REPORT: NATO Enters Implementation Phase — Ankara, the Summit of Action

The last major meeting before the verdict

On June 17 and 18, 2026, the Defense Ministers of the thirty-two NATO member countries met at the Alliance headquarters in Brussels for what Secretary General Mark Rutte called the last major ministerial meeting before the Ankara summit. This was not a routine encounter. It was a general rehearsal, the final chance to verify that all the pieces of the puzzle are in place before the heads of state and government convene on July 7 and 8, 2026, in the Turkish capital. The tone is set unambiguously: NATO is leaving the phase of promises and entering the phase of accountability.

Rutte said it bluntly during the June 18 press conference: "This Ankara summit will be entirely dedicated to implementation." Three words that sum up a paradigm shift. For decades, the Alliance has excelled in the art of solemn declarations. The Hague summit in June 2025 had already set the bar historically high, with a collective commitment to reach 5% of GDP in defense spending by 2035 — including 3.5% for so-called core defense and 1.5% for resilience, critical infrastructure, and the industrial base. In Ankara, they will have to show how they get there, not just repeat the goal.

Ankara: A Turkish Capital Propelled into the Center of the Western World

The choice of Ankara as the summit venue is not insignificant. Turkey, host of the 36th NATO Summit, has deployed colossal resources to host this event: according to Turkish media cited by Bulgarian sources, Turkish authorities have spent approximately $250 million in preparations, including $200 million for the construction of a modernized military airport in the Etimesgut district, adjacent to the summit sites. This secure terminal will allow member country delegations to land without passing through Esenboğa International Airport, reducing logistical and security risks. The city will be patrolled by 70,000 security personnel, including 55,000 police and gendarmes, and some 35 major arteries of the capital will be closed to traffic.

This impressive deployment reflects the strategic importance Turkey attaches to this summit. Ankara is not content to be a neutral backdrop; it intends to be a player. The Erdoğan presidency has chosen this event to project the image of a Turkey that is essential to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture — reliable, militarily capable, and resolutely anchored in the Western camp despite historical ambiguities in Turkish foreign policy. The message to Moscow is deliberate.

I have been covering NATO summits for years, and what I sense for the first time is a certain collective impatience — a weariness of grand announcements that are never followed by action. Rutte's rhetoric in Brussels had something almost clinical about it: fewer speeches, more concrete plans. This kind of sobriety, in a world where the Russian threat has never been more tangible, seems to me exactly what the West needs.

An objective unimaginable five years ago

To understand why the Brussels summit of June 17-18 held such decisive importance, one must go back to the Hague summit of June 2025. It was there that the allies carved the 5% of GDP defense and security spending goal into stone for 2035. The formula is precise: 3.5% of GDP dedicated to defense spending in the strict sense — personnel, equipment, operations, research — and an additional 1.5% of GDP for what NATO calls resilience: protection of critical infrastructure, cyber defense, civil preparedness, military mobility, and strengthening the defense industrial base. Just five years ago, such a commitment would have been deemed utopian by most European chancelleries.

What changed? American pressure, embodied in its rawest form by the Trump administration. As Reuters recalled in March 2026, Rutte himself acknowledged that Trump's influence was decisive in pushing allies to adopt this new objective. U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, whose presence in Brussels on June 17-18 was highly noted, was even more direct: "The goal regarding defense spending is to transform NATO into a true military alliance focused on real power and real deterrence." We are a long way from polished diplomatic formulas. And in a way, this bluntness had the merit of producing results.

The 5% formula: A two-pillar architecture

The Hague commitment rests on a specific architecture, engraved in the Hague Summit Declaration of June 2025. The allies committed to allocating at least 3.5% of GDP annually to defense spending as per the NATO-agreed definition, to fund core defense requirements and satisfy NATO capability targets. To this is added a slice of up to 1.5% of GDP for broader security spending: critical infrastructure protection, digital network defense, civil preparedness and resilience, innovation, and strengthening the defense industrial base.

