TESTIMONY: What I saw in Kim Jong Un's weapons tests — the North Korea rewriting the rules

Introduction: June 26, 2026 and what the images show

A day of tests that changes the picture

On June 26, 2026, I am following news from North Korea with the attention I have paid this regime for years. And what I observe concerns me more than usual. The official North Korean news agency KCNA announces that Kim Jong Un personally oversaw a series of weapons tests. Not a symbolic test. Not a demonstration firing. A battery of tests covering at least three major weapons systems — each with specifications that sketch the outline of a revised military doctrine, more ambitious, more precise, more threatening.

What I observe in this publicly available data is not a complete surprise. Pyongyang has been intensifying its arms program since the talks with the United States collapsed in 2019. But the scope and specificity of these June 26 tests — and the statements from Kim Jong Un accompanying them — signal something qualitative. This is no longer a North Korea provoking to extract diplomatic concessions. This is a North Korea preparing for actual military operations, with a precise doctrine on how to strike, where to strike, and at what distance.

The three systems tested: a threat matrix

Three systems were tested on June 26, 2026, according to information published by KCNA and relayed by Al Jazeera and the AP. The first: a 240mm multiple rocket launcher with 24 tubes and extended range — analysts estimate it can reach up to 90 km — and an automated fire control system. The second: a special-mission ballistic warhead, designed to inflict "fatal damage" on airports, ports, and power stations. The third: a 155mm self-propelled howitzer with a range of 65 km. These three systems cover different ranges, different targets, different missions. Together, they sketch a strike architecture that can reach a significant portion of South Korean territory.

What I read in this combination is not accidental. The 90 km rocket launcher can hit Seoul from positions pulled back from the border. The special-mission warhead specifically targets critical infrastructure — airports to prevent reinforcements, ports to block deliveries, power stations to plunge South Korea into darkness. And the 65 km howitzer delivers precision artillery fire against advanced military positions. This is a first-strike architecture — or rapid escalation architecture — designed to hit fast, hit far, and hit the right targets.

Kim Jong Un's words: a lethal posture demanded

"Lethal and destructive offensive posture": what Kim demands

I pay particular attention to the exact words Kim Jong Un uses during these tests. They are not rhetorical — they are doctrinal. According to KCNA, Kim called on his army to adopt a "lethal and destructive offensive posture." He demanded that his enemies feel "constant anxiety and fear" — and dare not attack. He set as objective capabilities of "ultra-precision" at long range. He declared that the test results demonstrate the "progress made in his firing capabilities" along the southern border.

These formulations are not diplomatic bluster. They are operational directives. A "lethal and destructive offensive posture" means that the objective of North Korean military posture is no longer merely to deter an attack — it is to prepare the army to strike first, massively and devastatingly. The demand for "ultra-precision" at long range indicates that Pyongyang is seeking to develop the ability to hit specific targets — not merely geographic zones — at significant distances. This is a meaningful qualitative shift in doctrine.

The navy as nuclear priority

In statements close to these ground tests, Kim Jong Un also announced that the North Korean navy would be equipped with nuclear weapons and larger ships, ensuring that North Korea is ready for "multifaceted and effective" operations. I connect this declaration directly to the commissioning, a few weeks earlier, of the destroyer Choe Hyon — North Korea's first surface destroyer. A surface warship. Naval nuclear weapons announced. A 90 km extended range for ground artillery.

What I observe is a military doctrine expanding progressively into every dimension: land, naval, ballistic, and — implicitly — nuclear in every vector. North Korea is no longer satisfied with strategic nuclear deterrence. It is developing tactical nuclear capabilities — weapons usable in real combat configurations, not only as instruments of last resort. This shift is potentially one of the most dangerous developments in Asian security in decades.

South Korea responds: 500,000 "drone warriors"

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and the drone revolution

I follow the South Korean response with equal interest. On Friday, June 27, 2026, the South Korean Defense Ministry announces a massive plan to expand its drone capabilities. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back's formulation is striking: he announces the training of 500,000 "drone warriors" — soldiers capable of using drones as "personal weapons," the same way they would use a personal rifle. This figure is colossal. For a country of 51 million, training half a million drone warriors means integrating drone capabilities at every level of the military structure.

