OPEN LETTER: Mr. Pentagon, $910 Million for Ukraine Has Expired — Explain Yourself

Introduction: A letter Ukraine should have written

To whom this letter is addressed

This letter is addressed to the United States Department of Defense, to its acquisition officials, its contracting officers, its auditors, and to all those who allowed $910 million earmarked for Ukraine to expire without being contracted. It is also addressed to the members of Congress who voted those appropriations in the trust that competent agencies would know how to use them. And it is addressed to the American and Western public — because this type of institutional waste must be named, documented, and challenged.

I am not a senator. I am not a lawyer specializing in military acquisition law. I am a columnist. But when an audit report reveals that $910 million in aid to Ukraine was rendered unusable by expired administrative deadlines — while Ukrainian soldiers were short of ammunition on their front lines — someone must write it. Here it is, written.

The raw facts: $910 million the Pentagon did not use

What the audit reveals

An audit report on Operation Atlantic Resolve, published for the first quarter of 2026, reveals that the Pentagon did not use $910 million allocated to the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) before contracting deadlines expired. These appropriations are now "unavailable for entering new contracts with American arms manufacturers." The commitment window having passed, the money can no longer be used to order new weapons.

There is a nuance in Pentagon rules: expired appropriations can still cover, for five years, additional costs on contracts already signed. But for what matters here — new weapons, new orders, additional capabilities for Ukraine — these $910 million are essentially lost in their original military aid function.

The context: $33.51 billion allocated, 57% delivered

Since February 2022, the U.S. Congress has allocated $33.51 billion through the USAI for military aid to Ukraine. Of that total, $19.21 billion — or 57% — was actually spent on defence products and services delivered to Ukraine as of March 1, 2026. Additionally, $13.49 billion was assigned to ongoing industrial orders, not yet delivered. And $110 million had not yet been assigned to specific contracts.

These figures, taken together, paint a troubling picture: four years after the start of the large-scale invasion, 43% of allocated appropriations had not yet been converted into delivered weapons. Even accounting for normal military production timelines, this percentage is an invitation to an uncomfortable question: is the Pentagon's administrative machine equipped to manage emergency military aid at the scale of a high-intensity war in Europe?

The letter — first paragraph: on the nature of your responsibility

The Pentagon is not exempt from accountability

Ladies and gentlemen, officials of the Department of Defense, you are entrusted with an extraordinarily complex bureaucracy — 3.5 million people, an annual budget of $850 billion, acquisition programs that stretch over decades. I do not minimize this complexity. But I remind you that Ukraine does not have the luxury of that complexity. It has been fighting for its survival for more than four years.

When your administrative system allows $910 million in aid to Ukraine to expire — not because the weapons were unavailable, not because funding was lacking, but because contracting deadlines were not met — you have failed your mission. This failure is not attributable to the White House, nor to Congress, nor to Ukraine. It belongs to you.

What "expired deadline" means in Ukraine

Let me translate "expired contracting deadline" into the language of war. It means that artillery shells that could have been ordered, manufactured, and delivered to Ukraine will not be. It means that missile defence system batteries that could have been reinforced will not be, with these appropriations. It means that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had, at certain moments, fewer munitions than they needed — not because Congress refused to vote the appropriations, but because your contracting apparatus failed to use the appropriated funds in time.

Can you measure how many Ukrainian positions were held or lost during the periods of shortage? No. Neither can I. But the question deserves to be asked — and the fact that it is impossible to answer does not cancel it.

The letter — second paragraph: the rules that failed

The Anti-Deficiency Act and its contradictions

Pentagon acquisition rules are governed by laws that legitimately prevent unauthorized spending of public funds. The Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits federal agencies from committing to expenditures for which funds have not been appropriated. As a corollary, funds voted by Congress carry commitment windows: if contracts are not signed within those windows, the funds become "expired" for new engagements.