A review of the spending trajectory and balance is scheduled for 2029, and all allies must reach the new goal by 2035. Unlike the years of vague commitment around 2% of GDP, plans must now be submitted, published, and evaluated. It is this accountability mechanism that the Ankara summit is tasked with concrete inauguration for the first time, by examining the first national implementation plans submitted by allies before July 7.

Trump is a necessary evil, say some of my colleagues. I'm not far from sharing that analysis. His method is brutal, his attacks on allied institutions are regrettable — and that must be said clearly. But on the question of European defense, his pressure achieved what decades of soft diplomacy failed to produce: a real, massive increase in budgets. The ends don't always justify the means, but the numbers, they don't lie.

An almost incredible surge in a single year

Rutte presented the figures during the press conference on June 17, before the meeting: European allies and Canada increased their core defense spending by more than $90 billion in 2025 compared to 2024. In nominal terms, he specified that the increase even reaches $139 billion. This is, in his own words, an increase of nearly 20% in a single year. He called this figure "staggering." And he's right: it is a figure unprecedented in the recent history of the Alliance. The comparison with the stagnation of previous decades, during which many allies struggled to maintain the promised 2% of GDP, is unavoidable.

But Rutte immediately tempered the enthusiasm: "Cash is crucial, but you don't stop a missile or a tank with a dollar or a euro." The priority now is no longer just spending more; it is transforming this money into operational military capabilities, and doing it fast. Therein lies the true challenge of the Ankara summit: documenting not just financial commitments, but concrete and credible plans to achieve specific capability targets that each ally must fulfill according to NATO defense plans. Some allies are even expected to reach 5% this year, well before the 2035 deadline.

From money to capabilities: The central challenge of the Ankara summit

The distinction between budgetary spending and operational military capabilities is not a technocratic subtlety — it is the heart of the problem NATO must solve in Ankara. One can increase a defense budget and still lack combat-ready battalions, air defense systems, and precision-guided munitions. Allies must therefore demonstrate how their increased spending translates into additional deployable forces, delivered equipment, replenished ammunition stocks, and modernized military infrastructure.

Rutte summarized the logic for the ministers in Brussels: "Around the table today, I heard ally after ally after ally explain how they are increasing their defense investments." This repeated, insistent, almost incantatory message aims to create a dynamic of emulation. But the real proof won't be in the speeches of June 18 — it will be in the capability assessment reports that NATO will produce in the months following the Ankara summit, measuring whether the capability targets assigned to each ally are actually progressing.

This Rutte line — "you don't stop a missile with a dollar" — struck me. It says everything. NATO spent years fighting over GDP percentages, holding conferences on budgetary roadmaps. The money is finally there. But the real question — do we actually have the munitions, the soldiers, the systems capable of stopping a Russian offensive on the eastern flank? — that is the one Ankara must start answering. And no one should be under any illusions: it will still take years to close the accumulated capability gap.

"The Ankara summit will be entirely dedicated to implementation"

The phrase came out on June 18, 2026, at the opening of the Defense Ministers' meeting in Brussels. Mark Rutte, addressing the allies gathered at Alliance headquarters, declared: "This is the last major meeting we will have before the Ankara summit, and the Ankara summit will be entirely dedicated to implementation." According to Yeni Şafak, which covered the event from June 18, Rutte also announced that NATO 3.0 is well and truly taking shape — a reference to his vision of a revamped alliance, founded on a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO. This is no longer an institutional marketing slogan; it is the operational framework for the ongoing transformation.

This implementation phase implies, concretely, that each ally must present in Ankara a credible, incremental, and verifiable national plan to reach the financial and capability objectives. The Hague Summit Declaration had stipulated that annual plans showing "a credible and progressive trajectory" must be submitted. The Ankara summit will be the first major collective test of this obligation. For Rutte, the message to European capitals is clear: it is no longer about promising, but about proving. "I expect countries to present clear, concrete, and credible plans to reach this objective," he had declared on June 17, according to the Evening Standard.

