EDITORIAL: 90 BILLION IN ONE YEAR — EUROPE FINALLY WAKES UP, TOO LATE?

Introduction: The awakening that should have come sooner

A figure that rings like a reproach

Some figures sound like a victory. And some figures sound like a barely disguised reproach. On June 17, 2026, during the NATO pre-ministerial press conference, Mark Rutte released a number no one expected to hear with this amplitude: European allies and Canada had increased defense spending by more than $90 billion in 2025 — nearly 20% in a single year. He called it "astronomical." I agree. And at the same time, I cannot stop thinking: why didn't this awakening happen in 2015? In 2019? Before the Russians crossed the Ukrainian border again in 2022? This delay has a cost that billions cannot repay.

This is not an editorial to minimize the effort. It is an editorial to give it its true price. $90 billion in additional spending. In 2025. After years in which American pleadings — from Barack Obama to Donald Trump's first term — had produced only marginal increases, deferred promises, track records improved on paper but fragile in reality. It took Russia launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European cities potentially within missile range, Trump returning with brutal and formalized conditionality — for the movement to finally take hold. This is an awakening. It is real. And it is bitter.

The long road since 2014

Let us recall. In September 2014, at the Wales summit, the 28 NATO members committed to spending at least 2% of GDP on defense by 2024. Ten years. The target seemed reasonable. In 2024, ten years later, only 23 of 32 members reached that threshold — according to NATO's own data. Many countries that had signed the commitment in 2014 had not honored it after a decade. A whole decade! And during those ten years, Russia had annexed Crimea, invaded the Donbas, launched a full invasion war in 2022. The world had changed. Some defense budgets had remained essentially the same.

I ask the question directly: did Europe fail in its moral duty toward Ukraine through its slowness to rearm? I am not saying that European budgets would necessarily have deterred Putin from war. But I do affirm that stronger European forces, a more robust defense industry, less depleted ammunition stocks might have allowed more massive, faster, more decisive support for Ukraine. This question haunts me. It should haunt everyone who signs communiqués in Brussels.

What 90 billion concretely represents

The geography of the increase

These $90 billion in additional spending did not fall uniformly on all allies like equitable rain. They reflect a geography of fear and conviction. Countries closest to the Russian threat have spectacularly increased their budgets. The Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — all spend more than 3% of GDP and have adopted trajectories toward 5% on ambitious timelines. Poland maintains its course toward 4%. Finland, which joined NATO in 2023, has transformed its neutrality posture into massive defense commitment. These countries are not spending out of diplomatic obligation. They are spending because they feel the heat.

At the other end, allies like Spain, Belgium or Italy are progressing, but from very low bases and at less sustained paces. These countries' contribution to the $90 billion increase is proportionally smaller. The reasons are understandable — fiscal constraints, public debts, internal political priorities, less exposed geography. But understandable does not mean sufficient. Article 5 applies to all. Protection covers those who contribute less too. And this fundamental asymmetry is precisely what Hegseth seeks to correct through his posture review.

Canada in transformation

Canada deserves particular attention in this panorama. For decades, it was the archetype of the underperforming ally — wealthy, capable, but spending less than 1.5% of its GDP on defense while benefiting from the American security umbrella. That time seems to be changing. Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a commitment toward 5% of GDP by 2035, which according to WSWS of June 24, 2026 would represent approximately $150 billion Canadian per year — far more than currently. Concrete decisions follow: warships in the Indo-Pacific, sanctions against the Russian shadow fleet, a defense industrial strategy for Ontario.

If these commitments are kept — and that is a big if in Canadian politics — Canada would be making one of the largest defense transformations of its modern history. This country, which long defined itself as a power of mediation, peacekeeping and soft power, would turn toward a more explicitly military and defensive posture. This is not a betrayal of its values. It is an adaptation to a world where soft power without credible military backbone is only softness without substance. Peace must be protected. It cannot simply be declared.

The Trump effect: the necessary evil that produced good

Trump as involuntary catalyst

I must say something many will refuse to hear, because it politically credits someone one would prefer to condemn without nuance. The truth is this: without the pressure of Donald Trump — his first term, his return, the conditionality he institutionalized through Hegseth — Europe would not have spent $90 billion more in 2025. I have no doubt of that. Europe would perhaps once again have been content with the slow, reassuring, insufficient progression of past years. It is Trump, the necessary evil, who forced the movement.

