PROFILE: Lavrov, the Indestructible — Rigidity as a Diplomatic Weapon

PROFILE: Lavrov, the Indestructible — Rigidity as a Diplomatic Weapon

Introduction: The man who never yields

Twenty years in the service of immobility

Sergei Lavrov entered the grand history of international diplomacy on March 9, 2004, when Vladimir Putin appointed him Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Since then, he has held that post without interruption — an exceptional record in a system where loyalty is often paid for with one's head. At 72, Lavrov is the longest-serving foreign minister among the world's major powers. And this longevity is no accident.

In June 2026, while special envoys like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner shuttle between Washington and Moscow to seek an end to the war in Ukraine, Lavrov continues to occupy the diplomatic front stage — but in a particular way. The Kyiv Independent revealed in May 2026, based on Ukrainian and American sources, that Lavrov had been effectively sidelined from the real negotiations on Ukraine. "He has essentially no say in the matter," a senior Ukrainian official declared. And yet, he is still there.

Presence as message

This contradiction — marginalized in negotiations but still in post — is itself revealing of the nature of Russian foreign policy. Lavrov is no longer the architect of Russian diplomacy. He is its mouthpiece. His role is to repeat the official positions of the Kremlin with cold eloquence and implacable consistency. He does not improvise. He does not concede. He never surprises. And that is precisely why Putin keeps him — because a predictable, disciplined Lavrov is more useful than a creative diplomat who might suggest compromises.

On June 26, 2026, Lavrov made international headlines again by publicly contradicting US Secretary of State Marco Rubio over the nature of the "Anchorage agreements" — the Putin-Trump Alaska summit of August 2025. Rubio had said there was no agreement. Lavrov replied that American proposals had been accepted by Russia and that claiming otherwise was "inelegant." This kind of semantic skirmish — where every word is weighed, where the archives of every statement are mobilized — is Lavrov's playing field. He excels at it.

Portrait of an apparatchik turned icon

Origins and training

Born on March 21, 1950 in Moscow, Sergei Lavrov is the son of an Armenian civil servant and a Russian mother. He grew up in the USSR of Khrushchev and Brezhnev — a period of bloc geopolitics, ideological dialectic, and diplomacy as an instrument of power. He studied at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) — the same school that trained generations of Soviet and then Russian diplomats — and joined the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1972.

His career took him to Sri Lanka, then to the Soviet Mission at the United Nations in New York, where he represented the USSR and then Russia with growing competence. He served as Russia's Ambassador to the UN from 1994 to 2004 — ten years on the Security Council, wielding the veto as a surgical instrument. That is where he forged his style: precise, unyielding, capable of citing international law precedents while ignoring those that contradict him.

The architecture of systemic rigidity

Lavrov's rigidity is not a character defect — it is a deliberate strategy. In multilateral negotiations, the party that never yields first generally obtains better terms. Lavrov has applied this principle to Russian foreign policy with remarkable consistency: on NATO, on Georgia in 2008, on Crimea in 2014, on Syria, and now on Ukraine. At every crisis, he has presented the Russian position as non-negotiable, while leaving a door slightly ajar to allow his interlocutor to save face — an art the USSR elevated to the status of diplomatic doctrine.

This method is particularly effective in a context where the adversary — whether European or American — is subject to internal democratic pressures that reward compromise and penalize prolonged confrontations. Lavrov, who is not accountable to voters, can afford to wait. And he waits. For twenty years.

Lavrov and the war in Ukraine: the implacable

The zero-concessions doctrine

Since February 24, 2022, the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Lavrov has been the international voice of Russian justification. His repertoire is well-worn: the war is presented as a defensive reaction to NATO expansion, to Western "russophobia," to the "persecution of Russian speakers" in Ukraine. Every Western ceasefire proposal is labeled an "unacceptable ultimatum." Every sanction is described as "hybrid warfare."

In June 2026, following the meeting of leaders from Great Britain, France, Germany, and Ukraine in London on June 7, Lavrov published a foreign policy op-ed formally rejecting the five European conditions for a lasting peace. He called these conditions an "unacceptable ultimatum" and stated that "trust cannot be restored, nor dialogue resumed, through ultimatums." United24 Media reports that this rejection was "categorical and immediate," confirming that Russia is not engaging with the European peace process.

