OPINION: Putin wants "peace" — provided Ukraine surrenders completely

The June 23 declaration and what it conceals

On June 23, 2026, during a meeting with members of the Russian government, Vladimir Putin declared that Russia is ready for peace negotiations with Ukraine, on the basis of the agreements discussed at Istanbul in spring 2022. On the surface, an innocuous phrase. In depth, a declaration of diplomatic war. Because the Istanbul agreements of 2022 — those documents negotiated in the first weeks of the Russian invasion, when Russia was advancing on Kyiv and believed itself within reach of a few days' victory — represent in substance the total capitulation of Ukraine.

Those agreements stipulated that Ukraine would be barred from joining NATO, that its armed forces would be slashed to 85,000 soldiers, that permanent neutrality would be enshrined in the Constitution, that foreign military personnel or weapons systems would be prohibited from Ukrainian territory — and that the maximum range of Ukrainian missiles would be capped at 40 kilometers. Putin wants to return Ukraine to the conditions of 2022 — plus the territorial gains made since.

The veneer of legitimacy: "the Ukrainians initialed it"

Putin added, with the characteristic aplomb of the brazen lie: "the Ukrainian delegation initialed these agreements, which means they were satisfied." This is a diplomatically fanciful interpretation. Initialing a document during negotiations does not mean approving it as a final agreement — it is a procedural step indicating that the parties have taken note of the text, not that they have accepted it. Ukrainian negotiators had initialed the text as part of a process that subsequently collapsed, partly because the Russian conditions were deemed unacceptable by Kyiv.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) was explicit in its assessment on June 23, 2026: Putin's statements represent his maximalist opening position for any future negotiations — not a sincere opening to compromise. It is a war position renamed as a peace offer.

It must be admitted: Putin is a remarkably effective communicator for a war criminal. Presenting himself as the champion of peace while demanding the total surrender of the other party, and convincing a portion of international opinion that this is reasonable — that is a rhetorical tour de force. Dismantling it is the minimum work any journalist or analyst must do.

Istanbul 2022: what those agreements actually required

To understand why the Istanbul agreements are unacceptable for Ukraine, their content must be spelled out. Permanent neutrality enshrined in the Constitution meant that Ukraine could never join a defensive alliance even if it chose to — a permanent vulnerability against a neighbor that has invaded twice in 10 years. The cap at 85,000 soldiers would have left Ukraine militarily incapable of defending itself against a Russia that maintains hundreds of thousands of troops.

Restricting Ukrainian missiles to 40 km range would have allowed Russia to position offensive military systems within range of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, beyond the reach of Ukrainian defenses. That is the definition of nominal sovereignty — a state that cannot defend itself is not a sovereign state.

The additional layers: Anchorage and the reality on the ground

Putin did not only invoke Istanbul. He also cited the Anchorage modalities — discussions between Russian and American representatives at an August 2025 summit whose content was never officially made public — and the realities on the ground (a coded phrase meaning Russian territorial gains since 2022). These successive layers of conditions mean in practice: Ukraine must cede the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson within their full administrative boundaries — including areas still controlled by Kyiv.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov simultaneously declared on June 23 that Russia would achieve all its war objectives, including Ukraine's neutrality and the elimination of laws "discriminating" against the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church. There is nothing there that resembles a negotiation — it is the list of conditions for total victory.

Lavrov speaking of laws "discriminating" against the Russian language in Ukraine is the occupier dictating the linguistic policy of the country it invaded. Let me be clear: Putin and Lavrov are not seeking peace. They are seeking to end Ukraine as a sovereign national project. This is not an interpretation — it is what they say themselves, in barely veiled terms.

How "peace" disarms Ukraine's supporters

Putin's declaration of June 23, 2026 is not addressed to Zelensky. It is addressed to Western public opinion — particularly American and European voters who sincerely wish for an end to the conflict and who may be tempted to believe that if Putin says he is ready to negotiate, refusing those negotiations would be a mistake. That is precisely the desired effect: to create pressure on Western governments to push Ukraine to the negotiating table, on terms that Kyiv has rightfully rejected.

