ANALYSIS: Eurosatory 2026 — 80 Ukrainian companies in Paris and the birth of a defense power

From 5 stands to 80 companies: the transformation in two years

At Eurosatory 2026 in Paris, from June 15 to 19, more than 80 Ukrainian companies presented their defense products to buyers, ministries, and industrial partners from around the world. Two years earlier, in 2024, Ukraine was represented by just 5 stands. The sixteen-fold increase in Ukrainian presence at Europe's most important defense event is the clearest numerical illustration of the industrial transformation this war has produced.

This is not a statistic among others — it is the sharpest possible signal that the Ukrainian defense industry has crossed a qualitative threshold. You do not go from 5 stands to 80 companies at Eurosatory in two years without having real products, documented technical capabilities, and commercial partners who trust what you are offering. Eurosatory is a serious exhibition, with serious buyers who hold high standards. A presence at that scale is a market validation that no press release can fake.

An analysis that goes beyond the product catalog

This analysis does not settle for listing the systems on display — it seeks to understand what Ukrainian presence at Eurosatory 2026 means strategically for Ukraine, for Europe, and for the ongoing war. The partnerships signed, the systems presented, the funding announced — all of it charts a map of the future of European defense that chancelleries and general staffs are reading closely.

I went looking for the details of what Fire Point, Luch, the drone companies, Ukrainian roboticists, and electronic warfare specialists presented in Paris in June 2026. What I found exceeded my expectations. And yet the facts are documented, sourced, verifiable.

80 Ukrainian companies at Eurosatory — I want that number repeated and memorized. In 2022, no one imagined Ukraine could become a defense exporter within a few years. In 2026, it is exhibiting at Europe's most important show and signing agreements with MBDA and HENSOLDT. That is the most eloquent answer to everyone who thought Ukraine was finished.

The FP-7 at 25 km altitude: Patriot-comparable at $700,000

The company Fire Point was undoubtedly the Ukrainian star of Eurosatory 2026. It presented several systems, including the FP-7 — an interceptor missile that reached an altitude of 25 kilometers during testing. According to data presented at the exhibition, that performance is comparable to American Patriot systems — which cost $3.8 million per unit. The FP-7 is expected to run approximately $700,000 — a cost reduction of more than 80%.

That cost difference is not a marginal detail. The economic viability of European air defense is a major concern: interceptor missiles are consumed rapidly in high-intensity conflicts, and their high unit cost creates serious budget constraints. A Ukrainian interceptor offering Patriot-comparable performance at 20% of the price is a commercial proposition that every country seeking to strengthen its air defense takes very seriously.

The FP-9 ballistic missile and the Danish solid-fuel plant

Alongside the FP-7, Fire Point presented its work on the FP-9 — a ballistic missile in development targeting a range of approximately 855 km. This system fits within the logic of the 2030 Concept approved by Syrskyi: developing domestic ballistic strike capabilities to reduce dependence on Western deliveries. The company also revealed that it had established a solid-fuel production plant in Denmark — a logistical decision that secures a critical manufacturing component away from potential bombardment zones.

Zelensky confirmed at the exhibition that Fire Point is advancing toward mastery of ballistic missile production, with the FP-7 and FP-9 being prepared for serial production. That presidential confirmation gives an official dimension to the company's presentations — these programs carry the endorsement of Ukraine's highest political level.

A Ukrainian missile at $700,000 with the performance of a $3.8 million Patriot — if those figures hold up under operational deployment, Fire Point will transform the global air defense market. That is not an overstatement. It is a value proposition that, if confirmed, will make Europe less dependent on costly American systems. The geopolitics of defense could shift as a result.

Fire Point and HENSOLDT: a partnership that restructures European defense

The most significant partnership signed at Eurosatory 2026 may be the cooperation between Fire Point and the German defense technology firm HENSOLDT on the FREYJA system — an air and missile defense system designed as a European anti-ballistic shield integrating Ukrainian missiles. HENSOLDT is one of the world leaders in radar and electronic surveillance systems — its decision to partner with Fire Point is a top-tier technical validation.

FREYJA is designed to integrate various radars, including HENSOLDT's TRML-4D — which can simultaneously detect and track more than 1,500 targets at ranges up to 250 km. Those same radars are used in IRIS-T SLM systems and have demonstrated their operational effectiveness in Ukraine against Russian air attacks. The combination of Fire Point's Ukrainian missiles with HENSOLDT's German radars creates an air-defense architecture that draws on each partner's strengths.

