PROFILE: Netanyahu, the Man Who Says No — and the Diplomatic Options Shrinking in Gaza

Introduction: a declaration that closes doors

June 25, 2026: a sentence that resonates across chancelleries

During a commissioning ceremony for combat officers in southern Israel, on June 25, 2026, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke words that went directly against any diplomatic trajectory toward an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza: "We will remain in Lebanon, in Syria, and in Gaza for as long as necessary." His Defence Minister Israel Katz was even more explicit, declaring that the Israeli army would remain in these zones "without a time limit." This is not an ambiguous formulation. It is a frontal refusal of any withdrawal horizon.

These declarations come in a particularly tense context. Since a ceasefire took effect in October 2025, negotiated under the aegis of the United States, fragile arrangements had allowed hope for a transition toward Palestinian governance in Gaza. But the month preceding Netanyahu's declaration, he had ordered the army to occupy 70% of the Gaza Strip — according to the news site Middle East Eye — in clear violation of the commitments made. At the moment of the June 25 declarations, the Israeli army already controlled approximately 60% of the territory.

Portrait of a man who has chosen his side

Benjamin Netanyahu is a political figure of genuine complexity. At 76, he is Israel's longest-serving prime minister in the country's history. He has survived corruption scandals, unstable coalition governments, partial military setbacks, and constant international pressure. His political survival is itself an art form. But the declarations of June 25, 2026 suggest that this political survival now passes through an explicit commitment to the indefinite occupation of territories that the international community largely considers zones of illegal occupation.

What makes the situation particularly difficult diplomatically is that Netanyahu is not in a position of internal political weakness. His governing coalition holds, and the hard line he defends is popular among significant segments of the Israeli electorate. Negotiating with a leader who has clear political incentives to maintain the status quo is a diplomatically daunting task.

Trump's peace plan: what it envisioned and why it is in trouble

The Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict

In September 2025, President Donald Trump announced at a press conference in the presence of Netanyahu what he called the "Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict." This plan, endorsed by the UN Security Council in November 2025, provided for an immediate ceasefire, the release of all hostages, prisoner exchanges, the demilitarization of Gaza, the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), transitional governance by Palestinian technocrats under international supervision, and large-scale reconstruction. It also provided for "a conditional pathway toward Palestinian self-determination."

The first phase of the plan was partially implemented: the remaining hostages were released, a semblance of ceasefire was maintained. But the second phase — which involved the demilitarization of Hamas, the establishment of a technocratic government, and the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces — is at a standstill. Hamas refuses verifiable disarmament. Israel, for its part, has resumed large-scale military operations. And Netanyahu has publicly declared that Israel will not withdraw from Gaza.

The ISF and its compromised deployment

One of the central elements of the Trump plan was the deployment of an International Stabilization Force supposed to supervise the transition in Gaza. Several countries had expressed interest in participating — Indonesia had even announced a potential contingent of 8,000 soldiers by June 2026. But the deployment of this force presupposes that Israeli forces withdraw sufficiently to allow the ISF to operate freely. With 60% of Gaza's territory under Israeli control and Netanyahu's declaration of indefinite occupation, this prerequisite is not met.

The International Stabilization Force cannot set up in a territory where a foreign army is simultaneously conducting offensive operations. There would be real risks of accidental or deliberate confrontation. Contributing countries cannot expose their soldiers to this type of situation without clear guarantees. Netanyahu's declaration therefore makes the deployment of the ISF practically impossible in the current context, thereby compromising the central element that was supposed to enable the transition to post-Hamas Palestinian governance.

The diplomatic options still available

American pressure: the only lever that counts

In the diplomatic architecture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one reality has imposed itself for decades: only the United States holds a real lever over Israel. American military aid, estimated at approximately $3.8 billion annually in normal times and considerably increased since October 2023, constitutes the main instrument of potential pressure. If Washington were to condition this aid on respect for withdrawal commitments, Netanyahu would find himself in a very different position.

