COMMENTARY: The IAEA demands strong guarantees: trust is not enough

COMMENTARY: The IAEA demands strong guarantees: trust is not enough

Introduction: Grossi's words, and their weight

The IAEA Director General takes a stand

On June 26, 2026, speaking to journalists in Tokyo, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said words that should not have needed saying. "A very strong verification system must be put in place" to monitor Iran's nuclear programme, he declared. "The government of Iran has stated quite clearly that developing nuclear weapons is not their intention. But of course, intentions are not enough."

That statement is remarkable in its simplicity. The man who leads the international organization tasked with verifying that states honour their nuclear commitments is saying: we need to verify — not to trust. That is the very foundation of international non-proliferation law. And yet, this minimum requirement sits at the heart of a standoff that may well define the outcome of the US-Iranian negotiations in the weeks ahead.

The memorandum of understanding and its gaps

The preliminary agreement signed between the United States and Iran on June 14, 2026 contains, according to Grossi, an explicit provision on IAEA oversight of Iranian nuclear activities. The text of the MoU, of which a 14-point version was made public by Tehran, mentions this oversight. Grossi is categorical: "The memorandum of understanding established with the United States explicitly stipulates that nuclear activities concerning nuclear materials and facilities will be supervised by the IAEA."

But here is the problem: Iran contests that reading. Iranian Deputy Minister Kazem Gharabadi responded publicly that access by UN inspectors to targeted nuclear sites would be "exclusively evaluated and resolved in the context of a final deal" with the United States. In other words: no final deal, no inspectors. That is not the same thing as what Grossi understood from the text.

The IAEA and Iran: a documented history of violations

A damning quarterly report

The IAEA's quarterly report published in June 2026 — even before the MoU was signed — continued to declare Iran in violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The agency maintains that Iran has not provided accurate and complete information on its nuclear activities, has restricted inspector access to certain sites, and has not cooperated fully with ongoing investigations into traces of nuclear material detected at undeclared sites.

A draft resolution at the IAEA, backed by the United States and European members — France, Germany, United Kingdom (E3) — demanded that Iran provide "accurate information on nuclear material accounting" and grant inspectors "without delay" access to all relevant installations. That text was tabled at the start of June 2026, before the deal was signed — signalling the deep frustration of the IAEA's Western members at Iran's continued obstruction.

The bombed sites: grey zones in the verification picture

The complexity of the situation also stems from the fact that the US and Israeli strikes of February 2026 damaged — and in some cases partially destroyed — Iranian nuclear sites, notably the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow. This physical destruction complicates verification: what remains to be inspected in bombed tunnels and centrifuge halls? What nuclear materials were dispersed? Where does the programme actually stand after the strikes?

For the IAEA, this uncertainty is precisely why inspections are urgent and necessary. Without access to the sites — even damaged ones — it is impossible to draw up an accurate assessment of the state of Iran's nuclear programme. And without that assessment, any discussion of the "guarantees" Iran is offering is fundamentally hollow.

Iran's position: nuclear negotiation as bargaining chip

Iran that ties everything to everything

Iran's negotiating strategy throughout this crisis has been consistent: link every nuclear concession to a concrete economic or diplomatic counterpart. From Tehran's perspective, this is not irrational — Iran learned from the experience of the 2015 JCPOA, in which it made significant nuclear concessions only to see the agreement abandoned unilaterally by Trump in 2018. Iran's distrust of Washington is therefore structural and historically grounded.

But that distrust cannot translate into a refusal of independent verification. Grossi put it plainly: "Inspections are going to happen. It is not a question of if, but of when." That assertion rests on his reading of the MoU — but Tehran contests it. If the 60 days of the technical negotiation phase run out without that dispute being resolved, the deal itself will be compromised.

Iran's sovereignty argument

Iran has also advanced the sovereignty argument: IAEA inspections would constitute a violation of its national sovereignty. That argument is rejected by the international community — Iran is a signatory to the NPT and has therefore voluntarily subscribed to the IAEA inspection regime. Sovereignty cannot be invoked to escape contractual obligations freely assumed. But this rhetorical argument will be deployed domestically by the regime's hardest-line factions to resist any concession.

The situation echoes, mutatis mutandis, the rhetoric of "sovereign claims" that Russia uses to justify its refusal to submit to the norms of international law. In both cases, the invocation of sovereignty is a political tool designed to paralyse international accountability mechanisms. Western democracies must be clear: sovereignty does not protect against freely contracted obligations.

The "breakout time" question: the heart of the nuclear issue

What is nuclear breakout time?

The concept of "breakout time" — the time needed to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon — is central to the IAEA's concerns and those of American negotiators. Before the February 2026 strikes, Iran had accumulated enough uranium enriched to 60% to approach weapons-grade threshold. The strikes potentially destroyed part of those stockpiles and enrichment capacity — but "potentially" is not "certainly."