This response draws directly from lessons learned in the war in Ukraine. I have followed closely how drones transformed military operations in the Donbas — the ability of small operators to destroy armored vehicles, gather intelligence on enemy positions, deliver ammunition in inaccessible areas. South Korea is drawing the same conclusions and adapting them to its own geography: a dense, narrow land front, cities immediately adjacent to the border, demographics that prohibit maintaining a traditional mass army.

20,000 reconnaissance and attack drones on the horizon

Beyond individual warriors, the South Korean plan envisions acquiring more than 20,000 reconnaissance and attack drones. This figure is not presented with full technical details in available sources — but it signals a large-scale deployment ambition that would fundamentally transform the tactical parity with North Korea. An army with 20,000 attack drones, operated by soldiers trained to use them as personal weapons, is an army capable of saturating combat airspace in ways conventional defenses struggle to counter.

What strikes me about Seoul's announcement is its symmetry with North Korean doctrine. Pyongyang seeks "ultra-precision" at long range. Seoul answers with mass — thousands of drones capable of overwhelming defenses. The Korean Peninsula is transforming before my eyes into a laboratory of 21st-century warfare: high precision against saturation, advanced armaments against massive quantities of cheap platforms. This is exactly what is also playing out in Ukraine — and the results there are instructive about what it might mean here.

Trump and the North Korean stakes: "time to pay attention"

What Lee Jae Myung heard from Trump

I note a statement from South Korean President Lee Jae Myung worth highlighting. The week before the June 26 tests, he revealed that American President Donald Trump had told him that "the time had come to pay attention to the North Korean question." This vague formulation — characteristic of Trump's communication style — can mean several things. It may mean the American administration is considering a resumption of diplomatic negotiations with Pyongyang. It may also mean that Trump recognizes the escalating North Korean military capabilities and is seeking a diplomatic exit.

In the context of the June 26 tests, this statement takes on particular dimensions. If Trump is contemplating a resumption of talks with Kim Jong Un — a dynamic he himself initiated during his first term — he would be doing so in a context where North Korean military capabilities have considerably advanced since 2019. This is no longer the same North Korea he met in Singapore and Hanoi. This is a North Korea with 90 km artillery, special-mission ballistic warheads, and announced naval nuclear weapons.

What "paying attention" means in this context

Trump's statement — relayed by Lee — illustrates a fundamental tension in American policy toward North Korea: does "paying attention" mean negotiating, containing, or deterring? The history of American-North Korean negotiations since 1994 is the history of a series of partially respected agreements, calculated provocations, and the steady progression of Pyongyang's arms program during and after each phase of dialogue.

What I observe in following this long history is a consistent pattern: North Korea uses negotiations as space to advance militarily without suffering the consequences of direct escalation. The June 26, 2026 tests fit this pattern — they probably precede a diplomatic opening from Trump, and they serve to define the terms of that opening. Kim Jong Un comes to the table with a more powerful arsenal. And the concessions he will demand in exchange for a pause in his tests will be proportionate to that arsenal.

Russian assistance: a determining factor

What the South Korean Defense Ministry confirmed

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back explicitly acknowledged it in his June 27 statements: North Korea is receiving technological assistance from Russia. This is not analytical speculation — it is an official confirmation from the Defense Ministry of a government with significant intelligence capabilities on its northern neighbor. Russian assistance partly explains the rapid progression of North Korean capabilities — notably in the domains of ballistic missiles and precision guidance technologies.

What I observe here is one of the least discussed consequences of the war in Ukraine: the Russia–North Korea strategic rapprochement. Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with millions of artillery shells for the Ukrainian front. In exchange, Russia shares advanced military technologies. This is a technology transfer between two pariah states that benefits both parties: Russia gets ammunition for its operations in Ukraine, North Korea gets capabilities that would have taken decades to develop alone.

North Korean soldiers in Ukraine and their return

Credible data, notably information relayed by South Korean sources, indicates that North Korean soldiers have been engaged on the Ukrainian front alongside Russian forces. This deployment is militarily significant in both directions: it provides Moscow with additional manpower, but above all it provides North Korea with real combat experience in a modern high-intensity war. Soldiers who have seen how Ukrainian drones operate, how defense in depth resists artillery assaults, how precision strikes disrupt logistical lines — when these soldiers return to Pyongyang, they bring operational knowledge that no manual can replace.