But under the Trump administration, this option is unlikely. Trump has made support for Israel one of his most consistent political positions, and his electoral base — notably Christian evangelicals — firmly backs Israel in its current posture. The US Congress regularly votes military aid to Israel with comfortable majorities in both parties. The likelihood that Washington will impose real conditionality on its aid to Israel remains extremely low in the current political context.

European and UN pressure: symbolic but insufficient

The European Union and the United Nations have multiplied critical declarations regarding Israeli policy in Gaza. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. The UN Security Council has adopted resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal. Several European countries have recognized the Palestinian state. All these measures carry non-negligible symbolic weight, but they have not fundamentally altered Netanyahu's calculations.

Israel can ignore ICC warrants by not travelling to countries that have ratified the Rome Statute. UN resolutions are not binding. European recognition of Palestine comes without enforcement mechanisms. European and UN pressure is real in the symbolic and diplomatic space, but it runs up against the absence of coercive mechanisms. Without the United States, international diplomacy cannot impose anything on Israel.

Netanyahu facing international law

The ICC warrants and their practical consequences

In November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu for war crimes. This decision — historic in its subject matter, as it targeted the head of government of a democracy allied with the West — created an unprecedented diplomatic situation. Several countries, including members of the European Union, would be legally bound to arrest Netanyahu if he visited their territory.

In practice, Netanyahu has become a leader whose international travel is constrained. He can no longer visit certain countries without risking arrest. His closest allies — the United States, which is not a party to the Rome Statute — offer him political refuge, but even they cannot cancel the practical effects of the warrants. This situation illustrates the fundamental contradiction in which Western policy finds itself: supporting an ally whose head of government is the subject of international arrest warrants.

The occupation of Gaza: a violation of international law according to the UN

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and several UN bodies have declared that Israel's occupation of Gaza violates international law. The expansion of the occupation to 60–70% of the territory, in violation of the October 2025 ceasefire, has been condemned by numerous states and international organizations. Palestine has addressed the Security Council with letters requesting a permanent ceasefire and an end to the occupation, under international law principles that repeated votes of the General Assembly have reaffirmed.

But Netanyahu's Israel advances a justification that does not belong to international law but to security necessity. The "security zones" in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria are presented as imperative conditions for the survival of the State of Israel. This rhetoric of security necessity is powerful and difficult to contest emotionally — all the more so after the attacks of October 7, 2023. But it does not fit within an international legal framework that recognizes the legitimacy of indefinite occupation of third-party territories.

Hamas: the other party that blocks

The refusal to disarm and its consequences

It would be intellectually dishonest to focus this analysis solely on Netanyahu without mentioning the obstacles posed by Hamas. The organization continues to refuse verifiable disarmament — the central condition of the second phase of the Trump plan. According to UN documents, Hamas "refuses to accept verified decommissioning, to relinquish its coercive control, and to allow a genuine civilian transition in Gaza." This refusal is not incidental: it constitutes the main obstacle to the implementation of the peace plan as designed.

Hamas is not an organization seeking a two-state solution. Its ideology rests on the destruction of the State of Israel, and its maintenance of power in Gaza is presented as the only way to prevent the Palestinian resistance from being eliminated. In this context, accepting disarmament is equivalent for Hamas to accepting its own political — and perhaps physical — disappearance. It is difficult to negotiate seriously with an organization whose very identity is defined by opposition to the other party's existence.

The Palestinian Authority as a possible alternative

The Trump plan envisioned a transition to governance by a reformed Palestinian Authority, cleansed of its corrupt elements and renewed by technocrats. This vision is seductive in theory. In practice, the Palestinian Authority has lost much of its legitimacy in the eyes of Gazans since being sidelined during Hamas's seizure of power in 2007. Its return to Gaza would require an agreement with Palestinian factions, significant internal reform, and international support — notably Arab — robust enough to allow it to impose itself on a devastated territory without the military backing of Hamas.

This scenario is not impossible, but it requires conditions that are not currently in place. It requires in particular that Israel be willing to withdraw its forces in exchange for the deployment of an international force — something that Netanyahu has just rendered politically impossible through his June 25 declarations. The circle is vicious: the Israeli military presence legitimizes Hamas's refusal to disarm, and Hamas's refusal to disarm legitimizes the Israeli military presence.

