ANALYSIS: Anchorage, Istanbul, MFA: the Kremlin's three maximalist mantras

ANALYSIS: Anchorage, Istanbul, MFA: the Kremlin's three maximalist mantras

Introduction: A Kremlin that repeats its demands while changing the packaging

The strategy of disguised maximalism

There is a constant in Vladimir Putin's diplomacy since the start of the full-scale war: the objectives have never changed, only the vocabulary adapts to the audience. In June 2026, three recurring references resurface in Kremlin declarations — the Istanbul 2022 agreements, the alleged "Anchorage modalities," and the official positions of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) under Sergei Lavrov. Together they form a triptych of Russian maximalism that ISW analysts decoded on June 23, 2026.

These three references are not starting points for negotiation. They constitute a prefabricated framework within which Moscow intends to confine any future discussion. Accepting them as a basis for dialogue already means accepting the terms of Ukrainian surrender. That is why understanding them in detail is an analytical necessity before any serious mediation attempt.

Why the ISW is sounding the alarm

The ISW, in its report of June 23, 2026, insists that recent declarations by Putin and Lavrov represent "no evolution" from Russia's 2022 positions. This point deserves strong emphasis, as it runs counter to numerous analyses that have presented these declarations as a sign of openness. There is no opening. There is a reiteration.

Meduza, the independent Russian exile media, also reported on June 23, 2026 Putin's declarations of readiness to negotiate "on the basis of the Istanbul agreements." And Pravda Ukraine, the same day, analyzes how this position amounts to demanding total Ukrainian capitulation. The convergence of these analyses is revealing: what Putin calls "negotiation," the world used to call a "diktat."

Istanbul 2022 revisited: point-by-point deconstruction

Forced neutrality: banning Ukraine from defending itself

The first core demand of the Istanbul 2022 draft agreements was "permanent neutrality" for Ukraine — a constitutionally inscribed neutrality implying a ban on joining military alliances, notably NATO. This demand, presented as a regional security guarantee, is in reality exactly the opposite: it is a guarantee of insecurity for Ukraine.

A constitutionally neutralized Ukraine cannot collectively defend itself with its allies. It cannot benefit from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It remains alone facing a Russia that has demonstrated its willingness to use force. This "neutrality" would protect Ukraine from nothing. It would make it an easier target for the next invasion — scheduled as soon as the Kremlin judges its forces sufficiently rebuilt.

Limitations on armed forces: a paper army

The Istanbul drafts also included drastic caps on Ukrainian armed forces — in terms of troop numbers, heavy equipment, and the range of weapons systems. In practice, this would have meant dismantling the military capabilities that Ukraine has developed, at immense sacrifice, since 2014. It is a demand for unilateral disarmament, presented as a "confidence-building measure."

The precedent of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 is starkly clear here. Ukraine had then renounced its inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from the great powers. Those guarantees proved empty when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. To repeat the experiment of disarmament under Russian promises would not merely be naive — it would be irresponsible.

The "Anchorage modalities": a vague construction serving maximalism

Anchorage: what exactly is Russia claiming?

The reference to the "Anchorage modalities" is more opaque and more difficult to document than the Istanbul agreements. This term apparently refers to discussions that allegedly took place on the sidelines of diplomatic meetings between American and Russian representatives, potentially linked to discussions on the Arctic or other bilateral matters. Russia claims these discussions included elements relating to Ukraine.

The strategy is visible: by invoking conversations whose exact content is not publicly documented, Moscow claims to have obtained "implicit concessions" or "informal recognitions" from American interlocutors. It is a classic technique of multi-track diplomacy: using the ambiguity of informal discussions to anchor positions that official interlocutors have never explicitly endorsed.

Why this reference is dangerous for the West

For Western governments, and particularly the American administration, Russia's reference to the "Anchorage modalities" creates a dilemma. Either they categorically deny that these discussions took place or that they touched on Ukraine — which requires a diplomatic transparency that some services prefer to avoid. Or they let the ambiguity subsist — and Russia exploits this silence to build a legitimizing narrative for its positions.

The solution is simple but politically sensitive: total clarity about what was said and what was not said during all American–Russian diplomatic interactions. The Trump administration, which multiplied informal channels with Moscow, must ensure that these discussions are not reinterpreted by the Kremlin as implicit concessions on issues vital to Ukraine.

Lavrov's MFA: the institution of bureaucratic maximalism

Lavrov as an instrument of capitulation rhetoric

Sergei Lavrov, Russia's Foreign Minister since 2004, is one of the world's most experienced diplomats. His expertise must not be confused with his good faith. Lavrov is an instrument of Putin's policy, not a moderator. His declarations, carefully formulated to sound diplomatically reasonable to uninitiated Western ears, invariably translate the same maximalist Kremlin positions.

