ANALYSIS: Nammo delivers hundreds of thousands of N7 warheads — Ukrainian drones change their calibre

The Eurosatory 2026 revelation

On June 30, 2026, at the Eurosatory 2026 exhibition in Paris, a piece of information that deserved far more attention emerged almost quietly: Norwegian company Nammo revealed that it had delivered hundreds of thousands of N7 armour-piercing warheads to the Ukrainian Armed Forces for use on their loitering munition drones and FPV drones. Torstein Korsvold, Nammo's Director of Communications, confirmed this to Janes journalists at the exhibition. These deliveries have been taking place "for some time already."

This is not an announcement of a future project. These are munitions already delivered, already in use at the front, already piercing Russian armour. The revelation comes after the operational reality. And it is precisely this delay that speaks volumes: military aid to Ukraine often unfolds in silence, confirmed publicly only when operational security permits.

Hundreds of thousands of warheads. This figure represents a considerable strike capacity distributed across thousands of Ukrainian drones. When Nammo confirms these deliveries have been happening "for some time," it means Ukraine has been hitting Russian armour with N7s for months without the whole world knowing. That is war in its rawest state: effective, discreet, documented after the fact.

Technical specifications: 66mm, 1.5kg, 450mm penetration

The N7 is a shaped-charge munition of 66mm calibre, weighing 1.5kg. Its penetration capacity is 450mm of rolled homogeneous armour (RHA). To put that figure in perspective: most light Russian armoured vehicles — BTR, BMP, MT-LB — have armour ranging from 10 to 35mm. Even T-72 and T-80 tanks have lateral and roof armour well below 450mm. The N7 is designed to penetrate what drones most commonly encounter on a modern battlefield.

The N7's fuze is dual-mode: it can trigger at release from a loitering munition drone (vertical strike on the upper armour, the most vulnerable point of a tank) or on impact for direct-approach FPV drones. This functional duality is a major operational advantage: the same warhead can be used on two different types of platforms, simplifying the logistics chain and operator training.

The Eurosatory format: a demonstration against a Russian MLRS

At Eurosatory 2026, Nammo representatives showed Janes journalists a video demonstrating typical N7 use: a warhead dropped from a bombing drone striking a Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). The choice of demonstration target is not incidental. Russian MLRS — BM-21 Grad, BM-27 Uragan, BM-30 Smerch — are among the most lethal weapons against Ukrainian positions. Destroying them directly reduces the Russian artillery tempo.

One additional technical detail warrants attention: an exhibition photograph shows an Orca UAV drone equipped with an N7 anti-tank explosive fragmentation warhead with copper cone. The Orca is a Ukrainian bombing drone — direct proof that N7 integration on Ukrainian platforms is not theoretical; it is operational and displayed without ambiguity at an international exhibition.

Displaying at Eurosatory a Ukrainian drone armed with a Norwegian warhead alongside a video destroying a Russian MLRS — that is a statement as much as a technical demonstration. Nammo is telling the world: we support Ukraine, our munitions work, and we are not ashamed to show it. That is the kind of moral clarity I value in this conflict.

Quantities running into six figures

Nammo confirmed that N7s have been sold to Ukraine in "six-figure quantities." In plain terms: at minimum 100,000 warheads, potentially several hundred thousand. For context: if Ukraine operates as few as 10,000 active FPV drones per week (a conservative figure given published estimates), 100,000 N7 warheads represent about ten weeks of operations at that tempo. If the figures exceed 300,000 or 400,000, that is several months of anti-armour strike autonomy.

These figures illustrate a major evolution in the drone war: it is no longer a niche weapon reserved for special missions. It is a mass weapon. Ukrainian FPV drones have destroyed thousands of documented Russian armoured vehicles since 2022. With N7 warheads capable of penetrating 450mm RHA, their effectiveness against heavy armour has grown considerably.

Nammo in April 2026: SOHG grenades also delivered

The N7 announcement is not the first recent Nammo delivery to Ukraine to be revealed. In April 2026, the Norwegian company had delivered its final Scalable Offensive Hand Grenade (SOHG) systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Nammo has thus established itself as a regular, reliable, and diversified supplier of Ukraine's arsenal — not only for drones but for infantry as well.

This pattern of diversified deliveries reveals a strategy: Nammo has decided that Ukraine is a long-term partner, not merely an occasional customer. By investing in the commercial relationship and adapting its products to the specific needs of the Ukrainian conflict, Nammo is building a presence that will last well beyond the current war — whether for reconstruction, post-conflict defence, or exports to other defence markets.

Nammo is a defence company. It makes profits. I acknowledge that without reservation. But in this specific case, commercial interests and strategic interests are perfectly aligned: Nammo makes money supplying munitions that allow Ukraine to destroy Russian armour and save Ukrainian lives. When the market serves justice, I have no philosophical objection.

FPV drones before the N7: limited effectiveness against heavy armour

Before the large-scale adoption of N7 warheads, Ukrainian FPV drones were primarily equipped with improvised anti-tank warheads, often derived from RPG grenades or adapted commercial warheads. These munitions had variable penetration capabilities — sometimes insufficient against the frontal armour of Russian tanks, more effective on flanks and from above.