Regional actors: between hope and disillusionment

Arab countries and their ambiguous role

Several Arab countries — Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, Saudi Arabia — have played more or less active mediation roles in the conflict. Qatar has been particularly active as an intermediary between Hamas and Western negotiators. Egypt controls the Rafah crossing, the only land entry point into Gaza not passing through Israeli territory. These countries have complex interests: they want an end to the violence, but none wants to see a total Hamas victory, nor, for most, an indefinite Israeli occupation.

Saudi Arabia occupies a particularly interesting position. Before October 2023, negotiations were underway for an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement — what Netanyahu was then presenting as his main diplomatic objective. Those negotiations are today frozen. Riyadh has made clear that normalization with Israel is now conditioned on concrete progress toward a Palestinian state. In this context, Netanyahu's declaration of indefinite occupation destroys the prospect of Saudi normalization — a real cost to Israeli foreign policy that Netanyahu appears willing to accept.

The reconstruction of Gaza: an impossible undertaking under occupation

The plan for Gaza's reconstruction is intimately linked to political questions. No serious international donor — whether Gulf countries, Western nations, or international financial institutions — will invest in the massive reconstruction of a territory militarily occupied by a foreign power that refuses any withdrawal horizon. Reconstruction requires security, governance, and the prospect of a normal life for inhabitants. None of these conditions are met under indefinite Israeli occupation.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains catastrophic. Despite the October 2025 ceasefire, hundreds of Palestinians have been killed since then according to humanitarian organizations and UN reports. Infrastructure — water, electricity, hospitals — remains largely destroyed. Reconstruction requires investments of several tens of billions of dollars — the $5 billion announced by Trump's Board of Peace is insufficient for a truly transformative reconstruction. And these investments will not come without a clear political horizon.

Netanyahu: the strategist of calculated inaction

Indefinite occupation as a strategy

To understand Netanyahu, one must understand his fundamental political logic. His political survival in Israel depends on maintaining a right-wing and far-right coalition that considers any territorial concession a betrayal. Ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich — two pivots of his coalition — have repeatedly threatened to bring down the government if Netanyahu makes concessions. In this context, indefinite occupation is not merely a strategic conviction: it is a political survival necessity.

This reality does not absolve Netanyahu of the responsibility for his choices. He could have formed a different coalition. He could have sacrificed his political survival for an agreement more favourable to regional peace. He made other choices. Historians will debate his place in history. What is certain today is that his declarations of June 25, 2026 constitute a major obstacle to any negotiated diplomatic exit from the conflict.

The ongoing trials and their effect on political calculations

Benjamin Netanyahu is still facing criminal charges in Israel for corruption, fraud, and breach of trust in several cases. These trials — the most advanced concerns Case 4000, linked to favours granted to shareholders of the media company Bezeq — constitute a sword of Damocles over his political career. Some Israeli analysts argue that Netanyahu's political decisions are partly influenced by his need to hold onto power to protect his judicial interests — a holding of the prime ministerial office that offers him informal protection.

I flag this dimension with caution, as it is an interpretation that Netanyahu vigorously contests and one the courts have not validated in this sense. But a political analysis of his behaviour would be incomplete without mentioning that his calculations are influenced by considerations that go beyond strategic security alone.

What the international community can still do

Pressure on Israel's European allies

Even without the United States, European countries have levers they have not yet fully used. Several of them have preferential trade agreements with Israel, including the EU-Israel Association Agreement. These agreements contain clauses relating to respect for human rights and international law. Their partial or total suspension is not legally impossible, even if it is politically difficult. The recent decision by some European countries to condition their indirect military support for Israel — by refusing arms export licences — is a signal, however modest.

The collective pressure of Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, on the United States remains the most powerful diplomatic lever outside direct American pressure. These countries have vital economic and security interests with Washington, and their coordinated expression of concern about Israeli policy could have an impact on the calculations of the Trump administration — especially if accompanied by concrete threats on matters important to the United States, such as oil prices or military cooperation in the region.

