NARRATIVE: Lavrov cries theft — when Moscow makes a spectacle with victims' money

The Primakov Forum, theater of Russian resentment

On June 24, 2026, at the Primakov Readings — an annual Moscow forum designed to polish Russia's diplomatic image — Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took the floor with fierce conviction to denounce what he calls "outright theft." The object of his fury: the 45 billion euros transferred to Ukraine from the proceeds of Russian assets frozen by G7 countries and the EU. In a speech of high diplomatic theatricality, he claimed this practice "undermines the credibility of global financial institutions" and calls into question the functioning of global governance bodies.

This speech is a fascinating document. Not because it tells the truth — it offers only a carefully distorted version of it — but because it reveals the state of mind of a Russian diplomatic machine backed into a corner, which can find no better argument than an outraged cry at the consequences of its own actions. Lavrov is not shocked that Russia's money is being used to rebuild Ukraine. He is shocked that the world has not buckled under his pressure.

The frozen-asset mechanism — why it is legal and legitimate

To understand why Lavrov's indignation rings hollow, one must recall the mechanism at stake. In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, G7 countries and the European Union froze roughly 300 billion dollars in Russian sovereign assets held within their financial systems. These assets generate interest and income. In 2024, the G7 decided to use those revenues to fund a 50 billion dollar loan to Ukraine, to be repaid through future proceeds from the frozen assets. It is a legally complex measure, but one that falls within the framework of international law.

According to published data, the G7 has already delivered 45.5 billion dollars in loans to Ukraine from these frozen assets. The word "theft" that Lavrov uses is a deliberate distortion: what is happening is the use of funds belonging to the aggressor state to compensate, in however small a part, for the devastating cost of the aggression.

Lavrov calls it theft. I call it imperfect distributive justice. When a state invades its neighbor, destroys its cities, kills its civilians, and pillages its resources, using a fraction of its frozen assets for reconstruction aid is not theft — it is the very definition of international accountability. The real question is why this was not done sooner and on a larger scale.

45 billion against trillions of destruction

Let us put the figures in perspective. The 45 billion euros denounced by Lavrov represent a fraction of the damage Russia has inflicted on Ukraine. The most conservative estimates of war damage to Ukraine — destroyed infrastructure, razed industrial facilities, farmland rendered unusable by mines — run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. The World Bank and the European Commission have estimated reconstruction needs at more than 500 billion.

In that context, 45 billion — barely 9 percent of the minimum estimate — represents a symbolically important but materially insufficient contribution. If Lavrov genuinely wanted to talk about financial fairness, he should start by adding up the bills of destruction his country has generated. The arithmetic would not be in his favor.

The credibility of global financial institutions — a very selective Russian concern

Lavrov's argument about the "credibility of global financial institutions" deserves particular scrutiny. Russia, which has routinely used its foreign currency reserves as a geopolitical tool, its energy exports as economic blackmail, and its connections to the international financial system to fund its military-industrial complex, is poorly placed to worry about the credibility of those very institutions.

What genuinely worries Moscow is not the abstract credibility of the world financial system — it is the precedent. If the sovereign assets of an aggressor state can be mobilized to compensate its victims, then other states — China, Iran, North Korea — are taking note. Lavrov's warning is addressed to a specific audience: the capitals that might one day find themselves in the same situation as Moscow.

Russia worrying about the credibility of global financial institutions is like an arsonist weeping in front of the firefighters. This country spent years weaponizing gas, oil, bank deposits, and financial flows as tools of political influence. Lavrov can cry theft — his argument only fools those who want to be fooled.

The EU extends its sanctions for a full year

On the very same June 24, 2026 — and this is no coincidence — the European Union decided for the first time to extend its sanctions against Russia for a full year, abandoning the previous six-month renewal cycle. This decision, reported by NewsUkraine RBC, sends a clear signal: the EU is not yielding to Russian pressure, is not divided by economic fatigue, and views sanctions as a long-term instrument rather than a temporary crisis-management measure.

