OPINION: Berlin, the Five, and Europe's Silent Test of Will Ahead of Ankara

One room, five countries, and a question with no safety net

On June 24, 2026, in Berlin, five European heads of government sat down at the same table. Friedrich Merz (Germany), Emmanuel Macron (France), Keir Starmer (United Kingdom, still serving as outgoing prime minister), Giorgia Meloni (Italy), and Donald Tusk (Poland). NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte joined by videoconference from Washington. The question was simple and unsparing: what does Europe do with NATO if the United States continues to pull back?

This informal summit of the E5 group — the five most significant European military powers — took place thirteen days before the official NATO summit in Ankara, scheduled for July 7 and 8, 2026. The agenda was not ceremonial. It was strategic. The commitments made in Berlin — on long-range weapons, air defense, military artificial intelligence, the gradual absorption of American capabilities — represent the most concrete document Europe has produced since the start of the war in Ukraine on the subject of its own defense autonomy.

There is something profoundly different about this Berlin summit. It is not a statement of intent. It is numbered commitments, named systems, concrete budget lines. Europe was no longer waiting to be reassured by Washington — it was beginning to calculate what it can do without Washington. That is a shift in mindset that nobody would have thought possible in 2022.

Why the German host matters more than the setting

Friedrich Merz's choice to host this summit is not incidental. Germany is Europe's dominant economic power, and for decades it distinguished itself by its post-World War II military restraint. Chancellor Merz, by organizing this gathering of the Five in Berlin and openly declaring "The message to Russia is clear: Ukraine remains strong," is assuming a leadership posture that his predecessors — notably Olaf Scholz — carefully avoided. That change in tone was noticed in Moscow, in Kyiv, and in Washington.

Germany had been criticized as early as 2022 for its hesitation to deliver Leopard tanks to Ukraine. By 2025, it had become the second largest military contributor to Ukraine after the United States. The decision to commit 3% of GDP to defense — a threshold only Poland was meeting among the major NATO countries — reflects a structural transformation. The Berlin summit, under Merz's leadership, is the formalization of that transformation into a collective posture.

The chosen date: thirteen days before Ankara

Holding this E5 summit on June 24, precisely 13 days before the official NATO summit in Ankara, is not a default scheduling decision. It is a positioning strategy. By establishing a common European position before the NATO summit, the Five arrive in Ankara not as separate delegations that can be divided, but as a bloc that has already aligned its positions on the key points: a 5% of GDP defense target, long-range weapons for Ukraine, integrated air defense, shared military AI capabilities.

The Ankara summit will bring together 32 NATO members — including Erdogan's Turkey, which has played an ambiguous mediating role between Moscow and Kyiv throughout the war. Arriving united at that meeting, with commitments already sealed in Berlin, considerably strengthens the Europeans' ability to resist Turkish maneuvering or the internal divisions that Russian diplomacy systematically seeks to exploit.

Thirteen days. That is not arbitrary in the machinery of diplomacy. It is close enough to Ankara for the message to remain fresh, and far enough for delegations to work through their positions. Merz understood that European cohesion is not decreed on the day of a summit — it is built beforehand, quietly, with concrete commitments. That is grown-up diplomacy.

Spain absent — and what that absence means

Pedro Sánchez's Spain was not in Berlin. That absence is not accidental. The Spanish government refused to commit to the 5% of GDP defense target, a threshold that the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague had established as a horizon for 2035. For Sánchez, politically dependent on left-wing coalition partners opposed to any increased militarization, that commitment was politically impossible. Madrid prefers to negotiate a separate threshold for countries geographically more distant from the Russian front.

Spain's exclusion from the E5 circle sets a precedent. It means the informal format can function as a pressure mechanism: countries that do not commit to the core objectives remain outside the leadership decisions. That is not without risk — a NATO with two speeds, a hard core that makes the decisions and a periphery that absorbs them, is a potential source of long-term tension. But it is also the only way to push concrete commitments forward when unanimity is impossible.