An accountability process unprecedented in NATO history

What distinguishes this "implementation phase" from previous Alliance cycles is the setup of a concrete accountability mechanism. Allies must submit annual national plans describing their trajectory toward 5% of GDP. These plans are reviewed by NATO headquarters, discussed with other allies, and their results are published as comparative data. This is a break from the culture of secrecy and vagueness that often surrounded defense spending commitments in past decades.

Rutte also insisted on the industrial dimension of this accountability: ministers in Brussels approved "a new push to turbocharge transatlantic defense cooperation" — which concretely means coordinating procurement, harmonizing standards, and developing common supply chains between allies. The goal is no longer just to spend more, but to spend intelligently, by pooling capabilities and avoiding the costly duplications that have long weakened the Alliance's collective power.

I sincerely believe that this "implementation phase" formula is one of the most important any NATO Secretary General has uttered since the start of the war in Ukraine. It marks a break with an Alliance culture where final communiqués often served to mask the gap between stated ambition and the reality of capabilities. We are entering an era of accountability, and honestly, it's about time.

A host who intends to carry weight in the history of the Alliance

While Rutte set the course, it was the Turkish Minister of National Defense, Yaşar Güler, who gave the Ankara summit its symbol-laden dimension. Speaking to the Turkish press on the sidelines of the Brussels meetings, Güler stated, according to Yeni Şafak on June 19, 2026: "We do not view the NATO summit we will host in Ankara simply as a meeting of leaders. We believe this summit will be an important turning point that will demonstrate NATO's determination to adapt to the evolving security environment and shape its future strategic direction." These were weighed words, reflecting Turkey's ambition to no longer be perceived as a peripheral ally, but as the architect of a new stage for the Alliance.

And Güler was direct about his country's position: "Today, there is a very clear reality: Turkey is not on the periphery of the security architecture, but at its center." Turkey is one of NATO's five largest force contributors. It is preparing to take command of the Allied Reaction Force, a post Güler calls a concrete indicator of Ankara's reliability. According to IRIA News on June 20, 2026, Güler also highlighted that the discussions in Brussels focused on deterrence, defense planning, support for Ukraine, spending targets, and NATO's future force posture — an agenda that shows the breadth of Turkish responsibilities in preparing for the summit.

Turkey and the command of the Allied Reaction Force

One of the most significant concrete announcements related to the Ankara summit is Turkey taking command of NATO's Allied Reaction Force. This is the most reactive component of the Alliance's force posture, capable of rapid deployment in the event of a crisis. This command, which Güler describes as a "concrete indicator of Ankara's reliability," represents a major operational responsibility — and a strong signal sent to allies who might have doubted Turkish commitment. Turkey doesn't just want to host the summit; it wants to emerge with a central role in the collective defense apparatus.

Güler also mentioned, according to IRIA News, the organization of a Defense Industry Forum on the sidelines of the Ankara summit, intended to strengthen cooperation between allied defense industrial sectors. This forum reveals Turkish ambition: positioning Ankara not just as a military power within NATO, but also as an emerging defense industrial hub, capable of contributing to filling production gaps identified since the start of the war in Ukraine. "A strong defense sector means strong deterrence and a strong NATO," the Turkish minister summarized.

Turkey is a case that fascinates and troubles me at the same time. Güler speaks of Ankara as the "center" of the NATO security architecture, and regarding military numbers, he isn't wrong. But we must name the tensions: Turkey has long played both sides, maintaining ambiguous relations with Moscow. The context of the Ankara summit forces it to choose its camp more clearly — and this Defense Ministers' meeting seems to indicate that Ankara has decided to position itself resolutely on the Western side. It's good news, even if vigilance is required.

Decoding the formula that will redefine European militaries

The 5% of GDP goal is often mentioned as a whole, but its two-part structure is fundamental to understanding what Ankara will make concrete. The 3.5% for so-called core defense corresponds to traditional spending under the NATO definition: personnel in uniform, military equipment, operations, maintenance, research, and development. This is the hard core of military power. These 3.5% must fund the NATO capability targets assigned to each country — and that is where the real concrete obligations lie, broken down by nation, force type, and equipment sector.