Without inspector access, no one can say with certainty what the current state of Iran's programme is. That is precisely what the IAEA is seeking to assess — and it is precisely what Iran is pushing to a later date. That delay is not trivial: every week without inspections is a week during which reconstitution activities could theoretically proceed unmonitored.

The Board of Governors resolution and its implications

The resolution tabled at the IAEA by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany in June 2026 demanded that Iran provide accurate information on its nuclear materials and grant immediate access to inspectors. This resolution comes in a context where the IAEA has repeatedly declared that Iran had produced uranium enriched to 60% in violation of its commitments — a concentration with no practical use outside a weapons programme.

If Iran refuses to meet the verification demands during the ongoing negotiations, the members of the IAEA Board of Governors will face a choice between two options: accept a deal without solid verification — which would be a historic mistake — or reject the deal and return to confrontation. Neither option is satisfactory. The pressure on negotiators to secure concrete guarantees is therefore immense.

Historical precedents: what history teaches us

The 2015 JCPOA: lessons from an imperfect agreement

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in 2015 was a significant diplomatic achievement: Iran agreed to reduce its enriched uranium stockpile, limit its enrichment capacity, and host IAEA inspectors with enhanced access. In exchange, sanctions were partially lifted. For several years, the mechanism worked — the IAEA confirmed multiple times that Iran was respecting its commitments.

But two major flaws had undermined the JCPOA in the long run. First, the agreement did not cover Iran's ballistic missile programme or the regional activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Second, it was contingent on American political goodwill — a condition Trump destroyed by withdrawing unilaterally in 2018. These two flaws have fed Iran's current distrust, and they raise the question: how do you build a 2026 agreement that can survive the next American administration?

Iraq 2003 and the lesson of insufficient inspection

Recent Middle Eastern history also offers the opposite example: a military intervention based on faulty intelligence about weapons of mass destruction that proved catastrophic — the invasion of Iraq in 2003. If insufficient verification can lead to dangerous tolerance of a real nuclear programme, a rush based on unverified information can lead to an unjustified war. This dual risk illustrates the importance of independent, rigorous, and continuous verification — which is exactly what the IAEA represents.

These precedents reinforce Grossi's conviction that inspections cannot be deferred until "after a final deal." In the world of non-proliferation, time is critical. Every additional delay without verification is an additional opportunity for undeclared activities to continue unmonitored. That is a reality Tehran knows perfectly well — and it is precisely why certain Iranian factions keep pushing to defer inspections.

What democracies must demand

Non-negotiable minimum conditions

If Western democracies — United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany — want an agreement with Iran to be genuinely lasting, they must insist on a number of non-negotiable minimum conditions. First, immediate and unconditional IAEA inspector access to nuclear sites — including those damaged by strikes. Second, a continuous and enhanced verification mechanism, including snap inspections. Third, automatic "snapback" sanctions protocols in the event of a confirmed violation — a mechanism that existed in the JCPOA but was insufficiently used.

These conditions are not punitive — they are the minimum necessary for the deal to have real substance rather than merely symbolic value. Without them, the June 2026 agreement risks resembling a pause in the confrontation rather than a lasting transformation of relations between the West and Iran.

Europe's role in the weeks ahead

Europe has a particular role to play in this critical phase. As members of the IAEA Board of Governors and parties to nuclear negotiations with Iran for over twenty years, Paris, Berlin, and London possess a technical expertise and diplomatic credibility that Washington alone does not have. Europe must use that leverage to insist on robust verification guarantees — even if it complicates the negotiating timeline, even if it irritates Tehran, and even if it puts Washington in an uncomfortable position.

This is precisely the role of guardian of international norms that Europe must assume — not to obstruct the United States, but to ensure that whatever deal emerges will be solid, verifiable, and durable. A rushed nuclear deal with Iran will prove far more dangerous in the long run than no deal accompanied by clear guarantees.

The major powers' positions: who actually wants to verify Iran?

Washington between nuclear ambition and political compromise

The agreement signed by the United States with Iran in June 2026 is a compromise that reflects the limits of what Washington was prepared to demand. JD Vance presented the deal as a diplomatic success — and on some points, it is. IAEA inspector access to previously closed sites, the reduction of certain enriched uranium stockpiles, commitments on centrifuge transparency: these are real advances over the previous status quo.

But several independent nuclear experts point out that Iran's commitments fall short of what the original 2015 JCPOA had obtained — and that deal was itself criticized for being insufficient. The question of "breakout time" — the time needed for Iran to produce enough fissile material for a weapon — remains at the centre of debate. Recent estimates put it at between one and three weeks, a horizon that experts consider dangerously short for an effective diplomatic or military response.

Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran: the triangle of resistance to inspections

Russia and China have systematically weakened the pressure mechanisms on Iran within the UN Security Council. Their repeated vetoes on resolutions aimed at strengthening sanctions and verification mechanisms have allowed Tehran to navigate the blind spots of the international system. This tacit — and sometimes explicit — support partly explains why Iran has been able to advance its nuclear capabilities as far as it has despite Western pressure.

For Moscow, an Iran that is nucleariy advanced but not officially armed is the ideal scenario: it keeps pressure on the United States and their regional allies, consumes Western diplomatic resources, and creates a zone of instability that diverts attention from Ukraine. For Beijing, an economically integrated but geopolitically disruptive Iran offers both an energy partner and a tool for pressuring US policy in the Middle East. These cynical calculations do not disappear with a US-Iranian deal.

Regional consequences: Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the arms race

Israel facing the deal: between official pragmatism and deep scepticism

Israel reacted to the US-Iran deal with its characteristic blend of official pragmatism and profound scepticism. The Netanyahu government welcomed the elements of the deal concerning IAEA inspections, while expressing doubts about their adequacy and binding character. For Tel Aviv, the experience of previous agreements with Iran — notably the JCPOA that Trump abandoned in 2018 precisely at Israel's request — left deep scars on the trust extended to any diplomatic framework with Tehran.

Israel's doctrine on Iran is clear: the Jewish state cannot allow Iran to reach military nuclear capability, regardless of formal diplomatic guarantees. That non-negotiable red line explains why sabotage operations attributed to Israel against Iranian nuclear facilities — and against scientists — continued even during phases of diplomacy. For Jerusalem, deterrence also passes through unilateral actions that multilateral agreements cannot replace.

The question of regional proliferation: a real and documented risk

The most troubling paradox in the Iranian nuclear situation is what experts call the "proliferation cascade." If Iran achieves military nuclear capability — even implicit, even unacknowledged — several countries in the region could seek to develop their own capabilities as a counterweight. Saudi Arabia has explicitly stated, through Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman himself, that it would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran developed them. The Crown Prince made that statement publicly in 2018 — it remains current.

Turkey, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates have all developed civilian nuclear energy programmes — a step that can be compatible with latent military ambitions. The IAEA monitors these programmes, but the tension between the sovereign right to civilian nuclear energy and the risks of proliferation is a structural constant of the non-proliferation regime. A Middle East in which multiple states possess military nuclear capabilities would be one of the most dangerous configurations in contemporary history — and insufficient Iranian guarantees bring us closer to that scenario.

Conclusion: trust is built, not declared

What Grossi is really telling us

When Rafael Grossi declares that "intentions are not enough," he is not putting Iran on trial for bad faith. He is restating a fundamental principle of nuclear diplomacy: trust cannot replace verification. That principle was enshrined in the NPT precisely because a government's intentions can change, leaders come and go, and circumstances evolve. What endures is international law and the verification mechanisms that give it teeth.

The stakes for global non-proliferation

What plays out in the next 60 days of negotiations goes beyond the Iranian file alone. If a deal is concluded without robust verification, it will send a signal to other states that see a nuclear programme as an insurance policy: that Western democracies can be brought to accept insufficient guarantees when economic pressure is strong enough. That is a catastrophic precedent for global non-proliferation. The IAEA is demanding strong guarantees. It is right. The world must listen.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Position on the nuclear file

I believe that every state not recognized as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT must honour its non-proliferation obligations and submit to independent IAEA verification. That position is consistent and non-selective — I apply it to Iran as I would apply it to any other state. I acknowledge the legitimacy of Iran's aspirations to a fair agreement and the normalization of its international relations — those aspirations are compatible with rigorous verification.

What I don't know

I do not have access to the full IAEA quarterly report for June 2026 — I am relying on summaries and analyses from FDD and specialized media. I do not know what IAEA inspections would find exactly at the damaged Iranian sites. The actual state of Iran's nuclear programme post-strikes is an unknown that only on-site inspectors could resolve.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — IAEA demands a "very strong" verification system for Iran's nuclear programme — June 26, 2026

Al Jazeera — UN nuclear chief says Iran inspections "are going to happen" — June 24, 2026

Euronews — IAEA chief: nuclear inspections in Iran are going to happen — June 24, 2026

Washington Times — Vance says Iran agreed to nuclear inspectors, hails "good foundation" for final deal — June 22, 2026

Secondary sources

FDD — Analysis of IAEA Iran verification and monitoring and NPT safeguards reports — June 2026

UK FCDO — NPT safeguards agreement with Iran: resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors — June 2026

NPR — IAEA chief says inspectors will visit Iranian nuclear sites — June 24, 2026