PROFILE: Rafael Grossi, the man who must verify the unverifiable against Iran

Tokyo, June 2026: a statement that puts everything at stake

It was from Tokyo, on the margins of an international meeting, that Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), spoke these words: "This agreement expressly indicates that inspections will take place." The sentence seems innocuous. It is not. It was the direct response to the total confusion surrounding the true scope of the memorandum of understanding concluded between Washington and Tehran regarding IAEA inspectors' access to Iranian nuclear facilities.

While Grossi spoke from Tokyo with carefully measured diplomatic precision, in Tehran the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmaeil Baghaei, flatly denied everything: Iran had "not invited the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities." At the same time, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi wrote on X that "no meeting had taken place with Grossi in Switzerland," despite the IAEA's request, and that "there is no plan for access to the attacked facilities or to nuclear materials."

Two readings of the same text

This is the heart of the Grossi problem: he is the guardian of an agreement whose reality is contested by the very party he is meant to monitor. The memorandum of understanding signed between the United States and Iran — which codifies IAEA access to Iranian nuclear sites — is interpreted differently in Washington, Vienna, and Tehran. Grossi says inspections "will take place." Iran says there is no invitation. Trump says an agreement exists. The Iranian regime says its attacked sites — a reference to Israeli strikes — cannot be inspected "without a final agreement."

To understand who Rafael Grossi is, one must understand this: he leads an agency whose primary mission — verifying that states are not secretly building nuclear bombs — depends entirely on the goodwill of the states it monitors. And Iran has been, for twenty years, the perfect demonstration that this goodwill can be systematically manipulated.

There is something profoundly human about Grossi's position: he is the man who must believe in words in a world where words are weapons. Every statement he makes from Tokyo commits the credibility of the institution he represents. And every Iranian denial is a direct attack not only on him, but on the very principle of non-proliferation. I do not envy him.

A career built on patience and technical expertise

Rafael Mariano Grossi is an Argentine diplomat born in 1961. His career at the IAEA dates to the 1990s. He joined the organization as a legal counsel, rising through the ranks with recognized expertise in international nuclear law, non-proliferation treaties, and inspection modalities. He was elected IAEA Director General in October 2019, succeeding Egyptian Yukiya Amano. His election was relatively consensual in an already tense geopolitical environment.

His style is that of a discreet technocrat who favors precise statements over thundering formulas. He speaks Spanish, English, and French with fluency that reflects decades of diplomatic multilingualism. His method is one of persistent dialogue: keep channels open, frame technical requirements with precision, and avoid giving Iran or anyone else a pretext to walk away. It is an approach that has virtues — and deep limits when facing a regime that uses precisely these diplomatic forms to buy time.

The IAEA he leads: an institution under permanent pressure

The IAEA is an international organization founded in 1957, headquartered in Vienna. Its mandate is dual: promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To fulfill this mission, it operates an inspection system based on safeguards agreements negotiated with each member state. These agreements only work if the state cooperates. That is the fundamental limit: the IAEA has no police powers. It cannot force access.

Under Grossi's leadership, the IAEA has published successively more alarming reports on Iran. In 2023, the agency discovered traces of uranium enriched to 84 % — a hair's breadth from weapons-grade — at the Fordow facilities. These revelations were each time followed by Iranian protests, secret negotiations, and "commitments" to cooperate never fully honored. Grossi has navigated these troubled waters with a measured caution that earned him both praise and criticism for his supposed timidity.

I find Grossi's position morally uncomfortable in the best sense of the term. He cannot claim victory without having the inspections. He cannot admit failure without torpedoing negotiations. He is condemned to constructive ambiguity — that diplomatic formula which consists of keeping hope alive without guaranteeing an outcome. That is the price of an international institution that still wants to have influence in a world where authoritarian regimes scorn its injunctions.

The forbidden sites: what Tehran does not want to show

At the heart of the June 2026 crisis lies a specific and highly technical question: access to nuclear sites that have been attacked. Strikes — attributed to Israel — damaged several Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran is refusing IAEA inspectors access to these sites "without a final agreement." Why? Because the damage would reveal the true extent of the nuclear activities Iran conducted at those installations, activities that may have gone far beyond what Tehran declared.

