COMMENTARY: Netanyahu's "no time limit" — the permanent occupation isolating Israel from the world

COMMENTARY: Netanyahu's "no time limit" — the permanent occupation isolating Israel from the world

Introduction: An officers' graduation as political theater

The June 25 speech and what it actually means

On June 25, 2026, at a combat officers' graduation ceremony in the Negev, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz delivered remarks that, taken together, constitute an announcement of permanent occupation unprecedented in modern Israeli history. Netanyahu: "We dominate southern Lebanon from the top of Beaufort, and we will stay as long as necessary in the security zone. We have no intention of withdrawing." Katz: "The Israeli army will remain in the security zones in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, without any time limit." And the day before, Katz had publicly declared that Israel would not withdraw from southern Lebanon "even if the United States asks."

This is not electoral rhetoric. It is not a message aimed at the Israeli nationalist right, though it is that too. It is a foreign policy declaration — public, delivered by Israel's two most senior security officials — stating explicitly that the Jewish state intends to maintain a military presence on the soil of three sovereign countries: Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories, with no exit horizon and no consideration for the demands of its closest allies, including the United States.

The context: three theaters, one logic

To understand the weight of these declarations, it helps to briefly recall what Israel controls in June 2026. In Lebanon, since its offensive of March 2, 2026, the Israeli army occupies a strip of territory extending up to 10 kilometers inside Lebanon — its deepest advance since the 2000 withdrawal. More than one million people have been displaced, according to official Lebanese figures. Israeli strikes have caused the deaths of more than 4,230 people according to the Lebanese health ministry as of June 26. In Syria, Israel controls positions in the Golan and expanded adjacent areas since the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024. In Gaza, after 18 months of war since October 7, 2023, the Israeli army occupies more than 60 percent of the territory.

What the US-Iranian memorandum says

Point 1: the clause Netanyahu ignores

The memorandum of understanding signed on June 17, 2026 by Presidents Trump and Pezeshkian is explicit in its point 1: "immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon," with all parties committing to guarantee Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Pakistani mediator Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif publicly stated that the agreement "takes effect immediately" and covers Lebanon. Iran's ambassador to the UN in Geneva was even more precise: Lebanon is "an indisputable part of the agreement," and that includes the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

Israel is not a signatory to this memorandum. And that is precisely where the central paradox of the situation lies. The United States signed an agreement that calls for an end to hostilities in Lebanon, then finds itself incapable of having that point respected by its closest ally. Defense Minister Katz said it directly: "We made it clear — the Prime Minister to the President, myself to Hegseth, the secretary of defense, to the military — that we are there to protect the residents of the north." Israel Katz publicly told the world that Washington had been informed and had not gotten what it asked. This is an American diplomatic humiliation dressed up as a security statement.

The United States in an impossible position

The American position in this context is uncomfortable to the point of absurdity. The 5th round of Israeli-Lebanese negotiations in Washington, whose work had to be extended by one day on June 26 without results, embodies that absurdity. The United States is trying to get Israel to partially withdraw from Lebanese territory to allow the Lebanese army to take control of vacated zones — a condition Iran has set for maintaining the memorandum. But a US official had to quickly deny a report that Israel had already withdrawn from one zone — a denial confirmed by an Israeli defense official who said there had been "no change in position." The United States is negotiating with Israel for something Israel categorically refuses to do.

Israel's growing diplomatic isolation

What allies are saying behind closed doors

Netanyahu's "no time limit" declaration did not fall into diplomatic indifference. It came in a context where Israel's isolation had deepened considerably in 2025-2026. In Europe, several countries — including Spain, Ireland, and Norway — recognized the State of Palestine in May 2024. The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in July 2024 declaring Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories illegal. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in November 2024. The permanent occupation declaration simultaneously reinforces all of these legal and diplomatic fronts.

On substance, even Israel's closest allies in Western diplomatic circles are voicing private reservations that are no longer so well contained. Anadolu Agency reported on June 26 that the US State Department had extended the Washington negotiations by one day following reports of a "deep gap" on the question of Israeli withdrawal — diplomatic language that means American negotiators are not getting what they want from their own allies.