Permanent contradiction as a tool

One of the most striking — and most manipulative — characteristics of Lavrov's diplomatic communication is his ability to hold contradictory positions simultaneously. In April 2026, he declared that "resuming negotiations is not our number one priority." In June 2026, he claimed that "Russia is ready to talk with Kyiv." In an interview with Euronews on June 8, he stated that "soldiers, not negotiations, will decide the war in Ukraine" — while adding that "Russia preferred a diplomatic solution."

These contradictions are not errors. They are functional: they keep the interlocutor in a state of permanent uncertainty, make it difficult to plan a coherent response, and allow Russia to always find a statement to cite in order to justify any position. It is fog-of-war diplomacy — and Lavrov is its undisputed master.

The sidelining: a Lavrov without real power

The parallel channels of Russian diplomacy

The Kyiv Independent's revelation of May 19, 2026 is particularly illuminating: Lavrov was reportedly excluded from the real negotiations on Ukraine. Substantive discussions are said to run through different channels — notably Yuri Ushakov, the Kremlin's foreign policy adviser, and Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian sovereign wealth fund RDIF, who has emerged as an informal interlocutor with Washington. "Lavrov has never played a major role" in discussions with Washington, an American official told the Kyiv Independent.

This marginalization is explained by the nature of the man himself: Lavrov is too visible, too public, too marked by years of belligerent statements to serve as a discreet channel. Real negotiations — those involving concessions, calculated ambiguities, gray areas — demand a flexibility that the Lavrov style does not permit. His approach is that of the press conference room, not the negotiating table.

The paradox of utility

But if Lavrov is excluded from substantive negotiations, why does he remain in post? The answer comes down to a few words: he is useful precisely as a facade. His continued presence sends a signal: Russia maintains a maximum posture. No concession is imminent. Red lines do not move. While the parallel channels — Ushakov, Dmitriev, discreet envoys — search for acceptable exits, Lavrov continues to hold an intransigent public line that preserves the regime's domestic credibility.

It is a sophisticated division of labor: discreet negotiators do the real work, the public diplomat maintains the ideological facade. This institutionalized "good cop/bad cop" technique was not invented by Russia — but it is applied here with particular effectiveness. And Lavrov plays his role perfectly, perhaps without even realizing it — or perhaps precisely because he knows it.

Lavrov and the Westerners: a long history of contempt

The memorable confrontations

The list of Lavrov's verbal clashes with his Western counterparts is long and often colorful. In 2022, in Stockholm, he called the condemnation of the invasion of Ukraine "collective hysteria." In 2014, facing his British counterpart, he ironized about what he called "democracy lessons" given by countries that had their own colonial histories. In 2021, he threatened to "break relations" with the European Union if it imposed new sanctions — a threat that was never followed through.

These exchanges reveal an important aspect of his personality: Lavrov is not intimidated by his interlocutors. He knows them too well — their political systems, their internal constraints, their room for maneuver. He knows that an American secretary of state's anger will pass, that European sanctions will not fundamentally disturb Putin, and that the democratic electoral cycle will always eventually produce a more accommodating interlocutor. This cold reading of Western democracies is both a strength and a blind spot — because it underestimates democratic societies' capacity to sustain long-term commitments.

The special relationship with Rubio

In June 2026, Lavrov's most visible confrontation is with Marco Rubio. The American secretary of state had declared during a Congressional hearing that "Washington cannot be a mediator because it supports Ukraine." Lavrov seized on that statement to turn it into a demonstration of American "bad faith." On June 15, 2026, at a press conference with his Belarusian counterpart in Minsk, he claimed that in Alaska, "Witkoff had responded affirmatively" to each of Putin's points — implying that Rubio was rewriting history.

Rubio responded on June 26: "There was a proposal in Alaska, but not an agreement. If there had been an agreement, we would have had an end to the war." Lavrov immediately fired back that calling the "acceptance" of American proposals "not an agreement" was "inelegant." This semantic exchange — which turns on the meaning of the word "agreement" — perfectly illustrates the Lavrov technique: transform every ambiguity into a tool of political pressure.

