ANALYSIS: Eurosatory 2026 and Autonomous Drones — The Show That Redefined 21st-Century Warfare

Introduction: Five Days in Villepinte That Redrew the Map of Modern War

June 15–19, 2026 — The Largest Defense Show in History

From June 15 to 19, 2026, the Paris-Nord Villepinte exhibition center hosted the largest edition in the history of Eurosatory — the world's premier land defense and security trade show. More than 2,600 exhibitors from 68 countries, across 185,000 square meters, with more than 350 official delegations from 100 nations. French Minister of the Armed Forces Catherine Vautrin officially opened the show on June 15. Commissioner General Charles Beaudouin summarized the edition in a single word: «feverishness».

That feverishness had a precise object. In every aisle, at every stand, around every live demonstration, one subject dominated: autonomous drones and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Ukraine had transformed the world's understanding of drones since 2022. Eurosatory 2026 consecrated that transformation by converting it into industry, markets, and generalized military doctrine.

36% First-Time Exhibitors — An Industry in Full Restructuring

One of the most revealing figures of the 2026 edition is that 36% of exhibitors were participating in Eurosatory for the first time. This is not a statistical footnote. It is the sign of a structural break in the global defense industrial base: technology startups, dual-use companies, and manufacturers from automotive and consumer electronics are entering a sector long dominated by large legacy prime contractors.

These new entrants come from fields — artificial intelligence, robotics, sensors, communications — that traditional defense industry has long treated as component suppliers. They are becoming full actors, capable of designing and manufacturing complete weapons systems. This restructuring of the industrial base has profound implications for how states acquire military capabilities and for the speed at which those capabilities can be renewed.

Ukraine: From 10 to 80 Exhibitors in Two Years — The Most Important Industrial Lesson

An Industrial Revolution Born of the Necessity to Survive

In 2024, Ukraine had 10 defense companies at Eurosatory. In 2026, it had 80 — making Ukraine the fifth-largest national delegation by number of exhibitors, behind France, the United States, Germany, and Australia. This eightfold increase in two years is not the product of a planned industrial program. It is the result of a country that had to produce in order to survive, under pressure, with certification timelines eliminated out of necessity, and with immediate battlefield feedback on every deployed system.

Since Russia's 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian defense sector has grown from approximately 300 to nearly 1,000 companies, of which 80% are private. Annual defense production, which stood at roughly $1 billion before the war, reached projected figures of $35 billion for 2025. This is not industrial growth. It is a civilizational transformation conducted under bombardment.

What Buyers Want — and What Only Ukraine Can Offer

The Eurosatory commissioner general summarized the paradigm shift in a single sentence: «There is a feverishness among states today, who are going out to find off-the-shelf material.» Buyers no longer want promises. They want systems available immediately, battle-tested, with no certification delays. This is exactly what Ukrainian manufacturers have to offer. The FPV drones, electronic warfare systems, and loitering munitions presented at Villepinte had, for the most part, been deployed at the front the previous week.

No other country — not Germany, not the United States, not France — can make that claim. This competitive lead is the direct result of four years of high-intensity war that served as an accelerated laboratory for testing, failing, modifying, and redeploying systems at a cycle that traditional defense industry measures in years and that Ukrainians measure in weeks. At Eurosatory 2026, the Ukrainians were not selling weapons. They were selling experience.

The Autonomous Drone Market: $55 Billion and 30% Annual Growth

The Numbers of an Exploding Market

The global market for autonomous defense drones is projected to exceed $55 billion by 2032, according to projections published by BriefGlance in June 2026. Other estimates reach as high as $74 to $90 billion depending on the scope considered. The most dynamic segments — fully autonomous systems, drone swarms, counter-UAS — display compound annual growth rates (CAGR) exceeding 30%. The market could exceed $25 billion as early as 2026 according to some projections.

To contextualize these figures: in 2027, the Pentagon's Defense Autonomous Warfare Group — which replaced the Replicator initiative in late 2025 — requested a budget of more than $54 billion in a single fiscal year, representing a multiplication by 240 compared to Replicator's initial budget of $225 million. This American acceleration is a signal that the entire global defense sector immediately interpreted as an indication of strategic priority.

