TESTIMONY: Hegseth conditions America — NATO allies must pay or lose

The meeting that changed everything

On June 18, 2026, in the offices of NATO headquarters in Brussels, the defense ministers of member states gathered to prepare for the Ankara summit. In a hushed conference room, with the flags of thirty-two nations lined up behind the delegations, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth took the floor. What he said instantly changed the atmosphere in the room.

He announced a 6-month performance review — sometimes described as potentially completed even sooner — involving U.S. military chiefs, members of Congress and the allies themselves. The bottom line: American contributions to the NATO common budget would henceforth be conditional on ally results regarding spending commitments. That is a rupture. Not a threat in the air — a structural revision of the alliance's underlying logic.

The man who wanted to "irreversibly shift" responsibilities

Hegseth was not subtle about his intentions. He stated he wanted to "irreversibly shift" the responsibility for Europe's defense to Europeans themselves. That wording matters: "irreversibly." This is not tactical pressure in a budget negotiation — it is an openly stated change in strategic doctrine. Washington wants Europe to take charge of its own conventional defense, with the United States retaining its role as nuclear guarantor and global strategic reserve.

What I hear in Hegseth's announcement, beyond the management-by-objectives rhetoric, is the temptation of unilateralism. An alliance whose contributions are conditional is no longer truly an alliance — it is a commercial contract. And commercial contracts are cancelled when the clauses are no longer met. That is the deep danger.

USD 559 billion already spent — and still not enough

NATO's 29 European members collectively spent USD 559 billion on defense in 2025, according to SIPRI data. Europe and Canada together injected USD 90 billion more in a single year, a rise of +20%. These are real and substantial figures.

And yet, 6 NATO allies still did not meet their spending targets in 2025. The target is no longer the old 2% of GDP — it is now set at 5% for 2035, with 3.5% earmarked for defense proper. Even countries that had reached the 2% mark now find themselves abruptly behind the new requirements. The bar was raised mid-race.

A USD 1.5 trillion U.S. defense budget — Trump's sledgehammer argument

Donald Trump announced a U.S. defense budget of USD 1.5 trillion for 2027. That is colossal. It is roughly three times the combined European defense spending. In that context, the American argument that they are "carrying the burden" is not without factual grounding — even if the methodological comparison between American and European spending is complex and needs qualification.

USD 1.5 trillion in American defense spending — a figure that takes your breath away. But it is worth remembering that the United States maintains bases in the Pacific, the Middle East and Latin America. It is not solely for Europe. The raw comparison is political, not analytical. But in Trump's world, politics is what commands.

The gap between rhetoric and reality

According to an analysis by U.S. News published on June 19, 2026, the Hegseth review "appears out of step with what NATO allies are already doing." This phrasing — coming from an American, not a European source — is significant. It shows that even in the United States, informed observers recognize that the Pentagon's rhetoric about insufficient allied effort does not fully match the documented reality of spending increases.

But in the hallways of embassies and ministries, European diplomats know that being factually right is useless if Trump has the ear of American public opinion. Political communication overrides analytical precision. That is the logic of the Trump era, and the Europeans have understood it.

What allies cannot say in public

In private — without any direct testimony being available for this article — European capitals know that the American demand for 5% of GDP is unrealistic for most economies by 2035 without deep structural reforms. Reaching 3.5% for defense proper is already a considerable challenge for countries like France or Italy, whose social budgets are rigid and public debts high.

There is a truth that nobody states aloud in NATO meetings: the 5% of GDP target is not a rational military objective — it is a political target designed to force Europeans to spend without giving them the means to do so easily. It is a lever. I am not saying it is entirely irrational. But I am saying it needs to be called by its name.

American contributions to the NATO common budget

NATO's common budget — distinct from national defense budgets — funds the headquarters, shared infrastructure and some coordinated operations. The American contribution to this budget is significant but represents a fraction of total U.S. military expenditure linked to NATO. Making this specific contribution conditional on ally results is symbolically powerful, but its direct operational impact is limited.

The real impact would come if Washington made the presence of its 100,000 soldiers stationed in Europe — in Germany, Poland, the Baltic states — conditional. That is not what Hegseth formally announced. But the political signal — the implicit threat of gradual withdrawal — is there, and the Europeans heard it.

The allies' response: accelerate before the review

The allied reaction to Hegseth's announcement was predictable: several governments accelerated their defense spending increase announcements in the weeks following the Brussels meeting. Germany with its 3.5% of GDP by 2029, the E5 bloc with its coordinated commitments from Berlin — all of this accelerated in part to be in a strong position before the American review. The pressure works, even if its methods are debatable.

Trump succeeded, despite himself, in what George W. Bush, Obama and Biden had all failed to achieve: forcing Europeans to pay for their defense. The irony of history is brutal but real — the threat of American abandonment proved to be the best investor in European defense. One would prefer that result to have come from shared conviction rather than from fear. But in the real world, you take results as they come.

The paradox of forced autonomy

American pressure creates a fascinating paradox: by threatening to reduce its engagement, Washington forces Europe to build the strategic autonomy that Europeans have championed in theory for years but never truly implemented. European defense doctrine, industrial coordination projects, the EU's defense commission — all of this suddenly carries a different urgency when the American guarantee is no longer automatic.

