DECODING: Zelensky cuts the Belarusian relays: the strike that worked

DECODING: Zelensky cuts the Belarusian relays: the strike that worked

Introduction: An ultimatum that bent a regime

June 22, 2026: the relay stations go dark

On June 24, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky announced at a press conference a development few had expected: the relay stations installed by Russia on Belarusian territory — which had been guiding Shahed drones against Ukrainian cities — had ceased operations on June 22, four days before the expiry of the ultimatum he had issued on June 19. "According to information provided by the commander-in-chief and our intelligence services, the relay stations in question ceased their operations on Belarusian territory on June 22," he declared. A result — clear and documented.

This outcome deserves a thorough decoding. How did Zelensky manage to compel Lukashenko's regime — a regime entirely under the Kremlin's thumb — to deactivate Russian equipment on its own soil? What instruments were used? What are the limits and blind spots of this victory? And what does it reveal about the new geometry of the conflict in 2026?

The context of the ultimatum: six months of patience, then action

The story of the Belarusian drone relays goes back to the second half of 2025, when Russia began installing this guidance network on Belarusian territory. Ukraine progressively mapped these installations, documented their impact on drone trajectories, and shared intelligence with its NATO partners. By February 2026, Ukraine had precise knowledge of the location of four stations in the Homiel and Brest regions. By March, reports indicated that Russia was planning to deploy more.

This patient, graduated approach reflects a maturation of Ukrainian statecraft that is easy to underestimate from the outside. The Ukraine of 2026 does not react impulsively — it builds dossiers, prepares the information environment, and times its pressure for maximum effect. That is a strategic capability in its own right.

The mechanics of the ultimatum: how Zelensky built the pressure

The gradation: from warning to direct threat

Zelensky did not issue his June 19 ultimatum impulsively. He had carefully prepared the ground over several months. In January 2026, he had begun publicly mentioning the Belarusian relays. In February, the precise mapping of the four stations had been made public. In May, Ukraine had warned of 500 strategic targets in Belarus that could be struck in the event of escalation. Each step escalated the pressure before the final demand.

This gradual escalation produces multiple effects. It gives Lukashenko time to understand that the threat is serious. It allows Ukraine's Western partners to be briefed and signal their implicit or explicit support. It creates a dynamic of public expectations that makes the threat of action credible — if Zelensky does not do what he promised, he loses credibility. And it maximises psychological pressure on Lukashenko, who knows that Ukraine has the capabilities to follow through on its warnings.

The intelligence tool: InformNapalm and open-source intelligence

Zelensky's decision to make public the precise location of the Belarusian relays was made possible by a remarkable intelligence effort. In February 2026, the organisation InformNapalm, in collaboration with the cyber analysis centre Fenix, hacked into the accounts of Russian military drone operators and accessed the surveillance systems used by the operators. This infiltration did not allow the drones to be controlled — but it provided real-time observation of operations, transmitted directly to Ukrainian defences.

This offensive intelligence capability — combining cyber, satellite imagery intelligence, and human sources — gives Ukraine precise knowledge of what is happening on Belarusian territory. Zelensky was not bluffing when he said he knew where the relay stations were. That certainty made his ultimatum credible — and credibility is the very essence of deterrence.

Why Lukashenko caved: an analysis of motivations

The Ukrainian strike threat was real

The first reason Lukashenko deactivated the relays is simple: he believed Zelensky would follow through on his strike threat. And that belief was grounded in facts. In 2025 and 2026, Ukraine multiplied deep strikes on Russian territory — ammunition depots, arms factories, military bases, oil infrastructure. These strikes demonstrated a capability and a willingness to act at great distance that did not exist at the start of the conflict.

The threat to strike targets in Belarus was therefore not rhetorical. Ukraine had both the capability and the intention. For Lukashenko, the calculation was straightforward: are the relay stations worth the risk of a Ukrainian strike on Belarusian territory? A strike that could trigger uncontrollable escalation? His answer was no — and it is the answer of a pragmatic leader who prefers to preserve his regime rather than risk an existential crisis over Russian equipment.

Moscow's pressure and Minsk's resistance

It is worth noting that the decision to deactivate the relays directly contradicted Russia's interests. Moscow had invested in this equipment and was benefiting from its use for strikes on western Ukraine. The Kremlin was pressing Lukashenko to deepen Belarus's military role — not reduce it. Minsk's decision to yield to Kyiv's ultimatum rather than Moscow's demands therefore reveals something important: Lukashenko still retains some capacity for autonomous action on specific dossiers.

The ISW analysed this decision as an indication that Lukashenko "continues to resist the full engagement of Belarus in the war" and seeks to "preserve what remains of Belarus's degraded sovereignty." This resistance is fragile and conditional — but it exists. And it creates a window for Ukraine and Western allies to maintain diplomatic pressure that discourages deeper Belarusian engagement in the conflict.