The €70 billion for Ukraine and the question of sustainability

The E5 summit also addressed the mobilization of 70 billion euros for Ukraine over two years — a figure that represents significant ambition but whose financing mechanisms remain to be detailed. Part of it would come from the revenues of Russian assets frozen in Europe, estimated at around 300 billion euros, whose annual interest already partially funds weapons purchases for Kyiv. Another part would come from renewed bilateral commitments and potentially from new common European financial instruments.

The sustainability of this support is the real question. The United States has provided Ukraine with more than 175 billion dollars in aid since 2022. If the Trump administration slows or conditions that support further, Europe will have to compensate for a growing share. The figure of 70 billion over two years is ambitious — but it covers only a fraction of the current spending rate in Ukraine. The challenge at Ankara will be to translate these political commitments into binding budget lines.

Seventy billion over two years. The figure impresses — until you calculate the daily cost of the war. Ukraine burns through resources at a rate that even its most generous allies struggle to match. Berlin set a floor. Ankara will have to decide whether that floor is enough, or whether Europe is prepared to go further. Both answers are possible. Only one is equal to the moment.

Coordination on long-range weapons — a step toward autonomy

One of the most concrete commitments from the Berlin summit concerns the coordination of long-range weapons deliveries to Ukraine. The United Kingdom delivered Storm Shadow missiles. France provided SCALP-EG missiles. Germany delivered Taurus missiles — after lengthy internal debates. In Berlin, the five countries committed to coordinating these deliveries, harmonizing rules of engagement, and developing shared long-range strike capabilities across Europe.

That coordination matters because it addresses one of the central criticisms of aid to Ukraine: deliveries are fragmented, with different rules of use depending on the country, which complicates the training of Ukrainian forces and their operational integration. A coordinated approach would allow Ukraine to maximize the effectiveness of these systems in the field. It would also send a signal to Moscow: Europe will not drip-feed its weapons with variable conditions, but will do so within a collective strategy.

What the agreement does not yet specify

What the Berlin communiqué does not specify: the exact range of the weapons in question, the delivery volumes, and above all the rules of engagement for strikes on Russian territory. These details are not trivial — they concretely define what Ukraine can do with the weapons provided. Since the start of the war, some allies have imposed restrictions that limit Ukraine's ability to strike Russian logistics depots, launch bases, and military infrastructure inside Russia.

The lifting of those restrictions has been gradual but remains incomplete. Germany authorized the use of Taurus missiles against targets on Russian soil in 2025, after months of internal political resistance. The United Kingdom and France did so earlier. But the legal and political framework for these authorizations remains vague in public communication. Berlin may have aligned positions — the operational details still belong to each capital individually.

Long-range weapons delivered with restrictions on use are half-delivered weapons. Ukraine knows it. Its commanders have said so publicly. Coordinating deliveries is genuine progress. But if the rules of engagement remain inconsistent and unpublished, the coordination remains incomplete. Berlin laid a brick. Ankara will have to build the wall.

Taking over American capabilities

One of the most structurally significant commitments from the Berlin summit concerns air defense. The Five agreed to "gradually take over American capabilities" — diplomatic language for saying that Europe is preparing for a scenario where the United States reduces its presence in the defense of NATO's eastern flank. That takeover implies massive investment: Patriot systems, THAAD, Arrow, long-range surveillance radars, integrated command-and-control networks — these capabilities cost tens of billions of euros and require years of deployment.

Europe already has some of these systems, but not in sufficient numbers to cover the entire eastern flank from Scandinavia to the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, and Moldova. Poland is among the best equipped, with its massive investments in Patriot PAC-3 systems. But the coherence of an integrated defense network at the European level remains to be built. Berlin identified the ambition; Ankara will have to validate the concrete commitments.

Military AI: the next frontier of coordination

The Berlin summit also addressed the development of common military artificial intelligence capabilities — a domain where NATO is falling into a concerning lag behind China, and where even the United States struggles to move fast enough. The application of AI to modern warfare covers domains ranging from real-time intelligence analysis to drone trajectory optimization, early detection of missile strikes, and automated coordination of air-defense systems.

