REPORT: Lavrov, the G7 and the Question Moscow Asks Trump: Have You Really Changed Sides?

REPORT: Lavrov, the G7 and the Question Moscow Asks Trump: Have You Really Changed Sides?

Introduction: Évian changed something — but what exactly?

Lavrov facing the G7 mystery

On June 24, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke in Moscow with a question that summed up the entire diplomatic uncertainty of the moment: "Regarding Ukraine, we are seeking to understand what happened at Évian." That was not naivety. It was the carefully calibrated formulation of a deep Russian anxiety: after the G7 summit at Évian-les-Bains, France, held June 16–18, 2026, Russia no longer knew with certainty whether Donald Trump had genuinely shifted his position on the war in Ukraine — or whether the summit's declarations were merely a temporary episode of façade diplomacy.

What happened at Évian was, by the accounts of participants themselves, significant. French President Emmanuel Macron, who presided over the summit, declared that Trump had acknowledged during discussions that Russia was not interested in peace in Ukraine — calling it a "very deep change" in the American approach. Trump himself had called on Russia to negotiate peace with Ukraine after what he described as a "very good dialogue" with President Zelensky. G7 leaders departed with cautious optimism. Moscow departed with questions.

The spirit of Anchorage: what Moscow thought it had obtained

The August 2025 summit and its ambiguities

To understand Russian anxiety after the G7, one must return to the Anchorage, Alaska summit in August 2025. On August 15, 2025, Trump and Putin met at an American military base in Alaska — the first direct meeting between the two presidents since Trump's presidency began. The summit ended without a formal agreement, without a joint declaration, without an announced ceasefire. Yet Russia had extracted from it a very precise interpretation, which Russian officials would call the "Spirit of Anchorage" — a term that, according to analysts, represents Moscow's reading of an informal deal: Ukrainian withdrawal from the remainder of the Donbas in exchange for a freeze of the front elsewhere.

This "Spirit of Anchorage" did not exist in official documents. It existed in Russian declarations. And for months, Moscow had used it as a diplomatic reference — implying that Trump had implicitly accepted Russian conditions on the Donbas. The Ukrainian response had been unambiguous: Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha declared that "if the 'spirit of Anchorage' ever existed, it is certainly dead now." Zelensky for his part repeated that he would not cede any territory to Russia without resistance.

Macron and the "death" of the Anchorage accords at Évian

What Macron told Lavrov according to Lavrov himself

The central point of Lavrov's June 24, 2026 declarations concerned information that Macron had allegedly conveyed during the Évian discussions: the Anchorage accords had been "buried" at the summit. This information — reported by Lavrov, not by Macron directly — is explosive in the Russian diplomatic context. If the "Anchorage accords" are buried, Russia's entire negotiating strategy collapses: the reference to Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donbas, the argument that Trump had implicitly validated Russian positions, the diplomatic lever Moscow had been using since August 2025.

Lavrov had attempted to soften the impact of this information by saying he did not "even want to suppose" that the Anchorage summit had been "a tactic to buy time to rearm the Kyiv regime" — while formulating exactly that hypothesis. That is the rhetoric of performative denial: saying you do not think something while manifestly thinking it. Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister, went further, accusing Washington of drifting away from the "fundamental understandings" reached at Anchorage and toward a "rapprochement with the most rabid anti-Russian policy" of the United Kingdom and France.

Ryabkov accusing Washington of aligning with "the most rabid anti-Russian policy" of France and the United Kingdom. That hyperbolical language says everything about the Kremlin's state of mind when faced with a West that refuses to bend. If defending a sovereign country under aggression means being "rabid," then the West fully owns that label.

Rubio settles it: there was no agreement at Anchorage

The Manama declaration that clarifies everything

From the Bahraini capital Manama, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio settled the matter on June 25, 2026, with remarkable clarity: "There was no agreement in Alaska. There was a proposal in Alaska. But in Alaska, there was no agreement. If an agreement had been reached [at Anchorage], the war would have ended." That declaration demolishes in a few words the entire construction of the "spirit of Anchorage" that Moscow had cultivated for months. Rubio is not saying Trump changed sides. He is saying Russia had built a diplomatic fiction out of a summit with no agreement.