The international judicial route: slow but structuring

The international judicial route — ICC warrants, International Court of Justice opinions, UN body reports — is slow and without immediate effect. But it has a structuring effect over the long term. It documents violations, creates legal precedents, and progressively isolates a leader whose international travel is now constrained. It also feeds internal debates in Israel, where a part of the population and the judicial system takes the country's international obligations very seriously.

In the long run, no indefinite occupation truly lasts forever. Internal resistance — demographic, economic, political — eventually weighs. The question is at what human price and at what speed. And whether diplomatic pathways can reduce that cost before the spiral becomes uncontrollable.

Gaza after occupation: the possible scenarios

The most likely scenario: prolonged quagmire

Without a significant change in the current political factors, the most probable scenario is a prolonged quagmire. Israel maintains its military presence in parts of Gaza, alternating between periods of relative calm and targeted military operations. The humanitarian situation remains precarious. Reconstruction is paralyzed. Hamas maintains a political and armed presence in areas not controlled by Israel. UN and American negotiations produce declarations without concrete effect. Hundreds of thousands of Gazans continue to live in precarious conditions, without a clear horizon.

This scenario is the worst for the civilian population. It is also the least favourable to Israel's long-term security — because it fuels the cycle of radicalization and recruitment for armed groups. But it is the scenario toward which all current trajectories point, unless there is a major political change in Israel or the United States.

Alternative scenarios: conditions and obstacles

A more optimistic alternative scenario would require several simultaneous conditions: an electoral defeat for Netanyahu in favour of a more moderate coalition in Israel; strengthened American pressure under a future administration; substantial reform of the Palestinian Authority; a sufficient weakening of Hamas to prevent it from blocking a political transition. Each of these conditions is individually possible; their simultaneous fulfilment is far less probable.

Another scenario — darker — involves regional escalation. If Israel's military presence in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza triggered a reaction from armed groups or neighbouring states, the conflict could regionalize at a scale far greater than anything seen so far. This scenario is one that all regional and global powers want to avoid — but Netanyahu's declarations increase the risk that it materializes one day.

The hostage question: the human dimension always present

The released hostages and those who remain

Among the elements that continue to weigh on Netanyahu's decisions is the hostage question. According to the latest available reports, all hostages still alive were released in the context of the initial phases of the Trump plan. But the families of hostages whose remains have not yet been returned continue to exert political pressure on the Israeli government for their recovery. This human pressure, understandable and legitimate, is often used as a justification for maintaining military operations in Gaza.

The manipulation of this painful dossier by various political actors — including Netanyahu himself — is one of the most troubling dimensions of this conflict. The suffering of the families is real and deserves every possible compassion. But it cannot be used indefinitely to justify an occupation policy that prolongs the very conditions that make similar future crises more probable.

The civilian suffering on both sides

More than 600 Palestinians have been killed since the October 2025 ceasefire took effect, according to various UN reports. Dozens of Israelis have lost their lives in violence that continued despite the agreements. Civilian suffering is real on both sides, and any serious analytical framework must account for it. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a zero-sum game where the suffering of one side automatically justifies the policy of the other.

What this investigation seeks to show is that the political decisions of leaders like Netanyahu have direct human consequences. The indefinite occupation announced on June 25, 2026 is not a strategic abstraction: it is a sentence to a horizonless situation for millions of Palestinian civilians, and a factor of prolonged instability for millions of Israelis.

The portrait of a lost diplomatic moment

The agreement that could have been

Hypothetical history is always risky, but it has its analytical value. It is possible to imagine an alternative scenario in which Netanyahu, emboldened by the near-total neutralization of operational Hamas and by American backing of the Trump plan, had made the choice to play the diplomatic card: accepting the deployment of the ISF, authorizing the gradual return of reformed Palestinian governance, committing to a conditional withdrawal timeline. This choice could have opened the way to Saudi normalization, a renewed international legitimacy for Israel, and perhaps a durable reduction of the security threat.