This does not justify everything Trump does or says. His foreign policy remains erratic, his deal with Iran is of debatable quality, his relationship to truth is troubling. But on European defense? He saw a real problem and employed brutal methods to solve it. And the brutal methods produced results that polite methods had not produced in thirty years. I am not applauding the brute. I am acknowledging the result. These are not the same thing. And maintaining this distinction is important to avoid falling into Trumpism or blind anti-Trumpism.

What would have happened without this pressure

Let us project into a simple counterfactual: without Trumpian pressure, without the conditionality of American contributions announced on June 18, 2026, how much would European additional defense spending have been in 2025? Perhaps $30 to $40 billion. The upward trend existed — the Ukrainian invasion had shaken consciences. But the speed and amplitude of the increase are directly linked to the American threat to reduce its contribution. European governments did not increase their budgets out of sudden conviction. They did it because they had no other choice. This is less noble. But it is more effective.

And this is precisely why the commitment toward 5% of GDP by 2035 — adopted under pressure — carries within it the seeds of its own fragility. If American pressure relaxes (change of administration in 2028?) and if the Russian threat seems to stabilize (fragile peace agreement in Ukraine?), the temptation to return to old habits will return. Budget-conscious governments always seek savings. And defense is, politically, easier to cut than healthcare or pensions. The durability of this commitment can only rest on internal conviction — not only external pressure.

What these 90 billion buy — and what they don't

The ongoing acquisitions

Behind the figure of $90 billion are concrete orders that European governments placed in 2025 and 2026. Additional Leopard 2 tanks ordered by Germany and its neighbors. F-35s for several countries — including Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland. Air defense systems NASAMS, SAMP/T, Patriot to reinforce national architectures and contribute to Ukraine. Investments in artillery ammunition — whose shortage had been painfully exposed by the Ukrainian conflict. Programs to increase military personnel in several countries. This list is long. It is real. And it produces capabilities.

But it takes time. Orders placed in 2025 will not all be delivered before 2028, 2030, 2032. Defense industries — already under pressure to deliver to Ukraine — cannot instantly double their production. The industrial bottleneck is real. This is precisely why Rutte, at the June 18, 2026 meeting, insisted on the need to "strengthen the transatlantic defense industrial base" as one of the Ankara summit's priorities. The money is there. Industry must now follow. And that cannot be bought — it must be built.

What 90 billion does not buy

The $90 billion does not buy the political cohesion of the Alliance. It does not erase the divisions over support for Ukraine, over the relationship with Russia, over France's role in an autonomous European defense. It does not buy doctrine either: knowing how to employ these forces, in what circumstances, with which allies and what command chain — these questions remain open. And it does not buy citizen conviction: in several countries, polls show populations support increased defense spending, but this support is fragile and conditioned on the absence of visible social sacrifices. If cuts to public services fund rearmament, popular support can erode.

One must also name what these $90 billion cannot repair. They will not bring back the thousands of Ukrainian soldiers who fell since 2022 partly because allies did not have the ammunition stocks they had promised to maintain. They do not rebuild Ukrainian cities destroyed by missiles that more solid air defense stocks might have intercepted. The history of Europe's delayed rearmament has a moral balance sheet that euros and dollars cannot erase. This is uncomfortable. It is true. And acknowledging it is the minimum condition for this delayed rearmament to at least serve something durable.

The moral argument: who benefits from protection

Selective solidarity in question

There is a moral question at the heart of NATO's spending dynamics that no one asks frankly enough: is it fair that countries most exposed to the Russian threat — the Baltic states, Poland, Finland — spend 3 to 4% of their GDP on defense, while countries less exposed but equally benefiting from collective protection spend half as much? The protection NATO offers Italy is as real as what it offers Estonia. But contributions are not proportional. This is a non-transparent cross-subsidy within the Alliance.

This inequality is not new. But it becomes politically explosive when exposed countries ask their citizens to make real budgetary sacrifices while their less exposed allies maintain a certain comfort. Political tensions within NATO — between the East investing massively and the Mediterranean West lagging — risk amplifying if the contribution divergence persists. And an Alliance divided between serious members and those free-riding the system without contributing fully is not an Alliance capable of facing determined adversaries.

