NARRATIVE: The Belarus repeaters — Minsk, a platform for guiding Russian drones

Four stations that guided death

On June 21, 2026, President Zelensky revealed the existence of four Russian repeater stations installed in the oblasts of Gomel and Brest in Belarus. These stations were not there to improve Belarusians' mobile reception. They were there to precisely guide Shahed drones striking the oblasts of Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn — Ukrainian regions in the western part of the country, far from the traditional eastern front line. The Institute for the Study of War confirmed in its June 23 assessment that these repeaters represent legitimate military targets for Ukraine.

This revelation, which may sound technical, is in reality of considerable geopolitical significance. It confirms that Belarus is no longer merely a passive ally of Russia — a country that looks the other way while Russian troops use its territory as a transit zone. It is an active platform for Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine. And this distinction — between passive ally and active accomplice — has legal, political, and military implications that the world must examine.

The narrative of a threat from the north

This narrative follows the thread of the Belarusian threat against Ukraine — from the first uses of Belarusian territory as a transit zone in 2022 to the installation of guidance repeaters in 2026. It draws on documented facts available in primary sources and attempts to reconstruct the strategic logic that explains why Belarus has progressively become a tool of the Russian war machine. And it poses the question that Zelensky raised on June 21: if these repeaters are legitimate military targets, Ukraine has the right to strike them.

Not an abstract question. A concrete one, touching on the geography of the right of self-defense. At what point does the territory of a third country that hosts and operates military equipment used to strike another country become a legitimate target? The answer from international law of armed conflict is clear in principle. Its practical application depends on the political will of the actors concerned. And in June 2026, that political will is in the process of forming.

Four repeaters in the forests of Gomel and Brest. Four small electronic stations guiding missiles toward families in Volyn and Rivne. Lukashenko said he is not waging war on Ukraine. These repeaters say otherwise. Equipment lies less convincingly than its operators.

Why Gomel and Brest?

The Belarusian oblasts of Gomel and Brest are the regions sharing the longest border with Ukraine. Gomel, in southeastern Belarus, borders Ukraine's Chernihiv and Kyiv regions. Brest, in the southwest, borders Volyn and Rivne. These two regions are geographically ideal for installing long-range navigation repeaters: they allow coverage of a considerable geographic arc of northern and northwestern Ukraine — regions that were relatively less exposed to Shahed strikes launched from Russian territory to the east and northeast.

Shahed drones — the Iranian drones renamed Geran by Russia — use a navigation system combining GPS, inertial navigation, and, for greater precision, radio guidance signals transmitted by ground stations. Repeaters serve to amplify and refine these signals over long distances, allowing Shaheds to reach their targets with greater precision than GPS alone. Installing repeaters in Belarus means enabling precise strikes on western Ukraine from a direction that Ukrainian air defense systems cover less densely.

The northern arc of threat: a historic vulnerability

Northern and northwestern Ukraine have represented a particular vulnerability since the start of the war. The Russian attempt to take Kyiv from the north in March 2022 used Belarusian territory as a launching base. The failure of that offensive did not end the threat from the north — it transformed it. Russia is no longer trying to physically cross Belarus to take Kyiv. It is using Belarus as a logistical and electronic platform to strike Ukraine at a distance.

The oblasts of Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn are important regions for Ukraine — communication and supply corridors, regions with significant civilian populations, zones through which Western arms deliveries pass. Striking these regions with precisely guided drones from Belarus is an attempt to disrupt Ukrainian supply lines from the west — an additional dimension of Russia's logistical blockade strategy against Ukraine.

The north as Ukraine's permanent vulnerability. Since the attempted capture of Kyiv in 2022, we knew the northern border was porous. In 2026, we know it is equipped with Russian repeaters. Belarus has become, de facto, a rear base of Russian aggression. International law will eventually have to treat this for what it is.

The salvo that documents the use of repeaters

On the night of June 20–21, 2026, Ukraine sustained a combined mass attack: 105 Shahed drones, 2 Iskander missiles, and 2 Kinzhal missiles launched against Ukrainian territory, according to Ukrainska Pravda. Of these 105 Shaheds plus 4 missiles, Ukrainian air defense forces shot down or jammed 96 drones — a high but not total interception rate. The drones that penetrated the defenses reached targets across several regions.