The project of an EU anti-ballistic shield using Ukrainian missiles

FREYJA is described as a potential anti-ballistic shield for the European Union — using missiles manufactured in Ukraine. That would have sounded absurd in 2022: Ukraine, an invaded country, supplying the missiles for a European defense shield. In 2026, it is a serious proposal presented at Eurosatory by a company that has already proven its operational capabilities. The SPEXER 2000 3D MkIII — an HENSOLDT radar designed to detect and classify ground, maritime, and low-altitude aerial targets — rounds out the architecture.

If FREYJA becomes reality at a European scale, it will fundamentally transform the European air-defense supply chain, reducing dependence on American systems and creating an economically viable alternative. For Ukraine, that means structural integration into the European defense architecture — the best possible security guarantee after the war.

A European anti-ballistic shield running on Ukrainian missiles — I register the boldness of that idea. In 2022, Ukraine was desperately searching for missiles to defend itself. In 2026, it is potentially supplying the missiles that will defend all of Europe. The reversal is complete. And if Fire Point delivers on the FP-7, this is not science fiction — it is serious industrial planning.

From the Moskva to the deep-strike platform

The Luch Design Bureau, which develops the Neptune missile — the very one that sank the Russian cruiser Moskva in April 2022 in what remains one of the greatest Ukrainian naval victories of the war — signed a memorandum at Eurosatory 2026 with European missile giant MBDA for the development of an expanded Neptune platform including a Neptune2 deep-strike capability.

MBDA is the European consortium that produces the Meteor, SCALP, Brimstone, and other systems used by France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other NATO members. A cooperation between MBDA and Luch on extending the Neptune's capabilities is a first-class industrial alliance — it integrates one of the most operationally proven Ukrainian missile families into the most advanced European defense development networks.

Neptune2: growing-range deep strike

Neptune2 — the deep-strike capability in development under this partnership — aims to extend the range and capabilities of the original Neptune beyond its initial anti-ship missions. Technical details remain partially confidential, but the ambition is clear: transform a missile that sank the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet into a land and maritime strike system with significantly expanded range, developed in partnership with Europe's premier missile consortium.

This Luch–MBDA collaboration perfectly illustrates the dynamic of Eurosatory 2026: Ukrainian companies with genuine operational credentials (the Neptune sank the Moskva — no other European missile can make that claim recently) partnering with European giants to develop next-generation systems. This is a relationship between equals, not between donor and recipient.

The Neptune sank the Moskva. That line in the Luch Design Bureau's portfolio is the most powerful operational reference a missile builder could have. MBDA recognized that. Serious defense companies sign agreements with partners who have proved their capabilities in real conditions — not in a simulator. Ukraine has what few builders can offer: recent, documented, combat-proven results.

From interception to evacuation: the full range

Beyond missiles, Eurosatory 2026 revealed the full scope of Ukraine's drone and robotic systems ecosystem. MAC HUB and Paramount Greece signed a partnership in the domain of interceptor drones and unmanned naval platforms. Frontline Robotics, Dropla, and Milrem Robotics reached agreements on robotized combat systems and mobile anti-drone platforms. AIDronesUA and the Swedish company Njord Technology agreed to manufacture Ukraine's MAUL robotic evacuation systems in Sweden.

That last agreement — manufacturing Ukrainian systems on Swedish soil — illustrates a growing trend: European partners do not simply want to buy Ukrainian products. They want to co-produce, localize, and integrate these technologies into their own industrial capabilities. That is an even stronger validation than direct purchase: it means partners trust Ukrainian technology enough to embed it in their own industrial infrastructure.

AI and electronic warfare: the invisible edge

Among the least visible but most strategically important technologies presented by Ukrainian companies at Eurosatory 2026: artificial intelligence systems for reconnaissance, targeting, and electronic warfare. Ukraine has developed capabilities in AI applied to warfare that are unique in the world for one simple reason: it has had four years to test them in real conditions, against a serious adversary, with existential stakes. No simulation can replicate that experience.

Potential defense-system buyers understand this. The value of a military technology proven in real combat is immeasurable — that is what justifies the prices and the partnerships. Ukraine is selling not only systems, but the accumulated knowledge of four years of war against one of the best-equipped armies in the world.

Four years of combat experience against the Russian army — that is data no simulation can reproduce. When a Ukrainian company presents an anti-drone system at Eurosatory, it is presenting a system tested in real conditions against Shaheds, Lancets, and Iskanders. That is an operational certification the best armies in the world do not have. And it commands a very high price.

A political and financial signal from France

The announcement at Eurosatory 2026 of the BRAVE FRANCE program — a 20 million euro grant program established by France to support Ukrainian defense companies, with individual grants of up to 1 million euros and the first competition rounds planned for September 2026 — is a major political signal. France is not known for quick and generous decisions in the area of defense industrial cooperation. This program represents a deliberate decision by Paris to invest in the Ukrainian defense industrial ecosystem.

