OPEN LETTER: To the Europe that finally sends its €3.2 billion — Ukraine is asking for more

June 25 in Gdańsk: a historic moment, but not enough

On June 25, 2026, at the Ukraine Reconstruction Conference in Gdańsk, the European Union disbursed the first tranche of a historic loan: €3.2 billion from a total program of €90 billion planned for 2026–2027. That gesture is concrete, it is real, it is being welcomed. And yet this open letter is not a thank-you note.

It is a call. An appeal. A demand formulated with respect, but with urgency. Because Ukraine cannot reconstruct itself while it is still burning — and Vladimir Putin keeps striking.

Who this letter is addressed to

This letter is addressed to the European leaders who signed the Gdańsk commitments. To the Brussels commissioners who designed the €90 billion program. To the finance ministers who calculated the tranches. And to the European citizens who fund, through their taxes, this act of solidarity. It is addressed to all of you — not to assign blame, but to tell you what the numbers alone do not convey.

This letter is as imperfect as all open letters are — it cannot capture the full reality of Ukraine. But it can at least say what official communiqués do not: that the urgency is real, that delays cost lives, and that the European bureaucracy must adapt to the speed of war.

A first step in a colossal program

The figure of €3.2 billion in a single disbursement is objectively substantial. It sits within a program structured in two pillars: €30 billion in macro-financial assistance to support the functioning of the Ukrainian state, and €60 billion for defense. This financial architecture means Europe is treating support for Ukraine not as emergency charity but as a strategic investment in continental security.

Ukraine's 2026 budget law, signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 22, 2026 following its adoption by the Rada, provides for an increase in security and defense spending of 1,560 billion UAH, of which 1,300 billion UAH is earmarked for arms procurement. Ukraine is not spending European aid on current expenses — it is converting it into military capability.

The €5.9 billion for drones: a technical delay, not an abandonment

The €5.9 billion originally earmarked for drones was not included in this first disbursement due to technical reasons of supply logistics. This delay is not a political retreat, but it illustrates the bureaucratic complexities that inevitably slow the transformation of financial aid into operational capability in the field. And every week of delay costs lives.

"Technical" logistical reasons. Meanwhile, Russian drones keep falling on Ukrainian cities. I am not saying European officials are negligent — I am saying that bureaucratic speed and military speed are fundamentally incompatible, and that incompatibility is a luxury Ukraine cannot afford.

The need for 300 additional missiles

On June 19, 2026, President Zelensky stated publicly: Ukraine needs at least 300 additional missiles to prepare for winter, along with €6 billion more from the European Peace Facility (EPF). These figures are not invented — they result from a military assessment of what is needed to maintain Ukraine's capacity to resist Russian winter bombardment campaigns.

Winter is a weapon Russia uses deliberately — striking power plants, district heating networks, civilian infrastructure at the moment when temperatures make survival harder. It is a calculated terror strategy. The only adequate response is reinforced air defense capability. And that costs missiles. A great many missiles.

The EPF and its structural limits

The European Peace Facility, the extra-budgetary mechanism created precisely to fund military deliveries that the EU's regular budget cannot cover, has shown its limitations. Discussions on its recapitalization have dragged on. Disagreements between member states over funding conditions have slowed decisions. Meanwhile, Ukrainian stocks are shrinking.

The EPF is the perfect example of the European project at its best — ingenious, innovative — and at its worst — slow, subject to vetoes, mired in procedures not designed for the speed of war. It is a peacetime institution trying to operate in wartime. The result is predictable.

Why Poland, why Gdańsk

The choice of Gdańsk as the host city for the reconstruction conference is not accidental. Gdańsk is the birthplace of the Solidarity movement. It is where, in 1980, shipyard workers defied a totalitarian empire — and won. Holding a conference on the reconstruction of a country at war in that city is to situate support for Kyiv within a long tradition of European resistance to Russian oppression.

Poland is not just a neighboring country to Ukraine — it is a country that viscerally understands what it means to live on the frontier of Russian influence. Its presence in the European E5, its role as host of this conference: all of it says something essential about the geopolitics of support for Ukraine.

Bloomberg and "Ukraine's newfound strength"

In Gdańsk, the atmosphere was not merely one of charity — it was one of renewed confidence. Bloomberg headlined on June 25, 2026 that Europe was "lauding Ukraine's newfound strength" as disbursements began. This perception — Ukraine no longer as victim but as an actor in its own defense and reconstruction — is a fundamental narrative shift.

I think of Munich in 1938 every time I hear European officials talk about "not provoking Putin." Putin does not need provoking — he has already chosen war. The question is whether the West chooses to win it or to try to tame it. Gdańsk says: we choose to win. That is not enough yet. But it is a beginning that deserves to be supported and amplified.

A battlefield fact buried beneath the conference

On June 24, 2026, on the eve of the Gdańsk conference, a crucial piece of military intelligence was made public: Ukraine had destroyed more than 60,000 tonnes of ammunition at the Baltic Fleet arsenal near Saint Petersburg. That is an extraordinary deep-strike operation — hitting Russian logistical depots on Russian territory, hundreds of kilometers behind the front.

This letter is as imperfect as all open letters are — it cannot capture the full reality of Ukraine. But it can at least say what official communiqués do not: that the urgency is real, that delays cost lives, and that European bureaucracy must adapt to the speed of war if it is to live up to its ambitions.