The Yellow Line and Israel's resistance

The central point of friction in the Washington-Beirut-Jerusalem negotiations is what Israel calls the "Yellow Line" or "Anti-Tank Line" — an imaginary line drawn in April 2026 at approximately 8 kilometers inside Lebanon from the Israeli border. Israel refuses to withdraw from zones south of this line, particularly from Beaufort Castle on the heights dominating southern Lebanon. Lebanon, for its part, demands full withdrawal from all localities and towns within the line, including Majdal Zoun, Zibqin, Beit Lif, Tayri, and Kounine. The distance between the two positions is not only geographic. It is political and existential for both sides.

Gaza: the occupation continues in relative silence

What "no time limit" means for Gazans

The permanence declaration for Gaza is the one receiving the least international attention — perhaps because after 18 months of conflict since October 7, 2023, the world has partly grown accustomed to Israeli occupation of Gaza. But its significance is considerable. It means there is, in the minds of Israel's current leaders, no exit scenario for Gaza. No handover of control to the Palestinian Authority. No credible alternative Gazan government. No possible humanitarian reconstruction under permanent military occupation. It means, in other words, that the 2.3 million residents of Gaza are condemned to live under Israeli military occupation indefinitely, with no political horizon.

Israeli airstrikes in Gaza resumed after the collapse of the ceasefire agreement negotiated under Trump in early 2025. The total human toll since October 7, 2023, as documented by Gazan health authorities — the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health being the only available source in the territory — exceeds 35,000 deaths according to the latest available counts. That figure, which international humanitarian organizations such as the UN consider a low estimate, continues to rise.

International law and its limits

Katz and Netanyahu's permanent occupation declaration directly violates several United Nations Security Council resolutions, notably resolution 1701 of 2006 on Lebanon and more recent resolutions related to the Palestinian territories. It directly contradicts the International Court of Justice advisory opinion of July 2024. And as we have seen in the Iranian case, international law without an enforcement mechanism remains a statement of principle. The United States, which could in theory exert economic and military pressure on Israel to secure compliance with those norms, is not doing so — partly for domestic political reasons, partly by strategic calculation.

The internal posture: who is Netanyahu speaking for?

The governing coalition and its extremes

To understand the "no time limit" declaration, you also need to understand Israeli domestic politics. The Netanyahu government depends for its political survival on far-right parties — notably Bezalel Smotrich's Religious Zionist Party and Itamar Ben-Gvir's Jewish Power party. These parties advocate not temporary maintenance of security zones but permanent annexation of those territories. Smotrich declared on June 21, 2026 that Israeli troops could remain in Lebanon for "years" and that it might be necessary to establish permanent military bases and posts. Ben-Gvir, for his part, declared after the signing of the US-Iranian memorandum: "We are not party to that agreement. It does not guarantee our security."

Netanyahu, in delivering his June 25 declaration, satisfies those internal allies whose support he needs for political survival — particularly while he faces corruption trials. But this domestic political communication has external consequences that far transcend Netanyahu's electoral calculations. It commits the State of Israel to a posture that its allies and partners will have to manage politically in their own public spheres.

Israeli public opinion: real but not unanimous support

Israeli polls since October 7, 2023 show broad support — between 70 and 80 percent depending on the survey — for maintaining troops in security zones in Lebanon and Gaza as long as security guarantees have not been obtained. This support is real. It reflects the deep fear of a population that lived through the trauma of October 7 and fears a repeat of the attack if buffer zones are abandoned too soon. That popular support gives Netanyahu internal legitimacy for his posture. But it does not by itself determine Israel's foreign policy, whose diplomatic consequences are paid in the long term in ways the public does not immediately perceive.

The Washington negotiations: between autopilot and powerlessness

The 5th round and its results

The 5th round of Israeli-Lebanese negotiations in Washington was held on June 25-26, 2026. It was extended by one day — a clear sign of deadlock. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on June 26 a "framework agreement for lasting peace and security" in Lebanon, presented as an American mediation framework — a formula vague enough to be simultaneously an advance and an absence of concrete results. Information on this framework suggests it provides for a ceasefire, Hezbollah's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and the deployment of the Lebanese army — but no clear timeline for Israeli withdrawal.

