NARRATIVE: Starmer announces his exit, Brussels holds its breath ahead of the July summit

An announcement that reaches beyond British borders

On June 22, 2026, Keir Starmer announced from Downing Street that he would leave office earlier than expected, laying down a precise and irreversible departure timeline. This is not simply a matter of British domestic politics. In Brussels, Berlin, and Paris, the news triggered a series of emergency meetings, telephone calls, and confidential memos. The EU-UK summit scheduled for July 22, 2026 was meant to crown months of difficult negotiations. It now hangs in an unexpected political void.

The European Commission confirmed it was reassessing its position in the face of this unprecedented sequence. A head of government who negotiates a major agreement and then announces his departure before the formal conclusion: such a precedent is rare. The European Union, accustomed to procedural slowness and institutional predictability, finds itself facing a variable that no diplomatic model easily models — leadership uncertainty just weeks before a historic appointment.

The timeline that complicates everything

According to sources at Westminster, Starmer could officially leave the leadership of the Labour Party and the government by mid-July, possibly as early as July 17 — just five days before the planned summit. His most likely successor, Andy Burnham, current Mayor of Greater Manchester, would then be catapulted to 10 Downing Street in record time, without having had the opportunity to meet his European counterparts, absorb the technical files, or build any relationship of trust with the chief negotiators.

It is precisely this scenario that most worries European diplomats. Burnham is described by several Brussels officials as virtually unknown on the international stage. An entirely respectable profile domestically, but lacking the experience of European summits, without the network of contacts Starmer patiently built since January 2025. Arriving at a summit of this magnitude as prime minister for forty-eight hours: it is almost an impossible mission.

There is something tragic in this sequence. Starmer will have spent months rebuilding a diplomatic channel with Europe that his predecessor Boris Johnson had shattered with almost gleeful enthusiasm. And now, his own departure risks undermining what he took such pains to restore. Political history has this kind of quiet cruelty.

Neither single market nor customs union

Starmer had set clear red lines from the moment he took office: no return to the single market, no return to the customs union. These two positions, inherited from the 2016 referendum and the desire not to reignite the cultural wars of Brexit, channeled all negotiating strategy toward pragmatic sectoral agreements. The method is known informally as the "partial reset": not reintegration, but deeper cooperation on specific files.

Three priority workstreams had been identified: trade and the reduction of customs frictions, the interconnection of electricity markets between the UK and the continent — essential for the energy transition — and youth mobility, a program similar to Erasmus+ for under-30s. These three files represent concrete mutual interests, tangible gains for both parties, and had been advancing at a satisfactory pace up to June.

The July 22 summit, centerpiece of a reconstruction strategy

July 22, 2026 was meant to be more than an ordinary diplomatic summit. It was the symbolic moment when London and Brussels would display, for the first time since Brexit, a relationship of structured and acknowledged partnership. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had personally invested herself in the discussions. The President of the European Council had blocked the date in his calendar since the start of the year. Technical teams on both sides had been working for weeks on the final texts.

Starmer's departure announcement does not erase that work. But it exposes it to a major political risk: a new prime minister could, even without intending to, inadvertently signal different positions, reconfigured priorities, hesitations where conviction is needed. European diplomacy runs on personal trust as much as official texts. And trust does not transfer in forty-eight hours.

You can understand Starmer's decision to leave cleanly, without clinging to power. It is even a form of political dignity rare in this century of leaders who hold on until indecency. But a man's personal dignity should not mortgage the collective interests of an entire country. These two truths coexist. It is uncomfortable. That is politics.

A strong domestic record, an international stature to build

Andy Burnham, 62, built over two mandates at the head of Greater Manchester a solid reputation as a pragmatic manager, a defender of public services, and an architect of an ambitious regional transport policy. His domestic record is indisputable. He successfully transformed a post-industrial city into a laboratory of progressive social policies, with measurable results on housing, mental health, and mobility.

But the international stage is a different school. The files awaiting the next prime minister in Brussels are technical, embedded in years of prior negotiations, and handled by teams of European civil servants who have learned to know their current British counterparts. Burnham will need not only to absorb a considerable mass of technical information but also to rapidly establish his credibility with leaders who, for the most part, have never met him. The challenge is enormous.