The remaining 1.5%, classified as security and resilience spending, covers a much broader spectrum: protection of critical infrastructure (power grids, subsea cables, logistical hubs), cyber defense, civil preparedness for war, military mobility (roads, ports, bridges capable of supporting heavy military convoys), innovation, and strengthening the defense industrial base. As the Atlantic Council notes, the Alliance still needs to precisely define the accounting criteria for this 1.5% to avoid what experts call "creative accounting" — the rebranding of pre-existing spending to fit the "resilience" box. The Ankara summit's credibility stake is also there.

Civil resilience: A concept with still-vague contours

The concept of "resilience" as integrated into the 1.5% of GDP is one of the most complex to operationalize. The Atlantic Council has warned against the temptation for some allies to rename ordinary civil spending — infrastructure maintenance, existing cybersecurity programs, already-funded civil protection schemes — to enter them into the "NATO resilience" category without real additional effort. The Alliance must develop strict eligibility criteria, based on measurable common standards, before the first assessments are carried out.

Concretely, spending that should count toward the 1.5% includes: the protection of subsea cables and gas pipelines against sabotage (a direct lesson learned from the suspected attacks on Nord Stream in 2022), the construction of civilian shelters in exposed areas, the hardening of power grids to resist attacks, the establishment of strategic stockpiles of medicine, fuel, and food, and the installation of alternative communication systems capable of operating in the event of a massive cyberattack. This scope is colossal — and its funding requires unprecedented coordination between civil ministries and military staffs.

This debate over the 1.5% seems to me one of the least visible but most important. We could very easily dress up ordinary civil spending as "resilience" to inflate the numbers without real effort. This is the risk of a vague target and a sign that NATO still has methodological work to do. The allies most serious about their defense effort — the Balts, Poland, Finland — deserve a framework that protects the rigor of their commitment against the creative accounting of the less scrupulous.

An announcement that sends shivers through European staffs

The presence of U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the Brussels meeting was the most anticipated — and most feared — appointment. Hegseth is not known for diplomatic precautions. He arrived with an unambiguous message: "We are doubling down on our efforts to make NATO what it was always intended to be: a balanced alliance with Europe in the lead for its own defense." And to give weight to this vision, he announced, according to the U.S. Department of War communiqué on June 18, 2026, a six-month review of U.S. force posture and bases in Europe — what he dubbed the "NATO 3.0 review."

This review must examine whether U.S. bases in Europe remain suited to Washington's global needs, and whether the access, stationing, and overflight rights granted to the United States by its allies are correctly defined. Hegseth was direct: "This will be a real review. It will be designed to ensure that NATO moves rapidly and irreversibly toward a Europe that takes primary responsibility for its own defense." For European chancelleries, the message is twofold: keep investing, or we re-evaluate our presence. According to Rutte, when asked about U.S. reductions in certain contributions to the force model, European allies are already compensating for a large part of the affected capabilities.

The NATO 3.0 review: What Washington is really evaluating

The six-month review announced by Hegseth officially concerns the posture and stationing of U.S. forces in Europe. But between the lines, it is about something more fundamental: recalibrating the transatlantic military relationship according to new global strategic realities. Washington must simultaneously manage its presence in the Pacific facing China, maintain its nuclear deterrence, and keep its role in Europe. Hegseth acknowledged that the United States has already informed allies of reductions in some capabilities available to NATO in times of crisis — notably certain naval and air assets.

Rutte tried to minimize the concern: according to him, European allies "are already compensating for a large part of the affected capabilities, are close to covering the others, and still have areas where more work is needed." This message of measured optimism masks a more uncomfortable reality: for the first time since the Cold War, the NATO force model must be rebuilt by integrating a potentially reduced American contribution. This is a military and political engineering challenge of a scale unseen since the Alliance's founding in 1949.