Hezbollah's reaction was predictable: the movement rejected any agreement that did not include full Israeli withdrawal, repeating its June 2026 position — a permanent ceasefire paired with complete withdrawal, both simultaneous. The Lebanese government, more measured in its positioning, is seeking a formula that allows it to exercise sovereignty over southern territory without direct confrontation with Israel. These positions appear incompatible in the short term. Netanyahu resolved the problem by declaring he would not satisfy them, regardless of the pressure applied.

Marco Rubio and American pragmatism

Secretary of State Marco Rubio finds himself in the uncomfortable position of having to sell to Iran — which demands Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as a condition for maintaining the memorandum — an agreement that his Israeli ally refuses. To do so, Rubio has adopted a position of rhetorical separation between the US-Iranian agreement and Israeli obligations: the United States commits to its own behavior, not Israel's. This is legally coherent. It is practically untenable, since Iran conditions the maintenance of the agreement precisely on actions by Israel that Washington claims it cannot control.

Syria: the third theater, the least covered

What Israel controls in Syria

Katz's declaration of occupation "without time limit" explicitly includes Syria. This is perhaps the least covered chapter of Israel's permanent occupation posture. Since the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 and the partial disintegration of the Syrian state, Israel has extended its control in the Golan well beyond the pre-2024 line and established positions in areas of southern Syria. These positions allow the Israeli army to monitor and control a buffer zone on the Syrian side that now extends to the Quneitra region.

This occupation of Syrian territory is technically distinct from the Golan annexation proclaimed by Israel in 1981 and recognized by the United States under Trump in 2019. It lies outside the annexed zone, in sovereign Syrian territory. The transitional Syrian government — whose legitimacy and capacity to exercise sovereignty remain very limited — is not in a position to militarily contest this presence. But it constitutes an additional violation of international law that Katz's "no time limit" declaration makes permanent.

The strategic dimensions of the Syrian presence

For the Israeli army, the presence in southern Syria serves several strategic functions: surveillance of pro-Iranian militia movements seeking to reconstitute; control of potential supply routes between Iran and Lebanon; and creation of strategic depth that makes it harder for any hostile forces to return close to Israel's northern border. These are security arguments that military experts take seriously. But they run up against the fact that Israeli military presence in sovereign Syrian territory is a violation of international law that undermines the Jewish state's legitimacy in international bodies and complicates its relationship with moderate Arab countries — notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates — that normalized or opened relations with Israel after the Abraham Accords of 2020.

The frozen diplomatic horizon

The two-state solution: between agony and impossible resurrection

The "no time limit" declaration tolls the bell for whatever remained of the two-state solution as a credible medium-term political horizon. This solution — a Palestinian state alongside Israel, within 1967 borders with territorial swaps — was already moribund before the events of 2023-2026. The continuous expansion of West Bank settlements, Israeli coalition governments increasingly dominated by parties explicitly opposed to a Palestinian state, and now a permanent occupation declaration in Gaza — all of this closes a horizon that was already very narrow.

The moderate Arab countries that signed the Abraham Accords — the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan — had implicitly conditioned the development of their relations with Israel on progress toward the Palestinian question. That progress has not materialized. The question now is whether those relationships can survive a normalization whose Palestinian counterpart has not been delivered. Saudi Arabia, which was negotiating normalization with Israel before October 7, 2023, suspended those discussions. A Saudi return to the table is conditional on progress in Gaza. That progress will not come under a declared permanent occupation.

The State of Israel in 2026: military winner, diplomatic loser

It is necessary to acknowledge what is real: militarily, Israel has achieved significant results in 2026. The strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in February-March 2026 delayed or damaged Tehran's nuclear program. The Lebanon campaign substantially weakened Hezbollah, whose rocket capabilities and infrastructure were largely destroyed. The elimination of Hamas leadership and the disintegration of its military capacity in Gaza are advanced. Militarily, Netanyahu can legitimately speak of strategic success.

But these military successes were achieved at the cost of growing diplomatic isolation that calls into question the sustainability of Israel's long-term position. A state cannot indefinitely maintain military occupation across three theaters without exhausting its own armed forces, distorting its economy, and losing the support of countries whose political backing it needs. The "no time limit" declaration — whatever its security justification — is an attrition strategy that risks exhausting Israel as much as its adversaries.

