TESTIMONY: Ankara 2026 — NATO 3.0 and Europe taking the reins

Introduction: a summit under the sign of strategic shift

Ankara, July 7-8, 2026 — the Alliance reinventing itself

In two weeks, the heads of state and government of NATO's 32 members will gather in Ankara for what analysts are already describing as one of the most structurally significant summits since the end of the Cold War. On June 30, 2026, two weeks before the summit, the Anadolu Agency published an in-depth analysis: the Atlantic Alliance is entering a new era, designated by strategists as NATO 3.0. The paradigm is shifting. Europe is taking on more. The question is no longer whether the transition will happen, but how fast it can proceed without breaking what has protected peace for 75 years.

Secretary General Mark Rutte had set the framework: Russia remains "the primary threat" to the Alliance in the short and long term. This is not a protocol formula — it is a strategic judgment that shapes all of NATO's planning for the years ahead. Behind it lies the war in Ukraine, Trump's demands that Europe bear a greater share of the defense burden, and Washington's gaze turning toward the Pacific and the competition with China.

What NATO 3.0 means concretely

NATO 1.0 was the founding pact of 1949 — a war-shattered Europe seeking American protection against the Soviet threat. NATO 2.0 was the post-Cold War version, deployed in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya — an alliance in search of an out-of-area mission. NATO 3.0, as analysts define it ahead of the Ankara summit, is a return to the fundamentals of territorial defense — but with a redistribution of roles: Europe takes on the continent's conventional defense; the United States maintains the nuclear umbrella and certain unique strategic capabilities.

This redistribution is not American abandonment — Washington says so, and Ankara will confirm it. It is a rebalancing in a world where the United States can no longer — and perhaps no longer wishes to — be the universal guarantor. For Europe, it is both an immense capability challenge and a historic opportunity to become a credible, autonomous security actor. For Ukraine, it is a context in which its own security future must be negotiated.

The numbers that tell the story of European rearmament

Poland at 4.48% of GDP — the example that forces everyone else

Poland leads NATO members in defense spending: 4.48% of its GDP devoted to defense in 2026. This figure is the result of an accelerated buildup since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, in a country that borders Kaliningrad, faces the Suwalki corridor, and has an acute awareness of being on the front line against the Russian threat. Poland does not spend this much out of abstract strategic virtue — it does so because it is afraid, and because that fear is rational.

In 2025, at the The Hague summit, NATO members agreed to raise defense and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 — a considerable increase from the old 2% threshold that all EU members in NATO had only first reached in 2025. This decision signals a collective recognition that continental defense is not an optional expenditure but a condition of survival.

Missing capabilities — what Europe cannot yet do alone

Analyst Paul Taylor, cited in the Anadolu Agency analysis, summed up the situation with precision: "Europeans are primarily taking on the conventional defense of Europe. The US continues to provide the nuclear umbrella and certain unspecified conventional capabilities." These unspecified capabilities include, according to experts, strategic airlift, intelligence gathering, satellite communications, aerial refueling, logistics, and command-and-control systems.

These are precisely the areas where Europe remains dependent on the United States. It can field tanks, infantry, artillery. It can defend its territory with its own soldiers. But it cannot yet project these capabilities over long distances, sustain complex networked operations, or guarantee continent-wide secure communications without American infrastructure. These gaps are not closed in a few years — they require considerable investment and industrial coordination that Europe is only beginning to organize.

Turkey's role in this new balance

Ankara as host city — a symbolically loaded choice

The choice of Ankara as the host city for the 2026 NATO summit is not neutral. Turkey is an Alliance member with a strategic geographic position — it controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, borders Russia and several Middle Eastern countries. It has also had an ambiguous relationship with Moscow in recent years, notably over the purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, which led to its exclusion from the F-35 program.

Hosting the NATO summit in Ankara sends a strong signal to Turkey: you are a pillar of the Alliance, your commitment is valued, your role in European and Middle Eastern security is recognized. Turkey has also been an important mediator between Ukraine and Russia — notably during the 2022 grain agreement negotiations. This bridge role may prove valuable at a time when peace negotiations remain deadlocked.

Turkish statements ahead of the summit

In the days before the summit, Ankara declared that NATO was "adjusting to the new security landscape" and that the United States was not withdrawing from Europe. This formulation is measured: it acknowledges change while presenting it as an adjustment rather than an abandonment. For the most anxious Alliance members — the Baltic states, Poland, Romania — this formulation walks a delicate line between reassurance and realism.

Secretary General Rutte had stressed in his pre-summit statements that the 2025 Hague summit decision to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP was a decision for delivery and implementation. Ankara must be the summit where these commitments start to take concrete form — not another summit where goals are reaffirmed without robust implementation mechanisms.