This system was designed for a peacetime federal administration, with acquisition timelines measured in years. It was not designed to manage large-scale emergency military aid in a war that evolves week by week. Applying standard federal budget management rules to wartime military aid means using a tool unsuited to its task. Congress and the Pentagon should have identified this problem earlier and created exception mechanisms. This is precisely what the Kaine-Cornyn bill proposes for transfers through NATO allies — but no comparable reform appears to have been applied to the direct acquisition processes of the USAI.

The five-year transition rule: limited consolation

The five-year rule — which allows expired funds to cover additional costs on already-signed contracts — is thin consolation. It means the money is not totally lost in an absolute accounting sense. But for what matters in aid to Ukraine, what counts is the ability to order new weapons, not to pay extras on existing contracts. And for that purpose, the $910 million is effectively lost.

Of the $33.51 billion allocated since 2022, $110 million had not even been assigned to specific contracts as of March 1, 2026 — four years after the invasion began. This administrative inertia may be explainable by procedural complexity. It is not excusable when compared to the speed at which Ukraine burns through its ammunition on the ground.

The letter — third paragraph: on the $18 billion still in transit

What the $13.49 billion in orders reveals

The $13.49 billion assigned to ongoing industrial orders — not yet delivered as of March 1, 2026 — represents the hope in this dark picture. These orders are real, signed, in production. They represent systems and munitions that will arrive in Ukraine in the coming months and years. Military production timelines are long — some contracts signed in 2022 are still producing their first results in 2026. That is the reality of the defence industry.

But this stock of ongoing orders does not justify the $910 million that expired. These two realities coexist without cancelling each other out: one is the fruit of effective administrative work; the other is the symptom of a failure. Treating them as if they offset each other would be an analytical error.

The 18th Ramstein meeting and the $4 billion announced

The 18th meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group at Ramstein, on June 18, 2026, announced $4 billion in additional aid from partners. This is a welcome commitment. But it deserves context: if administrative mechanisms do not improve, part of these $4 billion risks meeting the same fate as the $910 million that expired. Announcing financial commitments without reforming execution processes is repeating the mistake.

The Pentagon must answer a specific question: what has changed in your acquisition processes to ensure that the funds announced at Ramstein are contracted on time? If the answer is "nothing," the Ramstein commitments are blank cheques that no one will cash in time.

The letter — fourth paragraph: on the necessary reforms

What the Pentagon must do now

Mr. Secretary of Defense, allow me to suggest some concrete measures. First, a complete review of USAI acquisition processes to identify all bottlenecks that led to the $910 million expiring. This review must be public in its general conclusions — not classified. The Americans whose money was wasted deserve to know what happened.

Second, an extension of commitment windows for emergency military aid appropriations in wartime. If the current rules do not allow appropriated funds to be used effectively, the rules must change. Congress can legislate on this — and it should. Third, an early warning system that automatically flags appropriations at risk of expiration six months before their deadline. This is basic administrative management that the private sector performs automatically. The Pentagon can do it too.

What Congress must do

The responsibility does not rest solely on the Pentagon. Congress votes appropriations in the trust that agencies use them. When that trust is betrayed — not through malice, but through systemic failure — Congress must respond. It must demand accountability for the $910 million that expired, require public explanations, and legislate to prevent recurrence.

Senators Kaine and Cornyn are working to streamline arms transfers through NATO allies. That is useful. But Pentagon direct acquisition processes must be reformed in parallel. Both workstreams are complementary. And both are urgent.

The letter — fifth paragraph: on what Ukraine did with what it received

57% delivered — and Ukraine still holds

This letter would be incomplete if it did not acknowledge what is working. The $19.21 billion delivered represents real, concrete, and transformative aid. Without it, Ukraine would not have the HIMARS, the Patriots, the Bradleys, the Abrams, the Storm Shadows, the millions of artillery shells that today form the backbone of its armed forces. The United States has been — and remains — Ukraine's most substantial supporter since 2022.

The fact that the administrative machine allowed $910 million to expire does not change this reality. It tempers it. It says that the potential of this aid could have been even greater. It says that improvements are possible and necessary. But it does not call into question the fundamental value of American engagement.

