukraine in 2022? A victorious Russia at the gates of the Baltic states. A Moldova under existential pressure. A devastating signal to every democracy that resisting aggression does not pay. A Putin emboldened with no reason to stop at the Ukrainian border. The cost of that scenario — in terms of additional European military deployments, regional instability, and mass migration — would have been far greater than the 200 euros per citizen that some find excessive.

The Ukraine Support Loan's Architecture: A Financial Mechanism at the Service of Defense

€45 billion in 2026: the breakdown

The financial architecture of the USL for 2026 is precisely articulated. Of the total 45 billion euros for this year, 28.3 billion are dedicated to the defense pillar — direct financing of drones, counter-drones, missiles, air defense systems, long-range munitions, and long-range strikes, as expressed by Ukraine and documented at the June 22 meeting. The remaining 16.7 billion constitutes budget support: 8.75 billion in Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) and 8.75 billion complementing the Ukraine Plan.

The first tranche of 3.2 billion under the MFA was agreed for disbursement at the Ukraine Reconstruction Conference on June 25–26, 2026. Additional tranches of 3.7 billion are planned for September and 1.45 billion at year's end, for a total 2026 MFA of 8.35 billion. On the 60-billion-over-two-years track, the first product schedule — covering drones — was received in March and the reimbursement for 255 contracts was submitted on June 18. Payment is expected before month's end. It is a precision bureaucratic machinery in the service of an existential emergency.

Who really pays? The double lock of frozen Russian assets

One of the most important innovations in this financial mechanism is its repayment structure. As declared by the European Council decision of December, Ukraine will only repay the loan after receiving reparations from Russia. Russian assets — approximately 300 billion dollars in Russian Central Bank assets are immobilized in G7 countries — will remain frozen until full repayment. The EU reserves the right to use these assets to repay the loan. The regulation adopted under Article 122.1 of the EU Treaty anchors this immobilization in damages caused to the EU itself — creating what legal scholars call a "double lock."

This architecture means, in plain terms, that it is the aggressor who pays — not the European taxpayer. Frozen Russian assets already generate income through interest, already being used under the G7 ERA initiative. This mechanism is elegant legally and just morally. It is also robust: it was designed to be difficult to dismantle unilaterally. MEP Jörgen Warborn summarized the position clearly: "It is the aggressor who must pay."

Aid Fatigue: A Narrative Forged in Russian Disinformation Studios

Where does this narrative really come from?

Things must be called by their name: the narrative of "aid fatigue for Ukraine" is, in large part, a product of the Russian disinformation machine. Studies by the Ukrainian Institute, the Digital Forensic Research Lab of the Atlantic Council, and the European Information Agency systematically document how media linked to Moscow amplify every poll showing a drop in European public support for Ukraine, every statement by a Eurosceptic politician, every economic argument against the funding. The goal is transparent: to weaken the coalition of support for Ukraine from within.

This narrative is facilitated by European political actors — some in good faith but poorly informed, others deliberately aligned with Russian interests or simply opportunistic. It thrives in contexts of inflation and economic hardship, where voters search for scapegoats for their everyday difficulties. Presenting the financing of Ukraine as the cause of European difficulties — when those difficulties have multiple origins and aid to Kyiv represents less than 1% of EU GDP — is a deception that deserves to be firmly combated.

The "fatigue" polls and their manipulation

Opinion polls on support for Ukraine do show variability across countries and periods. In Hungary, Slovakia, and some Southern European countries, popular support is more fragile. These realities must be taken seriously in their context — they reflect different national histories, different media exposure, different geopolitical sensitivities. But they do not justify a strategic change of course. Democracies sometimes have a responsibility to make difficult choices that transcend the opinion of the moment — particularly when the stakes are as fundamental as European collective security.