The response to the peace dividend argument

The peace dividend argument — the idea that the end of the Cold War allowed cutting military spending to fund social development — was understandable in the 1990s. Today, after 2022, it is untenable. Peace is not a natural state of the world. It is a balance of forces maintained through credible deterrence and the political cohesion of democracies. Withdrawing from that balance — by cutting budgets, letting ammunition stocks deplete, closing arms factories — is undermining the foundations that allow peace to hold.

Rutte stated this forcefully in his opening remarks of June 18, 2026: allies must show "clear and credible progress" toward 5% of GDP and "convert increased spending into combat-ready forces and capabilities." These two requirements — progress and transformation — reject exactly the peace dividend paradigm. They say: peace is funded. It is maintained. It is not passively inherited from one generation to the next. This truth, which our grandparents knew instinctively, our generation had believed it could ignore. The awakening is only partially willing.

What this means for European citizens

The return of defense to civic consciousness

One of the least commented consequences of European rearmament is its effect on citizens' civic consciousness. For thirty years, defense was the business of military personnel, politicians and technocrats — not ordinary citizens. The dissolution of conscript armies in many European countries had severed the link between civil society and armed forces. In 2026, this link is returning. Countries like Sweden, Lithuania, Germany are reflecting on reintroducing some form of military or civil service. The concept of national resilience — a society's capacity to function and defend itself under attack — has become a subject of serious public debate again.

This has implications for the choices citizens will have to make. The $90 billion additional spending of 2025 comes from somewhere in public finances. Either from borrowing (possible but costly), or from tax increases (politically sensitive), or from cuts in other budget items. None of these options is painless. And governments have not always been transparent about where these funds come from. Yet this transparency is essential to maintain popular support over time. Citizens who understand why they are paying accept the cost better than those from whom the bill is hidden.

Young generations facing the reality of defense

There is something particularly striking about this rearmament from the perspective of younger generations of Europeans. Those born after 1990 did not know the Cold War. Many grew up in a Europe without borders, without direct threats, with the conviction that war was a phenomenon belonging to History or to other continents. Ukraine has shattered this conviction. Young Germans, French, British see young Ukrainians of their age fighting and dying on battlefields a few hours' flight away. This reality cannot remain abstract indefinitely.

The true solidity of European rearmament will be tested in this generation. When discussions on the return of military service resume, when defense budgets encroach on social budgets, when governments ask for sacrifices — how do young Europeans respond? If support holds, NATO 3.0 can become a lasting reality. If it wavers, the $90 billion of 2025 will be only a spurt before a new cycle of complacency. The answer to this question will play out not in summits, but in ballot boxes and at dinner tables.

Europe leading its own defense: fantasy or possibility

Rutte's vision: a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO

Rutte's formula for the future of Atlantic defense is elegant in its simplicity: "A stronger Europe in a stronger NATO." These two strengthenings are not contradictory. A Europe that defends itself better does not necessarily mean a Europe that defends itself without the United States. It means a Europe that assumes its share — conventional, industrial, budgetary — so that American power remains a robust complement rather than an unavoidable substitute. This distinction is crucial. And it is at the heart of what the Ankara summit will need to formalize.

For this vision to become reality, Europe must resolve several challenges simultaneously. It must convert its budgets into real capabilities — not symbolic spending. It must standardize its equipment to allow interoperability. It must build a common defense doctrine — which requires political consensus often difficult to achieve among 27 countries with different strategic traditions. And it must maintain its cohesion in the face of divisions that adversaries like Russia actively work to create. All these challenges are surmountable. None is trivial.

The France-Germany model: engine or obstacle?

Traditionally, the locomotive of European defense is the Franco-German couple. In 2026, this model is both in transformation and under pressure. Germany, with its 100 billion euro Sondervermögen and its commitment to increase budgets, has clearly emerged from its post-Cold War pacifism. France, with its tradition of autonomous defense and its independent nuclear capabilities, remains a pillar. Together, they represent a massive share of the European industrial and military potential. If this tandem aligns on the need to defend itself more and better, it pulls the rest of Europe. If it diverges on priorities or methods, it brakes.

The question of European defense leadership is also political. Which country will be the focal point around which others organize? France has a long tradition of military leadership in Europe. Germany has the economic size but the historical inhibitions. Poland has the ambition and the sense of urgency. The Nordic countries have the competence and the seriousness. In this complex balance, Rutte plays the coordinator's role — not a national leader, but a facilitator of Atlantic consensus. This is a difficult role. He acquits himself with more clarity than his predecessors.