That scenario did not unfold. The declarations of June 25, 2026 are proof of that. And the cost of this missed choice will be paid, as always in this conflict, primarily by civilian populations — Palestinian and Israeli — who have the least say over the decisions that condemn them.

What remains to be done despite everything

Even in this impasse, actions remain possible. The international community must keep all diplomatic channels open, however fragile. Humanitarian organizations must maintain their access to Gaza to alleviate immediate suffering. Arab countries must maintain pressure on Washington so that the Palestinian question is not entirely abandoned. And the Israelis who believe in a durable solution — they are numerous, even if politics forces them to silence for now — must find ways to make their voices heard.

The humanitarian consequences of a prolonged occupation

A civilian population caught between two intransigences

Netanyahu's declaration of indefinite occupation has immediate human consequences that cannot be reduced to mere geopolitical parameters. In Gaza, more than 2 million people have been living for months in precarious survival conditions, with limited access to clean water, medical care, and food. This reality is not a statistical abstraction — it is the daily life of entire families who have no grip on the decisions that condemn them to this endless horizon.

Humanitarian organizations — UNRWA, Médecins Sans Frontières, International Red Cross — document the continuing deterioration of living conditions in Gaza. Humanitarian access remains insufficient despite ceasefire agreements. The reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure is paralyzed by political uncertainty. And every week that passes without a credible political horizon prolongs this suffering in ways that will have lasting psychological and social consequences for an entire generation of Gazans.

The impact on Israel's international legitimacy

The policy of indefinite occupation proclaimed by Netanyahu is progressively isolating Israel on the international stage. Countries that had until now maintained a balanced position are beginning to take concrete decisions: suspension of arms export licences, reduction of trade agreements, recognition of a Palestinian state. These decisions do not change the reality on the ground in the short term, but they erode the diplomatic capital that Israel will need for any future negotiation.

The International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice constitute another avenue of pressure that Netanyahu's declarations accelerate rather than slow. International judicial procedures are slow — they are measured in years, sometimes decades. But they have a structuring effect: they document violations, create precedents, and progressively constrain the freedom of movement of targeted leaders. Netanyahu knows this. And yet he chooses this path.

The diplomatic alternatives still available despite the deadlock

The channels that remain open despite the closure of the political horizon

Even with a Netanyahu determined to maintain an indefinite military presence, international diplomacy is not entirely paralyzed. Several channels remain open. Qatar and Egypt, historic mediators between Israel and Hamas, maintain their contacts. Jordan, whose internal stability is directly linked to the evolution of the Palestinian conflict, continues to advocate for a negotiated solution. And the United States, even under Trump, retains a strategic interest in regional stability that cannot be reduced to Netanyahu's calculations.

International pressure can take forms other than direct confrontation. Targeted sanctions against members of the far-right wing of the Israeli cabinet could create internal divisions in Netanyahu's coalition. Conditional normalization offers from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates could reshape the Israeli internal political calculus. These levers exist — but they require a coordination and a political will that the key actors are slow to mobilize.

Internal signals in Israel that could change the equation

It would be inaccurate to present Israel as a monolithic bloc behind Netanyahu's positions. A significant portion of Israeli society, including high-ranking military officers and members of the security establishment, questions the long-term viability of indefinite occupation. Voices such as that of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak or former heads of Shin Bet warn that current policy compromises Israel's long-term security more than it protects it.

These internal voices are not today sufficient to alter Netanyahu's policy, anchored in a far-right coalition on which he politically and potentially judicially depends. But they represent the seed of an alternative that could manifest at the next Israeli elections — if they take place in a context where a majority of Israelis concludes that current policy is not producing the security it promises.

The regional dimension: when Gaza destabilizes the entire Middle East

The domino effect on regional balances

Israeli policy in Gaza has contagion effects that extend far beyond the borders of that territory. In Lebanon, the military presence maintains permanent tension that feeds armed groups and complicates the political reconstruction process. In Syria, Israeli incursions are redrawing power balances in ways that no one entirely controls. These regional dynamics are interconnected, and every decision in one theatre affects the others.