MEP Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chair of the European Parliament's security and defense committee, asked the right question at the June 22 meeting: "What counts is that capabilities reach Ukraine when they are needed." Not opinion polls. Not short-term electoral calculations. The concrete effectiveness of delivering armaments to an army fighting for its survival — and, in doing so, protecting Europe.

What Ukraine Does With the Money — and How It Is Verified

A rigorous and transparent oversight system

One of the recurrent arguments of those opposing the funding is the risk of corruption and misappropriation. It is a legitimate question — especially in the context of a country at war with weakened institutions. The European Commission's response is systematic and documented. Representative Harald Ruijters, Deputy Director-General of DG DEFIS, described at the June 22 meeting a verification process "as serious and as strict as is humanly possible": checks before, during, and after each product schedule; a specialized audit team within DG DEFIS for ex-post verification; partnerships with EU bodies and Ukrainian anti-corruption agencies.

Ukraine, for its part, has undertaken substantial reforms conditioning disbursements: it has extended its military levy, adopted legislation on digital platform revenues, and launched the elimination of VAT exemptions on low-value imports. These 32 reform measures condition the MFA tranches — a conditionality mechanism that ties disbursement to verifiable progress on the rule of law, energy, state-owned enterprise governance, and social aspects of reconstruction.

Accession negotiations: an investment in transformation

One often overlooked aspect of the European commitment to Ukraine is the opening of the first accession negotiations on June 15, 2026. The first cluster — the "Fundamentals" — covers the rule of law, democracy, fundamental rights, internal markets, and institutions. This is the heart of the transformation Ukraine must accomplish to join the EU. Ukraine submitted a revised plan adopted by the Commission. This accession process is not only a political horizon. It is a lever of institutional transformation that will benefit Ukrainians and Europe in the long run.

When one hears that aid to Ukraine is money wasted in a corrupt country, one must respond: the EU is simultaneously financing the conditions for that country's transformation. It is tying its euros to concrete and verifiable reforms. It is creating the conditions for Ukraine to become a solid partner within the European order. That is the very definition of a strategic investment — and it is fundamentally different from unconditional humanitarian aid.

What Ukraine Defends — and Why It Is Europe's Fight

Ukraine is not a foreign country with a problem

MEP Pekka Toveri, former commander of the Finnish army, said it with a soldier's clarity: "This is not a question of European defense industry. It is a question of Ukraine's survival." This direct formulation cuts through the usual diplomatic euphemisms. Ukraine is fighting for its survival — and its survival is directly linked to Europe's security. This is not an abstract theorem. It is the geographical, historical, and strategic reality of Eastern Europe.

The Ukrainian border is less than 500 kilometers from Warsaw. It is less than 700 kilometers from Berlin. A Ukraine defeated and subjugated by Putin's Russia would push the Russian military threat immediately to the borders of NATO member states. What Putin would do next — if he had the capacity and the temptation — is not a certainty, but it is a possibility that Europe cannot afford to ignore. The Baltic states are not paranoid when they say that their security depends on Ukraine's. They are drawing the most direct lesson from recent history.

The values at stake go beyond geopolitics

Beyond the strategic calculation, there is a dimension of values that some consider naive but that is real: Ukraine is fighting for its democracy, its freedom, its right to choose its own future without submitting to the diktat of an authoritarian neighbor. These values are not foreign to Europe. They are constitutive of the European project itself. And supporting Ukraine in this fight is affirming that these values have real worth — not merely declaratory worth.

Volodymyr Zelensky is an imperfect leader like all human leaders. But he is the head of a country that refused to bend before a massive military aggression. That mobilized its society to defend its freedom. That is asking its allies for the military and financial support it desperately needs. To respond to this request with debates about "aid fatigue" and calculations of euros per citizen is a response at the level of cowardice — not of greatness.

The Reforms Ukraine Has Accepted — Proof of a Transformation Underway

Thirty-two verifiable reform measures

The 32 reform measures conditioning the MFA tranches are not statements of intent. They are verifiable contractual commitments, whose execution is audited by the European Commission before each disbursement. These measures cover four key areas: the rule of law, energy, state-owned enterprise governance, and the social aspects of reconstruction. For each, precise indicators make it possible to measure progress.