The war in Ukraine has already produced military AI innovations that Western allies are following closely. Ukrainian drones use autonomous guidance systems that function even under GPS jamming. Detection and interception systems integrate machine-learning algorithms to distinguish decoys from real targets. That Ukrainian experience is a resource that the Berlin Five have every interest in incorporating into their own development programs. The Berlin agreement on military AI is a signal — the details will emerge from the technical work between general staffs.

Military artificial intelligence is not an option for the future — it is a reality of the present. Ukraine has been practicing it in live conditions since 2022. Europeans signing declarations of intent in Berlin must urgently incorporate Ukrainian lessons into their programs. Otherwise they are investing in technologies that will already be obsolete compared to what Kyiv has developed under fire.

Starmer present, but outgoing

Keir Starmer was in Berlin on June 24, 2026 as the outgoing prime minister of the United Kingdom. A general election had just taken place; a new government was being formed. His presence at this summit is therefore both real — he signed the commitments — and precarious, since his successor is not bound by those commitments in the same way as if they had been concluded under a stable, continuing government.

The United Kingdom is Europe's most battle-hardened military power, with a strong tradition of Atlantic commitment and a significant defense industry. Since 2022, it was among the first to deliver sophisticated weapons to Ukraine — notably NLAW missiles, Storm Shadow missiles, and Challenger 2 tanks. But a government transition introduces uncertainty. The continuity of British support now depends on the incoming prime minister's position — whose identity had not yet been settled at the time of the Berlin summit.

The question of European institutional continuity

The British situation illustrates a broader problem for European cohesion: commitments made by heads of government do not automatically bind their successors, especially in democracies where defense policy is an electoral issue. France has its own elections on the horizon. Germany has just emerged from one. Poland is navigating a complex coalition. The durability of Berlin's commitments depends on the institutional solidity of each of the five countries.

That is precisely why the Ankara summit matters: it must translate those political commitments into institutional NATO decisions, which transcend individual government transitions. A decision taken within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance is harder to undo than a bilateral commitment made in an outgoing prime minister's cabinet. The Ankara mechanism is the one that gives durability to Berlin's intentions.

Starmer signed in Berlin with the authority of a prime minister at the end of his mandate. That is better than nothing — the commitment is on record, continuity is possible. But it is also a fragility. Ukrainians know better than anyone what it means to depend on their allies' electoral cycles. They have learned to lock commitments in institutional concrete rather than personal promises. Berlin is fresh concrete. It needs to be poured before it sets badly.

A naval mission at the Strait of Hormuz?

Emmanuel Macron and Giorgia Meloni discussed in Berlin the possibility of a naval mission at the Strait of Hormuz, contingent on certain preconditions being met. That discussion takes place against a backdrop of growing tension with Iran — now a confirmed exporter of Shahed drones to Russia — and Western powers. A naval presence at the Strait of Hormuz would aim to secure commercial shipping routes and send a firmness signal to Tehran within the framework of coordinated pressure on its military supply lines to Moscow.

This proposal remains conditional and fragile. France has aircraft carriers and the naval power-projection capability required. Italy has a significant navy and a tradition of presence in the eastern Mediterranean. But a mission in a zone as sensitive as the Strait of Hormuz carries escalation risks with Iran that not all NATO partners are prepared to assume. The preconditions mentioned by Macron and Meloni were not publicly specified — which leaves open the question of whether this discussion produced a real commitment or merely a preliminary exploration.

Iran as a variable in the Ukrainian war

The mention of Hormuz in Berlin underlines something important: the war in Ukraine is no longer a regional European war. It is part of a global geopolitical system in which Iran, North Korea, and China play support roles for Russia that extend its war-making capacity. Iran has supplied thousands of Shahed drones — the very drones that burned a building materials store in Snihurivka on July 1, 2026. North Korea has sent ammunition and troops. China supplies Russia with dual-use electronic components.