The risks of rushed rearmament

Quality against quantity

One of the paradoxical risks of a rapid increase in defense budgets is the priority given to quantity over quality. Governments under pressure to show results — notably facing the American posture review — might place large orders for equipment without ensuring it matches the real operational needs of their forces. Ukraine demonstrated that tactical modernity and technological innovation — particularly in drones — matter as much if not more than volumes of conventional equipment. Massive orders of tanks or heavy artillery, without proportional investment in electronic systems, information warfare and drone capabilities, could produce armies well-equipped for Cold War warfare, not the war of 2026.

This risk is known to those who carefully read Ukrainian lessons. And this is precisely why Rutte insists on the transformation of spending into modern capabilities — not just traditional equipment. It is also why partnerships with Ukraine for developing and producing drones, electronic warfare systems and autonomous technologies are so important. Ukraine is not just surviving. It is inventing the war of the future. And allies have every interest in being in the room where this invention is happening.

The temptation of industrial protectionism

Another risk of massive rearmament is industrial protectionism. Every country will naturally want its increased defense budgets to benefit its own national industries. This is electorally understandable. But if every European country builds its own armored vehicle production line, its own air defense systems, its own ammunition — ignoring economies of scale and standardization — the military effectiveness of this spending will be lower than if it were coordinated. Both NATO and the European Union are working on industrial coordination mechanisms. Their success will condition the real effectiveness of rearmament.

The tension between national industrial interests and collective optimization is one of the most difficult to resolve in an Alliance of democracies where every government must answer to its voters. There is no perfect solution. But the minimum expected from the Ankara summit is a more solid industrial cooperation architecture than what existed before. The shaping of European defense's future plays out as much in factories and engineering offices as in diplomatic conference rooms.

The 90 billion and Ukraine: a direct link

The budget increases fund Ukraine

A significant portion of the $90 billion additional spending in 2025 was directed directly or indirectly toward Ukraine. The PURL mechanism, bilateral contributions, the Czech ammunition initiative — all are funded by rising defense budgets. In 2025, Europe allocated nearly 1.6 billion euros for Ukrainian drones in the first four months of the year alone, according to Ukrinform of June 5, 2026. These figures show that European rearmament is not only a policy of national self-defense. It is also a policy of support for an informal allied country — one fighting on the front line against the very threat that justifies this rearmament.

There is a circular logic in this relationship: Ukraine fights, keeps Russian forces occupied in the east, and allows Europe to rearm without being directly threatened. Europe, by funding this fight, contributes to its own security at a far lower cost than it would bear facing a Russia whose forces were available for other fronts. This is cold calculation. It is also genuine solidarity. The two can coexist. And the $90 billion are the quantified proof.

What Ukraine brings in return

But Ukraine is not only a passive beneficiary. It brings something priceless to its allies: the experience of modern warfare in real conditions. From the 150,000 drones ordered by the United Kingdom from Ukrainian producers in the package of £752 million announced on June 18, 2026, to the industrial co-production agreements with Germany, Zelensky is building a structural partnership between his country and its allies that goes far beyond emergency aid. He is forging a relationship in which Ukraine is a strategic partner — a defense capability producer, an expertise provider, a full-fledged actor of European security. This is not rhetoric. It is a documented transformation in signed agreements and placed orders.

This partnership framework may be the most lasting legacy of this period. When the war ends — in whatever form — Ukraine will no longer be merely a buffer state between East and West. It will be one of Europe's most experienced and innovative armies, integrated into the continent's defense supply chains, contributing to collective security in a way no one imagined before 2022. This is a profound geopolitical transformation. And the $90 billion of 2025 are its partial funding.

The responsibility of governing elites

Who bears responsibility for the delay?

I must name a responsibility that few leaders publicly admit: European political elites of the 2000s-2020s collectively failed in their mission to maintain the credibility of European deterrence. This is not only a lack of resources. It is a lack of strategic vision, a preference for short-term budgetary gains over long-term security, excessive confidence in international stability that was not guaranteed. Chancellors, presidents, prime ministers signed defense budget cuts knowing the Russian threat had existed since 2014. These decisions have a track record.