Ukraine has already demonstrated a capacity to reform under pressure. Despite the war, it has maintained its democratic institutions, conducted verification processes for its magistrates, and adopted anti-corruption measures. Its tax system has been reformed in the middle of a war. The prospect of accession to the EU is the most powerful driver of institutional transformation a country can have — far more effective than any purely financial conditionality. The history of Central and Eastern European countries demonstrates this: Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria all profoundly transformed their institutions to join the EU.

The Reconstruction Conference and its commitments

The Ukraine Reconstruction Conference of June 25–26, 2026 marked an important moment in international mobilization. The disbursement of the first MFA tranche (3.2 billion euros) coinciding with this conference was no accident: it was a strong political signal addressed to Ukraine's international partners. Ukraine's reconstruction — its destroyed infrastructure, devastated cities, fractured economy — will require hundreds of billions of euros over several decades. The current European commitment is only the beginning of a massive investment that will transform Ukraine into a European economic power if it wins this conflict.

This is not philanthropy. It is long-term economic development. A reconstructed Ukraine, a member of the EU, with its fertile agricultural lands, educated workforce, natural resources, and defense and technology industries, would be a considerable net addition to the European economic bloc. To present the financing of Ukraine solely as a cost, without speaking to the economic potential of this relationship in the long run, is partial and misleading accounting.

The Arguments Against Funding — and Why They Are Weak

"Europe cannot afford it" — the false arithmetic

The economic argument against funding Ukraine deserves rigorous examination. The 200 euros per European citizen — over how long? Over several years. And in exchange for what? For de facto participation in a proxy war that is protecting the eastern borders of NATO. The same European citizen pays per year — depending on their country — between 200 and 600 euros for their car insurance. They are prepared to pay to insure their car, but not to insure the collective security of their continent?

The EU represents an economy of 17 trillion euros. Support for Ukraine represents less than 0.4% of annual European GDP. For that price, Europe is keeping more than 600,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the field, preventing Russia from approaching its borders, and preserving the credibility of the rules-based international order. It is the best value-for-money in the recent history of European defense.

"The funds should go to our problems" — the false alternative

The argument that the 45 billion should be devoted to internal problems — health, education, the energy transition — rests on a false dichotomy. The EU budget can simultaneously finance internal policies and support for Ukraine. MEP Janusz Lewandowski criticized the decision to finance 1.15 billion in 2027 from the general EU budget rather than from the USL itself — out of concern for budgetary flexibility, not because the two are in direct competition.

What is real is that some politicians prefer to point at Ukraine to explain economic difficulties rather than confronting the true causes: post-Covid inflation, the costly energy transition, the structural insufficiencies of certain European economies. Support for Ukraine is a convenient scapegoat. But it is an intellectual deception that disserves European voters as much as Ukraine.

What a Ukrainian Victory Would Mean for Europe

A safer continent, a credible deterrence architecture

A Ukraine that successfully holds out and obtains a peace agreement preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty would send a fundamental strategic message: aggression does not pay. That democracies supported by their allies can resist an authoritarian major power. That international law can have credible defenders even without its own army. This message would reinforce deterrence across the entire European security system.

Conversely, a Ukrainian defeat or an agreement that would sacrifice significant Ukrainian territories would send the opposite message: that aggression is rewarded, that Western security guarantees are not worth the paper they are printed on, and that small countries must either submit to major powers or live in permanent insecurity. It is this message that would encourage other aggressions — in Europe, in Asia, in Africa. The outcome of this war is not local. It is global.

The European defense industry: a necessary renaissance

A frequently underestimated benefit of funding Ukraine is its impact on the European defense industry. Ukrainian demand has accelerated the scaling-up of European defense producers that had stagnated for decades under the post-Cold War "peace dividend." Contracts to supply drones, munitions, and air defense systems have stimulated investments in industrial capacity that will benefit European defense as a whole in the long run.