France and Its Target of 20,000 Military Drones

France used Eurosatory 2026 to signal its own acceleration in military drones. During a live demonstration on June 14, 2026, the French Army displayed its ambitions: roughly 20,000 military drones as an end-state, with the goal of making drone operation a standard competency for every soldier. Concretely, the French Defense Procurement Agency (DGA) ordered on May 28, 2026 — publicly announced June 23 — 5,000 DELCO soldier drones from startup Harmattan AI.

This order illustrates the transition that every NATO army is attempting: from specialized drone possession by dedicated units, to the distribution of drones at the individual level. The goal is not to create drone units. It is to make drones what tactical radios became in the 1970s: an ordinary tool, available at every level of command.

VisionWave, Ondas, Red Cat: The New Actors Selling the Architecture of the Future

VisionWave and the STRATUM Ecosystem: Multi-Domain Integrated Autonomy

One of the most discussed presentations at Eurosatory 2026 was that of VisionWave Holdings, which publicly demonstrated its integrated autonomy ecosystem for the first time. Its executive chairman Douglas Davis declared: «For the first time, we have publicly demonstrated multiple autonomous platforms operating within a shared ecosystem.» This ecosystem includes TALON (a tactical ISR and payload delivery drone), D-FLY (a fast counter-drone interceptor), STRATUM (a combat-AI integration architecture), and VARAN (an autonomous ground vehicle).

What makes this architecture significant is its ambition: creating a unified operational picture that coordinates aerial and ground assets fluidly, even in environments where GPS and communications are jammed or disrupted. This is precisely the challenge Ukraine has faced against Russian electronic jamming — and solving it has become the number one priority for every autonomous systems developer.

Ondas and Iron Arrow: $150 Million in Orders in the Second Quarter

Ondas Inc. presented its Iron Arrow system at Eurosatory — a fully autonomous interceptor designed to neutralize high-speed aerial threats, integrated into a layered defense system. The company announced it had secured more than $150 million in new orders during the second quarter of 2026 alone for its autonomous defense systems.

This figure illustrates the commercial momentum of the sector. The orders being signed today in the aisles of Villepinte are no longer exploratory. They are production orders — from governments that have decided these technologies are mature and want to deploy them. The question is no longer whether autonomous drones will be part of modern warfare. It is how quickly armies will be able to absorb the doctrinal transformation that deploying them implies.

Fire Point and the Ukrainian-European Partnerships Signed at Villepinte

Hensoldt, Quantum Systems, Milrem Robotics: The Agreements That Restructure the Industry

The undisputed Ukrainian star of Eurosatory 2026 was Fire Point — the company founded in 2022 that has become one of the heavyweights of Ukrainian armament in just a few years. During the show, Fire Point signed a memorandum of understanding with German Hensoldt to integrate the next-generation TRML-4D radar into the Freyja project — a pan-European ballistic missile defense system competing with American Patriots and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T.

Frontline Robotics, another Ukrainian exhibitor, concluded production agreements with Estonia's Milrem Robotics and Denmark's Dropla for the development of anti-drone systems and mine-clearing solutions. German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems committed to co-producing 10,000 Linza drones on German soil, destined for the Ukrainian front. These partnerships are not letters of intent. They are transfers of competencies, technologies, and production chains that redraw the industrial geography of European defense.

Ukrainian Armoured Vehicles and Agreements With the Czech Republic and Spain

The Ukrainian delegation at the show also included the Ukrainian Armoured Vehicles group, which signed a strategic partnership agreement with Czech company AviaNera Technologies for the development of propulsion systems for Ukrainian missiles and unmanned systems, with a production localization option. The NAUDI organization (National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industrialists) also signed an agreement with Spanish firm Escribano Mechanical & Engineering for the joint development of high-precision weapons.

These agreements no longer concern emergency aid to a country at war. They concern the long-term integration of Ukraine into the European defense industrial chain. Ukraine is no longer merely a market for European weapons. It is a production partner, a supplier of technologies tested in real conditions, and an actor with lessons to teach manufacturers who have never produced under wartime constraints.