This frontline experience from Ukraine is directly relevant to the June 26 tests. The specifications of the 90 km rocket launcher with automated fire control, the special-mission warhead against infrastructure, the 65 km howitzer — all seem to reflect lessons drawn from real war in Ukraine. What artillery works. What targets are decisive. What ranges are needed to strike safely. North Korea is learning by watching — and by participating.

South Korea's defense industry: the strategic response

Five defense companies worth $650 million by 2030

Facing this escalation, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung announced an ambitious plan: develop five defense companies valued at $650 million by 2030. This is not only an investment in national security — it is an investment in the industrial capacity to respond to a rapidly evolving threat. A nation that depends on arms imports for its defense is vulnerable to delivery delays, stock shortfalls, and the diplomatic calculations of its suppliers. South Korea has taken this lesson — notably by watching what is happening with Taiwan and its $14 billion in blocked weapons.

South Korea's defense industry is already substantial — the country has become one of the world's top arms exporters, selling tanks, howitzers, and aircraft to countries such as Poland, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates. This expansion plan strengthens an already competitive industrial base and gives it the resources to develop the specific capabilities South Korea needs against the evolving North Korean threat.

28,500 American soldiers: the presence that matters

The presence of 28,500 American soldiers in South Korea remains a central deterrence factor. These troops are not there to conduct the defense of the peninsula alone — they are there to signal to Pyongyang that an attack against South Korea would be an attack against the United States. This tripwire force has maintained relative peace on the peninsula since the end of the Korean War in 1953.

But in the current context — with a Trump who has demonstrated he can cancel deployments by tweet, who uses Taiwan's weapons as leverage, who maintains a personal fascination with Kim Jong Un since his first term — the certainty that these 28,500 soldiers will always constitute a credible deterrence signal is less absolute than it was before. This is not a given. It is an assumption that must be maintained by consistent policy.

What the June 26 tests mean for the Indo-Pacific region

China, an interested spectator

I inevitably wonder how Beijing reads the June 26, 2026 tests. China has a complex relationship with North Korea: it is its principal economic backer, the guardian of its political survival, but also a neighbor that does not want war on the peninsula and does not want a North Korea so nuclearized it becomes unmanageable. Beijing watches the Trump-Kim dynamic with particular attention — if a new series of negotiations produces American concessions without real counterparts, this further weakens the non-proliferation regime that China has a formal interest in defending.

But Beijing also watches the South Korean response — and notably the expansion of drone capabilities. A South Korea with 20,000 attack drones and 500,000 trained operators is a South Korea whose military capabilities are growing independently of American weapons systems. This development is deterrent against Pyongyang — but it is also a development that Beijing notes in its calculations on the regional balance of forces.

Japan and the lessons it draws

I also note the Japanese reaction to this security environment. Japan has substantially increased its defense budget over the past two years — a decision directly motivated by North Korean provocations and Chinese ambitions in the region. The June 26 tests reinforce the political justification for these expenditures in Japan. They also confirm that North Korean ballistic missiles, some of which have the range to reach Japanese territory, constitute a direct — not theoretical — threat.

What I observe, stepping back from the Indo-Pacific region on June 27, 2026, is an arms race accelerating across multiple vectors simultaneously. North Korea develops more precise, longer-range systems. South Korea responds with mass drones. Japan rearms. China modernizes its navy. And the United States, with its post-Iran industrial shortfalls, its internal tensions over allied commitments, and a president talking about "paying attention" to the North Korean question — is navigating these waters with a less reliable compass than at any recent point.

The significance of "ultra-precision": a doctrine revealed

Why Kim wants precision weapons

Kim Jong Un's demand for "ultra-precision" long-range capabilities deserves in-depth analysis. Traditionally, North Korean military doctrine rested on mass — thousands of artillery tubes positioned near the border, capable of saturating Seoul through sheer volume of fire. This is the hostage city doctrine: as long as Seoul can be destroyed within hours, no one attacks North Korea.

But the pursuit of precision at long range signals a strategic shift. With precise weapons, you do not need a thousand tubes to destroy an objective — you need one or two systems capable of hitting the right target at the right moment. This allows selective strikes: Gimpo Airport to block American reinforcements, the port of Busan to block supplies, power stations to plunge South Korea into darkness. This is a doctrine of strategic paralysis, not total destruction. And this doctrine is, in certain scenarios, more formidable than brute saturation.