Lavrov's positions on peace: an analysis

What Lavrov says publicly

On June 23, 2026, Lavrov declared that Russia was "ready to resume negotiations with Ukraine where they were interrupted" — referring to the Istanbul talks of 2022. This statement received wide commentary. But it is in reality devoid of substance: resuming negotiations from Istanbul 2022 would mean starting from Russia's initial demands — which included the near-total capitulation of Ukraine, abandonment of its NATO aspirations, and "neutrality" guarantees that amounted to vassalization.

What Lavrov never says: that Russia renounces its territorial conquests. That Ukraine's 1991 borders are respected. That Russian troops withdraw. These elements — fundamental for Ukraine and for the principles of international law — are absent from every public statement Lavrov has made since 2022. Not a nuance, not a sign of compromise on the substance. Only variations of form that create the illusion of flexibility without any of its substance.

June 19, 2026: the article that reveals everything

On June 19, 2026, Lavrov published in the journal International Affairs an article titled "Ukraine, Europe and Global Security" — a text that concentrates twenty years of Russian foreign policy into a few dense pages. He accuses Europe of "facade diplomacy" aimed solely at "preserving the Zelensky regime" and "preventing the collapse of Ukrainian armed forces on the battlefield." He calls the five peace conditions posed in London an "inadmissible ultimatum."

The rhetoric is skillful: it positions Russia as the party ready for dialogue, blocked by a bellicose Europe. This inversion of reality — it is Russia that invaded Ukraine, not the reverse — is the trademark of Lavrov's discourse. It is constructed with enough partial truths to be consumable by an international audience unfamiliar with the detailed history of events since 2014.

The personal dimension: a man with no visible cracks

The diplomatic shell

In the archives of international press conferences, it is nearly impossible to find a moment when Lavrov appears destabilized or on the defensive. He is known for an icy humor — capable of landing a sarcastic joke in the middle of a discussion about a deadly conflict — and for perfect command of the formal register. He speaks fluent Russian, English, and French. He cites Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, but also the Treaties of Westphalia and the UN Charter.

This encyclopedic culture is not vanity — it is a tool. It allows him to label his interlocutors as "poorly educated" or "ignorant of historical precedents" when their arguments embarrass him. It is a form of intellectualized ad hominem — one does not respond to the argument, one devalues the person making it. Western diplomats who have dealt with him in negotiations testify to his ability to exhaust his counterparts through length, technicality, and relentless repetition.

Private life, a black box

Unlike many public figures who cultivate their image through personal revelations, Lavrov keeps his private life hermetically sealed. He was married to Maria Alexandrovna Lavrova, who died in 1999. He has a daughter, Ekaterina, who lived for several years in New York — a geographical irony that Western journalists did not fail to note at the height of Russian-American tensions. He subsequently had a relationship known but never officially confirmed with a former Russian athlete.

What is known of him outside diplomacy: a passion for alpine skiing and football — he is known as a supporter of Spartak Moscow. These human details do not alter the portrait of a man entirely devoted to his function. Lavrov appears not to exist outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is not an ideologue in the way Putin is — he is a professional of power, and this specialization is perhaps the most troubling characteristic of his personality.

Lavrov and the multipolarity doctrine

The Russian global project

Beyond the war in Ukraine, Lavrov is the principal theoretical architect of Russia's doctrine of "multipolarity" — the idea that the unipolar world order dominated by the United States since 1991 must be replaced by a system where multiple powers — including Russia, China, Iran, the BRICS — co-define the rules. This vision has been developed in dozens of speeches, articles, and conferences since 2004. It has become the conceptual framework of Russian foreign policy.

In his annual address of January 2026, he reaffirmed that Russia was building "a greater Eurasian partnership" and working toward "a Eurasian charter of multipolarity" open to all Eurasian countries. This vision is coherent — and it is seductive for many countries of the Global South that have historical reasons to distrust the Western order. It is the positive face of Lavrov's diplomacy — the face that does not simply reject proposals but builds an alternative.

The multipolarity trap

But the Russian multipolarity project has a fundamental flaw: it is presented as a system of equality between great powers, but it deliberately excludes the guarantees of individual rights and small-state sovereignty that are at the heart of the Western liberal order. A multipolar world without common norms of international law is a world where great powers make the law in their "spheres of influence" — which means concretely that Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova have no right to choose their alliances.