His position on Europe: between openness and political prudence

It is on the record that Andy Burnham has said in the past that he would like to see the UK rejoin the European Union. This position, sincere and consistent with his social-democratic convictions, cuts both ways in the current context. On one hand, it reassures European capitals of his good faith. On the other, it risks being weaponized by Conservative opponents as proof that Labour wants to "reverse Brexit" — which would be politically devastating at the precise moment a new prime minister seeks to establish his authority.

Advisors close to Burnham indicate he will exercise rhetorical caution. No talk of formal rejoining. The priority will be to confirm the commitments made by Starmer, to reassure European partners on continuity of the "reset" policy, and to avoid any statement liable to reignite the identity debate around Brexit. It is a balancing act that demands mastery that only international experience can truly develop.

A pro-European Burnham is good news for value consistency. But values are not enough to negotiate an agreement on interconnected electricity markets or phytosanitary standards. There is a specific technical competence in commercial diplomacy with the EU, and it takes years to build. Let us hope Starmer's teams stay in place to ensure the real transition.

Official signals: displayed calm, work continues

The European Commission responded with the customary mastery of its institutional communications. The chief spokesperson declared that summit preparations were continuing, that technical teams remained in contact, and that the European Union was committed to developing its relationship with the UK regardless of leadership changes. A calm, measured message, designed not to fuel speculation or give the impression that Brussels is destabilized.

But in the corridors of the Berlaymont and the European Council, the tone is different. Diplomats speaking on condition of anonymity speak of a "period of real uncertainty," the need to "revalidate British positions" with the new government, and the open question of whether the July 22 summit should be maintained in this format or pushed to autumn to give Burnham time to settle in. This postponement option is on the table. It is not publicly acknowledged.

National capitals: divergent positions

Paris and Berlin are the two heavyweights whose positions matter most in this dynamic. On the French side, the traditional priority is to protect fishing rights — an emotionally charged file in national politics — and access to financial markets. France has always viewed the "reset" with a mixed eye: favorable to a better relationship, but wary of any agreement that would give the UK market advantages without the obligations of membership. Starmer's departure revives that wariness.

Germany, for its part, is more directly affected economically by post-Brexit trade frictions. German carmakers, chemical companies, and machinery exporters suffer from non-tariff barriers. Berlin wanted a quick and pragmatic deal. The British leadership change is seen as a setback, but not a definitive block — provided continuity of commitments is clearly affirmed by the new government in the days following the transfer of power.

Europe has a fascinating and sometimes paralyzing habit of treating every new uncertainty as a reason to slow down. In this particular case, slowing down would be a mistake. The technical work is done. The texts are ready. Delaying the summit gives anti-agreement forces — on both sides — time to organize and sabotage what has been built.

The electricity market: a climate and strategic emergency

The interconnection of electricity markets between the UK and continental Europe is perhaps the most technically complex and strategically important file in the current negotiations. The UK is a major offshore wind energy producer in the North Sea. Continental Europe needs that capacity to meet its decarbonization targets. Both parties have an interest in an optimized interconnection grid that allows fluid real-time exchanges of renewable electricity.

A framework agreement on this file was to be announced at the July 22 summit. Without it, considerable investments in undersea cables and grid management systems remain in limbo. Energy companies on both sides are waiting for that signal to release their budgets. Every month of delay carries a measurable economic cost and a real climate cost. This is the kind of file that does not tolerate political improvisation.

Youth mobility: a symbol as much as a program

The proposed youth mobility program — allowing nationals under 30 to live and work freely in the other party's space for a limited period — is simultaneously a pragmatic agreement and a powerful political signal. For the generation that voted overwhelmingly against Brexit in 2016, this program represents a form of partial repair, a window reopened on European mobility that the referendum had shut.

Its economic impact would be limited but not negligible: skilled labor, academic exchange, entrepreneurial creativity between the two spaces. Its symbolic impact is considerable. Burnham, who has always championed the causes of younger generations, should be favorably disposed. But a new prime minister arriving at a European summit with a positive program but without mastered files risks appearing simultaneously enthusiastic and unprepared — which is almost worse than being prepared and skeptical.

Youth mobility is the only "reset" file that touches ordinary people directly. Not banks, not carmakers, not fish traders. Young people who wanted to study in Madrid, work in Amsterdam, discover Rome without paperwork. If this program fails because of a poorly managed political calendar, they are the ones who will pay. Again.