The limits of the victory: what Zelensky does not know

Deactivated or dismantled? The crucial question

Zelensky himself admitted a fundamental uncertainty in his June 24 announcement: "It is not currently clear whether Belarus has completely dismantled the relay stations or simply suspended their use." This is a critical distinction. Deactivated equipment can be brought back online within hours — it does not need to be rebuilt. If the antennas are simply disconnected from their power supply and not physically removed, the threat can return quickly, without warning, as soon as political pressure eases.

This uncertainty reveals a structural limitation of the ultimatum approach: it can produce temporary compliance without resolving the underlying structural problem. Lukashenko yielded on the existing relays — but Russia can deploy new ones, or reactivate the old ones, if circumstances change. Continuous surveillance — reconnaissance drones, cyber, signals intelligence — remains indispensable to detect any restart of operations.

New construction continues

The deactivation of the drone relay stations has not halted the broader militarisation of Belarusian territory. Zelensky's data from June 25, 2026 — on roads and depots under construction along the Ukrainian border — concerns infrastructure distinct from the relay stations. This construction continues, and it represents a longer-term military capability that cannot be switched off by a diplomatic ultimatum.

Furthermore, the 41 Russian reconnaissance drones recorded in Belarusian airspace over 10 days according to iSANS suggest that Russian operations via Belarus continue — even with the guidance relays temporarily inactive. Belarus remains a surveillance platform and potentially an action platform for Russian military operations, with or without the relay stations.

International reactions: little noise, much meaning

NATO watching, the Baltics monitoring

Zelensky's announcement about the Belarusian relays was received with discretion in allied capitals — but with genuine attention. The intelligence services of the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland were all briefed on the situation — some of them, according to available information, even received Ukrainian intelligence data on the relay station locations. The episode reinforced intelligence cooperation between Ukraine and its geographically and strategically closest partners.

Lukashenko, for his part, dismissed the entire affair as "Western propaganda" — a predictable reaction aimed at publicly minimising what was perceived internally as a climbdown. This dissonance between reality (the relay stations are dark) and official Belarusian communication (they do not exist) is characteristic of the communicative style of authoritarian regimes facing tactical defeats.

The signal sent to Moscow

Beyond the specific Belarusian situation, the success of Zelensky's ultimatum sends a signal to Moscow. It demonstrates that Ukraine is capable of constraining the behaviour of the Kremlin's closest ally by using its own strike capability as leverage. This is a form of conventional deterrence that transcends the immediate military context — it tells all actors in the region that Ukraine is an active and capable player in Eastern European geopolitics, not merely a victim awaiting rescue.

Russia saw one of its strategic investments in Belarus deactivated by Ukrainian pressure. It is a tactical defeat for Moscow — even if it can be reversed. And in an attrition war where every advantage counts, every Russian setback carries symbolic and operational weight.

Operational impact: fewer drones from the north

A documented reduction in incursions

Ground data confirms the impact of the relay station deactivation. Ukrainian border guards reported a reduction in the intensity of Shahed drone incursions from the Chernihiv region in the days following June 22. Comparing this with the two major drone waves of June 1–2 and June 14–15 — which made heavy use of the Belarusian route — concretely illustrates the impact of relay deactivation on Russian attack patterns.

Without the relay stations, modified Shahed drones lose their real-time long-range guidance capability. They revert to inertial or satellite guidance — still dangerous, but less precise and less capable of sophisticated evasion manoeuvres. Ukrainian air defence, already highly effective according to ISW reports, regains an increased advantage in intercepting these devices.

Ukraine's capability denial strategy

The relay station episode fits within a broader Ukraine strategy — that of capability denial against Russia. By striking arms factories, ammunition depots, oil refineries, communications infrastructure, and now by compelling the deactivation of Belarusian relays, Ukraine seeks to systematically degrade Russian military capability. Every Russian capability neutralised reduces the effectiveness of future strikes and forces Moscow to mobilise additional resources to compensate.

This capability denial strategy is complemented by the deep-strike campaign — the ISW having documented 210 strikes in May and 145 in June 2026 against Russian infrastructure. The destruction of 6,000 tonnes of munitions at the Baltic Fleet arsenal near St. Petersburg — confirmed by Zelensky on June 24 — illustrates the scale of this campaign. In this context, neutralising the Belarusian relays is one more link in a coherent strategy.

The next targets: toward systematic pressure on Minsk

Mapping Belarusian dependencies

Zelensky has clearly indicated that the Belarusian relay stations were not an isolated case but an illustration of a broader policy: identify every point of support that Belarus provides to Russia's war machine and apply pressure to neutralise it. ISW experts have documented several categories of relevant infrastructure: communications relays, logistical depots, land transit corridors, and hybrid force training bases. Each category represents a potential target for future Ukrainian diplomatic or military pressure.

Ukraine today has precise intelligence on these infrastructures — a targeting capability confirmed by the accuracy of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian depots documented by the specialist outlet Defence-UA. This intelligence is enormous leverage. Lukashenko knows this, and it partly explains his swift capitulation on the relay stations. The question is no longer whether Zelensky will renew this pressure, but on which target he will concentrate it next.