The impact on the US-Iranian memorandum

Tehran watches, observes, pulls its lever

Netanyahu's "no time limit" declaration is a political gift to Iran. It provides Tehran with an inexhaustible argument for maintaining pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, for refusing to advance in nuclear negotiations, and for presenting Israel — and by extension the United States — as responsible for the memorandum's failure. Iran can say, with a certain logic: "Point 1 of the agreement calls for a halt to military operations on all fronts. Israel continues its strikes in Lebanon. The United States cannot enforce its own agreement. Why should we comply with ours?"

This is exactly the logic that the Revolutionary Guards used to justify the attack on the Ever Lovely on June 25. And it is the logic that makes the US-Iranian agreement structurally fragile as long as Israel maintains an active military posture in Lebanon that the United States is incapable of controlling. Every Israeli strike, every permanence declaration from Katz or Netanyahu, weakens the American position in negotiations with Tehran and reinforces Iran's leverage over the strait.

The limits of American pressure on Israel

The real underlying question in this entire crisis is this: how far are the United States prepared to go to get Israel to behave in ways compatible with American commitments to other parties? The answer given by the Trump 2.0 administration is clear: not very far. Trump has maintained near-unconditional support for Israel while negotiating an agreement with Iran that requires Israeli compromises. This contradiction is politically viable in the short term, because Trump benefits from a very pro-Israel Republican electorate and because the administration prefers the fiction of a fragile agreement to no agreement at all. In the long term, this contradiction is structurally untenable.

The humanitarian impact: 200,000 Lebanese, 1 million displaced

Civilians, collateral damage of military permanence

The permanent occupation declaration has a concrete and immediate human dimension. Minister Katz specified in his declarations on June 24 that the 200,000 Lebanese residents of southern Lebanese municipalities under Israeli control would not be authorized to return home. The Israeli strategy is clear: evacuation of civilian populations, destruction of border village infrastructure used as Hezbollah positions, and maintenance of a de facto demilitarized zone. It is a policy of depopulation of Lebanese border zones that international humanitarian organizations are documenting with concern.

In total, according to official Lebanese figures, more than one million people have been displaced since the start of the Israeli offensive on March 2, 2026. Among them, a significant proportion faces total uncertainty about their ability to return home, particularly in zones that fall within the "security zone" Israel claims. Katz and Netanyahu's "no time limit" declaration means concretely that these people will not be able to return home in any foreseeable future. This is not a humanitarian footnote. It is a human catastrophe at the scale of permanent occupation.

Lebanon in default facing a dual occupation

Lebanon was already in a state of extreme economic and political decay before the 2026 war — the result of decades of corruption, the Beirut port explosion in 2020, the 2019-2020 financial crisis, and Hezbollah's pervasive influence on its political and economic life. The Israeli offensive, with its 4,230 dead and its million displaced, aggravates an already catastrophic situation. Adding a permanent Israeli occupation in the south of the country deprives the Lebanese government of the ability to exercise sovereignty over a portion of its national territory, which in turn undermines its political legitimacy and capacity to rebuild state authority.

The ICC and Netanyahu: an arrest warrant that weighs heavily

The ICC arrest warrant: real scope and real limits

In November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. This was a historic moment — for the first time, a sitting government leader of a close Western ally faced such a warrant. The symbolic reach is considerable. The practical reach is more limited: the United States is not a member of the ICC and does not recognize its jurisdiction; neither does Israel. Netanyahu can continue traveling to several allied countries that have also adopted ambiguous positions on their obligation to execute the warrant.

But the ICC warrant has real effects on Netanyahu's room to maneuver. He can no longer travel to most ICC member states without risking arrest. Several European states have affirmed they would execute the warrant if Netanyahu set foot on their territory. This limits his diplomatic travel, isolates Israel from some of its potential partners, and creates a cumulative reputational cost that even Israel's closest allies privately acknowledge as problematic. The "no time limit" policy carries an international judicial price that will grow heavier with the years.