For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which had hoped for a normalization with Israel allowing them to consolidate their positions vis-à-vis Iran, Netanyahu's policy is a major obstacle. Saudi normalization — which was within reach according to several analysts before October 2023 — is now conditioned on real progress on the Palestinian question that Netanyahu refuses to concede. This blockage deprives both Israel and the Gulf powers of a mutually beneficial strategic agreement.

Iran as an indirect beneficiary of the impasse

The great strategic beneficiary of the current impasse is, paradoxically, Iran. As long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict monopolizes regional and international attention, Tehran benefits from a diplomatic space that an Arab-Israeli normalization would have closed. Iran can continue to fund non-state actors in the region under the cover of resistance to occupation, without paying the diplomatic cost that a more stable regional context would impose on it.

This is one of the most painful calculations of this conflict: Netanyahu's policy, presented as a policy of maximum security for Israel, objectively strengthens the position of Iran — Israel's declared main enemy. This paradox does not escape certain members of the Israeli security establishment, who articulate it privately with a frankness they cannot express publicly in the current political context.

Conclusion: the portrait of a leader who chooses the impasse

What Netanyahu will leave behind in history

This portrait of Netanyahu in June 2026 is that of a leader who has chosen political survival over conflict resolution. His tactical pragmatism is undeniable — he has navigated crises that few others would have survived. But the cost of this navigation is now visible: an indefinite occupation that even his closest allies cannot fully support, growing international isolation, and a generation of Palestinians whose horizon contains no exit other than resistance or exile.

History will judge Netanyahu less on his intentions — which may be sincerely oriented toward Israel's security — than on the concrete results of his choices. And those results, at this stage, speak for themselves: no more security for anyone, less international legitimacy for Israel, more suffering for civilians on both sides. That is not a track record that can be called acceptable.

What this moment tells us about the nature of absolute power

Beyond Netanyahu, this portrait is also that of a political system that allows a single man — under the pressure of personal criminal proceedings — to paralyze a peace process that determines the fate of millions of people. This is not a criticism specific to Israel: other democracies have known leaders who personalized power to the point of confusing it with their individual interests. But the concentration of power in contexts of armed conflict produces consequences of particular gravity.

The question is not so much whether Netanyahu will eventually leave — all leaders eventually leave. The question is in what state he will leave the conditions for peace for his successor. A legacy of indefinite occupation, aggravated regional hostilities, and diminished international legitimacy is a heavy inheritance for whoever will one day need to pick up the threads of a negotiation that Netanyahu has consciously unravelled.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Who I am and my stated biases

I am a columnist-analyst committed to a tradition of pro-democratic Western journalism. I have biases: I believe in international law, in the value of multilateral institutions, and I consider that civilian populations — whether Israeli or Palestinian — deserve to live in dignity and security. I am not antisemitic, and I do not consider that criticizing Netanyahu's policy is equivalent to questioning Israel's right to exist. These are two distinct things that I want to separate clearly.

What I do not know and my method

I do not have access to the secret negotiations that may be taking place parallel to public declarations. I do not know the real state of discussions between the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and the mediators. The information I use comes from open sources: Al Jazeera, Middle East Eye, Arab News, Al Bawaba, UN documents and analyses from institutes such as the Israeli INSS. I cross-referenced these sources and flagged uncertainties. My method is analytical: I seek to explain, not to judge.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — Netanyahu: we will remain in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza for as long as necessary, June 25, 2026

Middle East Eye — Netanyahu and Katz: Israeli presence without a time limit, June 26, 2026

Arab News — Netanyahu: Israel will not withdraw its troops from Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, June 15, 2026

Secondary sources

Al Bawaba — Netanyahu vows indefinite Israeli military presence, June 25, 2026

Al Jazeera — Regional security context, June 19, 2026

Al Jazeera Centre for Studies — US-Iran MoU opens the door to major regional transformations, June 24, 2026

INSS — Strategic alternatives for the Gaza Strip, 2026