Non-proliferation experts, including David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, have warned against the illusion that the US-Iran memorandum of understanding would be sufficient to guarantee real access. Albright underscored that Iran's contradictory statements — invite or not invite the IAEA — "color his reading of the MoU." That is not gratuitous pessimism: it is the observation drawn from a twenty-year documented history of systematic concealment.

Enrichment at 60 %: the threshold of indecency

Before the Israeli strikes, Iran had enriched uranium to 60 % purity, well above the 3.67 % prescribed under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and just below the 90 % required for a military weapon. According to experts, with that stockpile of 60 % uranium, Iran was weeks — not months — from the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile material. IAEA inspectors documented those stockpiles. But documenting is not preventing.

The IAEA's problem under Grossi is structural: the agency can report what it sees, flag anomalies, pass resolutions at the Board of Governors — but it cannot stop a military nuclear program if the host state decides not to cooperate. Iran understood that long ago. Concealment does not consist of blocking all access, which would be too conspicuous. It consists of delaying, obfuscating, and compartmentalizing — ensuring the IAEA is always slightly behind the real state of the program.

Twenty years of negotiations with Tehran have produced what? A well-advanced Iranian nuclear program, documented uranium enriched to 60 %, potentially inaccessible underground sites, and an exhausted international nuclear diplomacy. I do not blame Grossi personally — he inherits a structurally flawed situation. But I refuse to pretend that "inspections will take place" is a sufficient guarantee when Iran simultaneously denies having agreed to anything.

Grossi in Tokyo: the optimistic version

From Tokyo, Grossi has maintained a posture that could be called institutional cautious optimism. He affirms that the agreement with the United States "expressly indicates" that inspections will take place. He refuses to give a precise timetable — doing so would expose the IAEA to swift embarrassment if inspections do not occur on time. His communication is carefully calibrated to maintain pressure without slamming the door.

That is a professionally defensible posture. It keeps negotiations alive, avoids giving Iran a pretext to permanently withdraw from the process, and preserves the IAEA's credibility as an indispensable interlocutor. The problem is that it also creates the appearance of diplomatic validation of an agreement whose substance remains deeply contested. Every "inspections will take place" from Grossi is also cover for a US-Iran deal whose real details remain opaque.

Tehran: the version that demolishes everything

Deputy Minister Gharibabadi is unequivocal: no meeting with Grossi in Switzerland. No plan for access to attacked sites. No transfer of nuclear materials before a final agreement. Iranian state news agency IRNA ran the headline in bold: "No plan for access to facilities without a final agreement." That is not a nuance. It is a declaration of blockage.

Non-proliferation experts highlight a troubling consistency in this Iranian strategy: Tehran in principle accepts international monitoring, systematically refuses its concrete implementation, and uses each denial to extract new political and economic concessions. It is the pattern observed since the revelation of the Natanz enrichment site in 2002, through the 2015 JCPOA negotiations, up to the "agreements" of 2026. The curtain changes; the play remains the same.

I must admit: I do not know whether the 2026 US-Iran agreement is a real step forward or a repetition of the diplomatic farce of the past twenty years. What I do know is that every time the West believed it had "a deal" with Tehran on nuclear issues, it found itself with commitments Iran interprets differently, inspections that never materialize, and a nuclear program that keeps advancing. The benefit of the doubt has its limits.

Every formulation as a strategic signal

In nuclear diplomacy, words carry a weight that non-specialists may underestimate. When Grossi says "inspections will take place," he is not certain they will. He is certain that the agreement provides for them — which is different. The distinction between "provided for" and "effective" is precisely the space in which Iran has operated for two decades. This careful language is institutionally necessary to maintain engagement — but it can also create an illusion of certainty that the non-specialist public absorbs as a guarantee.

Grossi's words from Tokyo have an international audience. They are heard by Western governments that backed the US-Iran deal, by Israel which watched it with skepticism, by Gulf states that observe Iran with fear, and by Tehran which monitors every statement for leverage points. In this context, calculated ambiguity is a diplomatic tool — it keeps all doors open. But it can also be perceived as naivety dressed as sophistication.