That is what Ukraine refuses. That is what the West should refuse. And that is precisely what Lavrov defends — with his polished words, his cultural references, his cold smiles, and his stubborn refusal of any compromise on substance. Lavrov's multipolarity is not a project for international equity. It is a project for a return to the spheres of influence of the 19th century, dressed in post-colonial language to seduce the Global South. It is brilliant. It is cynical. And it is dangerous.

The succession: what will happen after Lavrov?

A question nobody asks openly

Lavrov was born in 1950. He is 72. In a Russia where leaders' health is a state secret, nothing is known about his physical condition. He continues to appear regularly at press conferences, at the UN Security Council, during diplomatic visits. Nothing presages an imminent retirement. But the question of his succession — never openly posed in state-controlled Russian media — is politically sensitive.

In Putin's system, the Foreign Minister is not an independent power position — it is a transmission belt for presidential will. Lavrov's successor will therefore above all be someone chosen by Putin for loyalty and discipline — not for diplomatic imagination. Which suggests that the systemic rigidity that Lavrov embodies is not personal — it is institutional. And it will outlast the man who embodies it today.

The legacy: a diplomacy as the negation of diplomacy

Lavrov's legacy will be paradoxical: that of a man who practiced diplomacy for more than twenty years while systematically destroying the conditions that allow diplomacy to function. Mutual trust. Good faith. Commitment to honoring the resolutions one has voted for. Recognition that facts exist independently of the narratives one constructs around them. Lavrov used the language of diplomacy to put an end to diplomacy as a practice of mutual agreement.

That will be his legacy. Not a peace. Not a memorable treaty. Not a crisis defused through his foresight. His legacy will be a war now in its fifth year, a Europe fragmented in its responses, a Russia isolated from the world order it claims to want to reform. And him, still there, at 72, with his dark suits, his prepared answers, and his perfectly calibrated disdain for anyone who dares suggest that Russia might be wrong.

Lavrov in the global context: rival and mirror

Comparison with the great diplomats of the past

Diplomatic historians will place Lavrov in a tradition of diplomat-ideologues — those who serve not an abstract state but a civilizational project. Talleyrand, who navigated the Revolution, the Empire, and the Restoration while always serving France. Metternich, architect of post-Napoleonic European stability for four decades. Kissinger, who redefined American foreign policy. These analogies are flattering — perhaps too much so. Lavrov did not create an order. He destroyed one.

But like Talleyrand who served successive regimes with the same impeccable loyalty, Lavrov survived Yeltsin and two terms (then two more) of Putin. His institutional survival testifies to his ability to adapt to the evolutions of Russian power — while maintaining a consistent external line. It is a form of political genius, admittedly. But deployed in service of a project that led to a war of aggression. History will judge the nature of that genius.

The signal he sends to the world

What Lavrov has been telling the world for twenty years is simple: great powers make their own rules. International law is a useful fiction for small states. Borders only have reality if defended by force. And diplomacy is not a process of seeking mutually acceptable solutions — it is a theater where positions are displayed while waiting for the adversary to yield.

This message has disciples — in the authoritarian chancelleries from Beijing to Tehran, from Pyongyang to Minsk. And it has challengers — every state that believes international cooperation is better than the law of the strongest. Zelensky's Ukraine is at the forefront of those challengers. And Ukraine's resistance — more than four years against the world's second-largest army — may be the most eloquent rebuttal history has ever delivered to the Lavrov doctrine.

The mined terrain of possible peace

What Lavrov would accept — a hypothesis

What would it take for Lavrov — or rather the Kremlin he represents — to accept a peace agreement? Russian public statements offer some clues: recognition of territorial conquests since 2014 (including Crimea and parts of Donbas), neutral status for Ukraine (exclusion from NATO), limits on Ukrainian armed forces, protection of "rights of Russian speakers" — a formulation that serves as a pretext for permanent interference in Ukrainian internal affairs.

No democratic Ukrainian government can accept these conditions — it is politically impossible. And the West is not asking it to. This creates the impasse in which Lavrov has been maneuvering for years: the Russian conditions for peace are unacceptable to Ukraine, but Russia is unwilling to modify them. The result is a war that continues — and which Lavrov presents as the West's fault.