This strategy has a history. Putin has used the same mechanism from 2022 to today: alternating between impossible peace proclamations and military escalation, always presenting Russia as the one wanting peace and Ukraine (or the West) as the one blocking it. The result is confusion in international opinion that directly benefits Moscow by reducing support for Kyiv.

The timing: why now?

On June 23, 2026, Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations had been suspended for several months — the various rounds in Abu Dhabi, Geneva, and the 2025 Istanbul sessions having produced only limited prisoner exchange agreements. Washington was absorbed by negotiations with Iran and the midterm elections. Ukraine, the United States, and Europe were reportedly according to Daily Sabah ready to restart negotiations. It is precisely in this moment of diplomatic opening that Putin plants his maximum conditions — to ensure that any future process starts from his most advantageous position.

Furthermore, Putin accuses Ukraine of conducting strikes inside Russian territory to "build a position of strength" before talks — thereby turning the argument against Kyiv. In terms of rhetorical manipulation, this is a classic: accuse the victim of the defensive means it employs to justify the maximalist conditions you impose.

Ukraine strikes Russian territory with drones and missiles. Good. When you have been invaded since 2022, when thousands of your soldiers and civilians die every week, when your cities are being bombed — you have every right to strike the invader's military infrastructure on its own soil. Putin calls that seeking to "negotiate from a position of strength." Zelensky calls it self-defense. One of them is right.

The open letter of June 4 and its implications

On June 4, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had sent an open letter to Putin proposing a direct bilateral meeting to end the war — with the requirement that Europe and the United States be involved in the negotiations. This offer, sincere in its terms, was also a political gesture toward Western audiences wanting to see Kyiv maintain the diplomatic initiative.

Putin responded by demanding the exclusion of American representatives from bilateral talks in Istanbul — a demand that Kyiv rejected. Ukraine knows that in any negotiation without Western witnesses, the pressure from Moscow would be maximal and the military and economic asymmetry would weigh entirely against its interests. The security guarantees demanded by Ukraine — the equivalent of a NATO Article 5 — require precisely the involvement of Western allies.

What Ukraine would actually accept

Contrary to the Russian narrative that portrays Kyiv as refusing all peace, the Ukrainian position is documented and consistent: ceasefire along current lines, binding security guarantees, maintenance of Ukrainian sovereignty over occupied territories as a long-term objective (with the possibility of negotiating a resolution of Crimea's status over a ten-to-fifteen year horizon), NATO membership or equivalent. These conditions are those of a state that wants to survive, not surrender. They are incompatible with Russian demands — which explains why negotiations are stuck.

Zelensky cannot accept a peace that guarantees Russia can attack again in ten years, once its forces are rebuilt. No responsible government could. The memory of Budapest 1994 — when Ukraine surrendered its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees that were not honored — haunts every Ukrainian decision in this war.

Budapest 1994 is the bitterest lesson in diplomacy of the past 30 years. Ukraine surrendered the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. And Russia invaded twice. Any peace discussion that does not include rock-solid, verifiable security guarantees is an invitation to repeat Budapest.

Washington distracted by Tehran at the worst moment

Daily Sabah notes that talks between Russia and Ukraine were paused because Washington was focused on negotiations with Iran. This is a reality that Putin deliberately exploits: by signing a memorandum with Tehran, the Trump administration momentarily reduced its pressure on Moscow. Russia loses a precious technological and military partner — Iran was supplying Shahed drones used against Ukraine — but gains diplomatic breathing room while Washington looks elsewhere.

Trump made ending the war in Ukraine a campaign promise, but his transactional instinct could lead him to push Kyiv toward an unfavorable deal so he can present himself as the president who ended two conflicts — Iran and Ukraine — before the midterms. This is precisely the risk that Zelensky must navigate: maintaining American support while avoiding being pushed toward a facade peace.

