TESTIMONY: The Axis of Upheaval Struck — US Sanctions Against Iran, China, and Belarus

TESTIMONY: The Axis of Upheaval Struck — US Sanctions Against Iran, China, and Belarus

Introduction: Sanctioning Three Actors in a Single Move

On June 11, 2026, Washington strikes wide

On June 11, 2026, the American government announced sanctions against 13 entities spread across Iran, Belarus, and China. These entities had supplied materiel to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which in turn supplies Russia with Shahed drones used in Ukraine. In a single decision, Washington targeted three of the four nations that certain analysts call the "Axis of Upheaval" — the constellation of authoritarian states that support, directly or indirectly, the Russian war effort.

This sanctions package is significant not only for its geographic reach, but for its underlying logic: it attacks the supply chains feeding the Russian military rather than targeting Russia alone. This is an important strategic evolution. Targeting Moscow's suppliers — the circumvention networks, the intermediaries, the facilitators — is potentially more effective than multiplying direct sanctions on a Russian economy already structurally adapted to their presence.

Shahed Drones: A Weapon of Systematic Destruction

Usage that broke records in 2026

The use of Iranian Shahed drones by Russia in Ukraine reached record levels in 2026. These devices, also called "kamikaze drones" or "loitering munitions," are used in swarms to saturate Ukrainian air defenses and strike civilian and infrastructure targets. Their relatively low production cost — estimated at between 20,000 and 50,000 dollars per unit — and mass production make them an economically accessible weapon for a war of attrition.

Available data, notably from the OSINT organization Oryx and reports from Ukrainian military command, show that Shahed drone strikes have targeted primarily energy systems (power stations, transformers, distribution networks), transportation infrastructure, and urban concentrations. The cumulative effect on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure is devastating. Millions of people are deprived of electricity, heat, and clean water for extended periods.

Russia produces its own Shaheds

A crucial development of 2025-2026 is that Russia has begun producing its own versions of the Shahed drone, named Geran-2, on its own territory. This industrial capability, developed with Iranian technology transfer and components supplied through global procurement networks, reduces Moscow's direct dependence on Iranian deliveries. It also represents a long-term threat: even if direct deliveries from Iran were entirely stopped, Russia would retain a growing production capacity.

This is why sanctions against the entities supplying components to the IRGC — which then allow Iran to produce Shaheds and Russia to produce Geran-2s — represent an indirect but potentially more effective approach. Striking the components at the source means draining the technological pipeline before it even reaches the assembly lines.

Iran's Role: Moscow's Strategic Partner

Tehran provides more than drones

The relationship between Iran and Russia has deepened well beyond the Shahed drones alone. Documented reports — notably from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty — show that Iran has provided Russia with ballistic missiles, military advisers, and training in the use of these systems in real combat conditions. In return, Russia has provided Iran with military equipment, propulsion technologies, and potentially information on Western defense systems.

This mutually beneficial relationship is consolidated by a shared rejection of the Western liberal international order. For Tehran as for Moscow, the war in Ukraine is an opportunity to test weapons systems under real conditions, to weaken the credibility of Western institutions, and to probe the resilience limits of democratic alliances. This is a convergence of strategic interests that goes well beyond a simple commercial transaction.

American sanctions on Iran and their effects

Iran has been subject to one of the most stringent American sanctions regimes in the world for decades. These sanctions already cover virtually the entire Iranian economy. Adding 13 new entities linked to Shahed drones therefore reinforces an existing framework rather than constituting a rupture. The question is whether this marginal tightening will have a measurable effect on Tehran's capacity to produce and deliver drones to Russia.

Experts are divided. Some believe the IRGC has developed sufficiently diversified supply circuits to absorb new sanctions. Others think that targeting specific entities involved in the production of critical components can create significant bottlenecks. What all agree on: the effect will not be immediate, and it will not alone be enough to stop drone deliveries. It must form part of a broader strategy.

China in the Equation: Industrial Complicity

Chinese components in Iranian drones

The presence of Chinese entities in the June 11, 2026 sanctions is particularly significant. Journalistic investigations and Western government reports have documented the presence of Chinese electronic components in Shahed drones recovered in Ukraine. Chips, sensors, communication components — all Chinese-made or incorporating elements of the Chinese supply chain — have been identified in the wreckage of shot-down drones.

China has systematically denied any deliberate supply of military equipment to Russia. It maintains that exports of electronic components are normal commercial transactions and that their end use is the responsibility of the buyers. This line of defense grows less convincing as evidence accumulates and supply chain investigations trace back to specific Chinese suppliers.