The Senate voting $500 million more

At the same time this audit report was being made public, the Senate voted an additional $500 million for the USAI in 2026 — up from $300 million in 2025. This vote, bipartisan at 26 to 1, says that the political will to support Ukraine remains present in Congress. That is good news. Now the question is ensuring that these $500 million do not meet the same fate as the $910 million that expired.

One does not go without the other. Voting appropriations is half the work. Using them effectively is the other half. This letter argues that both halves be joined into a coherent and effective aid policy — because that is what Ukraine deserves, and because it is what American taxpayers have the right to expect from their government.

The letter — sixth paragraph: on American credibility

When commitments do not materialize

The United States told the world — and Ukraine in particular — that it would support the Ukrainian defence effort for as long as necessary. These declarations are politically important. They sustained Ukrainian morale in the hardest moments. They dissuaded some hesitant allies from stepping back.

But when an audit report reveals that $910 million of an announced commitment expired unused, the credibility of these declarations is damaged. Not irreparably — but genuinely. Every administrative failure that prevents political commitments from materializing into delivered weapons fuels doubt. And in a long war where doubt about the durability of Western support is one of Moscow's strategic weapons, this doubt has a price.

What Russia observes

The Russian command reads public reports. It knows that American appropriations expired unused. It knows that American acquisition processes are slow. It factors these timelines into its strategic planning — if the West takes years to convert appropriations into delivered weapons, the Russian strategy of attrition has a better chance of success. Every $910 million that expires is an administrative victory for Moscow — even if Moscow did nothing to cause it.

I say this without accusing anyone of malicious intent. No one at the Pentagon wanted these appropriations to expire. But results matter as much as intentions. And the result is that Russia can observe with a certain satisfaction that the American administrative system generates its own bottlenecks in aid to Ukraine.

The letter — seventh paragraph: on the silent victims

The soldiers who lack ammunition

Allow me to make concrete what abstract figures mean in the reality of war. Somewhere on the Ukrainian front line, commanders have received instructions to ration their artillery. They knew they had fewer munitions than needed. They had to choose where to fire and where not to fire. These choices have consequences — positions held or lost, advances allowed or blocked, lives preserved or not.

These commanders did not know that $910 million had been allocated by the U.S. Congress to help them, but that administrative deadlines had allowed these appropriations to expire. They simply had fewer munitions than expected. And they made do. They always make do. Ukrainian resistance does not depend on perfect administration of American appropriations. But it would be stronger if that administration were better.

The families who paid the price

Behind every Ukrainian soldier who lacks ammunition, there is a family. A father, a mother, a partner, children. These families do not have access to the Operation Atlantic Resolve audit reports. They do not know that $910 million expired. They only know that their loved one is on a front that is never supplied quite as well as it should be.

I do not cite these families as emotional manipulation. I cite them because politics, in the end, must always be brought back to its human consequences. And the human consequences of administrative failure are real, even when they are not directly measurable. It is this reality that I want to place before the eyes of those who allowed these appropriations to expire.

The letter — eighth paragraph: on what this letter cannot do

The limits of an open letter

I am lucid enough to understand that this open letter will probably not change anything directly. It will not force the Pentagon to reform its acquisition processes overnight. It will not return the $910 million that expired to Ukraine. It will not accelerate ongoing deliveries. What open letters can do is contribute to a public debate about dysfunctions that, without visibility, remain invisible.

The press — and I am part of it — has a responsibility to bring this type of information to the public's attention. Not to dramatize, not to discourage support for Ukraine, but to demand that this support be managed with the rigour the stakes require. Voting appropriations is a political decision. Using them effectively is an administrative responsibility. Both deserve to be held to the same standard of accountability.

What reforms can accomplish

Conversely, legislative and administrative reforms can change things for future appropriations. The Kaine-Cornyn bill on arms transfers through allies is one piece of this puzzle. A reform of commitment windows for emergency military aid appropriations would be another. An early warning system for appropriations at risk of expiration would be a third. These reforms are technically possible. Politically, they require agreement between the two chambers and an executive will that is not guaranteed in the current environment.

