DECODING: Zelensky cuts the Belarusian relays: the strike that worked

June 22, 2026: the relay stations go dark

On June 24, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky announced at a press conference a development few had expected: the relay stations installed by Russia on Belarusian territory — which had been guiding Shahed drones against Ukrainian cities — had ceased operations on June 22, four days before the expiry of the ultimatum he had issued on June 19. "According to information provided by the commander-in-chief and our intelligence services, the relay stations in question ceased their operations on Belarusian territory on June 22," he declared. A result — clear and documented.

This outcome deserves a thorough decoding. How did Zelensky manage to compel Lukashenko's regime — a regime entirely under the Kremlin's thumb — to deactivate Russian equipment on its own soil? What instruments were used? What are the limits and blind spots of this victory? And what does it reveal about the new geometry of the conflict in 2026?

The context of the ultimatum: six months of patience, then action

The story of the Belarusian drone relays goes back to the second half of 2025, when Russia began installing this guidance network on Belarusian territory. Ukraine progressively mapped these installations, documented their impact on drone trajectories, and shared intelligence with its NATO partners. By February 2026, Ukraine had precise knowledge of the location of four stations in the Homiel and Brest regions. By March, reports indicated that Russia was planning to deploy more.

This patient, graduated approach reflects a maturation of Ukrainian statecraft that is easy to underestimate from the outside. The Ukraine of 2026 does not react impulsively — it builds dossiers, prepares the information environment, and times its pressure for maximum effect. That is a strategic capability in its own right.

There is something deeply satisfying about this outcome — and I am going to own that fully. Zelensky said: "remove that or we do it ourselves." And Lukashenko complied. In a context where Ukraine is often shown as the weaker party, this is a reminder that Kyiv holds real leverage. This is not a war victory — it is a demonstration of diplomatic and military strength. And that counts.

The gradation: from warning to direct threat

Zelensky did not issue his June 19 ultimatum impulsively. He had carefully prepared the ground over several months. In January 2026, he had begun publicly mentioning the Belarusian relays. In February, the precise mapping of the four stations had been made public. In May, Ukraine had warned of 500 strategic targets in Belarus that could be struck in the event of escalation. Each step escalated the pressure before the final demand.

This gradual escalation produces multiple effects. It gives Lukashenko time to understand that the threat is serious. It allows Ukraine's Western partners to be briefed and signal their implicit or explicit support. It creates a dynamic of public expectations that makes the threat of action credible — if Zelensky does not do what he promised, he loses credibility. And it maximises psychological pressure on Lukashenko, who knows that Ukraine has the capabilities to follow through on its warnings.

The intelligence tool: InformNapalm and open-source intelligence

Zelensky's decision to make public the precise location of the Belarusian relays was made possible by a remarkable intelligence effort. In February 2026, the organisation InformNapalm, in collaboration with the cyber analysis centre Fenix, hacked into the accounts of Russian military drone operators and accessed the surveillance systems used by the operators. This infiltration did not allow the drones to be controlled — but it provided real-time observation of operations, transmitted directly to Ukrainian defences.

This offensive intelligence capability — combining cyber, satellite imagery intelligence, and human sources — gives Ukraine precise knowledge of what is happening on Belarusian territory. Zelensky was not bluffing when he said he knew where the relay stations were. That certainty made his ultimatum credible — and credibility is the very essence of deterrence.

The work of InformNapalm and Fenix illustrates something I consider crucial in this war: Ukraine has developed extraordinary asymmetric capabilities that partially offset its size disparity with Russia. These are civil-military organisations, patriotic hackers, open-source analysts who contribute to the defence of their country in a way that conventional armies alone could never achieve. This is a profound military innovation.

The Ukrainian strike threat was real

The first reason Lukashenko deactivated the relays is simple: he believed Zelensky would follow through on his strike threat. And that belief was grounded in facts. In 2025 and 2026, Ukraine multiplied deep strikes on Russian territory — ammunition depots, arms factories, military bases, oil infrastructure. These strikes demonstrated a capability and a willingness to act at great distance that did not exist at the start of the conflict.

The threat to strike targets in Belarus was therefore not rhetorical. Ukraine had both the capability and the intention. For Lukashenko, the calculation was straightforward: are the relay stations worth the risk of a Ukrainian strike on Belarusian territory? A strike that could trigger uncontrollable escalation? His answer was no — and it is the answer of a pragmatic leader who prefers to preserve his regime rather than risk an existential crisis over Russian equipment.

Moscow's pressure and Minsk's resistance

It is worth noting that the decision to deactivate the relays directly contradicted Russia's interests. Moscow had invested in this equipment and was benefiting from its use for strikes on western Ukraine. The Kremlin was pressing Lukashenko to deepen Belarus's military role — not reduce it. Minsk's decision to yield to Kyiv's ultimatum rather than Moscow's demands therefore reveals something important: Lukashenko still retains some capacity for autonomous action on specific dossiers.