Rubio's declaration also reveals something important about the American position: the United States was not on the Russian side in August 2025, and they are no more so in June 2026. What Trump had sought at Anchorage was a diplomatic opening — "proposals" discussed, not "agreements" concluded. Russia had interpreted these proposals as conceded American positions. Rubio corrects that reading with a lawyer's precision. And for Moscow, that is painful. Putin himself said at Anchorage: "I take responsibility, I support your proposals. That was already a compromise." But a verbal compromise without a signed document is smoke.

Trump at Évian: the shifting side

The G7 that surprised Moscow

What happened at Évian in June 2026 was partly predictable, partly surprising. Predictable: the G7 would reaffirm its support for Ukraine. Surprising: Trump stayed for the entire summit — unlike the previous year when he left early — and signed the final communiqué including references to the war in Ukraine. G7 leaders agreed to increase deliveries of air defense equipment to Ukraine, to "strengthen sanctions against the Russian war economy" including on fossil fuel revenues, and to grant licenses to Ukrainian companies to produce long-range missiles and air defense systems on Ukrainian soil.

Macron, presiding over the summit, described a "very deep change in the American approach" toward Ukraine. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz called the final communiqué "a success." Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan — all emphasized the G7's unexpected unity on Ukraine. Trump himself had said at Évian that Russia "must make a deal, Russia has lost tremendous numbers of people, as has Ukraine." He added: "I will do everything in my power." Those formulations are not those of a neutral mediator. They are those of a partner who is beginning to lose patience with Moscow.

Witkoff and Kushner: the negotiators expected in Moscow

A dialogue on hold

Despite the post-G7 tensions, Lavrov had insisted on June 24 that Moscow maintained its desire for dialogue with Washington and was awaiting the conclusions of the planned visit of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed the same day that Witkoff and Kushner were "occupied with other matters" — namely the Iran negotiations — but that Russia was counting on resuming contact "once they are available." That mixture of irritation and diplomatic civility is characteristic of Russian diplomacy toward Washington in 2026: publicly criticizing Anchorage "failures" while keeping channels open.

Witkoff and Kushner had already made several visits to Moscow — Witkoff was on his sixth trip in ten months according to January 2026 reports. They had spoken with Zelensky by phone on June 8, 2026, a conversation the Ukrainian president had described as "very positive." But they had still not visited Kyiv in person — a point Zelensky noted publicly as "not very respectful." That asymmetry — multiple visits to Moscow, zero to Kyiv — says something about American diplomatic priorities before Évian. The G7 may have begun to change that.

Russia's irreducible demands

What Putin wants — and what Ukraine refuses

Behind Lavrov's diplomatic rhetoric about the "spirit of Anchorage" and the post-G7 confusion, Russian demands remain the same as on day one. Rubio had stated them bluntly: "Russia wants, among other things, all of the Donbas transferred to it." Added to that: permanent exclusion of Ukraine from NATO, reduction of Ukraine's military size, recognition of Russian control over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — in other words, capitulation dressed up as peace. These demands reflect unchanged strategic goals. These demands have not evolved since 2022. What Russia is testing is solely the West's ability to sustain its resistance to those demands over time.

Ukraine's response is equally constant: Zelensky will not cede any territory to Russia. That position is absolute. He said so at Anchorage (Trump relayed to Zelensky that Putin wanted Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donbas — Zelensky refused). He said so at the G7. He said so in his open letter to Putin on June 4, 2026, a bilateral meeting proposal Putin rejected saying he "saw no point in meeting Zelensky." Meanwhile Putin posed four conditions for negotiations with Kyiv — including the "Anchorage modalities" and the "realities on the ground" (that is, Russian territorial conquests as the starting point). Those are conditions for capitulation, not for negotiation.

Ukraine as an unexpected lever

Ukrainian drones impressing Trump

A report published by Semafor on June 23, 2026 sheds interesting light on the diplomatic dynamic: Trump is reportedly "impressed by Ukrainian drone strikes" deep into Russian territory, and "appreciates winners" — adding that "Ukrainian battlefield victories have given him new leverage." Ukrainian drone experts are advising the Pentagon, and Ukrainian military technology is "highly sought after." That portrait of a Trump influenced by Ukrainian military performance is consistent with what happened at Évian.