What I hear in Hegseth's announcement, beyond the management-by-objectives rhetoric, is the temptation of unilateralism. An alliance whose contributions are conditional is no longer truly an alliance — it is a revocable commercial contract. And commercial contracts dissolve when conditions change. That is the deep danger that nobody yet dares to name clearly.

That is the deep irony of the situation: Trump doctrine on NATO is accelerating European defense integration more effectively than twenty years of Brussels initiatives. Europe is learning to walk on its own because someone is threatening to let go of its hand.

What this means for Ukraine

For Ukraine, Hegseth's pressure on allies has a direct consequence: Europeans who raise their defense budgets also increase their capacity to deliver weapons to Kyiv without depleting their own stocks. Every extra euro spent on European defense industries is a euro that can feed Ukrainian resistance. Rearmament in Europe and support for Ukraine are inseparable.

Zelensky has every interest in Europeans panicking slightly over Hegseth and raising their defense budgets. Because that increase translates into production capacity, stocks and potential deliveries to Ukraine. The NATO-Ukraine dynamic is a positive-sum game — provided everyone actually plays it.

The USD 250 billion increase since 2017

Facing Hegseth and Trump, Mark Rutte played his best card: the numbers. He presented at the White House the charts showing NATO spending has risen by USD 250 billion since 2017. That figure is real, documented, verifiable. It tells Trump: look, your pressure produced results. Your allies listened. Continuing to pay the security guarantee is not throwing money out the window.

This communication strategy — showcasing progress while acknowledging that more work remains — is the only approach that allows Rutte to maintain both alliance cohesion and American cooperation. It is a perilous but necessary balancing act.

The Ankara summit as the final test

The Ankara summit will be the real test of what Hegseth launched in June 2026. Either allies present commitments convincing enough to satisfy American requirements, or the fissure in the alliance becomes visible to the world — and to Putin. A divided NATO summit is the gift Moscow is waiting for. Rutte and the Europeans know they cannot afford to fail.

Putin watches NATO meetings with meticulous attention. Every crack, every disagreement, every hesitation in the alliance appears to him as a window of opportunity. That is why NATO cohesion is not just a matter of bureaucratic organization — it is a direct security question for Ukraine and for all of Europe.

What the United States cannot replace

Paradoxically, Hegseth's policy also reveals the limits of what it pretends to impose. Certain American capabilities in Europe — intelligence, integrated command, rapid deployment logistics, tactical nuclear weapons — cannot be replaced by increased European budgets in a matter of years. The dependence is structural and was built over decades. Dismantling it "irreversibly" takes a generation, not six months.

In ten years, historians will ask whether 2025–2026 was the moment when Europe truly took charge of its defense, or merely the moment when it appeared to. The difference between appearance and reality is measured in concrete acts: factories built, soldiers trained, weapons delivered. History's judgment will be unsparing. It must be.

This gap between Hegseth's rhetoric and the operational reality of the alliance is the central flaw in the doctrine he defends. Forcing Europeans to spend more now does not give them the integrated capabilities that seventy years of American presence built.

The defense industry as the real bottleneck

Even with doubled budgets, the European defense industry cannot instantly produce the necessary equipment. Orders have been placed, contracts signed — but production lines do not open overnight. Delays in deliveries of equipment ordered by European countries illustrate this fundamental problem. The money is there; industrial capacity takes time to catch up.

Calling things by their name

In the debate about NATO and European defense, too many realities go unnamed. American pressure on allies is not cooperation — it is conditional coercion. The rise in European spending is not a freely chosen decision — it is a response to an existential constraint imposed by the Russian war in Ukraine and by the Trump doctrine. And the war in Ukraine is not a regional crisis — it is the decisive test of the will of the democratic West.

Naming these realities clearly is not an act of division — it is a prerequisite for rational decisions. The European allies raising their defense budgets under Hegseth's pressure are doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. But the right thing remains the right thing. And the reasons evolve: as European leaders internalize the reality of the Russian threat, external pressure becomes durable internal conviction.

The strategic legacy of this historic moment

In ten years, historians will examine the 2025–2026 period: how did Europe respond to the dual pressure of a war at its doorstep and an American ally making its support conditional? The answer taking shape — massive budget increases, coordination within the E5, development of autonomous capabilities — is the right one. It is late. It is coerced. But it is real and potentially durable.

What matters now is ensuring this transformation becomes irreversible. That commitments made under pressure do not evaporate once the pressure eases. That investments in the defense industry create lasting capabilities. And that solidarity with Ukraine remains the central pillar of a coherent European defense policy over the long term, beyond electoral cycles.

The transformation of European defense under Hegseth's pressure — it is like quitting smoking because you were frightened by a diagnosis. Fear is a bad reason but an excellent trigger. What counts is what happens next, after the fear subsides. Europe must make sure the good habits outlast the fear. That is the real test of strategic maturity that the Ankara summit will reveal.

Europe must own its transformation

Hegseth's pressure is real, his methods are debatable, but his result — a Europe investing massively in its defense — is the right one. Europe must own this transformation not because it is being coerced to, but because it is fundamentally in its own interest. A Europe capable of defending itself is a more sovereign, more credible Europe, and one better able to help Ukraine without emptying its own stocks.

What history will remember

History may record that it was Pete Hegseth, the least conventional of all American defense secretaries, who forced democratic Europe to finally take its own security seriously. That is not a pretty story — it is not how allies should treat their partners. But in the real world, deep transformations rarely come from goodwill alone. They come from pressure. And the pressure is here.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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