But they are necessary. And this letter is a contribution to the argument in their favour.

The letter — ninth paragraph: on the good news

What works despite everything

This letter would be incomplete if it did not acknowledge what works. The $19.21 billion delivered represents real, concrete, and transformative aid. Without it, Ukraine would not have the HIMARS, the Patriots, the Bradleys, the Abrams, the Storm Shadows, the millions of artillery shells that today form the backbone of its armed forces. The United States has been — and remains — the most substantial supporter of Ukraine since 2022.

The fact that the administrative machine allowed $910 million to expire does not change this reality. It tempers it. It says that the potential of this aid could have been even greater. It says that improvements are possible and necessary. But it does not call into question the fundamental value of the American commitment.

The Senate voting 500 million more

At the same time this audit report was being made public, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted an additional $500 million for the USAI in 2026 — up from $300 million in 2025. This vote, bipartisan at 26 to 1, says that the political will to support Ukraine remains present in Congress. That is good news. Now the question is ensuring that these $500 million do not meet the same fate as the $910 million that expired.

One does not go without the other. Voting appropriations is half the work. Using them effectively is the other half. This letter argues for both halves to be united in a coherent and effective aid policy — because that is what Ukraine deserves, and because it is what American taxpayers have the right to expect from their government.

The letter — tenth paragraph: a direct address to Zelensky

What I would want to tell him

President Zelensky, if you read this column, I want you to know that the administrative failures of Ukraine's allies — including the one documented in this audit report — do not reflect the respect and admiration of millions of people in the West for what you and your people have been doing for more than four years. They reflect the limits of institutions that were not designed for wartime urgency. That is not an excuse — it is an explanation.

I know you do not have time to receive explanations. I know you need weapons, ammunition, air defence systems — and that explanations do not put holes in Russian tanks. What I can offer is the assurance that people continue to document, to denounce, and to demand accountability for every million that did not reach your soldiers. That is not much. But it is honest.

Ukrainian resistance as a response to all audit reports

In 2022, military analysts gave Ukraine a few days or weeks before the fall of Kyiv. We are in 2026. Kyiv is still Ukrainian. The Ukrainian army is still fighting. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have developed innovative combat doctrines, trained hundreds of thousands of soldiers, struck targets that many believed beyond reach.

This extraordinary resilience is the best response to all the audit reports, all the expired appropriations, all the delivery delays. It says that Ukraine can manage with what it has — but that it could have done more and better with what was promised. And it is this unkept promise — $910 million in this case — that is the object of this letter.

The letter — eleventh paragraph: on the long war and its demands

What the long war asks of institutions

The war in Ukraine is a long war. It will not be resolved in the coming months. It will demand years of continuous and coordinated support from allies. This type of long-term support is precisely what institutions are supposed to manage better than impulse decisions — because they have processes, rules, continuity mechanisms.

But institutions have value only when their mechanisms are adapted to their mission. And the Pentagon's acquisition mechanisms are not adapted to long-term emergency military aid. The report on the $910 million that expired is proof of that. Correcting this mismatch is a major institutional challenge — and it is precisely the type of challenge that great democracies are supposed to meet.

The West as an institutional project

The West is, among other things, an institutional project: democracies that have decided to govern according to rules, to render accounts, to correct themselves when they fail. This institutional dimension is what fundamentally distinguishes it from authoritarian regimes like Putin's Russia, which can redirect its military resources by decree in twenty-four hours — but pays for it with the absence of the rule of law, freedom of expression, and political accountability.

The institutional advantage of the West — the slowness of its bureaucracy, subject to rules and controls — is also its weakness in urgency. The solution is not to abandon the rules. It is to adapt them so that efficiency and accountability coexist with urgency. The USAI report is an invitation to this work of adaptation. Will it be heard?