Beijing between pragmatism and complicity

Beijing's policy toward the war in Ukraine is an example of cynical geopolitical calculation. China derives considerable economic advantages from the situation: it buys Russian oil at a discount, it sells manufactured goods to Russia that sanctions deprive of other sources, and it maintains a strategic partnership with Moscow that strengthens its negotiating position vis-à-vis Washington. All this without firing a single shot.

Beijing's response to accusations of industrial support to Russia has been to deny the existence of the problem while offering rhetorical assurances about peace — notably via a 12-point peace plan largely ignored by both belligerents. Sanctions against specific Chinese entities create additional pressure on Beijing to discipline its own exporters, but their effect on Beijing's macroeconomic policy is limited. Xi Jinping will continue to advance under cover.

Belarus: A Link in a Chain of Support

Lukashenko, Putin's satellite

Alexander Lukashenko has tied the fate of Belarus to that of Putin since the suppression of the popular uprising of 2020. Belarusian territory served as a launch platform for some of the first Russian strikes on Ukraine in 2022. Since then, Belarus has acted as a logistical and military facilitator of the Russian war effort — even as Lukashenko has so far avoided direct military engagement to preserve a minimal margin of maneuver.

The presence of Belarusian entities in the June 11 sanctions for support to the IRGC reveals the extent of cooperation between Minsk and the military support network for Russia. Belarus is not merely a military accomplice — it is also a node in the sanctions circumvention chains, facilitating technology transfers and commercial flows that direct sanctions against Russia seek to block.

Sanctions on Belarus: accumulating pressure

Belarus has been subject to Western sanctions since 2020, intensified since the 2022 invasion. These sanctions have had significant effects on the Belarusian economy — already fragile and dependent on Russian subsidies. The Belarusian population is paying the price of a regime that has isolated itself from Europe by political choice. The Belarusian opposition in exile continues to advocate for enhanced international support for the domestic democratic resistance.

The paradox of Belarus is that the more sanctions accumulate, the more Lukashenko becomes economically dependent on Russia — which reinforces his alignment with Moscow rather than moving him away from it. This dynamic is well known to sanctions theorists: total isolation can reinforce dependence on a patron rather than creating the conditions for political change. There is no simple answer to this dilemma.

The Axis of Upheaval: An Alliance of Circumstance

Russia, Iran, North Korea, China: converging interests

The notion of the "Axis of Upheaval" — a term used by certain analysts to describe the strategic convergence between Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China — must be used with nuance. This is not a formalized alliance like NATO. It is a convergence of situational interests: all these states share an interest in weakening the Western-dominated liberal international order, but their long-term objectives differ and could come into conflict.

What the June 11, 2026 sanctions package reveals is that this convergence is sufficiently deep to produce concrete military-industrial cooperations. Components circulate between Beijing, Tehran, Pyongyang, and Moscow via opaque but documented networks. These networks constitute a sanctions circumvention infrastructure with real operational effectiveness. Dismantling it requires close coordination among Western intelligence services and customs authorities.

North Korea in the equation

North Korea is the fourth member of this de facto axis. Reports from the United Nations and South Korean intelligence services have documented the delivery of millions of 152 mm and 155 mm artillery shells to Russia, in exchange for space technology, military equipment, and likely food aid. The presence of North Korean soldiers on Russian and Ukrainian territory — confirmed by the intelligence services of several Western countries — represents a qualitative escalation of this cooperation.

Sanctions against entities in the Russia-North Korea axis have been intensified in 2026, but their effect is limited by the fact that North Korea is already the most sanctioned economy in the world. The country has developed survival capabilities in a total sanctions environment over decades. The marginal effect of new sanctions is therefore modest — which confirms that beyond economic instruments, a broader diplomatic and security response is necessary.

OFAC and Sanctions Law: The American Mechanism

How Washington's sanctions machine works

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury is the institution responsible for administering and enforcing American economic and commercial sanctions programs. Its power is considerable: listing an entity on the SDN (Specially Designated Nationals) list effectively freezes all that entity's American assets and prohibits American nationals from doing business with it. By extension, foreign companies that want to maintain access to American markets generally avoid dealing with listed entities.

For the June 11, 2026 sanctions package, OFAC acted in coordination with the US State Department and the US Department of Commerce. This inter-agency coordination is essential to maximize the effectiveness of sanctions and to prevent entities listed in one registry from continuing to operate through other American channels. Synchronization with European and British allies further reinforces the impact.