The "special-mission warheads": a new category

The term "special-mission warhead" used by KCNA to describe the ballistic missile tested on June 26 is deliberately opaque — but its meaning is clear in context: this is a warhead designed for a specific mission against a specific target type. The examples given — airports, ports, power stations — correspond exactly to the targets of a strategic paralysis strike. This is not a thermonuclear warhead aimed at erasing a city. This is a precision warhead designed to surgically strike the critical infrastructure of an adversary.

The distinction matters militarily and politically. A total destruction warhead is a weapon of last resort — its use would trigger a disproportionate response. A surgical strategic paralysis warhead is a more "usable" weapon — it can be employed in an escalation context without necessarily crossing the threshold of national suicide. Pyongyang is developing a more granular, more flexible, more operationally usable range of military options. And this diversification is, to my eyes, the most troubling development of the June 26 tests.

What the failed 2019 talks produced

After Hanoi: a North Korea preparing without constraint

The Hanoi talks between Trump and Kim Jong Un in 2019 collapsed without an agreement. Kim wanted sanctions relief in exchange for partial dismantlement of his nuclear facilities. Trump wanted complete dismantlement. The gap was too wide. And since that failure, North Korea has developed its arsenal without diplomatic constraint — without a freeze agreement, without inspectors, without international monitoring.

When I look at the specifications of the systems tested on June 26, 2026 — 90 km for the rocket launcher, 65 km for the howitzer, special-mission warheads — I see directly the product of seven years of unconstrained post-Hanoi development. This period of intensive testing, accelerated technological development (potentially with Russian assistance), and accumulated experience through deployments in Ukraine has produced a North Korean army qualitatively different from that of 2019.

Kim's demand: abandoning denuclearization as a precondition

Kim Jong Un's current position on American diplomacy is unambiguous: he has responded to efforts to restart discussions with a non-negotiable precondition — the United States must abandon its denuclearization demand. For Pyongyang, nuclear weapons are not a problem to be solved — they are the foundation of state security. Any negotiation beginning with denuclearization as its goal is therefore a negotiation North Korea will reject by definition.

If Trump means to "pay attention" to the North Korean question, he will have to choose: either he maintains denuclearization as a condition — and there will be no deal — or he abandons it and agrees to negotiate with a nuclear North Korea, which creates a devastating regional precedent for non-proliferation. Between these two impossible options, history suggests American presidents tend to choose one, then the other, hoping the dynamic changes. It never does.

The human dimension: a population armed against its will

What the 25 million North Koreans are living through

Behind the range figures and technical specifications, there is a reality I try not to lose sight of: 25 million North Koreans live under one of the most repressive regimes in human history. The resources Pyongyang devotes to these arms programs — the sums invested in a 90 km rocket launcher with automated fire control — are resources not going to food, healthcare, or education for a population among the poorest in Asia.

North Korean military doctrine protects Kim Jong Un's regime — it does not protect the North Korean people. This is an army pointing its warheads at South Korean airports and ports — not an army feeding its soldiers or caring for its children. This gap between displayed military power and the real misery of the population is one of the most obscene contradictions of the Pyongyang regime. And it deserves to be named, even in a technical testimony about weapons tests.

The soldiers returning from Ukraine

North Korean soldiers who fought in Ukraine are returning to Pyongyang. They have seen something that very few North Koreans ever see: another world. They have seen countries that function differently, societies that do not live under permanent fear, armies that fight for something beyond regime survival. What they do with that experience — whether it creates a seed of questioning or is drowned by the ideological conditioning of return — is a question I cannot answer.

But I raise it because it matters. Regimes sometimes change from within. Soldiers who have seen other realities are sometimes the first to question. This is not a prediction. It is an observation about how history works — and about the fact that the June 26, 2026 weapons tests do not tell the whole story of what is happening in North Korea.

What I could not have foreseen — and what I should have seen coming

The progression faster than models predicted

I must honestly acknowledge: the progression of North Korean military capabilities since 2019 has been faster than most analysts — myself included — would have predicted. The development of a special-mission warhead to strike critical infrastructure at long range, the deployment of a surface destroyer capable of receiving nuclear weapons, the 90 km range for multiple artillery — all represent a significant qualitative leap in seven years.