Hegseth embodies what many in Europe find hard to swallow: the American partner who makes unilateral decisions and expects Europe to follow. And yet, this review is not necessarily bad news. If it pushes Europe to take more ownership of its own conventional defense, it will be a lasting strategic advance — far more resilient to American political shifts than a structural dependence on the US presence. The transition is uncomfortable. But it is healthy.

The Ukrainian president in the Defense Ministers' room

On June 18, 2026, on the sidelines of the Defense Ministers' meeting, a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group was held, and President Volodymyr Zelensky himself participated. According to the official NATO communiqué of June 18, participants reaffirmed their support for Ukraine and confirmed new promises of essential military aid, notably via the PURL mechanism — the Priority Ukraine Requirements List — which identifies and coordinates the most urgent equipment deliveries. Zelensky's presence in a NATO Defense Ministers' meeting is a strong signal in its own right.

Rutte was unequivocal: "We must keep Ukraine strong, strong in the fight." And U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen, during the Atlantic Council event on June 17, said what few dared to formulate so directly: "The American people stand behind the Ukrainian people." Her Republican colleague, Senator Thom Tillis, hammered home: "If the United States and our European allies send a strong signal this year, Putin's days in Ukraine are numbered." These declarations — bipartisan, transatlantic — sketch the ideological backdrop of the Ankara summit: NATO is strengthening, not for form's sake, but because a war is being fought at its gates and its outcome depends directly on the credibility of Western deterrence.

The PURL mechanism: Ukraine in the allied defense architecture

The Priority Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) is one of the concrete tools NATO has developed to structure and accelerate military support for Kyiv. This mechanism identifies the most urgent equipment needs of the Ukrainian army and coordinates deliveries among allies to avoid duplicates and gaps. The June 18 meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels served to confirm new promises of aid via this mechanism, with Zelensky directly present to represent his country's needs.

Senator Shaheen highlighted at the Atlantic Council that the U.S. Congress was showing positive signs on this front, with the passage of a text in favor of Ukraine via a discharge petition procedure in the House of Representatives. She also mentioned the Graham-Blumenthal sanctions bill as a signal of bipartisan determination to keep pressure on Moscow. These legislative developments, combined with the commitments made in Brussels, outline a durable support for Ukraine that will not fade with war fatigue — at least if the senators and their colleagues keep their word.

Zelensky is a man who carries on his shoulders the weight of a nation at war and the responsibility of convincing sometimes hesitant allies. I cannot help but be struck by the extraordinary resilience of Ukraine against a Russian military machine that believed it would crush it in a few days. His presence in Brussels on June 18 is not insignificant — it is a living, embodied reminder that the stakes are not abstract. These are men and women dying while we debate GDP percentages.

The money is there, but can the factories keep up?

One of the great lessons of the war in Ukraine was brutal: Western ammunition and equipment stocks were insufficient to support a high-intensity conflict of this duration and scale. As Senator Shaheen noted at the Atlantic Council: "With the war in Ukraine, we realized that the defense industrial base is not as prolific as we thought." Rutte hammered the same point before the ministers in Brussels: "We need more forces, more resources, and a much stronger industrial base." But building factories, training skilled workers, securing supply chains — all this takes time. Much more time than voting on a budget.

That is why Defense Ministers approved in Brussels, according to the NATO communiqué, a "new push to turbocharge transatlantic defense cooperation." The goal is twofold: to produce faster and at a larger scale on both sides of the Atlantic, while fostering industrial cooperation between allies. Hegseth was particularly insistent on this point: the United States and Europe must produce more together, as China, Russia, and other rivals are rapidly increasing their defense industrial production. The Defense Industry Forum to be held on the sidelines of the Ankara summit, mentioned by Güler, will be one of the first concrete translations of this agenda.