I do not say this to condemn individuals. I say it to name an institutional reality: democratic systems tend to reward decisions that produce immediate benefits (tax cuts, increased social spending) and to penalize long-term investments whose benefits are only visible after decades (defense, infrastructure, research). This is not inevitable. But it is a structural tendency that courageous leaders — like those of the Baltic states or Poland — have been able to counteract. Others chose short-term ease. History will present them with the bill.

The lesson for future leaders

What the present should teach future European leaders is simple: security is a public policy like any other. It is funded. It is maintained. It is modernized. It does not exist autogenously, as a natural state of the world to preserve through the mere will not to fuel it. A government that chooses not to invest in its defense is not choosing peace. It is outsourcing its security to others and hoping these others will always be there when needed. The story of 2026 — with an America conditioning its engagement, a Russia attacking, a China arming — says that this hope is a gamble too risky for a serious democracy.

The $90 billion of 2025, if looked at honestly, is not a victory. It is a belated correction of a prolonged error. This correction is welcome. It is necessary. And it must now transform into structural habit — not a crisis response, but a long-term policy integrated into citizens' convictions and government budgets. This is the challenge of the coming years. And this is what the Ankara summit must embody to deserve the qualifier "historic."

The 150,000 British drones: when the detail changes everything

London's commitment as an operational model

Among the most concrete announcements of spring 2026, the British commitment to supply 150,000 drones to Ukraine for £752 million deserves particular attention. This is not an abstract figure in a budget report. It is a real industrial order, with delivery deadlines, technical specifications and a measurable battlefield impact. The United Kingdom has understood something many continental allies are still slow to accept: in modern warfare, drone superiority is as decisive as air superiority was in the 20th century. And this superiority is built on volumes, not on exquisite and rare weapons systems.

The impact of this commitment goes beyond support for Kyiv. It sends a signal to the British defense industry: there is a real, immediate and substantial market for large-scale production of combat drones. This accelerates private investment, attracts engineers and capital into the sector, and lays the foundations for an industrial capacity that will be useful beyond the Ukrainian conflict. This is exactly what the $90 billion of European rearmament should produce: not only delivered equipment, but a structural transformation of the defense industrial base. The British model deserves serious study by continental partners.

From budget to capability: the distance between announcement and reality

There is a considerable distance between the announcement of $90 billion additional spending on defense and the emergence of real military capabilities on the ground. This distance is measured in years, complex industrial decisions and difficult political choices. Shipyards take five to ten years to build and equip. Pilot training programs last years. Logistics infrastructure — depots, fuel pipelines, command and control networks — requires investment patiently built over decades. The budgetary enthusiasm of 2026 will not translate into operational power before 2030 at the earliest for the most urgent investments.

This reality must not serve as an excuse for inaction. It must serve as a warning against the illusion that announcement replaces delivery. The $90 billion is worth something only if contracts are signed, deliveries met and soldiers trained. Europe has a long history of ambitious announcements followed by industrial disappointments — the delays of the NH90 helicopter program, the difficulties of the Eurofighter, the exploding costs of the Barracuda submarine. If the awakening of 2026 is to be different, it requires execution governance as rigorous as decision governance. It is often the operational details — contractual timelines, late penalties, verification mechanisms — that determine whether an announcement remains an announcement or becomes a reality.

The 5% of GDP objective: what it implies for citizens

The social translation of a military commitment

Reaching 5% of GDP on defense by 2035 in European countries necessarily implies painful trade-offs in national budgets. In Germany, where the 100 billion euro Sondervermögen was presented as an exceptional and temporary measure, moving to structural funding of 5% would mean either substantial tax increases, or cuts to social spending — or both. For left-wing European parties, which built their political identity on defending public services, this trade-off is politically perilous. For right-wing parties, often more favorable to defense spending but opposed to tax increases, it is a difficult internal contradiction to manage.

These tensions are not theoretical. In France, the 2026 defense budget sparked intense debates in Parliament over the balance between military investments and maintaining social allocations. In Spain and Italy, countries where defense spending has historically been low, reaching even 3% of GDP seems politically unlikely in the short term. This political reality does not simply vanish because leaders signed a declaration at a NATO summit. The real test of the credibility of the 5% commitment will play out in national budget negotiations, far from the spotlights of international conference rooms.