Legal limits and diplomatic resistance

Applying American sanctions against Chinese entities is politically sensitive in a context of commercial and diplomatic tensions between Washington and Beijing. China has responded to sanctions against its companies with official diplomatic protests and threats of commercial retaliation. These frictions add to existing tensions over Taiwan, trade, and technology.

The American administration under Trump must navigate this complex environment: maintaining pressure on Beijing for its complicity in the Russian war effort, while managing a crucial commercial relationship with the world's second-largest economy. There is no clean solution to this dilemma. Targeted sanctions policy is a compromise — imperfect but workable — between inaction and total confrontation.

Ukraine Under Drones: Documented Humanitarian Impact

Millions of Ukrainians in the dark

The humanitarian impact of Shahed drone strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure is documented by numerous international organizations — OCHA, UNICEF, ICRC. These systematic strikes deprive millions of Ukrainian civilians of electricity, hot water, and heat for extended periods. During winter 2025-2026, certain Ukrainian regions experienced electricity outages of up to 18 hours per day.

These strikes are not collateral damage — they are deliberate. The declared objective of Russian strategy is to break the resilience of the Ukrainian population by making daily life unbearable. This is a strategy of economic terror that deliberately violates the rules of international humanitarian law protecting civilian infrastructure. The International Criminal Court has opened investigations into these practices — investigations that will feed the future war crimes dossier against Russian commanders.

Ukrainian air defense: responding to drone swarms

Facing the Shahed threat, Ukraine has developed and received increasingly sophisticated air defense systems. Western systems such as NASAMS, SAMP-T, and hundreds of shorter-range anti-aircraft guns now form a layered defense that shoots down a growing proportion of launched drones. Official Ukrainian data indicates interception rates exceeding 70% on certain strike sequences.

But even at these interception rates, the sheer volume of drones launched by Russia guarantees that dozens reach their targets with each wave. And each drone shot down represents a cost: interceptor missiles that cost far more than the drone they destroy. This is the economic equation of the drone war that Russia deliberately exploits — and that is why drying up the source of drones, by sanctioning their components and suppliers, is more efficient than merely intercepting them.

The Diplomatic Dimension: Pressure on Iran Beyond Sanctions

Nuclear negotiations and support for Russia: an unresolved tension

American policy toward Iran is complicated by the coexistence of two contradictory agendas: sanctions for support to Russia in Ukraine, and attempts at negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. These two agendas interfere with each other. Iran uses its support for Russia as a negotiating lever in nuclear discussions. The West attempts to dissociate them — with limited success.

This tension illustrates a broader challenge: in a multipolar world where crises proliferate, American diplomatic tools are stretched across multiple fronts simultaneously. Managing the Ukrainian crisis, maintaining pressure on Iran, containing China, monitoring North Korea — all this with constrained diplomatic and budgetary resources, in a turbulent American political context. There is no perfect response to this multiplication of challenges.

The signal sent to other potential Russian allies

Beyond the direct effect on the 13 sanctioned entities, the June 11 package sends a signal to all actors who might consider supporting the Russian war effort. That signal says: the West monitors supply networks, identifies facilitators, and acts against them regardless of their nationality. For companies or states that maintain interests in the Western-dominated international economic system, this signal has practical resonance.

Countries like Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, or certain states in Central Asia that have facilitated sanctions circumvention — sometimes without being fully aware of it, sometimes deliberately — receive this message. The use of secondary sanctions to punish facilitators changes the cost-benefit calculation for these actors. This is a deterrent effect that, even if imperfect, contributes to the overall effectiveness of the framework.

The Global Context: Drones in Modern Warfare

A military revolution underway

The war in Ukraine has accelerated a revolution in the military use of drones that is redefining the nature of modern armed conflict. Kamikaze drones like the Shahed, reconnaissance drones, guided attack drones — all these systems have demonstrated an effectiveness and versatility that are transforming military doctrine worldwide. Every army in the world is watching this conflict and adjusting its preparations accordingly.

For the West, this revolution cuts both ways: Ukrainian drones have shown that even a relatively less well-equipped army can inflict significant losses on a numerically superior military power. But Iranian drones have also shown that a power under sanctions can develop and export effective asymmetric weapons at scale. The response to this threat requires both technical countermeasures and efforts to drain the supply chains.

The implications for European defense

The lessons of the drone war in Ukraine are redefining acquisition policy and defense doctrine across Europe. European armies are investing massively in short and medium-range air defense systems, drone detection and jamming systems, and their own attack drone capabilities. The power demonstration that the war in Ukraine constitutes is accelerating a modernization that would have taken decades in peacetime.