Ukraine and the Ankara summit — between hope and realism

Ukrainian security guarantees: the unresolved file

For Ukraine, the Ankara summit raises a fundamental question: what security guarantees will it receive? No formal NATO membership in the short term — the political obstacles remain considerable. But bilateral security agreements with the most committed members — United Kingdom, France, Germany, United States — can form a substitute security architecture while waiting for formal accession.

These bilateral agreements, which have multiplied since the Vilnius summit in 2023, commit signatories to support Ukraine militarily, financially and in intelligence matters. They are not Article 5 — but they are a form of commitment that, if all members honor their pledges, provides Ukraine with substantial security. The Ankara summit should consolidate and deepen these commitments.

NATO 3.0 and Ukraine's place in European security architecture

Within the NATO 3.0 framework, Ukraine occupies a particular position: it is simultaneously the primary reason this transformation is necessary and a leading military actor whose capabilities could enrich the Alliance if its integration progresses. Ukraine's long-range drones, its army's combat experience, its electronic warfare doctrine — all of this represents added value for collective security that the most clear-sighted member states are beginning to acknowledge.

Estonian MEP Riho Terras, cited in the pre-summit analysis, declared that Europe must become "strategically mature" — which notably means recognizing Ukraine as a security partner, not only as an aid recipient. This vision — Ukraine as a contributor to European security rather than as a burden — should guide the discussions at Ankara.

What the summit must deliver to be historic

Verifiable, binding spending commitments

For the Ankara summit to be more than a diplomatic event, it must produce concrete and verifiable defense spending commitments. The target of 5% of GDP by 2035 is ambitious — but without robust monitoring mechanisms and without consequences for states that fail to meet their pledges, it risks resembling past NATO promises on the 2% threshold, long unmet by most European members.

Alliance members bordering Russia — Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, Norway, Romania — already spend at high levels. It is the large Western European economies — Germany, France, Italy, Spain — that will need to make the biggest efforts. And that is precisely where internal political resistance is strongest, in societies that have enjoyed several decades of the peace dividend.

A clear message to Moscow — and to Beijing

The Ankara summit must send a clear message to Moscow: NATO is not fragmenting, support for Ukraine is sustained, and the transition to NATO 3.0 strengthens — not weakens — the continent's defensive capability. This message is particularly important at a moment when Russia hopes that divisions among allies over defense funding will create opportunities for further advances.

It must also send a signal to Beijing: China, which is carefully watching the management of the Ukrainian crisis to draw lessons about Taiwan, must understand that the West is capable of supporting an invaded ally and strengthening its own defenses simultaneously. If NATO demonstrates its solidity at Ankara, the entire Western deterrence posture toward China benefits.

The question of a European army — an old idea in a new context

Terras says no to a European army — Taylor says yes to a European pillar of NATO

Riho Terras was categorical in his pre-summit statements: "A European army is a bad idea." His argument: Europe does not need a new structure — it has NATO, which works. What it must do is fulfill its obligations within this existing structure. Political scientist Kai Kamp shares this view: "We don't need a new structure for European decision-making — we have one, and that's NATO."

This debate is not academic. The question of European strategic autonomy — championed by France in particular for years — resurfaces with force in the NATO 3.0 context. The idea is not to replace NATO with a European army, but to ensure that Europe can act defensively even if the United States is slow to respond — or if a future American administration decides to disengage further than Trump has.

The political flexibility of the NATO framework as an asset

The NATO framework holds a decisive political advantage over any other European defense structure: it includes the United States, which is irreplaceable for nuclear deterrence and strategic capabilities that Europe cannot yet afford on its own. It also includes Turkey, Norway, the United Kingdom — actors who would not necessarily be part of an EU army. This inclusivity is a strength in a security environment where cohesion and interoperability matter more than formal autonomy.

NATO 3.0 is therefore less a formal restructuring than an informal redistribution of responsibilities within the existing framework. Europe takes on conventional defense. The United States keeps the nuclear deterrent. Both remain bound by Article 5 and by decades of interoperability. This is a pragmatic arrangement for a pragmatic era — and it is probably what the Ankara communiqué will formalize, with appropriate diplomatic language.

Russia and Iran: the allies of threats watching Ankara

Moscow calculates what the summit reveals about Alliance cohesion

Russia is watching the Ankara summit with particular attention. Every signal of division among Alliance members — on funding, on red lines regarding Ukraine, on the pace of NATO 3.0 — is strategic intelligence that Moscow will use in its military calculations. Putin has always bet on Western fragmentation. If Ankara produces an ambitious but vague communiqué without concrete implementation mechanisms, the Kremlin will draw its own conclusions about the coalition's solidity.