The pressure of Western allies: support that is eroding

Western support for Israel since October 7, 2023 has been real but progressively more conditional. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the main European democracies maintained their support for Israel's right to defend itself, while expressing growing concerns about the methods used in Gaza and Lebanon. Decisions such as the temporary US suspension of certain arms deliveries in 2024, Security Council resolutions calling for ceasefires, and public criticism by European leaders on humanitarian conditions in Gaza mark a gradual shift in the Western position.

This shift puts Netanyahu in an increasingly uncomfortable diplomatic position. His "no time limit" strategy presupposes durable Western support. But that support is not unconditional. Key partners such as France and the United Kingdom recognized the Palestinian State in 2024, breaking with the historic position of tying recognition to a negotiated peace agreement. These signals progressively isolate Israel in multilateral bodies — not to the point of threatening its existence, but to the point of complicating its international governance.

Toward an impossible stabilization?

What would be needed for a way out

Even a partial exit from the Lebanese crisis would require an alignment of several factors that currently appear incompatible. A partial and conditional Israeli withdrawal from the zones farthest from the border, allowing the Lebanese government to deploy its army and establish a civilian presence. A firm agreement on Hezbollah's disarmament south of the Litani, with a verification mechanism. A more robust American commitment to enforcing the terms of the memorandum, including with Israel. And a resumption — even symbolic — of the Israeli-Palestinian political process, signaling that the two-state horizon is not definitively closed.

None of these elements are in place on June 26, 2026. Netanyahu's "no time limit" declaration actively closes two of them — Israeli withdrawal and the political perspective. The other two — robust American engagement and Hezbollah's disarmament — also seem beyond near-term reach. We are therefore in a situation of structural deadlock, with low-intensity violence likely to recur regularly, an occupation that continues, and a humanitarian catastrophe that deepens.

The future: three scenarios for the coming months

For the coming months, three scenarios take shape. In the first, the American mediation effort produces a partial agreement — conditional Israeli withdrawal from a limited zone, deployment of the Lebanese army, status quo in other zones — that allows the US-Iranian memorandum to stay alive and avoids a resumption of major hostilities. This is the most diplomatically practicable scenario, but it resolves none of the underlying problems. In the second scenario, negotiations bog down, Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz following a new Israeli strike, and the memorandum collapses, returning the region to a situation of armed tension. In the third scenario, a serious incident — an Israeli strike that kills Syrian or Lebanese civilians in a spectacular way — triggers a regional reaction that escapes the control of all parties.

Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank: three fronts, one logic

The simultaneity of operations as doctrine

Netanyahu's "no time limit" policy is not deployed on a single theater. It is simultaneous — committing Israeli forces in Gaza, in Lebanon (against Hezbollah), in the West Bank (against Hamas and Islamic Jihad infrastructure), and potentially in Syria (airstrikes against Iranian arms transfers). This simultaneity is presented as an operational necessity — the threats are interconnected, the Iranian financing and weapons networks feed all fronts. The response must therefore be multidimensional.

But this simultaneity has a cost. It stretches Israeli forces, creates resource allocation dilemmas, and produces operations on multiple fronts that are each incomplete. Gaza has not been secured in a durable way after two years of operations. Hezbollah in Lebanon, weakened but not destroyed, is progressively reconstituting. The West Bank is seeing an escalation of settler violence and military operations that feeds Hamas recruitment. This logic of simultaneous multiple fronts can produce tactical successes while creating conditions that make definitive strategic victory ever more distant.

The day-after question: who governs Gaza and Lebanon

The "no time limit" policy has a fundamental blind spot: it does not answer the question of what comes next. Even granting that Israel can militarily neutralize Hamas in Gaza and durably reduce Hezbollah's capabilities in Lebanon, the question of civilian governance of those territories remains without a credible answer. Who will govern Gaza after Hamas? What Palestinian authority will be legitimate enough to maintain order and public services without being perceived as a puppet of occupation? These questions are not secondary — they determine the durability of any military gain.

Netanyahu has systematically avoided answering these post-conflict governance questions. His far-right coalition partners — Ben-Gvir and Smotrich — have promoted visions of reoccupation and colonization that are unacceptable to the entire international community, including Israel's closest allies. This absence of a credible political plan for the post-war period may be the deepest flaw in the "no time limit" strategy. Wars always end with politics. Ignoring the politics guarantees the war will start again.