British Conservatives: structural opposition

The British Conservative Party, in the midst of rebuilding after its electoral defeats, has found in negotiations with Europe a terrain for identitarian reconquest. For its most sovereigntist wings — and they are numerous — any agreement with Brussels is a betrayal of the 2016 referendum mandate. It matters little that the said agreement touches neither the single market nor the customs union. The rhetoric of violated sovereignty is more powerful than technical details.

Starmer's departure and the arrival of a new prime minister offer the Conservatives an ideal attack window. They can accuse Burnham of wanting to go further than his predecessor, of preparing a "soft Brexit 2.0," of sacrificing British sovereignty on the altar of a pro-European ideology. These attacks are factually groundless but politically formidable. They force the new government into a defensive posture that complicates negotiations.

Skeptics within the EU: the all-or-nothing temptation

On the European side, a significant minority of member states — with France leading the charge on certain files — has always maintained that the British "partial reset" was fundamentally inequitable: the UK would obtain cooperation advantages without accepting the institutional and financial constraints of membership. This position, understandable in its logic, leads to deadlock if pushed to extremes. An imperfect agreement is better than no agreement, which leaves trade frictions to crystallize.

Starmer's departure temporarily strengthens this faction. If the UK sends a signal of hesitation — even an apparent one — the all-or-nothing advocates in Brussels will be well positioned to argue it is better to wait until the new government is fully established before concluding anything. This calculation is dangerous: it risks making waiting a permanent policy, a comfortable status quo that nobody wants but nobody has the courage to break.

There is in European politics a tendency toward institutional procrastination that can resemble wisdom but is often collective cowardice. Waiting for the right moment, the right leader, the right political configuration — meanwhile, people pay customs duties, companies relocate, young people lose their mobility. The imperfection of a signed agreement is worth more than the perfection of an agreement perpetually deferred to tomorrow.

Historical precedents: a gray area of international law

The question of the validity of commitments made by a transitional government is not uniquely British. In international law, an agreement signed by a government in office remains fully valid until the moment of the transfer of power. The difficulty is therefore not legal but political: an agreement signed by Starmer in the days before his departure risks being presented by the opposition as a "fait accompli" imposed on his successor, an act of illegitimate governance because politically compromised.

Precedents exist. In 2019, when Theresa May was negotiating the Withdrawal Agreement in her final weeks, her European interlocutors knew she was politically finished. They nonetheless continued to deal with her, because the alternatives were worse. The logic here is the same: Starmer remains prime minister until his official departure. His mandate is full and complete. But the political will to conclude is eroded by the public countdown.

Options on the table: maintain, postpone, recalibrate

Three scenarios circulate in diplomatic circles. First scenario: the July 22 summit is maintained, Burnham attends as new prime minister, and the agreement is sealed under his name. Risky but possible, provided the transfer of power is fast and clean. Second scenario: the summit is postponed to September, allowing Burnham to prepare adequately and meet his counterparts before a formal major gathering. More prudent, but carrying the risk of team demoralization and loss of momentum.

Third scenario: a framework agreement is reached before Starmer's departure, followed by a confirmation summit under Burnham. This arrangement, described by several diplomats as the most pragmatic, would protect the work accomplished while giving the new prime minister space for a positive international debut. Its feasibility depends on intense political coordination in the coming weeks — and on Starmer's willingness to push toward conclusion despite his imminent departure.

I lean toward the third scenario. Not because it is elegant — it is not. But because it is the only one that protects Starmer's work, Burnham's authority, and European interests simultaneously. Politics is often about choosing the least bad path. Here, the least bad path requires Starmer to act fast and Burnham to be humble enough to sign what he did not entirely negotiate.

On the British side: an economy still under Brexit's shadow

The economic impact of Brexit on the UK is documented and significant. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimated in 2025 that Brexit had reduced British long-term trade potential by 4 percent. Exports to the EU have not returned to pre-Brexit levels, regulatory frictions weigh on small businesses, and uncertainty continues to restrain foreign investment in certain sectors. A solid "reset" agreement would not resolve everything, but it would send a clear signal to investors that the UK is a reliable and stable partner.

The most directly affected sectors are London financial services, the agri-food industry, technology companies, and universities that depend on European academic exchanges. Each of these sectors has active lobbies at Westminster pressing the government — whichever government — to conclude the agreement as rapidly as possible. This economic consensus is rare in post-Brexit British politics. It should be seized.