The challenge of coordinated transatlantic production

The acceleration of transatlantic industrial cooperation in defense, approved by ministers in Brussels, raises a complex governance question: how to coordinate the defense procurement of thirty-two sovereign nations, each with its domestic industries, political imperatives, and technological preferences? Senator Tillis proposed a path at the Atlantic Council: creating integrated supply chains within the Alliance, allowing one or two countries to become the main link for certain capabilities, thus creating a "healthy co-opetition" that stimulates innovation while guaranteeing production volumes.

This logic is inspired by NATO's military interoperability experience — which proved that armies of different cultures can operate together in sophisticated ways if they share common standards. Applying this model to the defense industry is more complex, as it involves economic stakes and industrial sovereignty. But the war in Ukraine has shown that an alliance without a common industrial base capable of producing at war tempo is a vulnerable alliance. Ankara will have to validate this industrial cooperation framework as one of the summit's key decisions.

The defense industrial base is the Achilles' heel that no one wanted to look in the face during the peace dividend years. We let arsenals close, suppliers offshore, and ammunition production capacity shrink in the name of economic efficiency. Now we are paying the tab. And China, which is investing massively in its military-industrial complex, is watching this vulnerability with manifest interest. Europe's industrial awakening is an existential necessity, not a political option.

A vanguard pulling the whole group upward

Rutte revealed during his June 18 press conference that some allies will reach the 5% of GDP target as early as this year — nearly ten years before the 2035 deadline. This is not a result of coercion; it is a reflection of geographical and security reality: countries closest to Russia have long understood what the threat means. Poland has been a pioneer, exceeding 4% of GDP and establishing itself as the Alliance's largest defense investor relative to GDP. The Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — have also made defense their absolute priority. Finland, which entered NATO in 2023, rapidly joined this group.

This vanguard is politically precious for Rutte: it proves that the objective is not a theoretical chimera. But it also creates tension within the Alliance between those who "put their money where their mouth is" and those who continue to move slowly. Rutte sought to transform this tension into a motor: by publishing transparent data on who reaches what, he creates reputational pressure, an implicit ranking that forces laggards to explain themselves. The Ankara summit will be, from this perspective, a public accounting of who has kept their commitments and who has not. Senator Tillis summarized the stake: "We must create a political framework to allow decision-makers to defend investment before their constituents."

Poland, a model and a warning for Europe

Poland occupies a special position in this panorama of allied defense spending. Warsaw now spends more than 4% of its GDP on defense, making it the top investor as a proportion of GDP among all NATO allies. This level of investment reflects an acute awareness of risk: Poland shares a border with Russia via the Kaliningrad enclave, and with Belarus, a Moscow ally. For Warsaw, defense is not an abstraction — it is a question of national survival. Poland has invested massively in tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft systems, and considerably increased military personnel.

This Polish model is both an inspiration and a warning for the rest of Europe. An inspiration, because it proves that very high defense budgets are politically viable when the threat is perceived as immediate. A warning, because it reveals the gigantic gap that remains between the seriousness of frontline allies and the relative complacency of certain Western European allies who still thought until recently that security could be outsourced to the United States. The Ankara summit must draw a line between these two attitudes.

I think of those Baltic countries that have implemented universal military service, that are building fortifications, that are training their reservists for territorial defense. They aren't pretending. They know that if deterrence fails, their territories would be the first hit. Comparing their seriousness to the procrastination of some Western European allies is enlightening — and a little shameful. Ankara should pay them an explicit tribute.

Putin, involuntary engine of NATO's rebirth

There is a dark irony in this moment: it is Vladimir Putin who, through his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, achieved what decades of summits failed to accomplish — revitalizing NATO, expanding the Alliance, and pushing Europeans to take their defense seriously. Güler said it clearly to IRIA News: "The Russia-Ukraine war continues to affect European security, energy markets, global trade routes, and NATO's global strategic agenda." This conflict is not just a humanitarian tragedy and a major geopolitical injustice — it is the structuring event that gives reason for being to the Alliance's entire current dynamic.