The balance sheet of the "no time limit" posture

What Netanyahu gains and what he risks

What is the political balance sheet of the "no time limit" posture for Netanyahu himself? In the short term, he consolidates his governing coalition and his internal popular support. He maintains maximum pressure on Hezbollah and responds to an Israeli public opinion that demands security guarantees. He offers his electorate an image of strength in a context where his political survival is on the line through his corruption trials. These gains are real.

In the long term, the risks are considerable. He deepens Israel's diplomatic isolation, including among its closest allies. He weakens the US-Iranian memorandum whose stability also benefits Israel — an agreement that holds, even fragile, is better for regional security than a resumption of direct hostilities. He closes the door to any future Arab normalization conditioned on progress toward the Palestinian question. And he creates a permanent occupation situation that generates cyclical armed resistance that security zones cannot definitively eliminate — as Israel's own history in Lebanon since 1982 demonstrates.

History as judge

The history of Israel's attempts at permanent occupation in Lebanon is eloquent. Between 1982 and 2000, Israel maintained a presence in southern Lebanon through support for the South Lebanon Army. That presence generated a resistance movement that contributed to creating and strengthening Hezbollah. The 2000 withdrawal, ordered by Ehud Barak, was the acknowledgment that permanent occupation had not brought the hoped-for security. The "no time limit" declaration of 2026 deliberately ignores that historical lesson. It bets that the circumstances of 2026 are sufficiently different from those of 1982-2000 to produce a different result. It is a bet that commits future generations of Israelis and Lebanese.

Conclusion: the endless occupation as policy and as admission

What "no time limit" reveals

Netanyahu and Katz's "no time limit" declaration is as much an admission as a policy. An admission that Israel has no plan for what comes after the military phase. An admission that the current government has neither the will nor the capacity to engage in a political process that would involve concessions. An admission, ultimately, that security through permanent occupation is the only strategy available to a governing coalition dominated by parties that refuse any political alternative.

This posture places Israel in an international position that is increasingly difficult to defend. It undermines the US-Iranian memorandum whose fragile stability would benefit Israel as well. It feeds the growing diplomatic isolation of the Jewish state in international bodies where even traditional allies struggle to defend it. And it generates, on the ground, a humanitarian situation that continues to deteriorate for the civilian populations of all three theaters concerned.

What the West should say

The West — and particularly the United States — should find the courage to tell Israel what a true friend says: that security through permanent occupation is a dangerous illusion that Israeli history itself has already refuted; that maintaining the US-Iranian memorandum is in Israel's security interest; and that a "no time limit" occupation policy across three simultaneous theaters is not a security policy but a recipe for additional decades of cyclical conflicts. That speech will not be delivered by a Trump administration. It will have to come from other voices. The hope that those voices will be heard in Jerusalem is, for now, slim.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

I support Israel's right to exist and to defend itself against real terrorist threats. I condemn Hamas's attacks of October 7, 2023, and decades of Hezbollah terrorist activity. At the same time, I believe that the construction of a Palestinian state is necessary for lasting peace, and I oppose settlement expansion and permanent occupation as a security strategy. These positions are potentially in tension, and I hold them as such.

Method and limits

This article is based on official declarations reported by international news agencies: Middle East Eye, The Guardian, i24NEWS, Anadolu Agency, RTÉ. Casualty figures cited for Lebanon come from the Lebanese Ministry of Health — the only source available in that context, whose origin I disclose. Displacement figures come from official Lebanese sources reported by international organizations.

Sources

Primary sources

Middle East Eye — Israel will remain Lebanon, Syria and Gaza without time limit — June 26, 2026

The Guardian — Israel says IDF is staying in southern Lebanon — June 24, 2026

i24NEWS — Netanyahu vows Israel will keep forces in southern Lebanon — June 26, 2026

Anadolu Agency — Israel, Lebanon split over south withdrawal in Washington talks — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

RTÉ — Israel: No troop withdrawal timeframe from Lebanon, Gaza — June 25, 2026

Wikipedia — 2026 Lebanon war (chronology)

Xinhua — Israeli DM says military to remain in S. Lebanon even if US demands withdrawal — June 24, 2026

CGTN — Israel, Lebanon discussing pilot scheme for handover of territory — June 24, 2026