The signal sent to Moscow: Minsk is no longer a sanctuary

The psychological rupture of the Belarusian sanctuary

For a long time, Putin used Belarus as a sanctuary — a territory from which he could strike Ukraine without risk of direct retaliation, knowing that Kyiv did not want to open a second front. The relay station episode cracked that certainty. By showing he was prepared to strike the Belarusian relays and to apply direct pressure on Lukashenko, Zelensky sent a clear message to Moscow: the Belarusian sanctuary has a limit, and that limit is the active use of its territory against Ukraine.

This signal is fundamental for the course of the conflict. Putin will have to recalculate the risks associated with every capability he deploys in Belarus. Every new system, every new infrastructure he installs on Belarusian soil can now become the target of a Ukrainian ultimatum. Russia had structured part of its logistics on the assumption that Belarus was beyond reach — that assumption is now obsolete, and Russian military planners must integrate this new reality into their operational calculus.

The limits of Russia's Belarusian calculus

Experts from Modern Diplomacy and the ISW have analysed how Russia anticipated — or rather miscalculated — the Ukrainian reaction. The Kremlin appeared to have bet that Zelensky, facing a difficult military situation on the eastern front, would not risk aggravating things on the northern front. That calculation proved wrong. Zelensky demonstrated the ability to conduct simultaneous actions on multiple diplomatic and military fronts — a capability Putin may have underestimated.

This Russian miscalculation fits into a broader pattern: since the large-scale invasion of 2022, the Kremlin has consistently underestimated Ukrainian resistance and initiative. Each time, Kyiv surprised Moscow — holding during the battle of Kyiv, launching the Kharkiv counter-offensive, striking deep on Russian soil, and now compelling the neutralisation of Belarusian relays. The pattern repeats, and it is time that Western analysts draw the appropriate conclusions about the true nature of this adversary.

Conclusion: A lesson in deterrence that applies well beyond the relay stations

Credibility as the condition for deterrence

The Belarusian relay station episode demonstrates a fundamental truth about deterrence: it only works if the threat is credible. Zelensky was able to compel Lukashenko because his strike threat was credible — built on months of demonstrated capabilities, precise intelligence on the targets, and public communication that left no exit without action.

This lesson applies to all of NATO in its interactions with Russia. Deterrence against a Russian provocation in the Baltic states or Poland will only be effective if NATO is perceived as capable of and determined to respond. The doubts about American reliability, European hesitations, Hegseth's conditionalities — everything that erodes this credibility erodes deterrence. Ukraine has shown the way: be strong, be clear, and be ready to act.

The next test

The deactivation of the relay stations is a victory, not a solution. Belarus remains militarised, construction continues, and Russian pressure on Lukashenko will not diminish. Ukraine will need to maintain constant vigilance and be prepared to renew its pressure if the relay stations come back online. And NATO will need to draw lessons from this episode for its own posture facing Russian hybrid provocations — because the next test may not be in Belarus, but in the Baltic states or on the borders of Poland.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My position

I am explicitly supportive of Zelensky's policy of firmness toward Belarus. I consider the drone relay stations a direct contribution to the war against Ukraine and their neutralisation a justified victory. I acknowledge that some analysts might view Zelensky's ultimatum as an unjustified escalation risk — that is a legitimate debate I do not close.

I want to be honest about one additional element of my positioning: I find Zelensky's wartime leadership genuinely admirable, and that admiration may incline me toward a more favourable reading of his strategic decisions than a strictly neutral analyst might apply. I have tried to correct for this, but readers should be aware of it.

My sources and their limits

The primary information on the relay station deactivation comes from Zelensky's own statements — who acknowledges not knowing whether the relays were permanently dismantled or simply deactivated. The ISW has corroborated the information. Confirmation from Ukrainian border guards of a reduction in drone incursions adds an element of operational verification. All my sources are dated from the week of June 20–27, 2026.

The core sequence of events — the ultimatum, the relay stations going offline, the announcement — is well documented across multiple independent sources. The interpretive questions — why Lukashenko caved, whether the deactivation is permanent, what Moscow's response will be — remain genuinely uncertain and are presented as analysis, not established fact.

Sources

Primary sources

Meduza — Zelensky: relay stations in Belarus went offline after ultimatum — June 24, 2026

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment June 24, 2026 — relays and Belarus

Militarnyi — Zelensky: Belarus must remove relay stations — June 20, 2026

Secondary sources

Ukrainska Pravda — No mass Shahed drone flights along Belarusian border — June 24, 2026

Belsat — What are the relay systems and why did Zelensky issue the ultimatum — June 22, 2026

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty — Relay stations Belarus-Ukraine tensions — June 26, 2026

Pozirk — Kyiv knows of four relay systems in Belarus — June 21, 2026

Modern Diplomacy — Zelensky pressures Belarus over drone operations — June 22, 2026