With 450mm RHA penetration, the N7 exceeds the lateral and roof protections of most Russian tanks in active service. The T-72B3, for example, has roof armour of 22 to 45mm depending on the version and reactive armour additions. The N7, dropped vertically from a hovering loitering munition, strikes precisely this vulnerability. This is why the "loitering munition drone equipped with N7" format has become one of the most documented tank-destruction methods on the Ukrainian front.

The drone war in 2026: industrialisation of anti-armour capabilities

What the delivery of hundreds of thousands of N7 warheads reveals is that the drone war in Ukraine has reached a level of industrialisation and professionalisation that far exceeds the improvised stage of the early years. Military-grade Norwegian warheads, factory-produced, delivered in six-figure quantities, integrated onto standardised Ukrainian drones — this is no longer improvisation.

This level of industrialisation is confirmed by other data: United24 reported that 95% of Ukrainian arms procurement in 2026 came from domestic industry. This means the drones carrying the N7s are overwhelmingly made in Ukraine, while the warheads equipping them can come from foreign partners like Nammo. It is an intelligent hybrid supply chain: Ukrainian platform, Western munition.

There is something symbolically powerful in this image: a drone built in Ukraine, armed with a Norwegian warhead, piloted by a Ukrainian soldier, destroying a Russian tank. Three countries involved in a single strike lasting a few seconds. That is Western solidarity made concrete, measurable, and destructive to the adversary. That is what real military aid looks like.

Displaying Ukraine-bound weapons at an international exhibition

Revealing at Eurosatory 2026 that hundreds of thousands of warheads have been delivered to Ukraine is a political act, not merely a commercial one. Eurosatory is one of the world's largest defence exhibitions, with buyers and delegations from every country. Explicitly displaying weapons destined for Ukraine alongside videos of Russian equipment being destroyed is an unambiguous statement of position.

Norway is a NATO member. It shares a land border with Russia in the Arctic region. Its commitment to Ukraine is therefore both strategic and existential: if Russia wins in Ukraine, the implications for Norwegian security are direct. Nammo, by displaying its Ukrainian deliveries at an international exhibition, participates in its country's strategic communication — while developing its commercial capabilities in a rapidly growing defence market.

What the delayed revelation implies about operational security

The fact that these deliveries were not announced before Eurosatory 2026 illustrates a normal operational security practice: not revealing to the adversary the available capabilities before they are deployed at scale. Had Russia known from the outset that Ukraine possessed hundreds of thousands of N7 warheads, it could have adapted its tactics, its vehicle formations, its supplemental reactive armour.

The public revelation now comes because the N7 is already an established fact on the battlefield. Russian military personnel have known for some time, through direct experience, that Ukrainian drones possess serious anti-armour capabilities. The public disclosure at Eurosatory therefore holds diplomatic and commercial value, not operational value: it tells potential buyers "here is a combat-proven product" — the most powerful certification stamp in the defence industry.

"Combat-proven" — that phrase is worth billions in the defence industry. Contracts are being won on Ukrainian battlefields right now. Nammo understood that. And its decision to support Ukraine is not only moral — it is also the best marketing investment a weapons manufacturer can make in 2026. I say this without cynicism: when commercial interest and moral interest converge, that is good news.

From total dependence to near-autonomy in four years

In February 2022, Ukraine produced virtually no significant military drones. It was entirely dependent on Western deliveries — Turkish Bayraktar TB2s, adapted commercial drones, American equipment. Four years later, 95% of its arms procurement comes from domestic industry, according to data reported by United24 in 2026. This transformation is one of the most remarkable in recent military industrial history.

This near-autonomy has a major strategic implication: Ukraine is far less vulnerable to allies' political hesitations regarding its supply of munitions and platforms. It can build the drones that carry the N7s itself. It can adjust their specifications based on field needs within weeks. This responsiveness is an advantage that no conventional army — including those of NATO — has managed to develop as quickly.

Nammo warheads in Ukraine's drone ecosystem

The delivery of N7s by Nammo illustrates a complementarity model: Ukraine produces the platforms, allies supply the specialised munitions. This is more efficient than trying to do everything in Ukraine (some warheads require complex industrial processes that Ukraine is developing but has not yet fully mastered), and more autonomous than depending on allies for everything.

Other drone munition suppliers for Ukraine exist within the allied defence network — Czech, Polish, Baltic, and now Norwegian manufacturers. This ecosystem of diversified suppliers makes Ukraine's supply chain resilient: if one supplier faces production problems or political constraints, others can compensate. Diversification is Ukraine's answer to its inevitable dependence on external partners for certain critical munitions.

The Ukraine of 2026 looks nothing like the Ukraine of 2022 in terms of defence industry. It went from zero to 95% autonomy in four years of total war. Had this same energy and urgency been applied in peacetime, Ukraine would already rank among the world's leading exporters of military technologies. The war was a brutal and unjust accelerant — but that is what it produced.