Harald Ruijters acknowledged at the June 22 meeting that there is "a significant gap between what Ukraine needs and what industry can deliver in the short term." This gap is itself a diagnosis of the state of the European defense industry after thirty years of disinvestment. Supporting Ukraine has provided the alarm signal that Europe needed to reinvest in its industrial defense capabilities. That is a direct strategic benefit for European security in the long run.

Trump, the Unpredictable Variable — and Why Europe Must Hold Without Him

American aid in suspense

The Trump administration has maintained an ambiguous position on support for Ukraine. After initially suspending certain weapons deliveries, it partially resumed support — but in a less predictable and less systematic way than the Biden administration. This unpredictability makes the European commitment all the more crucial. If the United States disengages or conditions its aid on unacceptable Ukrainian territorial concessions, Europe must be capable of filling the gap.

The European Commission anticipated this eventuality in the design of the USL. The regulation adopted under Article 122.1 provides flexibility to adapt the volumes and compositions of aid according to the evolving Ukrainian needs and the geopolitical situation. Non-EU sources — notably through NATO and like-minded partners — are integrated into the Commission's thinking. Europe cannot depend solely on Washington's goodwill to protect its security.

The hour of European strategic autonomy

The war in Ukraine has accelerated an awareness that some theorists of European strategic autonomy had been calling for over decades: Europe must be capable of defending its interests without depending exclusively on the American guarantee. This is not anti-Americanism. It is mature realism. Trump's America is different from Biden's America. And tomorrow's America will be different still. European security cannot rest forever on the goodwill of an ally whose domestic political priorities fluctuate.

Funding Ukraine to the tune of 45 billion euros in 2026 is also, for Europe, learning to assume its collective security responsibilities. It is painful. It is costly. It is politically difficult in certain member states. But it is the path toward a grown-up Europe in the field of defense — a Europe that does not weep when Washington turns its back, because it has developed its own capabilities and its own solidarity mechanisms.

Shame as a Response — and Pride as an Alternative

Why some politicians prefer shame to pride

It is striking that some European politicians speak about support for Ukraine with palpable discomfort — as though funding the resistance of a free country against a military aggression were something embarrassing. This discomfort has political roots: they fear the opinion of their constituents, amplified by Russian social media and their domestic relays. They prefer to minimize their commitment rather than publicly defending a potentially costly position.

It is a political mistake as much as a moral one. European voters — in their great majority — understand and support Ukraine's right to defend itself. Polls show that a clear majority of European citizens support support for Kyiv. It is not by apologizing for funding freedom that European politicians will earn the trust of their constituents. It is by clearly explaining the stakes and assuming their decisions with justified pride.

Pride as a political and moral message

I am arguing that European leaders should adopt a language of pride, not shame or apology, when they speak of support for Ukraine. Pride in having responded to an unjust aggression with concrete and massive aid. Pride in having invented innovative legal and financial mechanisms that make the aggressor pay. Pride in having maintained solidarity in the face of domestic political pressures and Russian disinformation campaigns. Pride in having placed values — freedom, sovereignty, international law — above short-term political convenience.

This pride is not arrogance. It is the recognition of a historically correct decision. And in fifty years, when historians evaluate the European response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the leaders who will have defended this support with conviction will be those that history judges favorably. Those who yielded to the pressure of "aid fatigue" will be on the other side of that judgment.

What Is Still Missing: Delivery on Time

The gap between commitment and field reality

MEP Strack-Zimmermann asked a crucial question at the June 22 meeting: were waivers required in air and missile defense? Did the cascade mechanism cause delays? These questions point to a real problem: it is not enough to decide on funding. Capabilities must reach Ukraine when they are needed. And on this point, European performance has sometimes been disappointing.