This operation illustrates precisely why Ukraine needs long-range strike capabilities, and why the 300 missiles Zelensky is requesting are not military hyperbole — they are the tools of a defensive strategy that works by striking the sources of enemy fire rather than waiting for the impact.

Reconstruction cannot wait for peace

Reconstruction conferences generally assume that rebuilding happens after the war. What is happening in Gdańsk is different: the groundwork for reconstruction is being laid during the war, betting on Ukrainian resilience and on the eventual — someday — arrival of a ceasefire. That is a reasonable but risky gamble. Russia can deliberately target reconstructed infrastructure to discourage investors and demonstrate the futility of Western efforts. Air defense is therefore not separable from reconstruction — it is its prerequisite.

Rebuilding a country that the adversary can still strike — that is Sisyphus with an excavator. I understand the diplomatic and economic logic of reconstruction conferences during an active war. But I cannot forget that every euro invested in Ukrainian infrastructure must be protected by Patriot missiles, F-16s, defense systems that Europe has not yet fully delivered.

A debt of values, not just money

The €90 billion in aid is imposing. But it is also, fundamentally, an acknowledgment of what Europe owes Ukraine — not in money, but in values. Ukraine is fighting for the same principles enshrined in the Treaty of Rome, in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in the ECHR's commitments. It is fighting for the sovereignty of nations, for the right of peoples to choose their own destiny, for democracy over autocracy.

If Europe does not defend these values when they are under attack on its own doorstep, it defends them nowhere. The €3.2 billion from Gdańsk is not charity — it is an investment in the credibility of the European project itself.

The memory of what cowardice costs

Europe has a long memory of the consequences of complicity in the face of aggression. The Munich Agreement of 1938 taught a lesson that subsequent generations swore never to forget. This Gdańsk conference, in this city of resistance, is an opportunity to prove that the lesson was learned — that democratic Europe chooses commitment over appeasement.

I think of Munich in 1938 every time I hear European officials talk about "not provoking Putin." Putin does not need provoking — he has already chosen war. The question is whether the West chooses to win it or to appease it. Gdańsk says: we choose to win. That is not enough yet. But it is a beginning.

Accelerate the remaining disbursements

The remaining €86.8 billion of the €90 billion program must be unlocked on a clear and predictable schedule, with no further bureaucratic delays. Ukraine needs predictability to plan its reconstruction and weapons procurement. Uncertainty about future disbursements weakens Ukrainian planning capacity just as much as an actual shortfall of funds.

€90 billion over two years — that is a historic commitment. And yet, writing it, I feel a deep unease: this is not a sum Europe is disbursing freely, with joy. It is a sum it is disbursing because history gives it no choice. That is not a reproach — it is an observation. Giving out of necessity and giving out of generosity have different effects on those who receive and those who give.

Releasing the €5.9 billion for drones must be a priority — not only because drones are the defining weapon of this war, but because Ukraine has demonstrated its capacity to produce and deploy them with creativity and effectiveness.

Coordinate defense and reconstruction

Europe must understand that the €60 billion defense pillar of the program is inseparable from the €30 billion in macro-financial aid. A Ukraine that cannot defend itself cannot rebuild itself. The two pillars are linked — and must be treated as such in Brussels' political and logistical coordination.

Rebuilding during war: a deliberate strategy

The decision to hold a reconstruction conference while the war is still active is not naivety. It is a deliberate political strategy. It tells Putin: your bombs cannot stop our will to build. It tells Ukrainian citizens: your future does not depend on Moscow's goodwill. And it tells international investors: betting on Ukraine is a bet on victory, not merely on survival against Russian aggression.

This logic of constructive resistance is one of the most powerful ideas Zelensky has developed since the war began. Every piece of infrastructure rebuilt is an assertion of sovereignty. Every renovated school, every power station brought back online, every bridge rebuilt is a symbolic victory as much as a practical necessity for the 23 million Ukrainians still living on their territory.

The psychological dimension of international aid

Beyond the budget figures — the €3.2 billion disbursed on June 25, the €90 billion pledged for 2026–2027 — international aid has a crucial psychological dimension. It tells Ukrainian soldiers in the trenches: you are not alone. It tells displaced families: your home will be rebuilt. It tells the civil servants keeping the state running under bombardment: your work is supported, recognized and durably funded.

This moral and psychological dimension of aid is no less important than its direct economic value. The resilience of a people is not only a matter of material resources — it is also a matter of the deep conviction that the democratic world is on their side and will not abandon them when international attention turns elsewhere.

I often think about what it means for a Ukrainian teacher to see the EU disburse €3.2 billion for their country while they are holding class in a basement because of air raid sirens. That is not abstract money — it is concrete dignity. That is the message the Gdańsk conference sends to every Ukrainian: your resistance is recognized and supported. That message is worth as much as the billions that accompany it.

What the €3.2 billion cannot buy

The €3.2 billion disbursed on June 25, 2026 in Gdańsk is real, significant and welcome. It cannot buy peace. It cannot bring back the dead. It cannot undo the destruction accumulated since February 24, 2022. But it can buy time — time for Ukraine to hold, to push back, to rebuild, and ultimately to win.

Europe living up to its own history

Democratic Europe has a unique opportunity to show it is equal to its own values. The Gdańsk conference is a powerful symbol. But symbols without substance are hollow. What Ukraine needs now is for Europe to turn its commitments into action — swiftly, completely, without the usual bureaucratic delays that cost Ukrainian lives. Time is pressing. Putin does not pause for conferences.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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Nature of the analysis

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My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

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