On the European side: mutual dependencies often underestimated

The idea that Europe does not need the UK is a convenient simplification but an inaccurate one. London's financial market remains the deepest in Europe. British military and intelligence capabilities are indispensable to the continent's collective security — post-Brexit defense cooperation remains fragmentary and costly. British offshore wind energy is a resource Europe cannot ignore in its energy transition.

Several recent reports from the European Parliament and think tanks close to the Commission underline that the EU underestimated the political and economic cost of the rupture with the UK. The "reset" proposed by Starmer was not a favor done for the British — it was pragmatic mutual interest. That reality does not change with his departure. What changes is the time window and the political will to act on it.

Europe has sometimes treated Brexit as a deserved punishment for the British — a necessary lesson about the price of disunion. That reflex is humanly understandable. It is politically counterproductive. The British are not coming back into the EU anytime soon. The question is not to punish or forgive. It is to build the best possible relationship between two neighbors who, whether they like it or not, share the same continent, the same history, and the same threats.

Negotiating teams: a precious asset to preserve

Behind the summits and public declarations are dozens of civil servants, special advisors, and technical negotiators who have spent months working on the "reset" files. These teams — on the British side as much as the European — represent an irreplaceable capital of knowledge and relationships. A change of prime minister does not automatically erase them, but it creates a transition period where priorities can be reconfigured, teams reorganized, and hard-won gains put at risk.

The challenge for Burnham will be to signal very quickly that he is keeping these teams in place, that he trusts their work, and that he is not starting from scratch. This signal, which appears purely administrative, carries considerable diplomatic value. European negotiators want to know that their interlocutors tomorrow are the same as those of yesterday — or at least that they were briefed by them.

Internal Labour factions on Europe

The Labour Party is not monolithic on the European question. A significant fringe, led by "New Europeans" close to figures like Yvette Cooper and certain shadow cabinet members, advocates going further than the "partial reset" and eventually exploring membership of the customs union. This faction is energized by Burnham's likely arrival, whose historical positions are closer to theirs than to Starmer's.

At the other end, another fringe, representing mainly constituencies in northern England that voted heavily "Leave" in 2016, remains hostile to anything that resembles a return toward Europe. These MPs fear losing their seats if Labour's image becomes too pro-European. They will exert constant pressure on Burnham to stay within the limits set by Starmer — or even to tighten them.

The real tension in Labour over Europe is not ideological. It is electoral. And that is the worst kind of tension, because it turns complex policy decisions into constituency calculations. The result: policies designed to offend no one, which means satisfying no one. Europe deserves better. The British deserve better.

The Eurosceptic press: a formidable sabotage force

It would be naive to analyze British policy toward Europe without mentioning the role of the Eurosceptic press. The Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph, The Sun — these outlets shaped British public opinion on Europe for three decades, amplifying fears and grievances, minimizing the benefits of cooperation. They largely supported Brexit and have no intention of facilitating a "reset" they would perceive as capitulation.

Starmer's departure will be for them an opportunity to launch a narrative offensive: will the new prime minister be strong enough to resist Brussels? Will he be the Trojan horse of pro-Europeans who want to reverse the verdict of 2016? These framings are predictable, they are unfair, but they are devastatingly effective in a public opinion still divided on the country's European identity.

The pro-agreement press: a quieter but real support

On the other side, The Guardian, The Financial Times, The Economist, and several regional outlets have covered the "reset" negotiations positively, highlighting the expected economic benefits and the welcome normalization of relations with Europe. These media influence popular opinion less directly than Eurosceptic tabloids, but they reach a decision-making audience — businesspeople, civil servants, academics, members of Parliament — that matters in shaping policy.

The challenge for Burnham will be to navigate this media polarization without getting trapped in one camp. He will have to speak simultaneously to Financial Times readers — by demonstrating he understands the economic stakes — and to voters in the Midlands and the North who read the Daily Mail and remain wary of anything that smells of Europe. This political communication exercise will be as important as the negotiations themselves.