It was in the context of this attack that the use of Belarusian repeaters was able to be documented. The trajectories of the Shaheds striking Ukraine's northwestern regions — Volyn, Rivne, Zhytomyr — passed through corridors where guidance signals emitted from stations in Gomel and Brest could reach them and help them maintain their trajectory with precision. This type of trajectory analysis is exactly what Ukrainian intelligence services do in real time to understand the mechanics of each attack and improve future countermeasures.

Russia launches an average of 74 ballistic missiles per month

The ISW documents in its June 21, 2026 assessment that Russia launches an average of 74 ballistic missiles per month against Ukraine in 2026, and that Ukraine intercepts approximately one third of them. This interception rate of one third — for ballistic missiles, the fastest and hardest-to-intercept weapons — underlines the urgency of Patriot system and other high-altitude interceptor deliveries documented at Ramstein 35.

The two Kinzhal missiles launched during the night of June 20–21 are particularly significant. Kinzhals are hypersonic missiles — among the hardest to intercept in Russia's arsenal. Two Kinzhals in a single attack represents considerable expenditure of a precious resource. Their simultaneous deployment with Iskanders and Shahed drones illustrates Russian saturation doctrine: vectors of different speeds and altitudes launched simultaneously to saturate and confuse Ukrainian defense systems.

74 ballistic missiles per month. Only one third intercepted. That number haunts me. The two thirds that get through kill people, destroy infrastructure, terrorize populations. This is not an abstract statistic. This is the daily reality of millions of Ukrainians. And every additional Patriot delivered by the West reduces that number. It is that simple.

A remarkable but insufficient interception rate

During the June 20–21 attack, Ukrainian forces shot down or jammed 96 systems out of the 109 launched (105 Shaheds + 4 missiles). That is an overall interception rate of approximately 88% — an exceptional result for a night of mass attack combining three different types of vectors. This result is the product of massive investments in Ukrainian air defense — Patriot, NASAMS, Iris-T, short-range mobile systems — and the operational experience accumulated by the crews who operate them.

But 88% interception also means that 13 systems penetrated the defenses. And among those 13, some were guided with enhanced precision by the Belarusian repeaters. In the logic of Russian saturation, even an 88% interception rate lets through enough projectiles, sufficiently precise, to cause significant damage. Ukraine's objective is to progressively raise this rate toward 95%, then 98%, by combining more interceptor missiles, better radars, and more effective targeting. The Belarusian repeaters, by improving Shahed precision, make this objective harder to achieve.

Electronic jamming as a complementary defensive weapon

The figure of "96 drones shot down/jammed" deserves unpacking. Not all 96 were physically intercepted by missiles — some were jammed, meaning their navigation systems were electronically disrupted to the point that they could not maintain their trajectory and fell or crashed without reaching their target. Electronic jamming is a crucial component of Ukrainian air defense, less spectacular than interceptor missiles but potentially more economical.

If the Belarusian repeaters improve Shahed resistance to jamming — by amplifying guidance signals to compensate for electronic interference attempts — they reduce the effectiveness of this component of the defense. This is a technological race in the domain of electronic warfare playing out in parallel with the physical war of drones and missiles. And the repeaters of Gomel and Brest are a piece of this electronic chessboard.

Electronic jamming against Russian repeaters — this is the invisible war within the visible war. Waves against waves. Engineers against engineers. Those who win this frequency war will directly influence how many Shaheds reach their targets in Volyn and Rivne. This front also deserves its investment.

The legal and strategic question posed by Zelensky

In revealing the repeaters' existence on June 21, Zelensky was not merely publishing a military fact. He was posing a question: if these repeaters are military equipment directly participating in attacks against Ukraine, can they be treated as legitimate targets? The ISW, in its June 23 assessment, provided a clear analytical answer: yes, these repeaters represent legitimate military targets within the meaning of international law of armed conflict.