In retrospect, I should have weighted more heavily the combination of factors that made this progression possible: the absence of diplomatic constraint post-Hanoi, the potential acceleration through Russian assistance, and the operational lessons drawn from engagement in Ukraine. These three factors together create a multiplicative — not merely additive — acceleration. And this acceleration has produced, by June 26, 2026, a North Korea militarily more capable than I would have estimated probable in 2020.

What I see now and what it implies

What I see now, from publicly available data as of June 26, 2026, is a North Korea that has systematically filled the capability gaps that limited its military doctrine. It had nuclear range — it is now developing conventional precision. It had short-range artillery — it is now extending to 90 km. It had land capabilities — it is now developing naval capabilities with nuclear potential. This systematic progression is deliberate. It answers a doctrine. And this doctrine, as Kim Jong Un laid it out during the June 26 tests, is a doctrine of operational first strike — not pure deterrence.

This implication is the most important of this testimony. A deterrence doctrine seeks to prevent attack. An operational first-strike doctrine seeks to be ready to strike decisively if the decision is made. Kim's demand for a "lethal offensive posture" is not compatible with pure deterrence. This is an offensive doctrine. And its targets — airports, ports, power stations — are those of a strategic paralysis first strike, not a deterrence retaliation.

The question of regional threat integration

North Korea, China, Iran, Russia: the adversary constellation

On June 26, 2026, North Korean tests do not occur in a geopolitical vacuum. They unfold in a context in which Russia is fighting in Ukraine with North Korean shells, China is pressing its economic and military advantage in the western Pacific, and Iran recently challenged the United States in the Middle East — exhausting interceptor stocks that should have gone to Taiwan. This is not coincidence. It is an architecture of adversaries — coordinated, even if informally — all acting to simultaneously test and erode American capabilities and credibility.

This informal coordination is perhaps the most underestimated element of 2026 geopolitics. North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China do not form a formal alliance. But their actions mutually reinforce — each benefits from the difficulties the others create for the United States and its allies. This is a high-intensity geopolitical game for which Western democracies struggle to formulate a coherent response, notably because their decision-making structures are fragmented and their interests are not always perfectly aligned.

What North Korea brings to this constellation

Within this adversary constellation, North Korea plays a specific role: it pins American and allied military capabilities in Northeast Asia, it consumes political and diplomatic attention that cannot therefore be concentrated elsewhere, and it supplies Russia with ammunition allowing Moscow to maintain pressure in Ukraine. In exchange, it receives advanced Russian technologies. This is a mutually beneficial arrangement for both parties — and unilaterally destabilizing for international security.

The June 26, 2026 tests therefore also signal to this constellation: Pyongyang is a reliable partner that continues advancing militarily, honors its commitments to Moscow, and maintains pressure in Northeast Asia while other constellation members maintain theirs in their respective theaters. This is coordination through action, if not through words.

What this testimony attempts to document

The limits of observation at distance

This testimony comes from an observer who follows open data, agency reports, official statements, and expert analyses. It is not the testimony of a reporter in the field in North Korea — a country closed to independent press — nor of an intelligence official with access to classified sources. The limits of this observation are real and I own them. I do not know with certainty what the North Korean "special-mission warheads" can actually do. I do not know the real production figures for the tested systems. I do not have access to the intelligence analyses of South Korea, Japan, or the United States on the June 26 tests.

What I can do is read the public data with the attention it deserves, contextualize it within the long history of the North Korean arms program, and formulate reasonable inferences about what it means. These inferences are my opinions — not certainties. And I prefer honest uncertainty to feigned certainty.

Why it is important to testify despite the limits

I am documenting these tests because they deserve more attention than the news cycle gives them. A 90 km rocket launcher capable of reaching Seoul, warheads designed to paralyze a country's infrastructure, announced naval nuclear weapons — this is not routine. This is a meaningful qualitative evolution in North Korea's military posture, documented by the regime's own official agency.

And in the broader context I have sketched — American interceptor shortfalls, ambiguity of American regional commitment, Russian assistance, informal adversary coordination — these tests fit into a more troubling geopolitical dynamic than their technical specifications alone suggest. The dots connect. And when the dots connect, it is better to name them clearly.