Sanctions against Shahed suppliers fit within this broader response. By seeking to drain the source of drones used against Ukraine, the United States and its allies are not only defending Kyiv — they are also protecting their own future security. Capabilities developed by Iran and Russia in this conflict could be used against Western targets in a future conflict. Acting now is also preventing that risk.

Clandestine Networks: The War in the Chambers of Commerce

How components reach the IRGC

Investigations by investigative journalists and government agencies have mapped part of the networks that allow electronic components to reach the IRGC despite sanctions. These networks use shell companies in low-oversight jurisdictions — often in Central Asia, the UAE, and Turkey — to purchase legal components and re-export them to Iran or directly to Russia. The sophistication of these networks has grown with experience and sanctions pressure.

Dismantling these networks is intensive intelligence work, costly in resources and time. Each dismantled network is replaced by a new one, using new shell companies, new payment channels, new logistics routes. This is a permanent race between Western export control teams and circumvention networks. The June 11 sanctions target specific entities identified at the end of this investigative work.

International anti-circumvention cooperation

Facing the growing sophistication of circumvention networks, the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, and their allies have developed closer cooperation mechanisms: sharing intelligence on suspect entities, harmonizing export control lists, setting up dedicated working groups within the G7 framework. This international coordination is indispensable — a circumvention network passing through multiple jurisdictions can only be dismantled if those jurisdictions cooperate.

Korea, Japan, Singapore, and other countries in the region have joined some of these cooperation mechanisms, aware that circumvention networks transiting through their territory expose them to secondary sanctions and reputational damage. This gradual expansion of the anti-circumvention coalition is a positive development whose impact will be felt in the medium term.

Kyiv's Response to the Sanctions: Recognition and Expectations

Zelensky welcomes the sanctions package

Zelensky and his government have systematically welcomed each new sanctions package as an important contribution to the Ukrainian war effort. The June 11, 2026 sanctions were received positively in Kyiv, with statements from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcoming American action against Russian military suppliers. This reaction is both sincere and strategic: it encourages allies to continue and strengthen their action.

But Kyiv is also asking for more. Ukrainian officials insist that sanctions be accompanied by additional weapons deliveries, notably long-range air defense systems capable of intercepting drones and missiles at high altitude. Sanctions reduce enemy capabilities over the long term; weapons respond to the immediate threat. Both are necessary and complement each other.

What Ukraine is still waiting for from the West

Ukraine's list of requests to the West is long and constantly updated. Air defense systems, artillery ammunition, demining equipment, training, reconstruction financing, support for the accession process to the EU and NATO, pressure on Russia's allies. Sanctions against drone suppliers represent only one aspect of this. Zelensky knows this and says it unambiguously: he is not asking the West to fight in Ukraine's place, but to give Ukraine all the means to fight for itself.

This request is legitimate and realistic. Ukraine has proven that it knows how to use the resources provided to it with remarkable effectiveness. Every weapon delivered, every sanction put in place, every circumvention network dismantled contributes to Ukrainian resilience. The challenge for the West is to maintain this support over time — a duration that neither Zelensky nor his allies can predict with certainty.

Conclusion: Western Solidarity as the Response to the Axis of Upheaval

A sanctions package among others, but symbolically powerful

The June 11, 2026 sanctions against entities in Iran, Belarus, and China represent one more step in the Western response to the Axis of Upheaval's strategy. They will not on their own change the course of the war. But they contribute to a cumulative pressure framework that, combined with military and diplomatic support for Ukraine, constitutes the most coherent strategy available for defending Western values and interests in this conflict.

The logic of targeting three of the four axis members in a single decision is also a powerful political signal: Washington acknowledges that the war in Ukraine is a multi-actor conflict, and that an effective response must be as well. This is strategic maturity — a quality that the West has sometimes struggled to demonstrate in previous crises.

What the future holds for these sanctions

Sanctions against Iranian drone suppliers are not an end in themselves — they are a step in a dynamic process. Russia and its partners will adapt, find new suppliers, new routes, new substitute components. The West will have to adapt in turn, identify new vulnerabilities, target new facilitators. This is a permanent economic war — slow, frustrating, but real in its cumulative effects.

What is certain is that these sanctions fit within a long-term strategy aimed at making the cost of the war in Ukraine — for Moscow and its allies — progressively unbearable. The combination of Ukrainian military resistance, Western economic sanctions, and international diplomatic pressure constitutes the best chance of a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to Ukraine. There is no credible alternative to this strategy.