The promises of munitions — notably the decision to provide one million artillery shells — were executed with considerable delays. Supply chains showed their limits. Bureaucratic procedures sometimes slowed urgent deliveries. MEP Toveri called for pragmatic application of waivers and additional flexibility to respond to Ukraine's evolving needs. This is an imperative that the Commission must take seriously — euros are worthless if the equipment does not arrive on time.

Strengthening delivery capacity: the next frontier

The next step in support for Ukraine is not only financial. It is operational and logistical. Europe must invest in rapid production capacity, resilient supply chains, and coordination mechanisms between member states to avoid duplications and gaps. It must create strategic stockpiles of munitions and equipment rapidly accessible. And it must simplify the bureaucratic procedures that slow arms transfers between allies.

These improvements are not solely in Ukraine's interest. They reinforce European defense capabilities as a whole. The industry that produces drones for Ukraine today will develop the European defense technologies of tomorrow. Increased interoperability between European forces in the support of Kyiv will improve the military coherence of Europe in its future operations. Once again the same logic: what we invest in Ukrainian resistance, we recover in European collective capabilities.

European Unity as a Strategic Variable

When internal fracture is a victory for Moscow

Every internal European disagreement on support for Ukraine — whether Hungarian obstruction, Slovak hesitation, or budgetary debates in the European Parliament — is a victory for Moscow. Russian strategy rests precisely on the capacity to divide Europeans, to exploit national differences, and to amplify dissident voices. Every time a European leader uses the language of "fatigue" or doubt, they hand Putin the argument he needs to justify his strategy of attrition.

European unity is not a slogan. It is a military strategic variable. A united Europe sends Moscow the signal that it cannot wait for support to collapse. That it cannot wear down support through duration. That there is no reward for the persistence of aggression. This credibility is essential for deterrence — and it is built through the consistency of messages and actions, not through hesitations and doubts expressed in public.

The role of European institutions in cohesion

The European Commission, the European Parliament, and the EU Council have broadly maintained remarkable consistency on support for Ukraine since February 2022. The near-unanimous vote of the European Parliament on the USL reflects this consensus. The legal and financial structure of the USL was designed to resist individual blocking attempts — notably through the use of Article 122.1, which allows action without unanimity in certain cases. These institutional safeguards are essential to maintaining consistency of support over time.

But institutions cannot replace national political will. That is why the public discourse on support for Ukraine — in every member state, in every political party, in every televised debate — is itself a strategic battlefield. The narratives of "fatigue" must be combated by narratives of pride and clear-sightedness. And this communications battle is as important as the delivery of weapons.

The Conditionality of Aid: The Debate Europeans Avoid

Funds without conditions: a repeated historical error

The history of development aid — and emergency aid to conflict zones — is strewn with examples where funds without strict conditionality ended up feeding corruption, poor governance, or even belligerents. Ukraine is a different case: it is a democracy under attack by an external aggressor. But even in this context, the question of conditionality deserves to be asked honestly.

The 45 billion euros of the Ukraine Facility come with reform conditions — notably in the areas of anti-corruption efforts, strengthening the rule of law, and structural economic reforms. These conditions are tied to Ukraine's European integration ambitions. This is not paternalism — it is an acknowledgment that sustainable reconstruction requires solid institutions. And that solid institutions cannot be built without external pressure in a context of war.

Zelensky and the question of governance in wartime

Zelensky has responded to conditionality requirements with remarkable pragmatism. His government has adopted several of the reforms demanded by the EU — judicial reform, anti-corruption laws, restructuring of the energy sector — within timelines that would have seemed impossible in peacetime. This reforming capacity in wartime testifies to an institutional determination that goes beyond mere political survival.

One must be honest: Ukrainian governance in wartime is not without problems. Questions of defense procurement, political appointments in regulatory institutions, and press freedom have been raised by international observers. These problems do not justify withholding aid — they justify maintaining a robust oversight mechanism to ensure that funds reach their destination.

