OPEN LETTER: NATO — The 9th Battalion in Finland Is a Message to Moscow

OPEN LETTER: NATO — The 9th Battalion in Finland Is a Message to Moscow

Introduction: Gentlemen of the Kremlin's Strategy Room, Read Carefully

A letter I could not have written before 2022

I am writing to you in June 2026, from a continent that has relearned, the hard way, the meaning of the word "defense." In June 2026, NATO officially established the Forward Land Forces (FLF) Finland — the alliance's 9th multinational battalion, under the command of Sweden as framework nation. Nine battalions. Four years after the invasion of Ukraine. The alliance that was supposed to be irrelevant, according to your propagandists, now counts one more battalion, placed exactly where you would have preferred none to exist — on the north-eastern flank of Europe.

This letter is addressed to the strategists of the Kremlin who bet, since 2022, that NATO would fragment under pressure. That Finland and Sweden would hesitate. That Europeans would grow tired. That the northern flank would remain vulnerable. This bet has proven a losing one, point after point. The 9th FLF Finland battalion is the latest demonstration.

Finland in NATO: A Russian Geopolitical Nightmare Made Real

What Finland's accession changed

Finland's accession to NATO in April 2023, followed by Sweden's in March 2024, fundamentally reconfigured the security landscape of Northern Europe. Russia now shares a land border with NATO stretching more than 1,300 kilometers with Finland alone. The Baltic Sea has become de facto a NATO inland lake, with alliance members on all its shores except for Russia and isolated Kaliningrad. This is a strategic revolution that Moscow triggered with its invasion of Ukraine — and whose consequences it is now bearing.

For Finland, joining NATO ended decades of carefully maintained armed neutrality. This is not an abandonment of a tradition — it is a rational response to a clearly identified threat. The Finnish population, which carries the Winter War of 1939-1940 in its collective memory, understands better than anyone in Europe what it means to share a border with Russia. Its support for NATO is massive and deliberate — not the product of media hysteria.

The creation of FLF Finland: what it means concretely

The Forward Land Forces (FLF) Finland constitute a NATO multinational forward presence battalion, similar to the battalions already deployed in the Baltic states and in Poland. Under the command of Sweden as framework nation, this battalion groups troops from several allied nations stationed in Finland. Its creation symbolizes the complete integration of Finland into NATO's forward defense architecture — it is no longer merely a member on paper, it is integrated into the posture of collective deterrence.

Concretely, this means that any attack on Finland would trigger the mutual assistance clause of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty — and would immediately encounter allied troops already in place, not merely a promise of reinforcements. That is the difference between deterrence on paper and deterrence in steel.

Sweden as Framework Nation: An Intelligent Division of Roles

Why Sweden is the right framework nation

The choice of Sweden as framework nation for the FLF Finland battalion is logically coherent. Sweden and Finland have closely aligned military histories and strategic cultures — they cooperated militarily for decades even before their accessions to NATO. Sweden has a professional and well-equipped army, with particular expertise in operations in a Nordic environment. And its presence as framework nation avoids designating a major power that might be perceived as dominant.

This division of roles also illustrates the evolution of NATO's internal dynamics. The former members of the northern flank have become active and central contributors to collective defense, not merely beneficiaries of the American guarantee. Sweden commands a battalion. Finland hosts the troops. The Baltic states host battalions whose framework nations are the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. This is a fair sharing of the deterrence burden.

The north-eastern flank: from vulnerability to fortress

NATO's north-eastern flank — comprising the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, and Sweden — was traditionally considered the most vulnerable part of the alliance. Military simulations conducted before 2022 showed that the Baltic states could be overwhelmed within days by a massive Russian attack. These scenarios guided reinforcement decisions since 2022. The result is visible: the north-eastern flank is no longer a grey zone — it is now one of the best-defended regions of Europe.

Poland has more than doubled its defense spending. The Baltic states maintain levels of alert and exercises not seen since the Cold War. Finland has a trained reserve army of 900,000 personnel, capable of rapid mobilization. Together, these nations form a shield that makes a Russian attack on the north-eastern flank extraordinarily costly — and likely deterrent even for the most belligerent calculations of the Kremlin.

The Brussels Meetings of June: Progression Toward Ankara

June 17-18: spending commitments and priorities

The meetings of NATO Defense Ministers on June 17-18, 2026 in Brussels confirmed several important commitments in preparation for the Ankara summit. Ministers reported significant progress in meeting defense spending objectives: for the first time in the alliance's history, a majority of members are dedicating at least 2% of their GDP to defense, and several are exceeding this threshold. This is a major structural evolution in the funding of the alliance.

Priorities confirmed at Brussels for the Ankara summit include: strengthening the forward presence on the eastern flank, accelerating deliveries to Ukraine, modernizing allied air defense systems, and defining a new security guarantee framework for Ukraine. This last point is the most politically sensitive — it involves compromises on American positions and on Ukraine's formal status vis-à-vis the alliance.