The vague timetable: a telling absence

What is striking in Grossi's statements is the complete absence of any timetable. Inspections "will take place" — when? In what form? With access to exactly which sites? These questions have received no concrete answer. In a file where every week counts — where Iran can enrich uranium to 90 % in a few additional weeks — the absence of a timetable is not a trivial omission. It reflects an impossibility: Grossi cannot give a timetable that Tehran has not agreed to.

Experts cited in analyses by Fox News and other specialized media identify this gap as the central weakness of the arrangement. An agreement on "principles" with no enforcement mechanism or binding timetable is not a verification agreement — it is a statement of intent. And the history of Iranian nuclear diplomacy is paved with statements of intent never honored.

When Grossi carefully avoids giving a date, I think of the phrase that has become sadly iconic in international diplomacy: "We'll see." That is the sign that the party who must grant access — Iran — has not yet truly said yes. That is not Grossi's fault. It is the fault of an agreement negotiated in political haste, with terms vague enough for each side to claim victory. Ambiguity is another name for deferred failure.

The IAEA's formal powers

The IAEA has an arsenal of formal measures available in cases of non-cooperation. It can pass a Board of Governors resolution declaring a state in "non-compliance" with its obligations. It can refer the matter to the UN Security Council. These mechanisms have been used against Iran — with limited effect, since Russia and China have regularly blocked Security Council sanctions. Grossi can publish detailed reports on Iranian violations — which he does — but translating those reports into political action belongs to member states.

Grossi's real power is a power of narrative legitimacy: it is his agency that certifies or fails to certify that commitments are being honored. In a world where nuclear diplomacy depends on international consensus, his word carries considerable weight. When Grossi says "inspections will take place," he deploys that institutional legitimacy to maintain political pressure on Iran. The question is whether that pressure is sufficient.

Institutional and political constraints

Grossi operates in an environment where his room for maneuver is doubly constrained. On one side, Western powers — the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany — need the IAEA to validate their diplomatic agreements with Iran in order to defend them politically at home. This creates a subtle institutional pressure for Grossi to maintain an optimistic posture. On the other, he must preserve the IAEA's technical credibility by not making guarantees he cannot keep.

The Iranian file is all the more complex because Israeli strikes have created a new variable. If facilities have been damaged and nuclear materials are dispersed or hidden, inspections might find nothing — not because Iran is cooperating, but because evidence has been concealed in the post-strike confusion. That is precisely why Iran refuses access "without a final agreement": it controls what inspectors will see — or will not see.

Here is Grossi's paradox: he represents the most competent institution in the world for assessing a nuclear program, but he can only assess it if the state he monitors opens its doors. Iran manages that access as a strategic resource — to be granted in exchange for concessions, to be withdrawn as a sign of displeasure. The IAEA is held hostage by its own dependence on cooperation. That is the structural tragedy of non-proliferation.

What a military-nuclear Iran would change

If Iran were to cross the threshold and test a nuclear weapon, the consequences for international security would be profound and lasting. Saudi Arabia has already signaled that if Iran gets the bomb, Riyadh would seek the same capability. Egypt and Turkey could follow. Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East — a region already marked by instability — represents an existential risk for global balance. That is before considering Israel, which has demonstrated its willingness to act militarily to prevent that scenario.

In this context, Grossi's work is not merely technical or institutional. It is existential for international stability. Every day the IAEA maintains a thin thread of surveillance over the Iranian program is a day in which the race toward the bomb is at least partially visible. Losing that thread — through a rupture with Iran or through the collapse of the verification mechanism — would be a catastrophe for global non-proliferation.

The future of non-proliferation in question

The Iranian file raises a broader question than Grossi himself: can the non-proliferation regime survive its own structural limits? The NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) rests on an exchange principle: non-nuclear states renounce the bomb in exchange for access to civilian nuclear energy and disarmament commitments from nuclear powers. Iran has used this system to develop dual-use capabilities while maintaining a facade of compliance.