The legal reasoning is as follows: international law of armed conflict permits striking military objectives defined as installations, equipment, and positions that effectively contribute to the military action of a party, and whose destruction or neutralization offers a concrete military advantage. A guidance repeater that improves the precision of missiles striking Ukraine is, by definition, an installation effectively contributing to Russian military action. Its destruction would provide Ukraine with an obvious military advantage. The criteria of international law are met.

The political dimension: striking in Belarus — does it cross a line?

Legal legitimacy and political feasibility are not the same thing. Striking installations on Belarusian territory, even legitimate military targets, represents a politically sensitive decision. Belarus remains a sovereign state — even if its sovereignty is largely subordinated to Russia under Lukashenko. A strike on its territory could be invoked by Moscow as an escalation, as a provocation, as a pretext for direct involvement of Belarusian troops in the conflict.

These risks are real. But they must be weighed against the alternative risk: allowing the Belarusian repeaters to operate indefinitely, improving the precision of Russian strikes on western Ukraine, exposing the civilian populations of Volyn, Rivne, and Zhytomyr to more accurate attacks. The question is not: should we take the risk of striking the repeaters? It is: which of the two risks is more acceptable — striking or not striking? And Zelensky, in revealing the repeaters' existence, clearly signaled which way he leans.

Strike in Belarus or let the repeaters guide missiles onto houses in Volyn. That is the equation Zelensky is posing. There is no risk-free answer. But there is a more defensible answer: do not let Lukashenko and Putin use Belarusian territory with impunity as a platform for aggression. International law authorizes it. Strategic logic demands it.

From forced neutrality to documented complicity

In 2022, Lukashenko presented the use of Belarusian territory as a transit zone for the Russian army as a decision imposed by circumstances — Belarus could not resist Russian pressure. In 2026, the installation of four guidance repeater stations on Belarusian territory represents a degree of complicity that goes beyond simple resignation to external constraint. These repeaters did not install themselves. They required active technical cooperation, access to appropriate sites, and probably governmental agreements.

Lukashenko can continue claiming he is not at war with Ukraine. But the equipment on his territory is participating in that war — guiding the missiles that kill Ukrainians. This distinction between public declaration and the reality of equipment is exactly the type of concealment that Ukrainian intelligence services document and that Zelensky chose to make public on June 21. The light on the repeaters is also a light on Minsk's complicity.

The costs for Belarus of active complicity

Zelensky's revelation of the Belarusian repeaters has consequences for Belarus's international standing. It strengthens the arguments for new sanctions against Minsk — no longer only for domestic repression and the Ryanair flight diversion, but for its active participation in the military aggression against Ukraine. It creates a legal and political precedent that could justify more direct responses from Ukraine.

Lukashenko is playing a dangerous game. By allowing the installation of Russian repeaters on his territory, he exposes himself to legitimate military reprisals that could affect his own regime. He exposes himself to additional sanctions that deepen Belarus's economic isolation. And he further alienates the Belarusian population — already broadly hostile to a war that the majority of Belarusian civil society does not support — by making his country complicit in Ukrainian deaths. Lukashenko's complicity has a price that will eventually be paid.

Lukashenko says he is not at war. The Gomel repeaters say he is lying. This contradiction cannot last indefinitely. A leader whose militarized installations are documented by the ISW as legitimate targets is no longer in the comfortable position of neutrality. He is in the uncomfortable position of complicity. And accomplices always end up paying.

Trains as systematic targets

The ISW notes in its June 23 assessment that Ukrainian trains and railway infrastructure have been systematically targeted by Russia since the summer of 2025. This systematic campaign targets a crucial dimension of Ukrainian logistics: the rail network. Ukraine has made massive use of the railway system to transport refugees, troops, military materiel, humanitarian supplies, and industrial equipment. Striking trains and railways is an attempt to paralyze Ukrainian strategic mobility.

The Belarusian repeaters are directly relevant to this railway campaign. The enhanced precision that repeaters provide to Shahed drones enables the targeting of railway infrastructure in northwestern Ukraine — viaducts, rail junctions, equipment depots — with an effectiveness that a GPS-only guided Shahed could not achieve. Destroying a rail junction with a single well-guided drone produces a strategic effect that would require several less precise missiles to replicate.