Europe must speak with a firm voice

In this context, the role of Europe is crucial. The coalition of the willing — Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland — that formed to militarily support Ukraine must hold a firm position: any negotiation must start from Ukrainian sovereignty and include binding security guarantees. Europe cannot allow Trump to negotiate alone with Putin the contours of a deal on the future of European security — it did so once, symbolically, at Yalta. The result lasted forty years.

The threat of massive sanctions if Putin refuses a reasonable ceasefire must remain credible. Arms deliveries to Ukraine must continue. Ukrainian sovereignty is non-negotiable — not for Europe, which knows better than anyone what it means to let a powerful and bellicose neighbor redraw borders at its convenience.

I have said it before and I say it again: an unjust peace now is a guaranteed war in ten years. A Ukraine whose military sovereignty and territorial integrity had been eroded would be an even easier prey in a future Russian offensive. The West already made this mistake at Munich in 1938. History judges harshly those who repeated it. It would be time to remember that.

China's role in the pretend mediation

While Putin waves his Istanbul conditions as a peace olive branch, Beijing plays a facade mediator role that deserves critical scrutiny. China has repeatedly presented its 12-point "peace proposals" as a constructive contribution to resolving the conflict. These proposals were received with diplomatic courtesy by Western diplomacy and ignored in substance by all who read them carefully. They essentially repeat Russian demands dressed in more polished diplomatic language.

What Beijing actually wants is the end of Western sanctions against Russia — which indirectly affect Chinese companies — and the normalization of a precedent according to which territorial changes by force can be "managed diplomatically" rather than reversed. If this precedent is accepted in Ukraine, it will apply tomorrow to Taiwan. This is the primary reason why Ukrainian capitulation is not only morally unacceptable — it is strategically suicidal for the liberal world order.

Ankara caught between two fires: An interested mediator

Erdoğan's Turkey has skillfully used its mediator role in the Ukraine war to strengthen its international geopolitical position. The 2022 grain deal, negotiated with Turkish support, was a real achievement. But Turkish mediation has its structural limits: Ankara maintains close economic relations with Moscow (energy, tourism, bilateral trade up since Western sanctions) that create a fundamental conflict of interest. Turkey cannot be a neutral mediator when it financially benefits from the continuation of a conflict that keeps Russia in need of alternative trading partners.

Zelensky has acknowledged the value of Turkish mediation while maintaining non-negotiable demands on territorial sovereignty. This position is coherent: using all available diplomatic channels while refusing to allow mediators to define the terms of a settlement. Ukrainian diplomacy, often underestimated in Western analyses, has demonstrated remarkable sophistication in this multi-level game.

What strikes me about the international pseudo-mediation surrounding the war in Ukraine is the number of actors who profit from a conflict they claim to want to resolve. China, Turkey, certain Gulf states — all have interests in managing this conflict without concluding it. Zelensky, who bears the consequences of this management, deserves more clarity from his Western partners about who are truly his friends and who is playing a double game.

Ukraine's post-2022 military doctrine

The Ukraine of 2026 is not the Ukraine of February 2022. Over four years of total war, its armed forces developed a unique hybrid military doctrine — combining Western NATO training with tactical innovations born of necessity, a domestic defense industry producing drones and munitions in growing quantities, and a long-range strike capability that has fundamentally changed the strategic equation. These capabilities cannot be abandoned by treaty — they have become part of the Ukrainian national identity.

Putin's demands on demilitarization and weapons restrictions ignore this reality. A Ukraine that had signed the 2022 Istanbul agreement would have been disarmed against a Russian army that retained all its capabilities. The four years that have passed proved that this asymmetry was untenable — and that the only credible security guarantee for Ukraine is its own deterrent capability combined with institutional anchoring within the Western security architecture.

NATO membership: The central stake Putin wants to erase

At the heart of the Russian demand lies a constant objective since 2008: preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. This demand is presented as a legitimate Russian security concern. In reality, it is a demand for a right of veto over the strategic choices of a sovereign state. Countries have the right to choose their alliances. This principle is fundamental in international law. Putin refuses this principle for Ukraine — but no other power in the world has accepted granting him such a right of veto over his neighbors.