North Korea simply slammed the NPT door shut and built its bomb. Iran has adopted a more sophisticated strategy: remaining formally within the treaty while developing the capabilities that allow it to circumvent it. Against these strategies, the IAEA is a useful but insufficient shield. The real shield must be political — sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and as a last resort, military action. Grossi knows this. But it is not his role to say so.

I think of Grossi facing the cameras from Tokyo, weighing every word, and I wonder: what does his night look like? Does he know the Iranians are lying? Yes, probably. Can he say so publicly without torpedoing negotiations? No. Does he sincerely believe inspections will take place? Perhaps — career diplomats have a capacity to sustain hope that cynics like me both admire and dread. But hope is not a nuclear policy.

Nuclear non-proliferation is the file where I lose the most of my analytical certainties. Neither sanctions nor diplomacy nor the military threat seems sufficient to deter a determined regime. And yet the alternative — letting Tehran cross the threshold without reaction — is worse. Grossi embodies that paradox with a dignity I admire without being able to resolve the dilemma he represents.

Sanctions and their real effectiveness

The Iranian file has put the effectiveness of international sanctions to the test over two decades. The UN, US, and European Union sanctions regimes have unquestionably weighed on Iran's economy — inflation, currency devaluation, difficulties accessing international financial markets. But they have not stopped uranium enrichment. Tehran has learned to circumvent, adapt, and survive despite the restrictions.

The fundamental question raised by Iran's resilience against sanctions is crucial for Western foreign policy: to what extent can economic pressure modify the behavior of a regime that regards its nuclear program as a matter of existential survival? The answer, for now, is uncomfortable — not as much as had been hoped. That finding should force an honest reassessment of pressure strategies.

Grossi between hope and institutional realism

Rafael Grossi declared that the IAEA was continuing to monitor developments in the Iranian nuclear program with the utmost vigilance. That diplomatic formulation masks a reality inspectors know well: access to key facilities is restricted, surveillance cameras have been removed by Iran, and enrichment capacity has reached unprecedented levels. What the IAEA can monitor today is a fraction of what it should ideally observe.

The institution Grossi leads remains nonetheless indispensable precisely because it maintains a thin thread of international legitimacy. That thread can serve as an anchor for a future negotiation if political conditions change. Losing that thread — through a formal rupture between the IAEA and Tehran — would reduce even further the visibility over a program whose growing opacity is already alarming.

I am among those who believe Grossi is doing the hardest job in international diplomacy: keeping a credible institution alive in the face of an actor that respects it in appearance while circumventing it in practice. That is not naivety on his part — it is institutional realism. Without the IAEA, we would know even less about what Tehran is doing. And in non-proliferation, ignorance is always the worst scenario.

What Grossi represents

Rafael Grossi represents the best and the worst of multilateral diplomacy. The best: impeccable technical expertise, institutional patience that keeps channels open when everyone else wants to close them, international legitimacy that gives weight to every statement. The worst: a structural dependence on the cooperation of those he is meant to control, communication calibrated to maintain hope without guaranteeing it, an institution whose powers stop precisely where state sovereignty begins.

He is the indispensable man of a mission that surpasses him. Not for lack of competence — but because the mission itself is designed to be insufficient against regimes determined to deceive. The real question about the US-Iran agreement is not "Is Grossi telling the truth?" The real question is: "Is Iran telling the truth?" And to that question, twenty years of history provide an unequivocal answer.

What the world must demand

The international community — and the West in particular — cannot be satisfied with diplomatic assurances from even the most competent individual. It must demand binding verification mechanisms with precise timetables, automatic sanctions in case of non-compliance, and the political will to enforce them even at the risk of a diplomatic rupture. The Iranian nuclear file is not a technical problem Grossi can solve alone. It is a political challenge that Western democracies must have the courage to confront — even when it is costly.

Rafael Grossi is ready to verify. The question is whether Iran is ready to be verified. And on that question, every statement from Tokyo must be read alongside the denials from Tehran — both at the same time, without comforting oneself with one to forget the other.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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