The risk of a deal over Ukraine's head

A scenario that Ukraine and its European allies dread: that Trump and Putin conclude a bilateral American-Russian deal — in the tradition of the Yalta great powers — that imposes conditions on Ukraine without its consent. In this scenario, Lavrov would become central again — as a signatory of a historic agreement. But the deal thus concluded would be a capitulation, not a peace. And it would plant the seeds of the next conflict.

The signals Lavrov is sending about the "Anchorage agreements" — insisting on their binding nature for America — fit this strategy: establish that the United States had promised something to Russia that Ukraine and Europe sabotaged. If this narrative is accepted, the moral ground is prepared for an imposed deal. And it is there that Lavrov's rhetoric does its most damage — not in the negotiating room, but in the architecture of perceptions.

Lavrov and the media: master of hostile communication

Press conferences as diplomatic arena

In Sergei Lavrov's diplomatic arsenal, press conferences occupy a special place. Unlike most foreign ministers who view media interactions as a sometimes uncomfortable necessity, Lavrov uses them as a stage for ideological combat. His cutting responses to Western journalists, his ability to reverse questions into accusations, his art of sophisticated derision — all of this contributes to the "Lavrov brand" and to the Russian narrative that the West is the aggressor and Russia the victim.

These media performances have a dual audience: Western journalists and Western public opinion, whom Lavrov seeks to confuse and sow doubt; and Russian public opinion, to whom these exchanges are presented as proof that Russia is firmly resisting Western arrogance. Mastery of this dual communication is one of Lavrov's distinguishing competencies among diplomats of his generation.

Structural disinformation: Lavrov as narrative architect

Beyond press conferences, Lavrov has played a central role in the architecture of Russian disinformation narratives about the war in Ukraine. The notion of "denazification" — the central pretext for the invasion — was theorized and disseminated in part through the diplomatic networks that Lavrov oversees. The presentation of NATO as a structural "aggressor," the systematic reinterpretation of the Minsk agreements as having been violated by Ukraine rather than by Russia — all these narrative constructions emerged, in part, from the services of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

This informational dimension of Russian diplomacy is often undervalued. Lavrov is not merely a negotiator — he is a discourse producer, a narrative architect aiming to legitimize Russian policy in the developing world and fragment Western cohesion. His longevity in power has allowed him to develop an expertise in this form of narrative warfare that most of his Western interlocutors sorely lack.

Lavrov and Africa: the conquest of the Global South

African tours: the diplomacy of circumvention

Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Lavrov has undertaken several tours through Africa, meeting leaders who refuse to condemn Russia at the UN or who maintain commercial and military relations with Moscow. These African tours are a deliberate strategy: demonstrate that Russia is not isolated, circumvent Western pressure, and build a network of countries that provide diplomatic cover for Moscow in multilateral forums.

The strategy partially works. In votes at the UN General Assembly, a significant number of African countries regularly abstain rather than condemn Russian aggression. This is not a vote of support for Russia — but it is a refusal to join the Western coalition. Lavrov cultivates these abstentions as diplomatic victories, and he is not wrong to do so: in the narrative war, an African abstention is an argument that Russia can present as validation of its position.

Tools of Russian diplomacy in Africa: resources and security

Lavrov's relative success in Africa rests on concrete tools. The Wagner group — rebranded as "Africa Corps" after Prigozhin's death — offers security and mercenary services to African governments that cannot find these offers elsewhere. Russian arms contracts at reduced prices reach armies without access to Western equipment. Mining and agricultural partnerships create cross-linked economic interests. And Russia's anti-colonial rhetoric — which presents Russia as a preferred partner against Western domination — resonates in countries that retain vivid memories of European colonialism.

For the West, the response to this African strategy of Lavrov's runs through offering concrete alternatives — equitable economic partnerships, non-predatory security programs, a discourse that acknowledges colonial history without making it an alibi for supporting Russia. This is long-term work that democracies are finally beginning to take seriously, too slowly in the face of Russia's head start.

The succession question: what Lavrov after post-Putin?

Lavrov in the context of Kremlin succession

The question of Putin's succession — taboo in Russia but omnipresent in Western strategic analyses — has direct implications for the future of Russian diplomacy. Lavrov, at 72, is one of the figures who knows the system's inner workings best — but he is not himself a candidate for supreme power. His value is instrumental: he is the face of Russian foreign policy, not its primary architect. In the event of a political transition in Moscow, his position will depend entirely on whoever the new master of the Kremlin is.