The ISW analysed this decision as an indication that Lukashenko "continues to resist the full engagement of Belarus in the war" and seeks to "preserve what remains of Belarus's degraded sovereignty." This resistance is fragile and conditional — but it exists. And it creates a window for Ukraine and Western allies to maintain diplomatic pressure that discourages deeper Belarusian engagement in the conflict.

This partial resistance of Lukashenko to Putin is one of the most interesting and least discussed phenomena of the current war. A dictator under the total grip of another dictator who still refuses to give everything — this is a geopolitically fascinating situation. It says something about the dynamics of power between authoritarian states: even vassals have a servitude threshold beyond which they will not go.

Deactivated or dismantled? The crucial question

Zelensky himself admitted a fundamental uncertainty in his June 24 announcement: "It is not currently clear whether Belarus has completely dismantled the relay stations or simply suspended their use." This is a critical distinction. Deactivated equipment can be brought back online within hours — it does not need to be rebuilt. If the antennas are simply disconnected from their power supply and not physically removed, the threat can return quickly, without warning, as soon as political pressure eases.

This uncertainty reveals a structural limitation of the ultimatum approach: it can produce temporary compliance without resolving the underlying structural problem. Lukashenko yielded on the existing relays — but Russia can deploy new ones, or reactivate the old ones, if circumstances change. Continuous surveillance — reconnaissance drones, cyber, signals intelligence — remains indispensable to detect any restart of operations.

New construction continues

The deactivation of the drone relay stations has not halted the broader militarisation of Belarusian territory. Zelensky's data from June 25, 2026 — on roads and depots under construction along the Ukrainian border — concerns infrastructure distinct from the relay stations. This construction continues, and it represents a longer-term military capability that cannot be switched off by a diplomatic ultimatum.

Furthermore, the 41 Russian reconnaissance drones recorded in Belarusian airspace over 10 days according to iSANS suggest that Russian operations via Belarus continue — even with the guidance relays temporarily inactive. Belarus remains a surveillance platform and potentially an action platform for Russian military operations, with or without the relay stations.

We must remain clear-eyed about this victory. Zelensky won a tactical battle — not a strategic victory. The relay stations are dark today. Tomorrow, if Putin insists enough, if financial pressures on Lukashenko intensify, they can light up again. Celebrating without analysing the limits means preparing for the next unpleasant surprise.

NATO watching, the Baltics monitoring

Zelensky's announcement about the Belarusian relays was received with discretion in allied capitals — but with genuine attention. The intelligence services of the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland were all briefed on the situation — some of them, according to available information, even received Ukrainian intelligence data on the relay station locations. The episode reinforced intelligence cooperation between Ukraine and its geographically and strategically closest partners.

Lukashenko, for his part, dismissed the entire affair as "Western propaganda" — a predictable reaction aimed at publicly minimising what was perceived internally as a climbdown. This dissonance between reality (the relay stations are dark) and official Belarusian communication (they do not exist) is characteristic of the communicative style of authoritarian regimes facing tactical defeats.

The signal sent to Moscow

Beyond the specific Belarusian situation, the success of Zelensky's ultimatum sends a signal to Moscow. It demonstrates that Ukraine is capable of constraining the behaviour of the Kremlin's closest ally by using its own strike capability as leverage. This is a form of conventional deterrence that transcends the immediate military context — it tells all actors in the region that Ukraine is an active and capable player in Eastern European geopolitics, not merely a victim awaiting rescue.

Russia saw one of its strategic investments in Belarus deactivated by Ukrainian pressure. It is a tactical defeat for Moscow — even if it can be reversed. And in an attrition war where every advantage counts, every Russian setback carries symbolic and operational weight.

What this episode reveals to me is that Ukraine has learned something profound since 2022: credible military coercion is more effective than diplomacy alone. When Ukraine says "we will strike if you do not act," regional actors take that threat seriously — because they have watched Ukraine strike targets thousands of kilometres away. This is a major strategic transformation that deserves to be fully recognised.

A documented reduction in incursions

Ground data confirms the impact of the relay station deactivation. Ukrainian border guards reported a reduction in the intensity of Shahed drone incursions from the Chernihiv region in the days following June 22. Comparing this with the two major drone waves of June 1–2 and June 14–15 — which made heavy use of the Belarusian route — concretely illustrates the impact of relay deactivation on Russian attack patterns.

Without the relay stations, modified Shahed drones lose their real-time long-range guidance capability. They revert to inertial or satellite guidance — still dangerous, but less precise and less capable of sophisticated evasion manoeuvres. Ukrainian air defence, already highly effective according to ISW reports, regains an increased advantage in intercepting these devices.

Ukraine's capability denial strategy

The relay station episode fits within a broader Ukraine strategy — that of capability denial against Russia. By striking arms factories, ammunition depots, oil refineries, communications infrastructure, and now by compelling the deactivation of Belarusian relays, Ukraine seeks to systematically degrade Russian military capability. Every Russian capability neutralised reduces the effectiveness of future strikes and forces Moscow to mobilise additional resources to compensate.