The Six Technology Clusters at Eurosatory: Mapping Tomorrow's War

Autonomous Systems, Counter-UAS, Tactical AI — The New Priorities

Eurosatory 2026 organized its exhibitors into six technology clusters that directly reflect the operational lessons of the war in Ukraine and recent regional tensions. These six clusters are: autonomous systems, counter-UAS (hostile drone neutralization), AI-driven battlefield networking, directed energy (lasers, microwaves), electronic warfare, and space as an operational domain.

This mapping is itself a doctrinal declaration. It says that future conflicts will be won or lost on these six axes — not on the size of tanks or the range of conventional missiles. It says that autonomy and artificial intelligence have moved from the status of technological speculation to that of operational military capabilities requiring urgent acquisition.

Counter-UAS: The New Absolute Priority

The counter-UAS cluster was perhaps the one that drew the most professional visitors. The reason is simple: any state that cannot neutralize adversarial drones is today existentially vulnerable, whether in open warfare or in asymmetric attack contexts. The Ukrainian navy demonstrated that a surface drone costing a few tens of thousands of dollars can damage a warship worth hundreds of millions. The asymmetric cost of attack versus defense is a problem every armed force must solve.

Solutions presented at Villepinte covered a broad spectrum: directed energy systems (lasers) to neutralize drones at range, targeted electronic jamming systems, autonomous interceptors such as VisionWave's D-FLY and Ondas's Iron Arrow, and radar detection systems of very compact form adapted to miniaturized drones. The proliferation of solutions mirrors the proliferation of the threat — and neither shows signs of slowing.

The Israeli Presence: Between Restrictions and Iron Dome

The French Government's Compromise Facing Contradictory Pressures

The question of Israeli participation at Eurosatory 2026 crystallized the political tensions running through the European defense sector. In 2024, the French government had ultimately banned 74 Israeli stands under popular pressure, which constituted a significant precedent. In 2026, the position evolved: Israeli companies were permitted to exhibit defensive technologies only — missile defense systems, including the celebrated Iron Dome — while offensive systems and the national pavilion were excluded.

Commissioner Beaudouin justified this decision by noting that Iron Dome represents capabilities «we have never needed more». This is a factual argument. Israeli missile defense systems are among the most advanced in the world and are directly relevant to Ukrainian defense needs. But this offensive/defensive distinction remains politically complex — and was contested by the organizations that had demanded complete exclusion.

The Politicization of a Show That Would Prefer to Be Technical

Eurosatory has always had a political dimension — it is inherent to any gathering of arms manufacturers. But in 2026, that political dimension manifested with unprecedented intensity. Demonstrations took place from opening day on June 15, organized by a coalition of 13 organizations including the Peace Movement, the LDH, and several student unions. They demanded the banning of Israeli companies. Inside the show, some Ukrainian exhibitors refused to share spaces with Russian exhibitors — officially absent but present through shell entities according to some participants.

This politicization is not a surprise. It is the direct reflection of the fact that the products sold at Eurosatory have end users who, at this very moment, are employing them in real conflicts causing real civilian casualties. The defense industry's morale cannot be entirely separated from the morale of those who bear the consequences of the products it sells. This is a tension the sector will manage with decreasing comfort as conflicts multiply and public opinion seizes on them.

Combat AI: Between Operational Promises and Legal Vacuum

What LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems) Do Outside the Legal Framework

No binding international legal framework currently governs lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Discussions within the UN Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS have been ongoing since 2014. In Geneva, the expert group is attempting to negotiate a legally binding instrument by the end of 2026 — with no guarantee of consensus. Meanwhile, autonomous systems capable of making targeting decisions without human intervention are being presented, sold, and deployed.

This asymmetry — between the speed of technological development and the slowness of international law — is the fundamental problem that all actors acknowledge and none has yet resolved. The most advanced states in LAWS development — the United States, China, Russia, Israel — all have interests in not constraining their own programs. Less advanced states would prefer rules that limit capability asymmetries. This standoff has produced decades of discussions without agreement.

«Attribution of Responsibility» — The Question Manufacturers Prefer Not to Ask

The hardest question posed by LAWS is not technical. It is legal and moral: who is responsible when an autonomous system kills a civilian? The operator who launched the mission? The programmer who coded the algorithm? The government that purchased the system? The manufacturer that sold it? No national criminal code and no international treaty clearly answers this question. And in the void of that answer, autonomous systems are deployed and potential civilian casualties accumulate without an identified legal party responsible.