The post-Putin scenarios that analysts envision range from a similar replacement (silovik nationalist) to a fragmentation of power between rival clans. In each of these scenarios, Russian foreign policy is likely to change not in its fundamental objectives — the restoration of the Russian sphere of influence — but in its methods and time horizon. A transitional Lavrov could serve as continuity during this phase of uncertainty.

What his departure would mean for global diplomacy

Lavrov's departure — whether forced by age, by political succession, or by a change of Kremlin strategy — would represent a significant diplomatic moment. It would deprive Russia of an expertise and an international legibility accumulated over decades. His successor, whoever it may be, would need to rebuild a credibility that Lavrov's career — however controversial — automatically conferred in certain forums.

For the West, a change of personality in Russia's foreign affairs would be an opportunity to test whether Moscow's foreign policy is truly as inflexible as it appears — or whether part of that inflexibility is due to Lavrov's specific personality and doctrine. It is a diplomatic opportunity that Western chancelleries should actively prepare for, rather than waiting for it to present itself.

Conclusion: the status quo as victory by default

Lavrov, guarantor of the Russian status quo

In the final analysis, Sergei Lavrov is the guardian of the Russian status quo — not because he believes the status quo is good, but because he believes any concession opens a breach that the West will rush through. This defensive-paranoid vision of diplomacy — every agreement as a potential trap, every concession as capitulation — is deeply rooted in Soviet and Russian history. And Lavrov is its most accomplished human manifestation.

At 72, after more than twenty years at the ministry, Lavrov has become more than a minister: he is an institution. A brand. A signal that Russia will not change, will not evolve, will not concede. And this constancy — however frustrating and destructive for peace in Ukraine and for the international order — is, in its perverse way, a form of coherence.

What his portrait teaches us about Russia

To understand Lavrov is to understand a part of Russia that Western leaders refused to see for too long: a country that perceives diplomacy not as a search for equilibrium but as the continuation of war by other means. A country whose strategic horizon extends over decades, not electoral cycles. A country that can accept considerable costs — economic, human, diplomatic — to protect what it considers its vital interests.

This knowledge should lead the West not to capitulate, but to be strategically patient and structurally resilient. Ukraine must be armed, supported, and integrated into Western structures — not because it is easy, but because it is right. And because the history of the last twenty years demonstrates it: the only thing that has ever changed Russian policy is resistance. Not concessions. Resistance. Lavrov knows this better than anyone — and that is why he seeks to exhaust Western resolve. He must not be allowed to succeed.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My position and my sources

This portrait of Lavrov is written from a perspective clearly critical of Russian foreign policy and pro-Ukrainian. I acknowledge this bias. My analysis draws on official public statements by Lavrov — press conferences, interviews, articles — as well as reporting from independent sources including the Kyiv Independent, Reuters, Bloomberg, Euronews, and RBC-Ukraine. I have not had access to internal Kremlin sources and do not claim to know Lavrov's private thoughts.

Limits and uncertainties

The revelation of Lavrov's marginalization in negotiations comes from anonymous Ukrainian and American sources — and therefore cannot be independently verified. It is possible that Lavrov plays a more substantial behind-the-scenes role than these sources reveal. My portrait is constructed on observable public behavior — not on classified information. Factual errors, if they exist, are unintentional.

Sources

Primary sources

Kyiv Independent — Russia's foreign minister Lavrov cut out of Ukraine peace talks, officials say — May 19, 2026

United24 Media — Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov rejects Western demands for peace plan — June 19, 2026

Straits Times — Russia's Lavrov contradicts Rubio, calls for clarity on US mediation role — June 26, 2026

Euronews — Soldiers, not talks will decide Russia's war in Ukraine, Lavrov says — June 8, 2026

Secondary sources

RBC-Ukraine — Lavrov makes absurd statement about peace talks — June 4, 2026

Bloomberg — Russia's Lavrov Rejects European Push on Ukraine as 'Ultimatum' — June 19, 2026

International Affairs — Article by Lavrov: Ukraine, Europe and Global Security — June 19, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — After threatening new strikes, Russia says diplomacy is preferable — June 19, 2026