Ukrainian war logistics under pressure

Russia's campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure is part of a broader strategy to degrade Ukrainian war logistics. By targeting rail lines, bridges, road junctions, and logistics depots, Russia attempts to slow the flow of weapons and reinforcements to the front, disrupt unit rotation, and complicate coordination between different combat zones. This is a war against mobility as much as a war against defensive positions.

Ukraine resists this logistical campaign through dispersal and redundancy: multiplying routes, dispersing depots, maintaining a rapid repair capacity for damaged infrastructure. These practices were developed and refined since 2022 under the pressure of Russian strikes. But the Belarusian repeaters, by improving strike precision on the northwestern axis, add additional pressure on logistical infrastructure already bearing considerable strain.

Ukrainian trains under bombs. Railway junctions targeted. Belarusian repeaters guiding Shaheds toward the rail lines. This is the logistics war — less visible than front-line combat, equally decisive. An army that cannot move and resupply loses its battles regardless of its courage. Ukraine knows this. And it protects its rails the way it protects its soldiers.

Why Zelensky reveals now

Zelensky's decision to publicly reveal the existence of the Belarusian repeaters on June 21 is not incidental. It follows a well-established logic of strategic communication: before striking, or before asking allies for authorization to strike, document and make public the legitimacy of the target. This pre-operational transparency approach serves several simultaneous objectives.

It alerts Western allies to a documented threat, creating a favorable context for authorizing strikes. It exposes Belarusian complicity before world opinion, feeding sanctions dossiers. It signals to Lukashenko and Putin that the repeaters are known and documented — a form of warning that perhaps making them disappear or better protecting them will be their only response. And it prepares the ground for future action that will unfold within an already-established legal and political context.

Legitimate targets and the doctrine of self-defense

Ukraine has progressively expanded its definition of legitimate targets as its defense doctrine has matured. From front-line positions, it moved to refineries. From refineries to arsenals. From arsenals to spatial antennas and guidance repeaters. Each expansion of the list of legitimate targets was preceded by a legal and political argumentation — sometimes contentious with allies — that ultimately led to acceptance.

The Belarusian repeaters are the next frontier of this doctrine. The ISW has clearly stated they are legitimate targets. Zelensky has publicly revealed them. International law, as interpreted by the ISW, defines them as military objectives. The question is no longer legal. It is political and operational. And the logic of this conflict — where every tactical obstacle is eventually addressed if the political will is present — suggests that the Belarusian repeaters will not be spared forever.

Zelensky reveals the repeaters. The ISW confirms their legitimacy as targets. Doctrine follows. Action will come. This is the pattern we saw for strikes on Russian refineries, for strikes on arsenals. First documentation. Then legitimization. Then action. Belarus should look at this pattern with attention.

From partnership to military subordination

Belarus's trajectory in this conflict is one of growing military subordination to Russia. In 2022, Russian troops used Belarusian territory as a transit and resupply zone — with Lukashenko's tolerance or compulsion. In 2023–2024, Belarus allowed Russian military exercises on its territory and the installation of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. In 2026, missile guidance repeaters are directly participating in attacks against Ukraine from Belarusian soil.

This progression is not accidental. It reflects the logic of progressive vassalization that Putin applies to his closest neighbors. Belarus is not a Russian ally in the sense of an equal relationship. It is a country whose sovereignty is increasingly nominal, whose territory is increasingly integrated into the Russian military architecture, whose leader — maintained in power thanks to Russian support after the 2020 unrest — is in a position of structural dependence on Moscow.

Belarusian civil society facing its regime's complicity

It is essential to distinguish Lukashenko from Belarusian society. In 2020, hundreds of thousands of Belarusians took to the streets to protest Lukashenko's fraudulent re-election — a demonstration of democratic vitality that Putin watched with terror and that Lukashenko suppressed with brutality. This Belarusian civil society, reduced to internal silence, did not ask for its territory to be used to guide missiles toward Ukrainians.