A European strategy that does not account for this global dimension is incomplete. The discussion between Macron and Meloni on Hormuz suggests that some Europeans are beginning to think about the conflict in those broader terms. If Europe wants to help Ukraine win, it must also cut Russia's supply lines — not just at the front, but at the source. That is a strategy of global pressure that neither the EU nor NATO has yet formalized.

Iran supplies the drones that burn Ukrainian cities. North Korea supplies the shells that kill Ukrainian soldiers. China supplies the components that keep Russian arms factories running. If Europe responds only on the Ukrainian theater, it is answering a global war with a local strategy. Macron and Meloni cracked the Hormuz window open. It is small but it is real. It is the beginning of strategic thinking at the right scale.

What the 32 must decide

The NATO summit in Ankara, on July 7 and 8, 2026, will bring together the 32 members of the Alliance. The agenda is ambitious: validate the 5% of GDP defense target, confirm collective support for Ukraine, coordinate positions on long-range weapons, establish a framework for the progressive empowerment of European defense within NATO, and manage tensions with Turkey on several files. That is a great deal to accomplish in two days.

The Ankara dynamic will also be shaped by the position of the United States. The Trump administration has blown hot and cold on its commitment to NATO — one day threatening to withdraw, the next validating weapons deliveries to Ukraine. In that context of American uncertainty, the cohesion of the E5 bloc formed in Berlin on June 24 is the most valuable political capital the Europeans bring to Ankara. They arrive with a shared position. That is their strength.

Erdogan's Turkey: ambiguous ally, unavoidable host

That Turkey is hosting this NATO summit is itself an ambiguous signal. Erdogan has maintained economic relations with Russia throughout the war, positioned himself as a mediator in the Black Sea grain negotiations, and delayed Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO through political demands. Hosting the summit gives Ankara symbolic and procedural leverage — without necessarily signaling full alignment with European positions.

For the delegations arriving in Ankara on July 7, the Turkish position on Ukraine, on sanctions against Russia, on the delivery of Bayraktar drones (halted in 2022, never fully resumed), and on relations with Moscow will be an underlying source of friction. Managing that relationship without letting it explode, while maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance, is the summit's most delicate diplomatic exercise. Berlin prepared the Five. But the reality of Ankara is thirty-two.

Erdogan is hosting a NATO summit while maintaining trade relations with Russia. That is the central contradiction of an alliance that prefers to keep Turkey inside on the condition that it does not blow up the collective decisions. It is pragmatic. It is also uncomfortable. The real test of Ankara will be whether the Berlin Five can get their commitments adopted by all 32 — including the one hosting the meeting.

Trump's declaration on June 25, 2026

On June 25, 2026, one day after the Berlin summit, American president Donald Trump declared that Ukraine was "doing pretty well" against Russia. That formulation, relayed by the Guardian, is typical of Trump's ambivalent rhetoric toward the conflict: on one side, a form of acknowledgment of Ukrainian resistance; on the other, an absence of any reinforced commitment. No pledge of additional weaponry, no ceasefire horizon, no clear position on negotiations. Just an observation.

That comment comes in a context where the Trump administration is maintaining military aid to Ukraine but slowing certain sensitive technology transfers and conditioning its support more heavily on economic or diplomatic reciprocity. Saying Ukraine is "doing pretty well" can also be read as a signal that Washington believes Europeans can now carry more of the burden — which is precisely what the Berlin summit was trying to organize.

The declining dependence — and its limits

The stated objective of the Berlin summit is for Europe to "gradually take over American capabilities." But "gradually" over what timeline? With what transition guarantees? The United States still represents more than 70% of NATO's collective firepower. Their command, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C2ISR) are indispensable to the effectiveness of the Alliance. A gradual takeover without a precise schedule is an intention without a plan.

That gap is the main risk Berlin did not resolve. The Five said they could do more. They did not say how they will close the gap if Washington accelerates its disengagement. The Ankara summit will need to answer that question with more precision than Berlin did. Allies who claim to manage the risk of American disengagement must also have calculated its trajectory and prepared the alternatives. That calculation is not yet public.