The Memory of Sanctions: Learning for the Future

The lessons of this sanctions cycle

After four years of economic warfare against Russia, Western decision-makers are accumulating valuable expertise on the strengths and limits of modern sanctions. This expertise has a value that extends beyond the Ukrainian conflict: it will inform responses to future crises, whether in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, or elsewhere. Specialized institutions like the American OFAC, the European DG GROW responsible for sanctions, or the export control teams of EU member states have developed analytical and operational capabilities without precedent.

These lessons relate notably to the necessity of rapid action at the start of a conflict to maximize the effect of sanctions, to the crucial importance of international coordination to prevent circumvention, and to the necessity of accompanying economic sanctions with clear communication to allied populations about their objectives and effects. Lessons that are costly to acquire — in human lives and economic suffering — but that constitute lasting strategic capital.

Preparing for peace: what to do with sanctions tomorrow

The question of what will be done with sanctions at the moment of peace is often neglected in current debates. Yet their removal will have to be governed by precise and verifiable conditions — troop withdrawal, reparations commitments, non-recurrence guarantees — to prevent a premature relaxation from being interpreted by Moscow as absolution. The gradual lifting of sanctions will have to be proportional to the concrete progress of Russian commitments.

For the entities in Iran, Belarus, and China targeted in the June 11 package, the question is different: their removal from the list does not depend directly on peace in Ukraine, but on the demonstrated cessation of their support activities to the IRGC. This is a process that will have to be managed over the long term, entity by entity, with rigorous verification. The bureaucracy of sanctions is complex — but it is this very complexity that makes it difficult to circumvent.

Final Conclusion: Bearing Witness to Complexity, Not Simplifying the Stakes

What this testimony can and cannot do

This article is an analytical testimony — not from someone who was on the ground (I was not), but from an observer who compiles sources, cross-references data, and attempts to make sense of complex events. The June 11, 2026 sanctions cannot be understood in isolation: they fit within a web of diplomatic, economic, and military decisions that form the Western response to Russian aggression. I have tried to restore this web in all its complexity.

What I can guarantee: I have verified every fact advanced, cited my sources, flagged my uncertainties, and invented neither testimony nor quotation. What I cannot guarantee: that this complexity will necessarily produce the right outcome for Ukraine. International politics is never certain. But rigorous and honest thinking is the best compass available for navigating this uncertainty.

What Ukraine is teaching the world

In four years, Ukraine has taught the world several essential truths: that sovereignty is worth defending to the end, that resistance is possible even against a militarily superior power, that democracy can survive war if it is supported, and that the West can maintain its strategic coherence over time if it is determined to do so. These lessons have a universal value that extends well beyond the geographic framework of Eastern Europe.

The June 11, 2026 sanctions against Iranian drone suppliers are one small piece of a large puzzle. But every piece counts. Every sanction, every weapons delivery, every diplomatic commitment honored is an element of the larger picture of a West that defends — imperfectly but resolutely — the international order it helped build. This picture is not yet complete. Its completion depends on all of us.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases and my method in this article

I am Maxime Marquette, a geopolitics columnist. My positions are clear: I am pro-Ukrainian, in favor of sanctions against Russia and its allies, and critical of the foreign policy of China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea, which I consider threats to the international order. These biases shape my analytical framework — I own them. They do not authorize me to invent facts or ignore the nuances of reality.

For this article, I used official sources — OFAC communications, Euromaidanpress reports, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty documents — as well as recognized secondary geopolitical analysis sources. I did not personally attend the events described and I claim no access to confidential information. Everything I assert is sourced and verifiable. Where uncertainty exists, I signal it.

What I do not know and what no one yet knows

I do not have precise data on the exact effect of the June 11 sanctions on Iranian drone production or on the capabilities of the targeted entities. These effects will take months to measure, and the data will be partial and contested. I do not know whether China will actually change its dual-use component export policy following these sanctions. These blind spots are inherent to real-time coverage of an active conflict.

My method: cross-reference multiple sources of different types (official, journalistic, analytical), contextualize within the broader historical framework of the conflict, explicitly acknowledge the limits of my knowledge, and maintain an editorial line consistent with my values and doctrine — without confusing them with facts.

Sources

Primary sources

US sanctions 13 entities in Iran, Belarus, China — Euromaidanpress, June 11, 2026

OFAC sanctions program against Russian harmful foreign activities — US Treasury/OFAC

Iranian drones in Ukraine, Russia, and beyond — Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Secondary sources

Analysis of sanctions against Russian drone suppliers — Interfax Ukraine, 2026

China denies NATO claims of supporting Russia — News Ukraine RBC, 2026

Korean Peninsula update — Institute for the Study of War, June 2026