Conclusion: a peninsula in slow combustion

What June 26, 2026 changes — and what it does not

June 26, 2026 does not mark the start of a new war on the Korean Peninsula. Nor does it mark the collapse of the diplomatic status quo. It marks something more insidious: a qualitative progression in North Korean military capabilities that progressively narrows the strategic room for maneuver of all actors involved. Every successful test is one more capability that Pyongyang can use in its negotiations, its provocations, or — in the worst case — its operations.

What June 26 does not change: deterrence remains the dominant policy. The 28,500 American soldiers are still in South Korea. Allied retaliatory capability remains deterrent. And North Korea, despite its ambitions, is still a state that rationally calculates its survival risks. These constants matter.

What South Korea and its allies must do

But these constants do not justify complacency. What I observe in South Korea's response — the 500,000 drone warriors, the 20,000 attack drones, the five defense companies worth $650 million — is a response adapted to the nature of the threat. It deserves to be supported and strengthened. What I observe in the American response — a possible diplomatic opening with Kim in the context of an administration that has already shown it treats its security commitments as bargaining chips — is more concerning.

The security of the Korean Peninsula, and by extension all of Northeast Asia, rests on a combination of credible military deterrence and consistent diplomatic pressure. Weakening one to feed the other is to weaken both. And in the context of the June 26, 2026 tests, this is a luxury the region cannot afford.

Final conclusion: the peninsula the world is watching

What history says about weapons tests

The history of North Korean weapons tests is not one of gratuitous provocations. Every major test has preceded a diplomatic phase or a strategic evolution. In 2017, intercontinental missile tests preceded the Trump-Kim meetings. In 2022, the series of tests preceded a series of international diplomatic actions. The June 26, 2026 tests fit this pattern: they probably precede an attempt by Trump to "pay attention" to the North Korean question in the form of dialogue.

What history also says: these dialogues have never produced real dismantlement of the arms program. They produced temporary pauses, partial agreements, unrespected statements of intent. And after each cycle, North Korea emerged more armed than when it entered. June 26, 2026 documents the current state of that arsenal. Tomorrow's tests will document the state of the arsenal after the next failed diplomatic cycle.

The last word belongs to the facts

I leave the facts to speak in conclusion. A 240mm 24-tube multiple rocket launcher with 90 km range and automated fire control. A special-mission ballistic warhead designed to destroy airports, ports, and power stations. A 155mm self-propelled howitzer with 65 km range. A demand from Kim Jong Un for a "lethal offensive posture." A plan for 500,000 South Korean drone warriors in response. An American president saying "it's time to pay attention." These facts together draw a picture. That picture, I have documented as faithfully as possible. What is done with it belongs to everyone who reads it.

I remain on this peninsula — at least in my analytical watch. And I will continue to testify to what open sources allow us to observe. Not to fuel panic. To name reality with the words it deserves.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Biases and analytical framework

I consider North Korea an authoritarian regime that represents a real threat to the security of the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region. I am in favor of maintaining a firm allied deterrence posture. These positions shape my analyses. I acknowledge that different perspectives exist on the best way to manage the North Korean question — notably those who prioritize diplomatic engagement. I find them generally insufficiently demanding on counterparts, but I do not ignore their existence.

All numerical data and all quotes in this testimony come from the cited primary sources — notably the Al Jazeera article of June 26, 2026, which relays information from Reuters and KCNA. I invented no technical specification, no leader quote, no operational fact.

What this testimony does not cover

This testimony does not cover North Korea's actual current nuclear capabilities — a subject on which public information is fragmentary and expert assessments diverge. It also does not cover the internal humanitarian situation in North Korea, beyond a mention. Both dimensions would have deserved more in-depth treatment than this format allows.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera / Reuters — North Korea conducts major weapons tests — June 26, 2026

Anadolu Agency — North Korea tests upgraded artillery and missile systems — June 26, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Context North Korean soldiers in Ukraine — July 2026

Secondary sources

SOFX — North Korea commissions destroyer Choe Hyon — June 2026

Channel News Asia — North Korean soldiers in Ukraine — June 2026

Interfax Ukraine — Regional context and North Korea — July 2026