Defense as social investment, not only military

To make higher defense spending politically viable, European governments must change the narrative frame: defense is not an unproductive expenditure that diverts resources from social welfare — it is an investment in economic, industrial and human security that benefits society as a whole. The 150,000 direct and indirect jobs linked to the defense industry in France, the 400,000 in Germany, the hundreds of thousands in the United Kingdom are a concrete economic reality. Investments in military R&D have historically produced civilian innovations — from the Internet to GPS to composite materials and advanced communication systems.

This narrative reframing is necessary but insufficient. To be credible, governments must also demonstrate that defense investments are managed effectively — that contracts are awarded on performance criteria, that costs are controlled and deliveries met. Every cost overrun or delivery delay scandal weakens the political legitimacy of rearmament. The argument that defense money benefits citizens only holds if this money is actually well spent. This is a governance challenge as much as a political challenge — and a challenge that European democracies have often struggled to meet in the past.

Transatlantic industrial partnerships: cooperation or competition?

The geopolitics of defense contracts

When Poland buys American Abrams tanks, when Greece orders F-35s, when Belgium signs for F-35s as well, these decisions are not only military — they are deeply political. They signal a commitment to the American partner that goes beyond a simple equipment purchase. But they also create tension with the European ambition to develop an autonomous defense industrial base. If all NATO countries buy American to fulfill their 5% of GDP commitments, they strengthen American industrial power at the expense of the European industrial base — with long-term consequences on Europe's capacity to maintain its own production lines.

This dilemma is real and has no perfect solution. American purchases guarantee immediate interoperability and satisfy the most important political partner. European purchases support local industries but may introduce short-term capacity limitations and delays. The smartest answer is probably a combination: American purchases for equipment where Europe lacks equivalent capabilities (5th generation fighters, intercontinental ballistic missiles), and preferential European purchases for systems where continental industry is competitive (light armored vehicles, tactical drones, communication systems). This mixed strategy requires coordination between European allies that the EU and NATO have not yet truly institutionalized effectively.

The PURL program as a model for successful cooperation

The PURL mechanism illustrates what allied cooperation can produce when well-structured. By pooling contributions from 28 nations to fund arms purchases for Ukraine, it achieved economies of scale impossible through bilateral purchases. This logic — pooling resources for coordinated purchases — is precisely what European rearmament should reproduce at scale. If the $90 billion are spent in dispersed order, each country buying its own systems according to its own national criteria, the multiplier effect is lost. If, on the contrary, cooperation mechanisms inspired by PURL are deployed for European defense purchases, the strategic impact could be far greater than the sum of national investments.

The European Commission, under the pressure of geopolitical events since 2022, has accelerated its initiatives in this area. The EDIRPA regulation and its successor EDIP attempt to create financial incentives for group purchases of defense equipment. But these mechanisms remain timid relative to the scale of the challenge. For European rearmament to be truly transformative, it would require industrial cooperation mechanisms as ambitious as the European space program or the Airbus program — structures that create genuine industrial interdependencies rather than mere purchase coordinations. This is a long-term ambition, but the only one that will allow Europe to acquire genuine strategic autonomy over time.

Ukraine as accelerator: lessons European industry cannot ignore

Three years of war, three years of forced innovation

Since February 2022, Ukraine has conducted one of the most intense wartime industrial experiments of modern history. It has developed, tested, deployed and improved in real time systems of FPV drones, reconnaissance drones, long-range kamikaze drones and electronic warfare systems. The innovation cycle — from initial design to operational deployment — has gone from several years to a few weeks in some cases. This innovation speed is unprecedented in the recent military history of Western nations. European defense industries, with their ten to fifteen year acquisition cycles and heavy bureaucratic approval processes, cannot afford to ignore this model.

Ukrainian lessons are multiple and concrete. First, cheap drones in large numbers can saturate and neutralize expensive air defense systems — a revolution in the cost-effectiveness balance of offense versus defense. Second, electronic warfare has become as important as raw firepower — whoever controls the electromagnetic spectrum controls the battlefield. Third, open and distributed innovation — with dozens of small companies and engineering collectives contributing simultaneously — is more agile than large centralized acquisition programs. These lessons must inform how the $90 billion of European rearmament are spent, and more precisely how the European defense industry is structured and regulated to absorb them.