At Eurosatory 2026, this question was present in academic conferences and hallway conversations. It was remarkably absent from commercial presentations. This is not an oversight. It is a decision.

Space and Electronic Warfare: The Two Invisible Fronts

Space as an Operational Domain — and Its Vulnerabilities

The designation of space as an operational domain — on par with air, sea, land, and cyberspace — is a doctrine that NATO officially adopted in 2019. In 2026, it is an operational reality that the war in Ukraine has made tangible. Starlink commercial satellites have played a decisive role in Ukrainian communication and guidance capabilities. Military GPS systems have been jammed and recalibrated hundreds of times. Counter-satellite operations — never officially claimed but technically documented — have taken place.

At Eurosatory 2026, the space cluster saw record participation from companies specializing in encrypted satellite communications, commercial space observation, and jamming-resistant navigation systems. The presence of the French Defense Procurement Agency (DGA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) at conferences illustrated the growing integration of space into military operational planning.

Electronic Warfare: The Silent Force Multiplier

Electronic warfare — jamming, interception, exploitation of adversarial communications — is not new. It dates to the world wars. But the war in Ukraine has demonstrated its importance at a scale that surprised even experts: entire drone battalions neutralized by targeted GPS jamming, command communications intercepted in real time, missile guidance systems rerouted remotely.

Ukrainian manufacturers present at Villepinte brought direct expertise in this domain — developed in real conditions, against an adversary investing massively in electronic warfare. Companies such as Infozahyst and Kvertus (Ukrainian counter-electronic warfare specialists) attracted the attention of procurement delegations from more than 30 countries. What Ukraine has learned on the battlefield about electronic warfare is today worth billions of dollars on the global defense market.

What the 350 Official Delegations Bought — and What That Signals

Buyers in «Urgency» Mode — the Demand Has Changed in Nature

The presence of 350 official delegations from 100 nations at Eurosatory 2026 — some arriving with pre-allocated acquisition budgets — marked a break with previous editions, where the show was more a showcase than a marketplace. In 2026, contracts and letters of intent were being signed in the aisles, not after months of administrative negotiation.

For the first time in Eurosatory's history, financial market institutions were present alongside government delegations, prime contractors, and technology startups. This financial presence signals that the defense sector has become a top-tier investment asset class — which, over time, will modify the financing dynamics, risk appetite, and cycle durations of acquisition programs.

The Orders That Reconfigured International Competition

Among the most significant contracts signed during or in the immediate wake of Eurosatory 2026: the Fire Point-Hensoldt partnership for the Freyja project (pan-European missile defense), the Quantum Systems-Ukraine Linza drone co-production agreements (10,000 units), Ondas's Iron Arrow contracts ($150 million in Q2 orders), and the French order of 5,000 DELCO drones from Harmattan AI. These orders outline the topography of defense industrial alliances for the next decade.

What emerges from this topography is the rise of bilateral and multilateral cooperation arrangements at the expense of large single-nation programs. The failure of Germany's F126 (cancelled five days after Eurosatory closed) illustrates the limits of ambitious large national programs. The agreements signed at Villepinte illustrate the inverse trend: targeted, rapid cooperations directly tied to immediate operational needs.

Poland, Slovakia, Armenia: The New Purchasing Powers

Central Europe and the States Running an Arms Build-Up

Among the most striking progressions at Eurosatory 2026 are states that have substantially increased their presence: Poland (43 exhibitors versus 22 in 2024), Slovakia (23 versus 7), Armenia (19 versus 5). These figures reflect a direct geopolitical reality: these are states that either border Russia or active conflict zones, or have direct experience with asymmetric threats.

Poland is particularly significant. With a defense budget projected to reach 4% of GDP in 2026 — the highest in NATO — and a direct border with both an ally at war (Ukraine) and a neighbor integrated into Russia's orbit (Belarus), Warsaw is investing massively in systems that Ukrainians have proven in combat. The presence of 43 Polish exhibitors at Eurosatory is not purely commercial. It signals Poland's ambition to become an industrial defense actor, not merely a buyer.