The letter — twelfth paragraph: on what we owe Ukrainian soldiers

A collective moral debt

There is a collective moral debt of the West toward the Ukrainian military. These soldiers are fighting for values that are ours as well: democracy, national sovereignty, the right to choose one's own alliances. They are fighting with weapons we supplied them, according to doctrines we contributed to developing, with financial support that comes in part from our taxpayers. They are fighting in our name as much as their own.

When an administrative failure deprives these soldiers of resources they were promised, the moral debt deepens. This is not a philosophical abstraction. It is an operational reality: every position held thanks to delivered ammunition, every attack repelled thanks to an air defence system, every offensive halted thanks to artillery — all of this is the product of resources actually delivered. What is not delivered does not count.

What this letter ultimately asks

This letter demands accountability. It demands a public explanation of how $910 million in aid to Ukraine could expire unused. It demands administrative reforms so this does not recur. It demands that the $500 million voted by the Senate for 2026 — and the $4 billion announced at Ramstein — be managed with the efficiency that past appropriations did not always achieve.

This is not a hostile demand. It is a demand for institutional quality. Ukraine deserves allies who not only make the right political gestures, but who execute them with the administrative rigour the stakes demand. I make this demand on behalf of all those who follow this war with the hope that democracies can and must do better.

Conclusion: The letter will remain open

Until accountability is rendered

This letter will remain open until the Pentagon has publicly explained how $910 million in aid to Ukraine could expire unused, and what concrete measures have been taken to prevent recurrence. This is not an unreasonable demand. It is the minimal accountability request that democratic institutions owe to their taxpayers and their allies.

Ukraine continues to fight. The front lines shift centimetre by centimetre. Ukrainian soldiers demonstrate a courage that words cannot fully capture. Meanwhile, appropriations expired in administrative systems that no one reformed fast enough. These two realities exist simultaneously. This letter is written so that the second is not forgotten in the — justified — admiration for the first.

What remains possible

Despite everything, what remains possible is more important than what has failed. There is still time to reform acquisition processes. There is still time to use ongoing appropriations effectively. There is still time to build a military aid system for Ukraine that is adequate to the needs — in speed, in volume, in continuity. This work is not finished. It is not lost. It simply demands the political and administrative will that these pages try to fuel.

Ukraine deserves better than $910 million expired. America deserves better than a Pentagon that allows war appropriations to expire within its own administrative deadlines. The West deserves better than partially kept promises. This letter asks that we do better — together, now, before the next Ukrainian ammunition shortage forces someone to write the same letter again.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

The position of this letter and its limits

This open letter is a deliberate rhetorical exercise — a journalistic genre that adopts the form of direct address to force argumentative clarity. It is also a real analysis, based on a public audit report I have read and whose figures are verifiable. I am openly in favour of support for Ukraine and I regard the administrative failures in that support as real problems that deserve to be publicly named.

I do not have access to internal Pentagon deliberations on the USAI acquisition processes. I have not heard any official account of the precise reasons for the $910 million that expired. My critique is based on the public information available. If official explanations exist that I am unaware of, I am open to integrating them into a future analysis.

What I do not know

I do not know whether reforms to USAI acquisition processes have been undertaken between the time the audit was conducted and the time I am writing. I do not know whether force majeure circumstances explain some delays. I do not know whether the expired appropriations may have been partially compensated by other mechanisms. These uncertainties are real and I acknowledge them. My position remains that the available information justifies the questions I raise in this letter.

Everything I report is based on public sources. No figure is invented. No statement is attributed to actors without a source. That is the factual foundation of this column.

Sources

Primary sources

News Ukraine RBC — Pentagon did not use nearly 1 billion set aside for Ukraine arms — June 27, 2026

Militarnyi — US Senate Approves $500M in Military Aid for Ukraine in 2026 — June 30, 2026

Censor.net — US Congress may approve Ukraine aid by year end — June 2026

Secondary sources

News Ukraine RBC — US senators push to speed up delivery of critical ammunition to Ukraine — June 29, 2026

News Ukraine RBC — NATO allies ready to provide 70 billion for Ukraine — June 2026

Kyiv Independent — Ukraine war and defence coverage — consulted July 1, 2026