ANALYSIS: Gdańsk 2026 — Ukraine between Western aid and a war that keeps striking

Gdańsk, symbol and paradox

On June 25, 2026, the International Ukraine Reconstruction Conference was held in Gdańsk, Poland. Simultaneously, Russia continued to bombard Ukrainian territory. This coexistence — planning reconstruction while destruction continues — defines the unique and paradoxical nature of this moment. This is not political naivety: it is a deliberate resistance strategy that tells Moscow that neither bombs nor missiles can stop the will to rise again.

This analysis unpacks what happened in Gdańsk, what the numbers reveal about the real state of Western support, and what simultaneous military events mean for the trajectory of the war.

The actors and the stakes

The conference brought together representatives of the European Union, member states, international financial institutions and the Ukrainian government. As backdrop: a program of €90 billion for 2026–2027, broken down into €30 billion in macro-financial aid and €60 billion earmarked for defense. The first disbursement — €3.2 billion — was announced at the conference itself. The scale is historic. The challenges match the stakes.

The Gdańsk conference reminds me of those first-stone-laying ceremonies sometimes held in the middle of a war, to signal that reconstruction has begun before the fighting ends. That is politics, yes. It is also courage — the courage to bet on the future when the present is still uncertain and painful.

The Czech double delivery

On June 25, 2026, Ukraine received a batch of 10 ALTO NG training aircraft — a delivery split in two: 5 funded by the Czech government and 5 purchased by Czech citizens themselves through a public fundraiser. That detail is not trivial. It illustrates how support for Ukraine has become a societal phenomenon, not just a state policy, in Central Europe.

The ALTO NG aircraft are trainers — they do not fly directly into combat. But they are used to train the pilots who would fly F-16s and other modern aircraft. Each training aircraft is therefore a long-term capability multiplier, an investment in the Ukrainian air force of tomorrow.

The significance of the Czech citizens' fundraiser

Ordinary citizens collectively funding military aircraft for a foreign country at war — that is a phenomenon unseen in Europe since the Second World War, when similar fundraisers funded entire squadrons. This Czech civilian mobilization says something essential: solidarity with Ukraine is not solely a government policy — it is a deep popular conviction in a significant share of European society.

Citizens buying military aircraft for Ukraine — that is one of the most remarkable and most under-reported facts of this war. Not governments, budgets or bureaucracies. Ordinary people deciding that Ukrainian freedom is worth their personal savings. I have no analytical comment on that. Only deep admiration.

The mechanics of the €90 billion program

The EU's Ukraine Facility program provides €90 billion for 2026–2027. The first disbursement of €3.2 billion released on June 25, 2026 goes directly into the Ukrainian state budget, allowing it to maintain public services — civil servant salaries, pensions, healthcare — while dedicating its own resources to the war effort. This is direct budget support, not conditional project-tied aid.

This approach — paying directly into the national budget — is the most efficient mechanism for supporting a state at war, as it leaves the flexibility to allocate resources according to military and civilian priorities. Zelensky signed on June 22, 2026 the new budget law providing 1,560 billion UAH for security and defense, of which 1,300 billion is for arms procurement.

The €5.9 billion for drones: a delay, not an abandonment

The €5.9 billion initially earmarked for drone acquisitions was not included in this first disbursement, for "technical supply logistics reasons." That vague formulation conceals a complex reality: the EU's procurement systems were not designed for large-scale rapid military purchasing. The Commission must adapt its procedures to a speed that war demands but that its regulations were never built to accommodate.

The "technical logistical reasons" for delaying the €5.9 billion in drones — that is bureaucratic vocabulary for saying European regulations do not yet know how to buy weapons efficiently. That is a serious problem, and I will not pretend it is trivial. Every drone not delivered on time means weaker air defenses the following night.

The strategic declaration of June 25

On June 25, 2026, in Gdańsk, President Volodymyr Zelensky declared that Ukraine had created "a window of opportunity" in the war. This deliberately optimistic framing — without excess or false triumphalism — is a calculated strategic statement: it tells Western partners that their investments are working, that the situation on the ground makes a favorable outcome conceivable, and that now is the time to intensify support rather than seek a premature compromise.

Zelensky's rhetoric is not propaganda — it is strategic communication in service of a concrete objective: maintaining and expanding Western support at the precise moment when voices in Europe and the United States are starting to talk about "negotiations" and "compromises" that would look more like disguised capitulation.

The challenge of reconstruction during war

In concrete terms, rebuilding during an active war means every repaired piece of infrastructure can be targeted again. Russia has demonstrated its willingness to deliberately hit power plants, water distribution networks and hospitals — the targets that maximize civilian suffering. Investing in reconstruction without simultaneously strengthening air defense means rebuilding on sand. The 300 additional missiles Zelensky requested on June 19, 2026 are inseparable from the reconstruction program — they are its prerequisite.

Zelensky achieved something extraordinary: turning the Ukrainian cause into a moral obligation for all of democratic Europe. The window of opportunity he speaks of in Gdańsk is not only military — it is political, diplomatic, and economic. And that window is open now. It will not stay open indefinitely.

60,000 tonnes of ammunition destroyed

On June 24, 2026, the day before the Gdańsk conference, a Ukrainian deep-strike operation destroyed more than 60,000 tonnes of ammunition in a Baltic Fleet arsenal near Saint Petersburg. This operation is extraordinary on multiple counts: it demonstrates Ukraine's capacity to strike deep inside Russian territory, it significantly weakens Russian military logistics, and it sends a strategic message to Moscow: nowhere is out of reach.

The Gdańsk conference reminds me of those first-stone-laying ceremonies held during a war, to signal that reconstruction has begun before the fighting ends. That is politics, yes. It is also courage — the courage to bet on the future when the present is still uncertain and painful. That courage deserves to be recognized and supported.