In June 2026, Lavrov's declarations reaffirmed Russia's 2022 war aims in different formulations — according to ISW analysis. This is no surprise to anyone closely following Russian diplomatic developments. But for less specialized observers, Lavrov's polished tone may seem different from Putin's inflammatory declarations. That is exactly the role he plays: offering a facade of moderation in the service of an uncompromising imperial project.

Lavrov's art of the infinite clause

Lavrov has perfected a particular diplomatic technique: formulating conditions that seem reasonable on the surface but contain infinitely extensible clauses. "Russia is ready to negotiate if Ukraine takes into account the realities on the ground" — this phrase sounds moderate. But "realities on the ground" is an unlimited concept that Russia can expand at will with the military situation. It is a condition that can never be satisfied, except by total capitulation.

Similarly, "taking into account Russia's security interests" is an open formulation that has historically meant "Ukraine cannot join NATO," then "Ukraine cannot have a significant army," then "Ukraine must recognize the annexations" — the list extends as far as Moscow finds useful. Decoding this Russian diplomatic language is an indispensable skill for any Western actor involved in this conflict.

The Western diplomatic response: between discernment and naivety

The temptations of precipitate mediation

Faced with this Russian maximalist framework, certain Western governments yield to the temptation of "precipitate mediation" — finding an agreement at any cost to end a conflict whose domestic political costs they can barely stomach. This temptation is understandable. It is also profoundly dangerous.

Precipitate mediation that accepted Russian terms — even under a more palatable rhetorical wrapping — would produce a "peace" that rewards aggression, demoralizes democracies, and sends China, Iran, and North Korea the message that territorial conquest works provided you hold on long enough. It is a precedent the international order cannot afford.

Sound diplomacy: clarity on minimum conditions

The correct diplomatic response to Russian maximalism is not total deadlock. It is clarity on non-negotiable conditions. The West, as a whole, must articulate common clear positions: Russian withdrawal from sovereign Ukrainian territories, genuine security mechanisms for Ukraine, accountability for war crimes. These conditions must be non-negotiable, and they must be communicated to Moscow without ambiguity.

As long as Moscow maintains its maximalist demands, there is no basis for a fair negotiation. It is not Ukraine or the West that is blocking peace. It is Putin who refuses to retreat from his imperial ambitions. This reality must be named clearly, relentlessly, in every diplomatic forum.

Prisoner exchanges: the only channel that actually works

The 76th exchange: 160 for 160, Emirati mediation

While major peace negotiations are deadlocked, a modest but crucial humanitarian channel is functioning: prisoner of war exchanges. On June 26, 2026, the 76th exchange was completed on the principle of 160 for 160, with mediation by the United Arab Emirates, according to the Kyiv Independent. Zelensky confirmed that 1,596 Ukrainians have returned since the start of 2026, and more than 9,500 since 2022.

These figures represent human lives — soldiers who were tortured, civilians illegally detained, families reunited. These exchanges are possible precisely because they operate in a distinct register from political negotiations. The UAE can play this role because they have relations with both sides and because the humanitarian register partly escapes the political calculations that paralyze peace negotiations.

The limit of exchanges: a humanitarian channel without political translation

But we must be lucid about what these exchanges are not. They do not signal that Moscow and Kyiv are moving toward agreement on fundamental political questions. They do not represent a "normalization" of relations. And they must not be used by Moscow to claim it is acting in "good faith" in peace negotiations.

Each humanitarian exchange is a victory for the families concerned. It is also, for Zelensky, a demonstration of his government's priority for its soldiers and citizens. But these humanitarian victories coexist with total diplomatic deadlock on the fundamental questions. They must be celebrated for what they are, without being made to be more than they are.

Western crisis communication facing Russian maximalism

Naming things clearly: a political responsibility

Faced with the Kremlin's carefully calibrated formulations, Western governments and media have a particular responsibility: name things precisely. When Putin speaks of "negotiation," it must be specified "on terms equivalent to Ukrainian capitulation." When Lavrov speaks of "realities on the ground," it must be specified "illegal territorial conquests maintained by force." This clarification work is not partisanship — it is analytical precision.

Media editors, government spokespersons, academics, and experts commenting on the conflict all share a responsibility for maintaining this lexical clarity. Allowing Russia's vocabulary to progressively impose itself in Western discourse means offering Moscow a rhetorical victory that prepares political capitulations. The care taken with words is not pedantry — it is resistance.