The Eight New Countries: Defense as a Universal Concern

For the first time, eight countries were participating in Eurosatory: Chile, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Morocco, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. This geographic diversification says something fundamental about the state of the world: defense is no longer seen as the preserve of great powers. In an environment where asymmetric conflicts proliferate, where drones allow non-state actors to strike targets from range, and where hybrid warfare blends the military and civilian spheres, every state — regardless of size — must rethink its capabilities.

Morocco, Nigeria, and Vietnam represent markets with rapidly growing defense budgets and geopolitical postures seeking not to depend on a single supplier. Their presence at Eurosatory signals that they are looking for European alternatives to the American, Russian, and Chinese suppliers that had dominated their acquisitions.

After Eurosatory — What the Show Changed and What It Did Not Resolve

What the Five Days at Villepinte Concretely Produced

The five days of Eurosatory 2026 produced contracts, cooperation agreements, letters of intent, and technology transfers whose full tally will take weeks to compile. They also produced a clear political signal: European rearmament is real, it is structural, it is not conditioned solely on the continuation of the war in Ukraine, and it integrates Ukraine as an industrial partner rather than merely an aid recipient.

They confirmed that autonomous drones have moved from the experimental stage to generalized operational deployment — and that the market accompanying them is one of the most dynamic in the current global economy. They revealed an industry in rapid mutation, where the lines between civilian and military technology are blurring, where startups sometimes beat prime contractors on the operational criteria that actually matter.

What the Show Did Not Resolve — and What No One Will Resolve at Villepinte

Eurosatory 2026 did not resolve the question of autonomous weapons system governance. It did not resolve the question of the long-term financing of rearmament in democracies where public opinion is divided. It did not resolve the tension between the mass doctrine — millions of cheap drones — and the precision doctrine — sophisticated and expensive platforms. And it did not resolve the fundamental paradox that every arms show raises without being able to answer: an industry whose commercial success depends on the persistence of conflicts.

These questions are not settled at Villepinte. They are settled — or not settled — in capitals, in treaties, in international governance decisions, and in the political choices that determine what world we want to leave behind. Eurosatory 2026 showed the tools available. The use we make of them is not decided in the aisles of an arms show. It is decided in the principles we are prepared to defend — and to limit.

The International Ethical and Legal Framework: The Other War That Has Not Been Won

International Humanitarian Law Facing LAWS — A Regulation With a Fatal Lag

The development of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) is now a documented commercial and military reality. Eurosatory 2026 demonstrated this in five days. But the international legal framework governing their use lags considerably behind. International humanitarian law — built on the foundations of the Geneva Conventions — was designed to regulate conflicts in which humans make the decision to kill. An autonomous system that makes this decision without a human in the loop creates an accountability void that existing law does not fill.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) called in 2026 for a binding international treaty governing LAWS before they are deployed at scale. Negotiations have been ongoing within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) for several years. But they progress slowly, inhibited by the reluctance of major powers — notably the United States, Russia, and China — that do not want to constrain their freedom of military technology development. While negotiations drag on, the LAWS market grows at more than 30% per year.

Accountability in the Age of Autonomous Systems

The question of legal responsibility in autonomous operations is one of the most complex in contemporary international law. If an autonomous drone kills civilians in a mistargeted strike, who is responsible? The system's manufacturer? The commanding officer who authorized deployment? The state that used the weapon? Under current legal structures, this chain of responsibility is so blurred as to create what legal scholars call a «responsibility vacuum» — a situation where a serious unlawful act can occur without any clearly identifiable responsible party being brought before a court.

At Eurosatory 2026, this question was visible in corridors but absent from stands. Companies sell capabilities. Governments buy capabilities. And the discussion on rules of engagement, on human control, on the acceptable limits of autonomy remains confined to academic conference rooms and treaty texts not yet having the force of law. This is the paradox of Villepinte 2026: the most significant defense show in history celebrated a technological revolution whose fundamental rules have not yet been written.

The Geopolitical Consequences of the Democratization of War Drones

When Non-State Actors Access the Same Capabilities as Armies

One of the least-discussed consequences of the autonomous drone revolution is the democratization of aerial lethal power. For decades, the ability to strike targets from the air required combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and infrastructure reserved for states with significant defense budgets. A FPV drone costing $500 capable of carrying an explosive payload of several kilograms fundamentally changes this equation.