The Ukraine of 2026 is no longer the Ukraine of 2022 that was asking everyone for help. It is a country that has developed a significant defense industry, that produces drones capable of striking Moscow and fuel depots deep inside Russia, that is conducting a sophisticated logistical campaign against Russian supply lines, and whose military specialists have become sought-after advisers. That Ukrainian rise in power changes the diplomatic calculus. A Trump who "likes winners" and who sees Ukraine performing militarily is not the same Trump who in January 2025 wanted a quick deal at any cost.

What the G7 actually decided

The 27 conclusions of the Évian summit

Beyond the rhetoric, the G7 at Évian produced concrete decisions on Ukraine. Leaders agreed to increase deliveries of air defense missiles, to grant long-range missile production licenses and air defense systems to Ukrainian companies. They agreed on a "winter support package" — an anticipation of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure heading into winter 2026–2027, given the 96 strikes on Naftogaz documented since January 2026. They agreed to "strengthen sanctions on the Russian war economy," targeting specifically fossil fuel revenues — the main source of funding for Putin's war effort.

These decisions are not spectacular on paper. But their context is: they were taken with Trump's active support, in a communiqué Trump signed, at a summit Trump did not leave early. If the Évian G7 genuinely represents "a very deep change in the American approach" toward Ukraine as Macron says, then its decisions carry a different weight than those of previous summits. Credible American support changes the deterrence equation against Russia. And that is exactly what worries Lavrov.

Conclusion: The Trump-Zelensky-Putin triangle remains the knot of the war

The real test ahead

Russian post-G7 diplomatic anxiety is real and understandable. Lavrov, Ryabkov and other Moscow officials had built their negotiating strategy on a precise reading of American behavior: Trump is looking for a quick exit, Trump is willing to sacrifice Ukrainian positions for a deal, Trump will always prefer the deal to confrontation. That reading was partially challenged at Évian. Not totally, not definitively — but partially. And that is enough to generate uncertainty in the Kremlin's corridors.

The question Lavrov asks — "Have we understood what happened at Évian?" — is the right question. But the answer will not be diplomatic. It will be military. Russia continues to strike Ukraine while claiming to negotiate. Ukraine continues to destroy Russian logistics while saying it wants peace. Trump continues to tweet formulas about the need for a deal while leaving envoys Witkoff and Kushner occupied with Iran. And Zelensky continues to request missiles while his cities burn. That is the reality of Évian in June 2026: many contradictory signals, and one single certainty — the war continues.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and context

This report draws on journalistic sources covering the G7 at Évian-les-Bains (June 16–18, 2026), Lavrov's declarations of June 24, 2026, Rubio's declaration from Manama on June 25, 2026, and the diplomatic context of the Russia-Ukraine war since the Anchorage summit of August 2025. Quotes from Lavrov, Rubio, Trump, Macron and Peskov are drawn from the primary sources cited, including Reuters (via US News), Semafor, EADaily and Ukrainska Pravda. G7 data (production licenses, winter package, sanctions) are drawn from corroborating sources.

This text adopts an explicitly pro-Ukrainian perspective. I do not claim neutrality on a conflict where a sovereign country is under invasion. All quotes attributed to official figures are drawn from the cited sources — none are invented. Political analyses are mine and clearly identifiable as such.

Editorial positioning

Diplomatic coverage of this war is often presented as a balance between "two sides." This report refuses that artificial balance: Russian aggression is not symmetrical with Ukrainian resistance, and Russia's irreducible demands for Ukrainian capitulation are not equivalent to Ukraine's position of defending its sovereignty. I present the diplomatic facts as they are — including Russian positions — without granting them a moral legitimacy they do not deserve.

Sources

Primary sources

US News / Reuters — Russia Wants to Know if Trump Has Shifted His Stance on Ukraine War After G7, Lavrov Says — June 24, 2026

EADaily — The end of the Anchorage spirit: Rubio said that there was no agreement between Putin and Trump on Ukraine — June 25, 2026

Semafor — US' pro-Ukraine tone unnerves Moscow — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

Inquirer/AFP — G7 leaders welcome Trump 'change' on Ukraine — June 18, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Lavrov: I don't want to assume Anchorage summit was designed to buy time for Kyiv — June 23, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Zelensky discusses Moscow's intentions, peace efforts in 'positive call' with US envoys — June 8, 2026