Rutte, in his remarks before the ministers' meeting, explicitly cited the massive Russian military buildup as a direct justification for the 5% of GDP goal. "Given this fact and the rapid reconstitution of Russian armed forces, we must react, and that is the commitment of 5% of GDP in defense, with 3.5% spent on core defense." This is not gratuitous alarmism: since 2022, Moscow has put its economy on a war footing, with military spending now nearing 7 to 8% of Russian GDP. The asymmetry of military effort between NATO and Russia has long leaned unfavorably for the Alliance. Ankara is meant to mark the moment this trend durably reverses.

The Black Sea and the southeastern flank: The Alliance's other front

While NATO's eastern flank — Poland, the Baltic states, Scandinavia — focuses most of the media attention, the southeastern flank is just as strategic. The Black Sea has become an active theater of operations since the 2022 Russian invasion, with attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure and a Russian naval presence in Crimea. Güler spoke of Turkey's role in managing maritime security in the Black Sea, respecting the constraints of the Montreux Convention which governs access to the Bosphorus Strait. Ankara plays a geostrategic pivot role that few other allies can assume.

The Ankara summit must also address the question of the Mediterranean flank, where instabilities in Libya, the Middle East, and the Sahel create migratory and security pressures that spill over into the security of southern allies. Post-Ankara NATO will have to demonstrate that it can simultaneously strengthen its territorial defense against Russia in the northeast and maintain a stabilizing presence in the south — without diluting its resources or fragmenting its strategic coherence. It is a delicate balance, but Turkey, with its unique geographical position, is the ally best placed to embody this duality.

I say it without nuance: Putin is a war criminal. His forces have massacred civilians in Ukraine, destroyed entire cities, deported children. NATO is not strengthening for abstract reasons of power — it is strengthening because an authoritarian regime has proven, in blood, that it is ready to use force to overturn the international order. And if we lower our guard, the next victims won't only be Ukrainian. This is why Ankara is not just another summit.

The Nuclear Planning Group meets in Brussels

The Defense Ministers' meeting on June 18 also included a session of the Alliance's Nuclear Planning Group. The NATO communiqué indicates that ministers adopted a declaration reaffirming the Alliance's commitment to nuclear deterrence: "We will continue to modernize our nuclear capabilities, improve our planning, and adapt to ensure that our nuclear deterrence remains fit for purpose." In the context of Moscow's nuclear rhetoric since 2022, and as Russia maintains the world's largest tactical nuclear arsenal, this reaffirmation is not a bureaucratic formality.

The concept of NATO 3.0, as formulated by Rutte and echoed by Hegseth, encompasses this nuclear dimension. It is not just a rebalancing of conventional responsibilities — it is a complete overhaul of the entire deterrence posture, both extended and conventional. As the U.S. Department of War notes in Hegseth's remarks from June 18, it is about "returning to NATO's roots as a military alliance focused on real power" — an explicit reference to the NATO model of the Cold War, when the Alliance seriously planned the territorial defense of Europe against Soviet aggression. The difference is that this time, the threat is no longer hypothetical: it has invaded Ukraine.

Russian nuclear rhetoric and the Alliance's response

Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has multiplied allusions to the use of nuclear weapons — a deliberate intimidation strategy aimed at discouraging Western support for Kyiv. The Alliance's response to this rhetoric has been measured but firm: NATO has not yielded to atomic blackmail, and support for Ukraine has continued to progress in quality and quantity. The meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group on June 18 in Brussels fits this logic: reminding Moscow that the Alliance's nuclear deterrence remains credible, modernized, and operational, and that no threat will deflect the allies from their collective commitment.

The modernization of NATO's nuclear capabilities is a long-term program, which includes the renewal of B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs deployed in Europe as part of nuclear sharing, and the upgrading of the fighter jets that carry them. These programs are already underway in several member countries. Their explicit mention in the Nuclear Planning Group declaration in Brussels aims to recall that, in the face of Russia's massive rearmament, the Alliance is not just increasing its conventional spending — it is also maintaining and improving its extended deterrence, the ultimate security guarantee for allies that do not possess their own nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear deterrence is a subject I treat with a certain humility, because the mechanics are complex and miscalculations potentially catastrophic. But I fundamentally believe that the credibility of Western deterrence — conventional and nuclear — is what protects not only NATO allies, but also indirectly Ukraine, and potentially nations in the Indo-Pacific facing China. Weakening this credibility, as Putin has tried to do, would be the worst thing that could happen to global security.