This capability denial strategy is complemented by the deep-strike campaign — the ISW having documented 210 strikes in May and 145 in June 2026 against Russian infrastructure. The destruction of 6,000 tonnes of munitions at the Baltic Fleet arsenal near St. Petersburg — confirmed by Zelensky on June 24 — illustrates the scale of this campaign. In this context, neutralising the Belarusian relays is one more link in a coherent strategy.

I want to close with a reflection on what Zelensky represents as a wartime leader. He is not perfect, he makes mistakes, and some of his decisions are contested. But in this relay station episode, he demonstrated something essential: the ability to combine diplomatic pressure, intelligence, public communication, and credible military threat to achieve a concrete result. That is wartime leadership — and it is impressive.

Mapping Belarusian dependencies

Zelensky has clearly indicated that the Belarusian relay stations were not an isolated case but an illustration of a broader policy: identify every point of support that Belarus provides to Russia's war machine and apply pressure to neutralise it. ISW experts have documented several categories of relevant infrastructure: communications relays, logistical depots, land transit corridors, and hybrid force training bases. Each category represents a potential target for future Ukrainian diplomatic or military pressure.

Ukraine today has precise intelligence on these infrastructures — a targeting capability confirmed by the accuracy of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian depots documented by the specialist outlet Defence-UA. This intelligence is enormous leverage. Lukashenko knows this, and it partly explains his swift capitulation on the relay stations. The question is no longer whether Zelensky will renew this pressure, but on which target he will concentrate it next.

There is something fundamentally new in Ukraine's strategy over these past months. For two years, Ukraine mostly reacted — defending positions, absorbing strikes, requesting weapons. Today, it sets the tempo: it strikes in depth, it issues ultimatums, it compels third-party actors. This is no longer the same war. And this qualitative shift deserves to be recognised for what it is.

The psychological rupture of the Belarusian sanctuary

For a long time, Putin used Belarus as a sanctuary — a territory from which he could strike Ukraine without risk of direct retaliation, knowing that Kyiv did not want to open a second front. The relay station episode cracked that certainty. By showing he was prepared to strike the Belarusian relays and to apply direct pressure on Lukashenko, Zelensky sent a clear message to Moscow: the Belarusian sanctuary has a limit, and that limit is the active use of its territory against Ukraine.

This signal is fundamental for the course of the conflict. Putin will have to recalculate the risks associated with every capability he deploys in Belarus. Every new system, every new infrastructure he installs on Belarusian soil can now become the target of a Ukrainian ultimatum. Russia had structured part of its logistics on the assumption that Belarus was beyond reach — that assumption is now obsolete, and Russian military planners must integrate this new reality into their operational calculus.

The limits of Russia's Belarusian calculus

Experts from Modern Diplomacy and the ISW have analysed how Russia anticipated — or rather miscalculated — the Ukrainian reaction. The Kremlin appeared to have bet that Zelensky, facing a difficult military situation on the eastern front, would not risk aggravating things on the northern front. That calculation proved wrong. Zelensky demonstrated the ability to conduct simultaneous actions on multiple diplomatic and military fronts — a capability Putin may have underestimated.

This Russian miscalculation fits into a broader pattern: since the large-scale invasion of 2022, the Kremlin has consistently underestimated Ukrainian resistance and initiative. Each time, Kyiv surprised Moscow — holding during the battle of Kyiv, launching the Kharkiv counter-offensive, striking deep on Russian soil, and now compelling the neutralisation of Belarusian relays. The pattern repeats, and it is time that Western analysts draw the appropriate conclusions about the true nature of this adversary.

Russia has underestimated Ukraine at every decisive turning point of this war. And every time, it has paid the price. There is no reason to believe this dynamic will spontaneously reverse. Putin is locked into a war he can no longer win in the way he originally envisioned — and he does not yet appear to have found an honourable exit. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to advance.

Credibility as the condition for deterrence

The Belarusian relay station episode demonstrates a fundamental truth about deterrence: it only works if the threat is credible. Zelensky was able to compel Lukashenko because his strike threat was credible — built on months of demonstrated capabilities, precise intelligence on the targets, and public communication that left no exit without action.

This lesson applies to all of NATO in its interactions with Russia. Deterrence against a Russian provocation in the Baltic states or Poland will only be effective if NATO is perceived as capable of and determined to respond. The doubts about American reliability, European hesitations, Hegseth's conditionalities — everything that erodes this credibility erodes deterrence. Ukraine has shown the way: be strong, be clear, and be ready to act.

The next test

The deactivation of the relay stations is a victory, not a solution. Belarus remains militarised, construction continues, and Russian pressure on Lukashenko will not diminish. Ukraine will need to maintain constant vigilance and be prepared to renew its pressure if the relay stations come back online. And NATO will need to draw lessons from this episode for its own posture facing Russian hybrid provocations — because the next test may not be in Belarus, but in the Baltic states or on the borders of Poland.

History may well record this episode as a minor turning point in a great war. But for those living through it — the Ukrainian civilians who wake less often to the sound of air raid sirens from the north, the families of soldiers defending the Belarusian border — it is not a footnote. It is one fewer night under the bombs. And every night like that counts.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.