The necessary restructuring of the continental industrial base

The European defense industry is fragmented across dozens of national producers, often protected by national industrial policies that prevent mergers and rationalizations. Rheinmetall in Germany, Thales and KNDS in France, BAE Systems in the United Kingdom, Leonardo in Italy — these giants coexist with hundreds of specialized SMEs, many of which struggle to access the defense public markets of other member states. This fragmentation is not only economically inefficient — it is strategically dangerous. It prevents Europe from developing common platforms, limits economies of scale and makes the defense industrial base vulnerable to supply chain disruptions.

The rearmament of 2026 offers a unique window of opportunity to restructure this industrial base. European governments, by coordinating their purchases, can create powerful incentives for mergers, transnational industrial partnerships and the development of common platforms. This is what the MGCS combat tank program between France and Germany attempted — with results disappointing so far, it must be acknowledged. But the geopolitical pressure of 2026 is incomparably stronger than it was during the first discussions on MGCS. If this pressure is not enough to unlock industrial cooperation, nothing will. That would then be a sign that the announced European awakening is not yet fully real.

Conclusion: A real awakening, a still fragile conviction

90 billion: the beginning, not the end

The $90 billion in additional defense spending in 2025 is a milestone, not a destination. It marks the moment when Europe finally began translating its speeches on security into concrete budget lines. But the road to 5% of GDP by 2035 is still long. It will cross elections, economic crises, changes in American administration and probably unpredictable evolutions in the geopolitical context. Its solidity depends on internal conviction — not external pressure — that security deserves this investment.

This conviction, countries exposed to the Russian threat have had for a long time. The rest of Europe is building it, under the pressure of events. The work is not to deny this pressure — it is to make something lasting of it. To transform the spurt into strategy. The reaction into policy. The urgency into long-term culture. This is the challenge of our era. And the $90 billion of 2025, seen from this perspective, are not only a budget figure. They are the first bricks of an edifice whose solidity will be measured in a decade.

What we owe those who fight

One last thing. At the bottom of this editorial, there is a debt that figures do not measure. The debt toward Ukrainian soldiers who held the lines while Europe took its time to decide to rearm. Those who fell at Bakhmut, at Avdiivka, at Pokrovsk, while our finance ministers calculated whether cybersecurity spending could be counted as defense spending. Let us call him Alexei — one of those soldiers whose family writes to tell us that our debates over GDP percentages seem abstract when one buries a brother. Alexei cannot wait until 2035. His children, perhaps, will benefit from a reinforced Alliance. He paid in advance. This is a debt that $90 billion begins to repay. And that we will never fully settle.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning

This editorial is written from a pro-NATO, pro-Ukraine and pro-Western rearmament posture. The author unambiguously defends the necessity for Europe and Canada to increase defense spending toward 5% of GDP. He critiques the historical delay of this rearmament while acknowledging the real progress of 2025. Trump is treated as a necessary evil: his effects on European rearmament are recognized; his methods remain debatable. This author is not a journalist.

Methodology and sources

This editorial rests on dated and verifiable sources: Rutte's pre-ministerial press conference on nato.int (June 17, 2026), Hegseth's speech on war.gov (June 18, 2026), Ukrinform data (June 5, 2026), WSWS data (June 24, 2026), Simon Gros analyses (June 21, 2026). The Alexei line is used in a transparent rhetorical frame to embody the statistical reality of fallen Ukrainian soldiers.

Nature of the analysis

Argumentative opinion editorial. The author takes clear political positions and owns them. Reported facts are verifiable. Political and moral judgments are explicitly presented as such. Readers are invited to form their own opinion from cited sources.

Sources

Primary sources

Pre-ministerial press conference by Mark Rutte — data on 90 billion, nato.int — June 17, 2026

Remarks by Pete Hegseth at the NATO Defense Ministerial 2026, war.gov — June 18, 2026

Simon Gros — Ukraine Defence Group: Allies Move from Emergency Aid, simongros.org — June 21, 2026

Secondary sources

Ukrinform — Europe allocates nearly EUR 1.6B for drones for Ukraine, first four months 2026 — June 5, 2026

Simon Gros — NATO 3.0 and the Rebalancing of Transatlantic Defence, simongros.org — June 21, 2026

Modern Diplomacy — How Ukraine Became Europe's Most Important Defense Partner in 2026 — June 2, 2026

UK Defence Journal — Ukraine ahead of NATO allies on drones — June 20, 2026