The responsibility for the repeaters lies with the Lukashenko regime, not with the Belarusian population. This distinction matters for the future — on the day when Belarus regains its political freedom, as it demonstrated the desire for in 2020, Ukrainian-Belarusian relations must not be permanently poisoned by the crimes of a regime that both peoples reject. The Lukashenko page will turn. As all authoritarian pages eventually do.

The Belarusian civil society that marched in 2020 for its freedom — it did not choose the repeaters. It did not choose Lukashenko. It was crushed by someone who chose for it. I remember the images from 2020: women with white flowers facing soldiers. That courage deserves to be recalled now that the regime is guiding missiles. The Belarusian people are not their regime.

Hybrid warfare and gray zones

The Belarusian repeaters perfectly illustrate the hybrid warfare doctrine that Russia has developed and refined since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. This doctrine consists of exploiting the gray zones of international law and politics — actions that directly contribute to aggression without formally triggering the collective response mechanisms designed for direct aggressions. Soldiers without insignia in Crimea in 2014. Russian "volunteers" in the Donbas. Guidance repeaters in the Belarusian forests in 2026.

Each time, Russia bets that the ambiguity of the actor's status — is it really Russia? is it really direct aggression? — will paralyze responses. And each time, this ambiguity has indeed delayed responses. The Belarusian repeaters are the 2026 version of this strategy. Zelensky, by publicly naming them and emphasizing their legitimacy as targets, is trying to lift the ambiguity before it shields impunity. This is intelligent counter-hybrid doctrine.

What international response to complicit third-party states?

The question of the Belarusian repeaters raises a broader strategic interrogation: what does the international community do in the face of third-party states that actively facilitate aggression without directly participating in it? International law provides certain responses — sanctions, complicity proceedings before international jurisdictions. But these responses are slow, uncertain, and subject to political blockages.

Ukraine has opened a more direct path: document the complicity, demonstrate the military legitimacy of complicit equipment as targets, and reserve the right to act accordingly. This path is not without risks — of escalation, diplomatic complication, and conflict widening. But it is also the only one that poses the question clearly: at what point do we tolerate a state hosting the tools of aggression against another? The Gomel repeaters force the world to answer this question.

The Belarusian repeaters pose the question that diplomatic academies avoid: is a country hosting the instruments of aggression still neutral? The honest answer is no. The diplomatic answer is "it depends." The Ukrainian answer is to name things for what they are. I am with the Ukrainians on this one.

Holding against a combination of vectors

The night of June 21–22, documented notably by Ukrainska Pravda, saw Ukraine face a combination of vectors — Shahed, Iskander, Kinzhal — guided from several directions including Belarus. The 96 drones shot down or jammed out of 109 launched represents a remarkable air defense performance under saturation conditions. This performance is the product of investments, training, and experience.

What is particularly notable about this performance is that it was achieved despite the enhanced precision that the Belarusian repeaters conferred on the Shaheds. Ukraine managed to maintain a high interception rate even against more precisely guided drones. This suggests that Ukrainian forces have developed effective countermeasures — whether electronic (more effective jamming), tactical (repositioning of defenses), or technical (interceptor system improvements). The technological war advances on both sides. And in June 2026, Ukraine appears to be maintaining the advantage.

June 25: a Russia that keeps striking

Ukrainska Pravda reports for June 25, 2026 that Russia launched a combined attack with one ballistic missile and 90 drones. This figure, at the end of the documented week, confirms that the pace of Russian attacks is not diminishing. Russia strikes every day, with the combination of vectors that characterizes its saturation doctrine. Ukraine defends every day, with the means at its disposal. This conflict is a war of endurance. And endurance feeds on support, materiel, and will.

The Belarusian repeaters fit within this context of a war that continues and evolves. Each revelation — the repeaters, Baltic arsenals, the helium factory strikes — is a piece of the puzzle that sketches a conflict where both sides constantly innovate. Ukraine innovates in its deep-strike capacity. Russia innovates in its long-range precision guidance capacity from third-party territories. The technological war never stops. And it is by understanding each of its dimensions that one can intelligently support Ukraine in this war.