Information as a theater of war: lessons to draw

The information war that Russia wages against the West is documented, permanent, and sophisticated. Networks of fake accounts amplify Russian narratives on social media. Kremlin-aligned media distribute translations of their content in European languages. Opaque funding channels support European politicians favorable to Moscow. This information war is not won only with counter-narratives — it is won with institutional clarity on facts.

Investing in factual clarity, training journalists to decode Russian diplomatic rhetoric, equipping fact-checking institutions with adequate resources — these are priorities that Western governments must treat with the same urgency as physical defense spending. The war is being fought on Ukrainian battlefields, yes. But it is also being fought in the minds of European voters who will form the political majorities of tomorrow.

The future of Ukrainian diplomacy: beyond the current deadlock

Building a durable support coalition

Ukrainian diplomacy must inscribe itself in the long term. Beyond managing immediate crises — Russian strikes, weapons shortages, diplomatic blockages — Kyiv must build a durable support coalition that will survive changes of government in allied capitals. This coalition must be institutionally anchored, not solely dependent on personal relationships between leaders.

The peace conferences organized by Ukraine, bilateral security agreements, candidacy for the EU and NATO — all these initiatives contribute to institutionalizing international support. The more commitments are codified in treaties and permanent mechanisms, the less vulnerable they are to political reversals.

Reconstruction as a diplomatic tool

The reconstruction of Ukraine after the war is as much a diplomatic challenge as a humanitarian one. International reconstruction conferences have already laid the foundations for a long-term commitment from many states and institutions. This commitment creates economic interests in Ukrainian success that reinforce political support. Countries investing in Ukrainian reconstruction have a financial interest in seeing Ukraine prosperous and stable.

This mechanism of converging economic and political interests is one of Ukraine's most durable diplomatic resources. It transforms support for Ukraine from a moral position into a concrete economic interest for dozens of countries. This transformation is one that Ukrainian diplomacy must continue to cultivate actively, alongside the management of short-term crises.

Conclusion: Decoding Putin to avoid being trapped

Three mantras, one single objective: Ukrainian capitulation

Istanbul, Anchorage, MFA — these three references form a rhetorical triptych in service of one constant objective: obtaining Ukraine's capitulation without it looking like capitulation. The form varies, the substance remains immutable. Russia wants a Ukraine neutralized, disarmed, territorially amputated, and incapable of resisting the next Russian pressure.

Understanding this, expressing it clearly, and refusing to be trapped by the Kremlin's diplomatic vocabulary — that is the most urgent analytical and political task for Western governments. The ISW did it on June 23, 2026. It is time for the chancelleries to follow suit with the same clarity.

Ukraine deserves a just peace, not a hasty one

Zelensky has said and repeated that he wants peace — but a peace grounded in justice, international law, and genuine security guarantees. This is a reasonable position, legitimately founded and strategically coherent. The West must uphold it against pressure for a hasty deal that would sacrifice Ukraine on the altar of Western political convenience.

The Kremlin's three mantras are traps. Recognizing them as such, naming them, refusing them — that is the minimum dignity the West owes to a country that has been fighting for more than four years for its values and for ours.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My positioning and its consequences

My analysis is conducted from a clearly pro-Ukrainian position. I believe Russian positions are maximalist and unacceptable, and that the West must support Ukraine until a just peace is possible. This positioning necessarily influences my interpretation of Russian diplomatic declarations. I acknowledge it and encourage cross-checking with other sources.

This means I may underweight arguments that favor Russian positions or that cast doubt on Ukrainian strategic claims. I try to correct for this by citing the primary sources directly.

What I do not know

I have not had access to full transcripts of any Anchorage discussions, nor to the complete text of the Istanbul 2022 documents. My analysis relies on available sources — ISW, Meduza, Pravda Ukraine, Kyiv Independent, Interfax-Ukraine — all dated from June 23–26, 2026. On the most opaque aspects of informal American–Russian diplomacy, I acknowledge my ignorance of the precise details.

I do not have access to the confidential communications between parties at Anchorage, Istanbul, or other venues, nor to the full classified reporting on Russian military intentions.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Putin/Lavrov positions = reaffirmation of 2022 war aims — June 23, 2026

Pravda Ukraine — Putin ready to negotiate on basis of Istanbul 2022 agreements — June 23, 2026

Meduza — Putin says Russia is ready to negotiate on the basis of Istanbul — June 23, 2026

Kyiv Independent — 160 Ukrainian prisoners released in the 76th exchange — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Interfax-Ukraine — Zelensky: 1,596 Ukrainians returned since the start of 2026 — June 26, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — Details of the 160/160 exchange, 76th cycle — June 26, 2026