The Marshall Plan Model: Lessons for Ukrainian Reconstruction

1947–1952: what the Marshall Plan really accomplished

The Marshall Plan — officially the European Recovery Program — injected approximately 13 billion dollars (the equivalent of more than 150 billion today) into postwar Europe between 1948 and 1952. It did not merely finance reconstruction — it laid the institutional foundations of the European mixed economy, fostered commercial cooperation between formerly enemy states, and anchored the democracies of Western Europe within the American liberal order. It was not simply aid — it was an architecture.

The comparison with Ukraine is imperfect but instructive. Like the Europe of 1947, the Ukraine of 2026 faces massive infrastructure destruction, deep economic instability, and an urgent need for reintegration within a regional economic framework. Like the Marshall Plan, the Ukraine Facility aims to anchor the country within a system of economic and political alliances — the European Union — that will be its best guarantor of long-term stability.

What the Marshall Plan did not do — and what the EU must avoid

The Marshall Plan had its limits. It excluded Eastern Europe, contributing to the polarization of the Cold War. It sometimes supported governments that were not exemplary in democratic terms, in the name of anti-Communist stability. It favored American imports at the expense of local industry in certain sectors. These historical errors must not be repeated in Ukrainian reconstruction.

The EU has an advantage the United States did not have in 1947: it can offer Ukraine not only money, but also full institutional integration — single market, common rules, dispute-resolution mechanisms. This integration is the real value of the Ukraine Facility. Not the 45 billion themselves — but membership in a space of rules that these 45 billion condition and reinforce.

Conclusion: Assuming Our Role in History

What future generations expect of us

In fifty years, our children and grandchildren will read the history of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the European response. They will judge our choices with the hindsight of the final outcome. If Ukraine held and Europe preserved its security, they will read that their ancestors had the courage of their convictions. If, on the contrary, "aid fatigue" prevailed and Ukraine was abandoned, they will read that Europe preferred short-term political convenience to long-term collective security. This choice is in our hands today.

The €45 billion as an investment in our own dignity

The 45 billion euros that Europe commits in 2026 for Ukraine are an investment in security, in values, in the credibility of the European Union as an actor on the international stage — and in our own collective dignity. This funding deserves to be assumed with pride, explained with clarity, and defended with conviction against all those who prefer convenient cowardice to costly but righteous solidarity. Ukraine deserves these 45 billion. And Europe deserves to be the continent that gives them without apology.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My convictions and my sources

This editorial reflects my personal positions, formed by my reading of European history and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. It makes no claim to neutrality — editorials are by definition statements of position. My sources include the record of the June 22, 2026 meeting of the European Parliament, published by EU Perspectives, as well as official data from the European Commission. I sincerely support aid to Ukraine — not blindly, but because the strategic and moral arguments for that support seem to me overwhelming.

What I do not know and my limits

I do not know in detail the internal political negotiations within the EU on the design of the USL. I do not have access to the confidential assessments of European intelligence services on the state of the conflict. My analysis of the geopolitical effects of a Ukrainian victory or defeat rests on logical reasoning, not on certainties. On these questions, uncertainty is great and honesty requires acknowledging that.

Sources

Primary sources

EU Perspectives — Brussels steadfast on Ukraine commitment, MEPs hear — June 23, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Ukraine's military launches drones towards Moscow — June 26, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Russo-Ukrainian war, day 1580: Ukraine's drone fleet strikes — June 22, 2026

19FortyFive — Target Moscow: The Ukraine War Has Come Right to Putin's Doorstep — June 22, 2026

Secondary sources

CNBC — Ukraine is raising the cost of war for Russia — June 24, 2026

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2026 — June 22, 2026

US News — Zelenskyy Says Russia Is Shifting Air Defenses to Moscow — June 25, 2026

Moscow Times — Israel's EL AL Suspends Moscow Flights — June 25, 2026