90 drones on June 25. Russia still strikes. Ukraine still defends. And somewhere in the forests of Gomel, four repeaters transmit their signals. This narrative has no clean ending. This war does not have one yet. But it has a direction: Ukraine, despite everything, holds. And it strikes. And it documents. And it demands accountability. That is resistance in its purest form.

International law facing Belarusian complicity

Zelensky's revelation of the existence of four repeater stations in the oblasts of Gomel and Brest raises a question of international law that is not new in this conflict but which takes on a particularly clear dimension here: to what extent is Belarus co-responsible for Russian strikes that use its territory as guidance infrastructure? International law's answer is, broadly speaking, affirmative: a state that deliberately makes its territory available to a belligerent for military operations against a third party assumes international responsibility for those operations.

Lukashenko's Belarus cannot claim to be a neutral observer. Since 2022, its territory has served as a launch platform for the initial invasion. Its bases have hosted Russian forces. Its airspace has been used for strikes. The repeaters in the oblasts of Gomel and Brest are merely the latest example of documented structural complicity. This complicity has implications for international sanctions — and for Ukrainian response options, which the ISW confirms are militarily legitimate.

What international recognition of Belarusian complicity would change

If the international community formally recognized Belarus's military complicity in Russian strikes via the repeaters, diplomatic, economic, and potentially military consequences could follow. Additional sanctions targeting Belarusian officials directly involved in drone guidance operations, pressure measures on companies that continue trading with Minsk, a clarification of Belarus's status in discussions on European security architecture in the post-conflict period.

These consequences are not automatic — international law does not apply mechanically, especially when major powers have divergent interests. But they sketch a strategic framework in which each action by Lukashenko in favor of Russia increases the potential costs for Belarus. Ukraine and its allies have every interest in meticulously documenting each instance of Belarusian complicity — not only for the eventual legal dossier, but to build the political case that will support future coercive measures.

Belarus installs repeaters to guide Russian drones toward Ukrainian cities. And Lukashenko claims he is not at war. This lie has a name in international law: complicity. And complicity, unlike neutrality, does not protect against consequences. Belarus has chosen its side. It will one day pay the price.

The GPS guidance problem at long range and the repeater solution

To understand the strategic importance of the Belarusian repeaters, one must grasp the technical problem they solve. Shahed-136 drones and their Russian derivatives use a combination of GPS navigation and inertial guidance. At very long range — beyond 1,000 km — inertial guidance accumulates errors, and GPS can be jammed by Ukrainian electronic warfare systems. Repeaters solve this problem by providing an amplified reference signal that drones can use to recalibrate in flight, significantly improving their precision in the final approach phase.

This is why repeaters placed in the oblasts of Gomel and Brest — within range of the Ukrainian oblasts of Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn — are strategically decisive. They allow Russian drones to strike specific targets in these regions with enhanced precision, rather than causing general damage across a zone. This is the difference between an imprecise terror weapon and a targeted strike system. And this enhanced precision means that strategic infrastructure — power stations, rail junctions, bridges — can be targeted with a significantly higher probability of a hit.

Electronic warfare as a response to the repeater threat

The revelation of the Belarusian repeaters' existence opens the way for specific technical and military countermeasures. On the electronic level, Ukraine and its allies can develop systems for targeted jamming of the frequencies used by Russian repeaters, making their signal unusable or turning them into sources of confusion for drones rather than guidance. On the military level, the ISW confirms these installations are legitimate targets — and Ukraine now has long-range drones capable of reaching them from its own territory.

This dynamic illustrates a fundamental principle of modern technological warfare: every offensive innovation calls for a defensive adaptation, and every defensive adaptation stimulates a new offensive innovation. The Belarusian repeaters are a Russian offensive innovation. The Ukrainian response — electronic jamming, precision strikes, public revelation — is the defensive adaptation. This action-reaction cycle unfolds in real time, across multiple theaters simultaneously, and Ukraine has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for adaptation in this game.