The NATO summit in Washington in July 2024 sidestepped the issue by offering Ukraine an "irreversible path" toward membership without a concrete timeline. This diplomatic language disappointed Kyiv while irritating Moscow — the worst of both worlds. A clearer NATO position on Ukrainian post-ceasefire membership would be the most credible and durable security guarantee the West could offer.

Ukraine has paid an unimaginable price to defend the principle that a sovereign state has the right to choose its alliances. This principle benefits every country in Central and Eastern Europe — and beyond. Every dollar spent supporting Ukraine is also an investment in the credibility of that principle for all. The West does not support Ukraine out of charity — it defends the architecture that protects its own freedom.

The Ukraine that produces while Ukraine fights

An underreported aspect of Ukrainian resistance is the remarkable economic transformation the country has undergone under occupation and bombardment. Ukraine's defense industry, virtually nonexistent before 2022, now produces tens of thousands of drones per year, artillery munitions, electronic warfare systems, and cruise missiles. This industrial capacity was developed under Russian bombs, often in underground or dispersed factories to avoid strikes. It is an unprecedented demonstration of industrial resilience in modern history.

Ukrainian businesses have also demonstrated remarkable economic adaptability: reorienting supply chains toward borders with Poland, Romania, and Moldova, maintaining substantial agricultural activity despite the loss of land in the east, developing a thriving digital economy that maintained IT service exports throughout the war.

Reconstruction as a geopolitical stake

Ukraine's reconstruction is estimated by the World Bank at more than $411 billion — a figure that grows with every month of war. This reconstruction is both a colossal humanitarian challenge and a potentially transformative economic opportunity for Ukraine and its partners. European and American companies that participate in this reconstruction will build durable economic ties with a country of 40 million people situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia.

But reconstruction can only truly begin with security. This is why the conditions of peace matter so much — a peace without solid security guarantees will not allow the massive private investment needed for reconstruction. Companies do not invest in potential conflict zones. Putin knows this, and his conditions are precisely designed to keep Ukraine in a permanent state of insecurity that would prevent this transformative reconstruction.

The Ukraine that rebuilds will be the Ukraine most integrated into Europe in its history. This is precisely what Putin wants to prevent — not because it represents a military threat to Russia, but because it represents an existential threat to his narrative that liberal democracy cannot function in the post-Soviet space. A democratic, prosperous Ukraine is the living refutation of everything the Kremlin claims.

Calling things by their name

What Putin proposed on June 23, 2026 is not peace. It is surrender disguised as negotiation. It is demanding that Ukraine accept the terms of a military defeat it has not suffered, on the basis of agreements drafted in 2022 when Russia was in a position of strength — before the Ukrainian counteroffensives at Kharkiv and Kherson. Calling this a peace offer is to distort diplomatic language in the service of military propaganda.

Real peace in Ukraine will come through a ceasefire on lines acceptable to both parties, robust security guarantees for Kyiv, an international reconstruction process, and the recognition that the question of the status of occupied territories will require decades of negotiation — not a surrender in a few weeks under Kremlin pressure. Until then, the West must hold firm.

To Zelensky, with respect

Volodymyr Zelensky faces one of the most difficult tasks in modern history: defending a country at war with limited resources, maintaining national cohesion under bombs, and simultaneously negotiating with allies whose long-term reliability is not guaranteed. He does so with remarkable resilience and strategic clarity. His rejection of the Istanbul conditions is not stubbornness — it is historical lucidity. And that lucidity deserves the full support of Europe and allied democracies.

I close this opinion piece with a certainty that four years of war in Ukraine have reinforced: peace is not the absence of armed conflict. It is the presence of justice, security, and dignity. The peace Putin proposes is none of those things for Ukraine. It is not peace. It is disguised capitulation — and Zelensky is right to refuse it.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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