This democratization primarily benefits Ukraine, which uses it to offset its numerical disadvantages against a larger army. But it also benefits less virtuous actors. Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis of Yemen have all demonstrated the ability to use drones — sometimes very sophisticated ones — to strike state targets at asymmetric costs. The same technology that gives Ukraine a defensive advantage gives these actors an offensive advantage that conventional defense systems struggle to neutralize.

The Proliferation of Drone Capabilities — Systemic Risks

Eurosatory 2026 established the counter-drone (C-UAS) market as one of the most dynamic segments of the defense industry. This is no coincidence. C-UAS development is the direct response to the proliferation of offensive drones. It is an arms race in its purest form: we develop attack capabilities, then defensive capabilities against those attacks, then capabilities to circumvent those defenses. Each cycle increases costs and technological sophistication for all actors.

Defense analysts observing Eurosatory 2026 pointed to a systemic risk: within five to ten years, the lethal autonomous capabilities that today are reserved for the most advanced states will become accessible to a growing number of actors — state and non-state alike. The window for international regulation narrows as the technology spreads. And once capabilities are widely distributed, control treaties become structurally harder to impose. The time to establish the rules of the game is now — not in ten years when the game will be uncontrollable.

Conclusion: Villepinte 2026 Established Autonomy as Doctrine — Now Comes Governance

What the Show Says About the State of the World in 2026

Eurosatory 2026 is a window onto the state of the world in June 2026: a world rearming rapidly, where the war in Ukraine has functioned as a technological accelerator, where the lines between civilian and military sectors are disappearing in drone and artificial intelligence technology, and where the number of actors — states, companies, startups — capable of designing and deploying lethal weapons systems has multiplied.

This world is more dangerously capable technologically than it was in 2022. It is not more politically stable. It is not better legally governed. And it is not better prepared to manage the human and moral consequences of the systems it buys and deploys. This asymmetry — between the speed of technological innovation and the slowness of political and legal governance — is the real underlying subject that no Eurosatory cluster can address alone.

The Challenge for the Next Generation

The systems sold at Eurosatory 2026 will be deployed in the conflicts of the next five to ten years. The questions of accountability, targeting, involuntary escalation, and proliferation they raise must be answered before their generalized deployment — not after. The history of military technologies teaches us that rules of engagement always come after the catastrophe. Our generation has the possibility — not the certainty — of breaking that cycle. Eurosatory 2026 showed what we are technically capable of. The remaining question is what we are prepared to prohibit.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Method and editorial positioning

This analysis is grounded in verified public sources: official communiqués from the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and the DGA, data from Eurosatory's organizers, specialized press articles (Euronews, Le Monde, Army Recognition, Censor.net, Commando Magazine, TechTimes, BriefGlance, Journal de l'Économie), analyses from the Institute of Strategic Sciences. The author was not physically present at Eurosatory 2026. The contracts and agreements cited are those made public by the parties concerned.

Limits and unverifiable figures — noted

Market figures ($55 billion by 2032, etc.) are projections from commercial analysts with significant margins of uncertainty. The drone count (DELCO: 5,000; Linza: 10,000) and order figures (Ondas: $150 million) come from corporate announcements and have not been independently verified. This analysis reflects the state of available information as of June 26, 2026.

Sources

Primary sources

Euronews — At the Eurosatory 2026 show, Ukrainian know-how as the star guest — June 16, 2026

French Ministry of the Armed Forces — Rearmament, innovation, cooperation: Catherine Vautrin opens Eurosatory 2026 — June 16, 2026

Censor.net — Eurosatory 2026: results for the Ukrainian defense industry — June 26, 2026

BriefGlance — The new arms race: autonomous drones fuel a $55B defense revolution — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

Tech Times — Eurosatory 2026: the largest defense exhibition in history opens in Paris — June 15, 2026

Le Monde — Eurosatory expects record attendance, a reflection of global rearmament — June 14, 2026

Commando Magazine — Eurosatory 2026: 68 exhibiting countries, a world-class edition — June 2026

Journal de l'Économie — From 10 to 80: how Ukraine conquered Eurosatory in two years — June 15, 2026