The Eurosceptic British press is one of the great architects of the Brexit chaos — but saying so doesn't help move forward. What helps is understanding that Burnham will need to find a language that speaks to ordinary British people, not to Westminster or Brussels elites. A technical agreement on electricity markets doesn't make a headline. An agreement that "protects British jobs while strengthening our independence" — that sells. Political semantics are not a detail. Sometimes they are everything.

The war in Ukraine and defense cooperation

The geostrategic context in which these negotiations are taking place is radically different from the one in which Brexit happened in 2016. The war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year, reminded all of Europe — islands included — that collective security is not a luxury but an existential necessity. The UK has been one of the most consistent and most generous supporters of Kyiv, providing missiles, military training, and decisive diplomatic backing.

This convergence on Ukraine created a natural rapprochement between London and European capitals, a rapprochement that transcends the commercial questions of the "reset." The negotiations on mobility, energy, and trade are taking place in a context of intensified military and intelligence cooperation. Ignoring this geostrategic dimension would be an analytical error. The "reset" is not only a trade agreement — it is also the political signal that Western democracies can and must cooperate more closely in the face of shared threats.

China, Iran, North Korea: the deeper reasons for rapprochement

Beyond Russia, the challenges posed by China on the technological and economic front, by Iran on the nuclear front, and by North Korea on the ballistic front create a context of systemic pressure on all Western democracies. In that context, a Europe divided by the EU-UK fracture is a weakened Europe. A UK isolated in its identitarian Euroscepticism is a UK less capable of influencing the collective decisions of the West.

The "reset" proposed by Starmer was not only a social-democratic agenda or a symbolic repair of Brexit. It was a strategic response to a world that demands greater cohesion among allies, not less. That reasoning applies as much to Burnham as to Starmer. Geopolitics does not pause for government transitions. Threats do not catch their breath during transfers of power.

That may be the strongest argument for Burnham to move fast and boldly on the European file: not because it is popular, not because it is what Manchester voters want to hear, but because today's world no longer permits the luxury of isolation. Russia attacks, China advances, Iran destabilizes. In that context, a united Europe — even imperfectly — is a strategic necessity that even the most ardent Eurosceptics should understand.

Institutional continuity as a shield

The optimistic scenario rests on a central hypothesis: that institutions are stronger than individuals. If negotiating teams remain in place, if texts are largely finalized before Starmer's departure, if Burnham immediately makes clear continuity gestures — meetings with European ambassadors within 48 hours of taking office, a public statement confirming the "reset" framework — then the July 22 summit can be maintained and crowned with success.

The precondition for this scenario is a rapid and orderly transition of Labour's leadership. If Starmer's succession gives rise to a prolonged internal battle, multiple candidacies, and ideological debates about the party's direction, then the diplomatic timeline collapses. Everything rests on Labour's ability to manage this transition with a discipline that political parties do not always display in moments of internal crisis.

Burnham's personal role: a historic opportunity

If the transition goes smoothly, Andy Burnham will have a rare opportunity: to sign a historic agreement between the UK and the European Union in the first weeks of his mandate. It would be a spectacular governance debut, a clear signal of his capacity to govern on the international stage, and a concrete diplomatic legacy from his very first days at Downing Street. For a prime minister who arrives without visible international experience, this is a chance to seize rather than a burden to avoid.

A prime minister's first decisions set his image for years. Thatcher set hers with the Falklands. Blair with the Good Friday Agreement. Cameron with austerity. Burnham could set his with a pragmatic and ambitious European agreement. History is offering him this window. The question is whether he will have the courage, the competence, and the speed to seize it.

I want to believe Burnham understands what history is offering him. That in thirty years, when the memoirs of this period are written, the prime minister who managed to repair the relationship with Europe will be celebrated as the one who chose courage over comfort. But for now, he needs to reach for it. The world will not wait.

The paralysis of transition: the worst case

The pessimistic scenario is simpler to describe and, alas, easier to imagine. Starmer's succession triggers an internal Labour battle lasting three weeks. Burnham is only officially named prime minister on July 20. He has two days to prepare for the July 22 summit. He arrives in Brussels without mastering the files, gives hesitant answers on technical clauses, and the Europeans — who had invested so much political capital in this agreement — begin to doubt the reliability of the British partner. The agreement is not signed. The summit is a polite half-failure.