Trump says Ukraine is doing pretty well. That is true. But Ukraine is doing well in part because the United States armed it. If Washington steps back — even gradually — that "pretty well" can change very fast. Berlin began to build an alternative. It is not yet strong enough to replace what Washington represents. Acknowledging that reality is not pessimism — it is the starting point for a realistic plan.

What Kyiv expected from the summit

Since 2022, Volodymyr Zelensky has made European diplomacy a constant lever. He has pushed for NATO membership, for longer-range weapons, for massive economic aid, and for tougher sanctions against Russia. The Berlin summit fits a positive trajectory: the Five reaffirmed their support, coordinated their positions, and made numbered commitments. For Zelensky, that is better than the usual vague diplomatic communiqué.

But what Kyiv truly wanted from Berlin — and did not get — is a formal invitation to NATO, or failing that, legally binding security guarantees. Those guarantees are the only safeguard against a repetition of 2022: a Ukraine that receives promises, then finds itself alone against an invasion. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which led Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from the signatories (including Russia), is the permanent haunting of every act of Ukrainian diplomacy.

Security guarantees: the real test of Ankara

The question of security guarantees for Ukraine will be the ultimate test of the Ankara summit. NATO membership remains blocked by American and certain European reservations — including from countries that fear that Ukraine's entry into the Alliance during an active conflict would trigger Article 5. Alternative guarantees — robust bilateral commitments, long-term defense agreements with the main allies — are on the table, but their value depends on the political credibility of those offering them.

Sweden, which joined NATO in March 2024 and on the same day signed an agreement for Gripen E fighters with Ukraine, sets the example of a concrete commitment. The head of Swedish military intelligence MUST, Thomas Nilsson, declared on June 30, 2026 that the Russian threat is "deep, structural, and enduring" — and that the confrontation with the West "is not a temporary crisis." That is precisely the kind of long-term strategic clarity that Kyiv needs to see translated into formal institutional commitments at Ankara.

The Budapest Memorandum is the political scar of all Ukrainian diplomacy. Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons in exchange for promises. Those promises did not hold. Zelensky knows better than anyone what a declaration without a binding mechanism is worth. Berlin produced commitments. Ankara must set them in structures that survive political transitions. Nothing less will suffice for Kyiv.

Mark Rutte on videoconference from Washington

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte participated in the Berlin E5 summit by videoconference from Washington — where he was in consultations with the American administration. That geographical detail is revealing: Rutte must simultaneously sustain European cohesion in Berlin and maintain dialogue with an unpredictable American administration. His position is that of an institutional tightrope walker whose value lies precisely in his ability to manage both sides of the Atlantic.

Since taking office as Secretary General in October 2024, Rutte has adopted a more pragmatic tone than his predecessor Jens Stoltenberg — less rhetorical, more focused on concrete commitments. His participation in Berlin, even virtual, validates the E5 format as a serious consultation mechanism within the Alliance. It also means that the decisions of Berlin are not in opposition to NATO but upstream of it — a preparation, not an alternative.

NATO's role facing autonomous European initiatives

A fundamental question runs through both the Berlin summit and Ankara: is Europe strengthening NATO by taking greater charge of its own defense, or is it developing a strategic autonomy that could ultimately compete with the Alliance? The tension between defenders of NATO as the sole framework (notably the countries of central and eastern Europe, deeply Atlanticist) and advocates of greater European autonomy (often France) is a constant of Western geopolitics.

That debate, rekindled by the unpredictability of the Trump administration, has no simple answer. The most realistic option is the one Berlin appears to have adopted: remain fully inside NATO while building robust European capabilities that allow the Alliance to function even if the American contribution fluctuates. That is a complementary approach, not a competitive one. But it requires a European cohesion whose foundations Berlin has laid — and which Ankara must validate.