Russia also maintains its partnerships with Iran and North Korea, which continue to supply munitions and equipment. For these countries, a West that debates its burden-sharing instead of actually increasing its capabilities is good news. The Ankara summit must therefore not only reaffirm Alliance commitments, but demonstrate that members honor them. The credibility of deterrence depends on consistency between words and actions.

Iran, North Korea and the chain of support to Russia

North Korea has delivered millions of shells to Russia since 2023. Iran has supplied Shahed drones that continue to be fired at Ukrainian cities. China supplies technology components that feed the Russian defense industry despite Western sanctions. This coalition of support for Russia — informal but effective — is one of the factors explaining why the war has continued for more than four years despite sanctions.

Responding to this coalition requires Alliance coordination that goes beyond the purely military response: diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang, Tehran and Beijing, stricter enforcement of secondary sanctions on Chinese exports, and intelligence coordination to document prohibited arms transfers. The Ankara summit is an opportunity to strengthen this coordination — if members have the political will to do so.

The Baltic states and the forward defense line — what the eastern flank demands

NATO forward defense: from enhanced presence to real defense

Since the Madrid summit in 2022, NATO has upgraded its multinational battlegroups on the eastern flank from symbolic presence to real combat strength. Brigades deployed in Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania have been reinforced. Permanent infrastructure has been built. Large-scale exercises have been conducted regularly.

But Baltic military experts are clear: to genuinely deter a Russian attack, forces must be sufficient to hold without waiting for reinforcements. The Cold War doctrine — absorb the attack, then counterattack with reinforcements from the West — is no longer credible in the Ukrainian context, where Russia has shown it can seize territory rapidly before reinforcements arrive. NATO 3.0 must therefore give itself the means for robust forward defense from day one of any potential conflict.

The Suwalki corridor and the Kaliningrad threat

The Suwalki corridor — that narrow strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, sandwiched between Kaliningrad to the west and Belarus to the east — is the most vulnerable point on NATO's eastern flank. Russia could theoretically cut this corridor to isolate the Baltic states from the rest of the Alliance, trapping them in an enclave difficult to reinforce. NATO military planners have been working this scenario for years.

NATO 3.0 must provide a credible answer to this risk. It must show that the Suwalki corridor is defensible, that pre-positioned forces in the Baltic states are sufficient to hold, and that reinforcements can arrive quickly if necessary. These questions will be at the center of military discussions at Ankara — even if public communiqués will probably only mention them elliptically.

Conclusion: Ankara as a point of no return

A summit that must make history

The Ankara summit of July 7-8, 2026 bears the weight of a pivotal moment in European security history. The war in Ukraine continues. Defense spending is rising. Ambitions are being asserted. But concrete capabilities remain to be built. This summit will be judged not on its declarations — which everyone will applaud — but on the concrete implementation mechanisms it produces. Timelines. Targets. Responsibilities. Consequences for non-compliance.

What I take away as a witness of this era

I testify to this era with the conviction that Europe is taking its own defense seriously — for the first time since 1945. This is not an easy transformation. It will cost hundreds of billions of euros, require difficult political choices, and unfold in a context of active war on the continent's doorstep. But it is necessary. And if the Ankara summit produces the commitments the situation demands, it will be in the history books as the moment when Europe decided to stand up — and to keep its allies standing too.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases and my method

I am a columnist on defense affairs and collective security organizations. I support NATO as a pillar of global democratic security and I am convinced that strengthening European defense is a strategic necessity. I am pro-Ukrainian in this conflict. This testimony reflects these convictions without inventing or distorting the facts.

What I do not know

I do not know exactly what the final communiqué of the Ankara summit will produce — this article was written before the summit. Defense spending data and citations from cited analysts come from the Anadolu Agency analysis of June 30, 2026 and the verified sources listed below. Strategic assessments are my reasoned opinions.

Sources

Primary sources

Anadolu Agency — Ankara Summit: NATO enters new era as Europe takes on bigger security role — June 30, 2026

Anadolu Agency — Ankara summit should mark delivery and implementation for NATO, says Mark Rutte — June 30, 2026

Reuters — Turkey says NATO adjusting to security landscape, US not withdrawing — June 30, 2026

Secondary sources

Brookings Institution — A rebalancing NATO gathers in Ankara — 2026

European Parliament — EPRS Brief on NATO Ankara summit — 2026

Kyiv Independent — Ukraine signs Gripen deal with Sweden — June 30, 2026