The annual rather than six-month extension is technically significant. It narrows the diplomatic window of opportunity for Moscow to exploit renewal periods to sow discord among member states. It is a direct response to Russian attempts to divide Europe on the Ukrainian question.

The solidity of the G7 front despite the pressures

Beyond the EU, the G7 maintains remarkable unity on the question of frozen Russian assets. Despite pressure from certain financial circles worried about long-term legal implications, G7 governments have held their position: frozen Russian assets will remain frozen until Russia pays reparations to Ukraine. This condition, in the current state of affairs, amounts to an indefinite freeze.

This position is economically significant. The 300 billion dollars in frozen Russian assets generate several billion in annual interest. Over ten years, that is a substantial financial resource to support Ukrainian reconstruction — and a continuing economic punishment for Moscow.

Europe extends sanctions for a full year, the G7 maintains the asset freeze, and Lavrov gives a speech at the Primakov Forum. That asymmetry — between coordinated Western action and impotent Russian rhetoric — says everything about who actually controls the economic situation of this war.

A precedent that will rewrite the rules

Using frozen sovereign assets to fund Ukrainian resistance does effectively create a precedent in international law. Lavrov is right on this precise point: what the G7 and the EU are doing has no direct equivalent in the recent history of international financial relations. But a precedent is not necessarily bad — it can be the foundation of a fairer new norm.

The norm taking shape is as follows: a state that massively violates international law by attacking a sovereign neighbor exposes its assets held in Western financial systems to compensatory use. This is not theft — it is state accountability. Jurists will debate the modalities for decades. But the principle is legitimate.

Adversaries observe and draw their lessons

China, which holds hundreds of billions in assets within Western financial systems, is watching closely. If Beijing were ever to cross the red line of military intervention in Taiwan, the precedent of the frozen Russian assets would become immediately relevant. This is one reason why China is following these developments with particular attention, and why it is building up its gold reserves and seeking to internationalize the yuan — to reduce its exposure to the Western financial system.

Iran and North Korea, which operate largely outside the Western financial system, are less exposed. But the precedent carries deterrent value beyond the assets themselves: it signals that the West is prepared to use economic power as a strategic defensive weapon.

China is watching Moscow lose access to its 300 billion and drawing its conclusions. This may be the most underestimated contribution of the Ukraine war to global international security: it has shown the world that the West can and will use its financial power as a tool of deterrence. Not perfectly, not without internal debate — but it will.

The Primakov Forum: a bubble for nostalgia

The Primakov Readings are a revealing microcosm of the current state of Russian diplomacy. Named in honor of Yevgeny Primakov, former intelligence chief and foreign minister who formulated the doctrine of a multipolar world as a counterweight to American hegemony, this forum brings together voices favorable to the Russian narrative — whether Russian, Chinese, or carefully selected representatives of the "Global South."

In this echo chamber, Lavrov's speech was predictable: indignation about frozen assets, accusations of "Western financial colonialism," calls for a new global governance system. The problem is that this speech, however well-rehearsed, changes nothing on the ground — military, economic, or diplomatic.

The growing isolation of Russian diplomacy

Despite Lavrov's efforts to portray Russia as the champion of the "Global South" against a neocolonialist West, the diplomatic reality is less flattering. The great majority of the world's nations voted for the UN resolutions condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Countries that refuse to sanction Russia generally do so out of immediate economic self-interest, not out of conviction in Moscow's theses.

The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, signed by 36 states in May 2026 with the Netherlands as the host country, illustrates Russia's growing isolation in the international legal space. Lavrov can talk about theft — others are working to put him on trial for the crime of aggression.

There is something pathetic about Lavrov's trajectory — one of the most skilled diplomats of his generation, reduced to crying theft in a forum preaching to the converted, while his G7 counterparts extend sanctions and international judges prepare their dossiers. This is no longer diplomacy. It is rhetorical surrender.