NATO without the United States is a different organization. That is not an option — it is a catastrophe to prevent. What Berlin did was begin reducing European vulnerability to an American withdrawal, without weakening the Alliance in the process. That is the right strategy. Rutte on videoconference from Washington symbolizes exactly that dual belonging: European and Atlanticist at once. The balance is fragile. It must be maintained.

War as a catalyst for modernization

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated military truths that NATO allies were beginning to forget: massive firepower remains decisive, logistics are determinative, integrated air defense is indispensable, and drones are changing the dynamics of combat at a speed that conventional armies struggle to match. These lessons have already transformed the armaments programs of several NATO members — notably Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states.

The Berlin summit addressed those lessons not as an academic list but as operational constraints. The coordination on long-range weapons responds directly to the Ukrainian lesson on the necessity of striking enemy logistics depots at range. The commitment on military AI responds to the Ukrainian lesson on drone warfare and electronic countermeasures. The commitment on air defense responds to two years of missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities. War teaches; Berlin has begun to learn.

The lesson of industrial mobilization

The war in Ukraine has also revealed the weakness of the European defense industrial base. At the start of the conflict, NATO countries' ammunition stocks were largely depleted during the first deliveries to Kyiv. European ammunition factories have been running at full capacity since 2023 — but they were not designed to sustain a high-intensity war over several years. The EU launched joint ammunition purchasing programs, but results remain insufficient relative to Ukrainian needs and NATO stock replenishment levels.

That industrial deficit is one of the most troubling points for NATO planners. Berlin's commitments on 70 billion for Ukraine implicitly include an industrial scale-up component — but the timelines for building new production capacity are measured in years, even decades. Russia, which has converted a significant portion of its economy to war production, managed to increase its shell output at a rate Europe has not yet matched. Berlin acknowledged the problem; the solution remains to be built.

Europe has learned to send weapons. It has not yet learned to produce enough of them. That is the fundamental limit of support for Ukraine — not political will, but industrial capacity. Berlin committed billions. Those billions must now translate into production lines, supply chains, and trained personnel. That is the work of a decade. It has begun. It is not yet far enough advanced.

The signal sent to Moscow

Merz's declaration at the close of the Berlin summit — "The message to Russia is: Ukraine remains strong" — is calculated to be heard in the Kremlin. But it is not merely a phrase. It is the backdrop to a set of concrete decisions: coordination of long-range weapons, reinforced air defense, 70 billion committed, 5% of GDP target validated by four of the five countries present. Deterrence through words only works when it is backed by deeds — and Berlin laid down deeds.

Putin has bet on Western fatigue since the start of the war. He bet that elections, economic shocks, political divisions, and the length of the conflict would eventually erode support for Ukraine. Berlin on June 24, 2026 is a refutation of that calculation. Four years after the full-scale invasion, five of Europe's largest military powers show no sign of fatigue — they are coordinating their positions, setting more ambitious targets, and preparing to take over American capabilities if necessary. That is not what Moscow expected.

The signal sent to Beijing and Tehran

Beyond Russia, the Berlin summit sends a signal to Beijing and Tehran — the two powers that actively support the Russian war effort with military materials, electronic components, and, in Iran's case, drones. The discussion of a possible naval mission at the Strait of Hormuz is directly addressed to Tehran: Europe is equipping itself with tools to exert pressure on Russia's support lines, not just on the Ukrainian front.

China is watching. If it concludes that the West is resolute, divided, and weakened, it will adjust its calculation on Taiwan and on its support for Moscow. If it concludes that Europe is strengthening, coordinating, and prepared to maintain pressure on multiple theaters simultaneously, its calculation changes. The Berlin summit does not speak explicitly of China — but its geopolitical logic concerns China directly. Europe's decision to take charge of itself does not concern only Russia. It concerns the entire world order.

Beijing reads Berlin. Every Western summit is analyzed by Chinese strategists to assess the cohesion and resolve of their potential adversaries. A united E5, numbered commitments, a coordinated posture — all of it enters Beijing's calculation on the feasibility of taking a risk on Taiwan. An Europe that defends itself better in Ukraine is also indirectly defending Taiwan. It is no accident that the two files are linked in the most serious strategic analyses.