In that case, Eurosceptic forces on both sides of the Channel triumph. British Conservatives cry national humiliation. European economic nationalists say it was predictable. And both parties find themselves at the same point as before the negotiations, but with heightened mistrust and a public opinion even more tired of hearing about this file. This scenario is avoidable. But it requires a political will that the current sequence is placing under pressure.

Long-term consequences of another failure

A second failed EU-UK rapprochement in a few years would have lasting consequences. It would normalize the idea that the two entities are structurally incompatible, condemned to a relationship of cold and wary neighborhood. It would strengthen advocates of "sovereign isolation" in the UK and proponents of "all or nothing" in Brussels. And it would send a disastrous message to the entire Western world: that democracies are incapable of managing their own internal divisions in the face of external challenges.

This is not a theoretical risk. It is a real possibility, traced by a poorly managed political sequence. The stakes of Starmer's departure are therefore not only his personal legacy or Burnham's career. They are the ability of two great democracies to place collective interest above short-term power calculations. The bar is not high in theory. It is extraordinarily difficult to reach in practice.

If the agreement fails because of a poorly managed leadership transition, I won't know whether to be angry or simply sad. Angry at the politicians who will have chosen party interests over the national interest. Sad for the generations who will pay for this inability to conclude. Both, probably. Always both.

What this crisis teaches about transition diplomacy

If the management of the Starmer-Burnham transition demonstrates anything, it is that major diplomatic calendars must be designed with built-in continuity mechanisms. Bilateral summits of this importance — which mobilize months of preparation and engage considerable collective interests — should not be vulnerable to the single variable of a change of prime minister. Protocols need to be developed that allow technical teams to keep working independently of political transitions, and advanced agreements to benefit from formally recognized "pre-agreement" status.

This lesson applies well beyond the EU-UK case. As Western democracies experience more frequent political transitions — fragile coalition governments, leaders who leave mid-mandate, polarizations that accelerate successions — international diplomacy must adapt. Bilateral and multilateral institutions need rules that make them less dependent on the individuals in charge and more anchored in durable institutional commitments that ordinary transitions cannot erase.

The post-summit: building on whatever was or wasn't signed

Whether the July 22 summit takes place as planned, is postponed, or is replaced by a framework agreement followed by confirmation, one reality imposes itself: the EU-UK relationship will continue to exist after this episode. Economic interests, energy stakes, collective security imperatives — these structural factors do not disappear with political turbulence. They demand ongoing attention, permanent coordination mechanisms, and a political will that transcends the individuals in power at any given moment.

The true legacy of this moment — whether it concludes positively or with a postponement — will be the robustness of the institutional structures put in place to manage the relationship. Permanent technical committees, regular consultation mechanisms, multi-year calendars less sensitive to political uncertainties: these structures would have more long-term value than a single spectacular summit. Burnham, if he takes office, will have the opportunity to propose them as his own contribution to this relationship — not erasing Starmer's work, but giving it more durable institutional form.

What I hope from all this, at bottom, is that someone — in London or Brussels — draws the institutional lesson from this chaotic sequence. That the next time a British prime minister announces his departure weeks before a major summit, protocols exist to protect the work accomplished. Great diplomatic relationships cannot depend on the political health of a single individual. That is obvious. Evidently, it is not yet standard practice.

This narrative does not end with a clear winner. It ends with exhausted people, wounded territories, and a question suspended in the air: how much longer can Ukraine hold against a war machine that does not count its losses?

Starmer's record: unfinished but foundational

Keir Starmer departs with an unfinished but foundational record on Europe. He restored the dialogue, set pragmatic priorities, advanced on three key files, and created the conditions for a historic agreement. If that agreement is concluded under his successor, he will be its political father even without signing the text. If the agreement fails, he will be the man who almost succeeded — which, in political history, is often the definition of tragedy.

What he leaves behind above all is a framework. A negotiating framework, a method, trained teams, and advanced texts. This is more than one might think. It is not yet enough. The distance between "almost finished" and "signed" can be the longest in the world when political will wavers.

History's verdict belongs to the next few weeks

We are in a narrow historical window. What happens in the four weeks following Starmer's announcement will determine whether the UK and Europe will finally take the path of an adult and pragmatic relationship, or whether they will condemn themselves to several more years of latent tensions and missed cooperation. The good news is that the objective conditions for an agreement are in place. The bad news is that the political conditions are more precarious than ever. History, as always, will wait for humans to decide what they truly want.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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