When anti-Westernism serves Moscow's interests

One of the central axes of Lavrov's speech at the Primakov Readings was the appeal to the "Global South" — that constellation of nations refusing to choose a side in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Behind this rhetoric of third-world solidarity lie very concrete economic realities: China buys Russian oil at a discount, India imports Russian fertilizers and hydrocarbons, and several African countries remain dependent on Russian wheat and weapons. This is not ideology — it is interest.

Russia's manipulation of these economic interests is calculated and deliberate. Moscow offers cut-price oil and gas, weapons without political conditions, and a discourse of "respect for sovereignty" that resonates in capitals that have lived through decades of Western condescension. But this strategy has its limits: the countries enjoying Russian discounts today know very well that Russia is an increasingly unreliable long-term supplier.

Lavrov sells anti-Westernism as though it were an ideal. It is actually a commercial service. China does not support Russia out of conviction — it profits from a desperate energy supplier. India is not anti-Western — it is pragmatic. Confusing short-term self-interest with strategic alignment is the fundamental error at the heart of Russia's narrative about the "Global South."

From confiscation to Ukrainian reconstruction

The mechanism for mobilizing frozen Russian assets — roughly 300 billion dollars in total, the vast majority immobilized in Europe through Euroclear — is more nuanced than Lavrov presents. The G7 states and the EU did not simply "take" this money: they built a legal framework allowing the interest generated by these assets to fund Ukraine. The 45.5 billion dollars already transferred come largely from these interest payments, supplemented by loans backed by the assets themselves.

This mechanism was carefully designed to withstand legal challenges — and it is doing so. Russian attempts to contest these transfers before international tribunals have so far failed or are ongoing. The financial machinery works. And Lavrov, despite his cries, cannot stop it by decree.

It is almost comical to watch Lavrov invoke international law to defend Russian assets while his armies violate international law in Ukraine on a daily basis. The selectivity of Moscow's respect for the law is so manifest that it no longer even requires commentary — it denounces itself.

Sanctions holding better than expected

In 2022, some economists predicted that Western sanctions against Russia would quickly collapse under pressure from the diverging economic interests of G7 and EU members. In June 2026, those predictions have been proven wrong. The EU just approved, for the first time, a one-year extension (instead of the usual six months) of its sanctions against Russia — a remarkable signal of durability and political cohesion in the context of internal European tensions.

The economic effects are accumulating: Russia faces persistent inflation, high interest rates that are choking investment, a labor shortage exacerbated by military losses, and a growing dependence on China that is gradually transforming Moscow into an economic satellite of Beijing. This is not the immediate collapse some had hoped for — but it is a structural deterioration that deepens each quarter.

Sanctions are not an instant miracle. They are constant, accumulating pressure that wears, that constrains. Russia can survive sanctions for one year, two years, five years. But with each passing year, the bill grows larger, the options narrow, and dependence on Beijing deepens. Lavrov is crying. Time is working against him.

The money will go to Ukraine regardless

The 45 billion euros already transferred to Ukraine from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets will not be returned. The assets themselves will remain frozen until Russia pays reparations — which, in the current state of affairs, is not on the agenda. Lavrov can cry theft in every forum he pleases: the financial machinery is in motion, and it will not stop under pressure from outraged speeches.

Justice takes time, but it moves forward

Lavrov's cry reveals a deeper truth about the state of Russia in 2026: Moscow is losing not only on the military front, but also on the economic, legal, and diplomatic fronts. The mobilization of frozen assets, the extension of sanctions, the construction of the Special Tribunal — these are pieces of a puzzle that is slowly but surely drawing the outline of international accountability for the crime of aggression. This is not theft. It is the beginning of justice.

Lavrov is a brilliant rhetorician in a system that has lost the war of reality. The 45 billion transferred to Ukraine from frozen Russian assets are more eloquent than any speech at the Primakov Readings. Economic, legal, and military reality cannot be negotiated with words — however well constructed, however skillfully delivered by a seasoned diplomat.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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