A signal from Washington a few weeks before Ankara

On June 17, 2026 — the eve of the major ministerial meeting — the Atlantic Council hosted two U.S. senators in Washington: Democrat Jeanne Shaheen and Republican Thom Tillis, co-chairs of the Senate NATO Observer Group, on the eve of their final summit in this role. The two elected officials insisted on sending a strong bipartisan message before Ankara. Shaheen: "The worst thing that could happen — the best thing for Vladimir Putin, for Xi Jinping, for our adversaries — is to see a NATO that is not united, divided." This message on unity, addressed as much to Washington as to European capitals, is the one that must carry through the Ankara summit.

Tillis was even more offensive: "If the United States and our European allies send a strong signal this year, Putin's days in Ukraine are numbered." And he also put his fingers where it hurts on the American side: the first twenty years of exceeding the 2% of GDP target represented, according to him, a cumulative $2 trillion deficit in the military industrial base of the Alliance. This striking figure alone explains why the war in Ukraine revealed a structural shortage in munitions and equipment in Western arsenals. The bill for the years of carelessness is being paid now, in Brussels and soon in Ankara.

The transatlantic consensus as a strategic asset

Shaheen and Tillis, in holding this joint conference at the Atlantic Council on June 17, 2026, wanted to send a message that European capitals were waiting for with anxiety: American support for NATO and Ukraine transcends partisan divides. In a context where the Trump administration maintains a complex relationship with its European allies, alternating pressure and commitment, this bipartisan demonstration has considerable symbolic value. Shaheen said it explicitly: "I think the worst thing that could happen — the best thing for Vladimir Putin, for President Xi in China, for our adversaries — is to see a NATO that is not united, divided."

Senator Tillis, for his part, addressed the parliamentary dimension of support for Ukraine with unusually direct frankness: "I have two hundred days to make sure that Ukraine gets more support," he said, evoking the imminent end of his term. These two lawmakers, by closing their careers as co-chairs of the Senate NATO Observer Group with a call for transatlantic unity, illustrate what Senator Tillis calls "the nature of the Western alliance": an alliance that is not hierarchical and imposed, but founded on democratic deliberation and the shared conviction that freedom is worth fighting for.

Shaheen and Tillis embody something precious and fragile at the same time: the bipartisan American consensus on the value of NATO. In a deeply divided country, where isolationism resurfaces with every election cycle, this consensus is a strategic resource. I am relieved to hear it expressed with this clarity. But I also know it is not guaranteed forever — and that is precisely why Europe must continue to take its defense responsibilities, without waiting for Washington to impose its choices on them.

Three weeks to prove that words become deeds

The countdown has begun. On July 7, 2026, the heads of state and government of the thirty-two NATO member countries will meet in Ankara for what the actors themselves describe as a summit of truth. The Defense Ministers' meeting of June 17-18 in Brussels set the final markers before this moment. The Alliance is officially entering the implementation phase: it no longer promises; it documents, it plans, it produces. Rutte said it, Güler said it, Hegseth said it. All that remains is to do it. And Zelensky is waiting — not for speeches, but for weapons, capabilities, and support that will not falter.

The wager of the Western generation

What is at stake in Ankara is also a generational wager: the conviction that the West, if it finds its strategic coherence and defense industrial power again, can durably deter Russia, contain China, and maintain the international order based on law that decades of peace made possible. This wager is not yet won. The road to 5% of GDP is long, strewn with political, industrial, and budgetary obstacles. But the direction is clear, the will is real, and the threat is serious enough that even the most recalcitrant have stopped pretending to ignore the urgency. NATO is moving from promises to action. Ankara will be the first major demonstration of it.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.