This strike is not an isolated incident — it fits within a Ukrainian doctrine of pressure on Russian rear areas, aimed at degrading the supply capacity feeding troops at the front. If Russia cannot move ammunition forward, it cannot sustain its rate of attack. This is logistical warfare in its most effective form.

What this says about Ukrainian strategy

The destruction of 60,000 tonnes of ammunition near Saint Petersburg directly reflects what Zelensky calls the "window of opportunity." Ukraine is no longer merely defending its territory — it is carrying the war into the enemy's logistical system, creating pressures that Moscow did not anticipate in its initial calculations. This strategy requires precisely the long-range precision strike capabilities that the European E5 has committed to developing jointly.

60,000 tonnes of ammunition near Saint Petersburg. Ukraine strikes deep into Russian territory as never before since the war began. This proves that Western weapons, wielded with Ukrainian intelligence and courage, are changing the equation. And that is exactly what Putin feared when he demanded the West not deliver long-range arms.

From victim country to strategic partner

Bloomberg's headline of June 25, 2026 — Europe "lauds Ukraine's newfound strength" — marks an important narrative turning point. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the dominant Western narrative cast Ukraine as a heroic victim, deserving of aid and compassion. That narrative was not wrong — but it was incomplete.

The new narrative — Ukraine as a strategic actor creating "windows of opportunity," striking Russian arsenals near Saint Petersburg, signing a defense budget law worth 1,300 billion UAH in arms procurement — is that of a full security partner in its own right. This shift in perception has major political implications: a partner you respect is helped differently from a country you merely pity.

The trajectory toward EU membership

The Gdańsk Conference also served as a reminder that Ukraine, as an EU candidate country, is advancing on that path despite the war. The €90 billion in financial support is not presented as emergency aid but as an investment in a future EU member. This long-term vision — rebuilding Ukraine with a view to its European integration — fundamentally changes the logic of Western support.

Ukraine as an EU member — a project that seemed distant and hypothetical just five years ago. Today it is an explicit objective of European policy. Gdańsk is not just a reconstruction conference — it is a dress rehearsal for integrating a major new country into the European family. That is vertiginous. And it is wonderful.

The scale of the damage

The €90 billion over two years, as substantial as it is, covers only a fraction of the destruction inflicted on Ukraine since February 2022. Assessments of total damages exceed USD 500 billion according to estimates by the Ukrainian government and international institutions. Reconstruction is therefore a generational project, not a two-year operation.

Gdańsk 2026 will go down in history — but as what? As the starting point of the reconstruction of a victorious Ukraine? Or as one more conference in a long series of unfulfilled promises? The answer depends on what the signatories do in the weeks and months that follow. History is written in actions, not in conferences. And the actions start now, after the last speech and the last communiqué.

Moreover, reconstruction cannot be truly planned as long as the front line remains uncertain. Entire regions — particularly in the east and south — are still under occupation or in active combat zones. Planning the reconstruction of Mariupol or eastern Kherson first means planning their liberation.

Private investors and war risk

One of the ambitions of the Gdańsk Conference was to attract private investors into Ukraine's reconstruction. That is where the paradox of "rebuilding during war" is sharpest: the private sector demands a degree of risk predictability. Infrastructure rebuilt today that can be bombed tomorrow represents an investment risk that few companies can bear without substantial government guarantees.

Why helping Ukraine is an investment, not a cost

It is tempting to treat the €90 billion in aid to Ukraine as a pure outlay — money that goes out and does not come back. That is a profound analytical error. Every euro invested in Ukrainian resistance is a euro that spares Europe from spending far larger sums to face a victorious Russia pressing even harder against NATO's eastern borders. This is a strategic calculation, not merely a moral one.

Furthermore, Ukraine's reconstruction contracts — infrastructure, energy, housing, transportation — will represent substantial opportunities for European companies. Money invested in Ukraine's reconstruction will flow back partly as orders for French, German, Polish and Italian industries. That is a real economic multiplier, documented by economists who have studied post-war reconstruction phases.

The Marshall Plan lesson: investing in stability pays

The post-war Marshall Plan, which injected roughly USD 13 billion (about USD 170 billion in today's terms) into a devastated Europe, is the most relevant historical precedent. That American investment not only stabilized Europe — it created solvent markets for American exports and the economic foundations of fifty years of prosperity and peace. The €90 billion for Ukraine follows that same logic of strategic investment in stability.

A rebuilt Ukraine, integrated into the EU, with an economy of 60 million people and considerable natural resources, will be a major trading partner for Western Europe. That is the horizon toward which the Gdańsk conference points — even if full reconstruction is measured in decades rather than years.

The Marshall Plan and the €90 billion for Ukraine — two moments when the West chose to invest in stability rather than watch instability compound. The first created prosperous post-war Europe. The second can anchor a Ukraine within democratic Europe for the next century. The cost is real. The strategic return is equally real. This is a civilizational investment and deserves to be treated as one.

What the conference achieved

The Gdańsk Conference of June 25, 2026 accomplished several things simultaneously: it made a concrete and significant first payment of €3.2 billion, it politically affirmed the EU's commitment for years to come, it reframed the discourse about Ukraine from victimization toward resilience and strength, and it gave Zelensky a platform to project his optimistic strategic vision to Western partners.

The bet on Ukraine

Ultimately, the €90 billion from Gdańsk is a gamble — a bet that Ukraine will hold, that the investments will be protected, that the trajectory leads toward peace and European integration rather than stalemate. It is a justified bet, backed by the facts: Ukrainian resilience since 2022, the 60,000 tonnes of ammunition destroyed near Saint Petersburg, the window of opportunity Zelensky speaks of. But it is still a gamble. And Europe, in Gdańsk, chose to make it.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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