The supply chain in a war zone

Shipping hundreds of thousands of N7 warheads from Nammo's Norwegian factories to drone operators at the Ukrainian front requires complex logistics. The munitions must cross several borders, pass through intermediate depots, be redistributed to drone units, and be integrated onto platforms under often difficult conditions. This logistics chain, if disrupted, can cancel out the capability advantage the N7s provide.

Ukraine has developed remarkable logistics skills since 2022. Managing arms and munition flows from dozens of different countries, with varying formats and packaging, has become an expertise in its own right. The progressive standardisation of drone munition formats — including the N7 with its 66mm calibre, widely compatible with Ukrainian launchers — simplifies this logistics and reduces the risk of distribution errors.

Maintenance and operator training

Introducing professional munitions like the N7 in large quantities also requires operator training. FPV drones and loitering munition drones have different arming and release modes depending on the warheads used. The N7's dual-mode fuze — triggering at release or on impact — requires correct programming depending on the type of drone used. Misconfigured, the fuze can either trigger prematurely or fail to activate on impact.

These technical constraints are not insurmountable obstacles. They require training, standardised procedures, and systematic field feedback between units. The Ukrainian army has demonstrated, since 2022, an ability to learn and adapt to new systems that surpasses most conventional armies. The N7 is one more system in this ongoing learning process — and with hundreds of thousands of units available, time for training will not be lacking.

Training soldiers on new munitions while at war is an impossible exercise in classical military doctrine. Ukraine has been doing it continuously for four years. Every new system delivered — HIMARS, NASAMS, F-16s, now N7s in mass — is integrated faster than the adversary anticipates. This agility may be Zelensky's real secret weapon.

Available alternatives on the market

The N7 is not the only anti-tank warhead designed for drones on the market. Other manufacturers offer similar solutions — shaped-charge munitions adapted to the small format of FPV drones. But the specific combination of the N7 — 66mm, 1.5kg, 450mm RHA, dual-mode fuze — makes it a particularly well-suited option for the Ukrainian operational profile. The 66mm calibre matches many Ukrainian standard launchers, reducing compatibility issues.

Other warheads of Soviet or Russian design, recovered or adapted, have also been used by Ukrainian drone operators. But the limitations of these improvised options — quality variability, lack of fuze standardisation, uncertain penetration capability — have pushed the Ukrainian Armed Forces toward certified professional munitions like the N7. The professionalisation of Ukraine's drone war also runs through the professionalisation of its munitions.

The cost-effectiveness ratio: the economic argument for N7s

In a war of attrition, the cost-effectiveness ratio of weapons systems is a determining factor. A Ukrainian FPV drone costs on average between 500 and 2,000 dollars depending on its sophistication. An N7 warhead is estimated at a few thousand dollars at most. Against a T-72 tank valued between 1 and 3 million dollars, or an armoured vehicle at 200,000 to 500,000 dollars, the equation is clearly favourable to Ukraine. Russia spends far more than Ukraine for each exchange of this type.

This economic imbalance is one of the reasons why the drone war is strategically so favourable to Ukraine. Russia must replace every destroyed tank at a cost ten to fifty times higher than the strike that destroyed it. Multiplied by thousands of documented strikes, this gap represents considerable economic pressure on Russian defence industry — already under pressure to reconstitute its losses while maintaining missile and drone production.

The economic calculation of Ukraine's drone war is brutal and simple: destroy a two-million-dollar Russian tank with a thousand-dollar drone and an N7 warhead worth a few thousand — that is a ratio of roughly 1 to 200 in Ukraine's favour. Russia can absorb that. But not indefinitely. And every month that passes, the gap widens.

What hundreds of thousands of warheads mean for what comes next

Hundreds of thousands of N7 warheads delivered to Ukraine represent an anti-armour strike capability distributed across thousands of drones on a front spanning hundreds of kilometres. This mass of professional anti-armour munitions, integrated into increasingly sophisticated Ukrainian platforms, redefines the armoured combat equation on the Ukrainian front.

For Russia, this means its tanks and armoured vehicles are threatened not only by heavy weapons systems (anti-tank missiles, artillery), but by swarms of low-cost drones operated with armour-piercing munitions capable of penetrating the vast majority of their armour. The cost-effectiveness ratio of a 500-dollar FPV drone equipped with a 1,500-dollar N7 warhead against a 3-million-dollar Russian tank is relentless.

Nammo, symbol of a Europe learning to support Ukraine for real

The Nammo revelation at Eurosatory 2026 is also a symbol of the growing maturity of European military aid to Ukraine. It is no longer merely declarations of solidarity. These are hundreds of thousands of warheads already delivered, already in use, already documented. Norway, through Nammo, has decided that Ukraine deserves large-scale industrial support, not just symbolic backing. And this industrial support is precisely what makes the difference between an army that holds and one that collapses.

Hundreds of thousands of N7s. Drones striking Russian tanks from above, where the armour is thinnest. That is the war of 2026 — technological, industrial, asymmetric. And in this war, Ukraine is no longer the David of 2022. It is becoming a distributed firepower that Russia does not know how to stop.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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