What the war teaches those who truly listen

Ukraine has been since 2022 the most intensive military laboratory in recent history. No NATO exercise, no simulation, no general-staff doctrine can replicate what Ukrainian forces have learned in four years of high-intensity war. Ukrainian combat data on drone effectiveness, electronic counter-warfare, logistics under artillery fire, and the air defense of bombed cities is of inestimable strategic value — and NATO allies are progressively incorporating it into their own doctrines and training programs.

General Syrskyi, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, declared on June 30, 2026 that the most probable route for a new Russian offensive runs through Bryansk toward Chernihiv. That assessment, based on field intelligence, illustrates the level of analytical sophistication Ukraine has developed. NATO allies committing in Berlin on long-range weapons and air defense must ensure that the decisions made incorporate this type of Ukrainian operational assessment — and not only the analyses produced at Alliance headquarters.

Integrating Kyiv into NATO planning

A gap in the European defense architecture taking shape at Berlin is the formal absence of Ukraine from NATO's planning mechanisms. Kyiv receives weapons, funds, and intelligence — but it is not at the table where collective decisions on overall strategy are made. That asymmetry is politically understandable: Ukraine is not a NATO member. But it is strategically absurd: the country fighting Russia every day, with the most precise operational knowledge of the common adversary, is not systematically consulted in weapons and doctrine decisions.

The Ankara summit should institutionalize more systematic consultation of Ukraine in the Alliance's defense planning. Not as a substitute for membership — but as an operational partner whose combat data is indispensable to realistic planning. That mechanism would have immediate practical value for weapons delivery decisions and strong symbolic value for Kyiv: being treated not as a beneficiary, but as an actor.

Ukraine knows things about the war against Russia that NATO cannot learn in any exercise. Treating it only as a weapons beneficiary is wasting the Alliance's most valuable strategic resource. Ankara should correct that asymmetry. Not as a symbolic gesture — as an operational necessity.

What Berlin accomplished — and what it does not replace

The E5 summit in Berlin on June 24, 2026 accomplished something rare in defense diplomacy: it produced concrete, coordinated commitments carried by the five largest European military powers, thirteen days before the official NATO summit. That is better than what was expected. The figures — 5% of GDP, 70 billion for Ukraine, coordination of long-range weapons — are not vague declarations. They are measurable. They will be verifiable at Ankara.

But Berlin did not resolve the fundamental questions. It did not define the precise timeline for taking over American capabilities. It did not provide Ukraine with the legally binding security guarantees it has been asking for since 2022. It did not resolve the tension between European autonomy ambition and Atlanticist cohesion. And it was held with an outgoing British prime minister whose political continuity is not guaranteed. Berlin is a strong starting point — not a destination.

The Ankara horizon — and beyond

On July 7 and 8, 2026, the 32 NATO members will reconvene in Ankara. They will need to validate, deepen, and institutionalize what five of them put forward in Berlin. Ukraine will be at the table, as an observer or a partner. The United States will be there, carrying an ambivalent but still decisive policy. Turkey will host, playing its role as the uncomfortable ally. And Russia will observe from outside, watching for any crack it can exploit.

What is at stake in Berlin and Ankara is not only the future of Ukraine — even if that is where the stakes are most immediate and most human. It is the architecture of European security for the next generation. A Europe that takes charge of itself, coordinates its armies, maintains pressure on its adversaries, and protects its model of values — that is a Europe that will have drawn the lessons from what February 24, 2022 revealed about its vulnerabilities. The road from Berlin to Ankara is short. The road from Berlin to a truly secure Europe is still long.

What is being decided from Berlin to Ankara does not belong to diplomats or generals. It belongs to all those who understand what it means to live under occupation, under bombs, under a regime that erases street names and rewrites school textbooks. Ukraine is fighting to survive as a nation. Europe is fighting to remain what it is. This is not a local war. It is a war for the very idea that nations have the right to exist.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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