Repeaters in Belarusian forests guiding drones toward Ukrainian maternity wards. That is where this war stands. It plays out in the invisible, in radio waves, in navigation algorithms. And Ukraine must understand it, counter-attack it, and win on that terrain too. Not only on the battlefields. In the radio waves. Everywhere.

Belarus as a threat vector for NATO

The Belarusian repeaters are not only a threat to Ukraine. They illustrate how Belarus can be used as a platform for advanced military operations against long-range targets — and some of those targets could, in a scenario of broader conflict, be located on the territory of NATO member states. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are watching developments in Belarus closely, aware that the same long-range precision guidance capabilities could one day be directed at their territory.

The presence of Russian forces in Belarus — maintained and developed since the 2022 invasion — creates what NATO analysts describe as a vulnerability window for the eastern flanks of the Alliance. The repeaters are a concrete manifestation of this: they mean Russia can project advanced strike precision well beyond its recognized borders, using the territory of a vassal state. This is a doctrinal development that NATO must integrate into its defense planning.

The NATO summit in Ankara and the Belarus question

Against the backdrop of the NATO summit in Ankara — scheduled in the weeks following Zelensky's revelations — the question of Belarus as a threat vector should feature on the agenda. Alliance members have an interest in a doctrinal clarification on how to respond to attacks facilitated by Belarusian territory — not only against Ukraine, but potentially against Alliance members. The revelation of the repeaters provides a concrete case to fuel this strategic discussion.

Ukraine, for its part, has transformed the revelation of the repeaters into a call for diplomatic and military action. By publicly exposing the Belarusian guidance infrastructure, Zelensky achieves two results simultaneously: he forces Belarus to either withdraw the repeaters (under international pressure), or to publicly assume its complicity in the strikes. Both options present advantages for Ukraine. If the repeaters are withdrawn, the precision of Russian strikes from this direction decreases. If the complicity is assumed, international pressure on Belarus intensifies. This is high-intensity diplomacy.

Repeaters in Belarus. Poland watching. The Baltic states observing. NATO taking note. Zelensky revealing. This narrative is more than a Ukrainian story. It is a European story. And the lesson for all NATO member states is simple: Belarus is no longer a neutral state. It is a Russian military forward post. Treat it accordingly.

What the four stations of Gomel and Brest tell us about the conflict

The four repeaters in the Belarusian oblasts of Gomel and Brest tell us several important things about the state of the conflict in June 2026. They tell us that Russia continues to innovate in its strike capacity, exploiting allied territory to improve the precision of its weapons. They tell us that Belarus under Lukashenko is now militarily integrated into the Russian aggression apparatus, beyond mere tolerance or passive transit. They tell us that Ukraine faces a multidirectional threat — east, northeast, and now north via Belarus — that demands defensive resources dispersed across multiple axes.

And they also tell us that Zelensky and Ukrainian services continue to monitor, document, and reveal each enemy innovation. This intelligence and communication capacity — transforming technical facts into political arguments — is one of Ukraine's most consistent strengths since 2022. The four Gomel repeaters are now known to the entire world. And a revealed secret is a secret that has lost part of its strategic value.

What this narrative asks of those who read it

This narrative is not a request for a military decision. That is not a columnist's role. It is a narrative that seeks to make visible a hidden dimension of a conflict some parts of which remain deliberately in shadow. The Belarusian repeaters did not make the big headlines. They do not produce the spectacular images of refineries in flames. But they are changing, silently and significantly, the geography of the threat against Ukraine.

This narrative asks those who read it to keep this complexity in mind. The war in Ukraine is not only a story of fronts that advance or recede. It is a total war — physical, economic, digital, electronic — playing out across dozens of simultaneous dimensions. Understanding these dimensions, naming them, analyzing them — this is also a way of supporting Ukraine. Understanding is the precursor to action. And action, in this conflict, remains urgent.

Four repeaters in Belarusian forests. A narrative that begins in the invisible and ends in the geopolitical. This war is fought at every scale — from the navigation algorithm of a drone to the security architecture of a continent. Zelensky understood this. And in revealing the repeaters, he forced the world to understand it too.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.