The 20 million euros may seem modest compared to Ukraine's overall needs. But the signaling effect is disproportionate: when France opens a grants program for Ukrainian companies, other countries follow. The legitimation dynamic builds momentum. And for the 80 companies that exhibited at Eurosatory, this program represents a concrete funding stream to accelerate their development.

The Franco-German agreement in Ramstein format

On the sidelines of the exhibition, the defense ministers of Ukraine and Germany signed an agreement to combine the technological capabilities of both countries and create new defense solutions. This agreement in Ramstein format — the platform coordinating military aid to Ukraine — institutionalizes what has been happening informally for several years in Ukraine–Germany defense technology cooperation. It creates a formal framework for what was previously informal.

The combination of the BRAVE FRANCE program, the Ukraine–Germany agreement, the partnerships with HENSOLDT and MBDA, and the cooperations with Swedish and Czech companies — all of it sketches an integration of the Ukrainian defense industry into the European industrial fabric that will be very difficult, if not impossible, to undo. It is a strategic anchor for Ukraine's future in Europe.

20 million euros from France, a formal agreement with Germany, partnerships with MBDA and HENSOLDT — Ukraine is no longer a country being helped. It is a partner being integrated. The difference is fundamental and irreversible. Even if the war ended tomorrow, these industrial ties would exist and continue to strengthen. That is the best long-term security guarantee Ukraine could have.

From anti-drone drones to integrated systems

Among the innovations presented at Eurosatory 2026, Ukrainian anti-drone systems occupied a central place. Ukraine has developed a unique expertise in counter-drone warfare in response to the massive waves of Russian Shaheds that have targeted its cities since 2022. That expertise — acquired under the pressure of absolute necessity — is now packaged into exportable products: detection systems, jamming systems, interceptors, and electronic warfare solutions.

The partnerships signed at Eurosatory for mobile anti-drone platforms reflect a growing demand across Europe: after Ukraine, every country is looking to prepare for drone warfare. Ukrainian companies have the experience that European companies lack. And that experience carries considerable market value in the global defense industry.

Europeans look at Ukraine and think: "What if it were us?" That question is driving defense ministries to sign agreements at Eurosatory. Ukraine is selling not only systems — it is selling survival expertise that no one else possesses. And that cannot be ordered from a catalog. It is shared through partnership.

An agreement that secures propulsion components

An agreement concluded at Eurosatory 2026 between a Ukrainian armored-vehicle company and the Czech firm AviaNera concerns the development and supply of turbojet and turboprop engines for Ukrainian missile and drone systems. This cooperation goes beyond a simple supply contract — it calls for joint ventures, expanded production capacity, and technology localization in Ukraine.

Propulsion is one of the most critical and most difficult components to master in long-range missile and drone systems. Securing a reliable engine supply chain — through an EU and NATO partner like Czechia — is a necessary condition for scaling up Ukrainian production. This partnership quietly solves one of the least publicized bottlenecks in the Ukrainian defense industry.

Turbojet engines for Ukrainian missiles, manufactured in the Czech Republic as part of a joint venture — that is the kind of agreement that doesn't make headlines but changes everything. Propulsion is the heart of a missile. Securing that component through a reliable NATO partner eliminates a critical vulnerability in the Ukrainian supply chain. These quiet sub-component agreements are just as important as the headline announcements.

What these 80 companies mean for the post-war period

Eurosatory 2026 is not just another defense exhibition. For Ukraine, it is a milestone in a transformation process that is redefining its place in the European security architecture. The 80 companies, the partnerships with MBDA and HENSOLDT, the BRAVE FRANCE program, the production of Ukrainian systems in Sweden — all of it creates industrial and commercial ties that will outlast the war, whatever its outcome.

That industrial integration may be the most lasting strategic consequence of the war — more durable than territorial gains or losses, more resistant than diplomatic agreements. Factories in Sweden manufacturing Ukrainian systems, German radars integrating Ukrainian missiles, French funding for Kyiv defense startups — that is an industrial fabric nothing can easily unravel. Ukraine is now inside Europe structurally, not just politically.

A message for the skeptics

To those who still doubt Ukrainian capabilities, I submit these data points: 80 companies at Eurosatory, a sixteen-fold increase in two years, agreements with MBDA and HENSOLDT, French government grants, missiles that sank the Russian flagship. These facts require no particular optimism to read correctly. They simply require opening your eyes to what Ukraine has managed to build under fire. And if that is not enough for you, wait for Eurosatory 2028.

Eurosatory 2026 will not be forgotten by those who lived it. This was the show where Ukraine went from aided country to country that aids, from recipient to partner, from customer to supplier. That transformation will take years to fully solidify — but it has begun. And in ten years, when historians look for the moment Ukraine truly joined the European defense community, they will point to Paris, June 2026.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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