The 2% GDP target: a floor, not a ceiling

I want to note a point that too few analysts emphasize: the defense spending target of 2% of GDP, long treated as a politically difficult ceiling to reach, has become a floor that several nations now easily exceed. Poland is at 4%. The Baltic states are above 3%. Finland joined the alliance with a level of actual military readiness that goes well beyond the GDP percentage. This evolution is fundamental: it means that NATO is genuinely investing in the credibility of its deterrence.

The Ankara summit is expected to formalize a more ambitious spending target — some members are advocating for 2.5% or even 3% as the new standard. This internal debate within the alliance, sometimes perceived as a distraction, is actually central: it measures the collective political will to sustain defense over the long term, regardless of political fluctuations in each member country.

The Letter to Ukrainians: You Are Not Alone

What the 9th battalion says to Ukraine

I want to address Ukrainian readers directly now, if this letter reaches them. The 9th FLF Finland battalion is not merely a movement of pieces on the NATO chessboard. It is a message addressed to you: Europe is not abandoning you. While your soldiers defend the Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, the ruins of Kharkiv, NATO is building the flank that will prevent this war from repeating itself elsewhere. We are not fighting for you — we let you fight with everything we can give you. But we are preparing Europe for the more dangerous world that Putin's war has created.

The creation of FLF Finland also says something fundamental about the direction Europe is taking: toward greater security integration, more burden-sharing, more forward presence. Toward a defense architecture that does not depend exclusively on the goodwill of a single American power whose reliability can vary with elections. Toward a Europe that takes its own security in hand. That is what your resistance has catalyzed. That is not nothing.

What Ukraine has changed in European consciousness

I say this without hesitation: Ukraine has changed Europe. Not just defense policy — consciousness. Nations that had been sleeping under the duvet of the peace dividend since 1991 suddenly realized, watching the images of Bucha and Mariupol, that freedom is not guaranteed. That democracies must be capable of defending themselves. That the authoritarian neighbor dreaming of reconstituting an empire is not satisfied by mere diplomatic tolerance.

This revolution in consciousness may be the most enduring legacy of Ukrainian resistance, regardless of the military outcome of the conflict. Even if a negotiated peace came tomorrow — which I hope for only if it is a just one — Europe would emerge from this ordeal transformed. More coherent, better armed, more aware of its vulnerability. And therefore, paradoxically, more secure in the long run.

Security Guarantees for Ukraine: The Stakes at Ankara

From membership to guarantees: a political path

Formal Ukraine membership in NATO remains blocked by several obstacles — primarily American resistance under Trump and the unanimity rule that gives every member a veto. The Ankara summit is not expected to produce a formal membership invitation. But it should define substantial security guarantees that create near-equivalent protection for Ukraine in the interim.

These guarantees could include bilateral security agreements with the alliance's main members, integration of Ukrainian command systems into NATO structures, consultation mechanisms in the event of imminent threat, and delivery of interoperable equipment. This is not full membership — but it is more than a vague promise. It is a security architecture that gives Ukraine concrete protection.

The FLF Finland precedent for Ukraine

The creation of FLF Finland is instructive for Ukraine's future. It shows that there are mechanisms for integration into NATO's collective security that can precede or complement formal membership. Forward presence battalions on Ukrainian territory — if political conditions allowed — would constitute concrete deterrence against a new Russian offensive. No one says this officially. But the FLF model is there, and it works.

The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other nations have expressed their willingness to provide security guarantees to Ukraine within the framework of the joint E5 statement of June 24, 2026. These commitments are still being formalized. The Ankara summit will be the opportunity to make them operational — or to leave them as statements of intent.

The Letter to the Europe That Still Doubts

For those wondering whether it is worth the price

I am also addressing you — European citizens who wonder whether all this is really worth it. Whether energy prices, inflation, Ukrainian migration, and seventeen rounds of sanctions are an acceptable cost for a conflict "over there." My answer is yes, without hesitation. Not because economic suffering is negligible — it is not. But because the alternative — a Europe that lets Putin dictate his terms — would be far more costly in the long run.

The 9th FLF Finland battalion costs money. The Swedish, Finnish, and other contributing-nation soldiers who compose it spend time away from home. Their families make sacrifices. This is not abstract — it is real. But this cost is insurance: every euro invested in deterrence today avoids much heavier costs tomorrow. Peace through strength is not a paradox — it is the reality of collective defense.

What democracy owes to future generations

We are not only building a security architecture for today. We are building it for the generations that will follow us. The children growing up today in Finland, Estonia, Ukraine will live in the world we are shaping with our current decisions. A world where aggression is punished and sovereignty respected, or a world where great powers dictate terms to smaller neighbors. This choice is ours. FLF Finland is a partial but real response to this intergenerational responsibility.

Memory is short in democracies. In ten years, if peace returns, some will forget why these battalions were created and will want to dissolve them for savings. This is the usual cycle: the threat recedes, vigilance relaxes. To break this cycle, the memory of danger must be institutionalized in the permanent structures of the alliance. FLF Finland should become a lasting presence, not a temporary crisis measure.

Russia Facing Itself: The Wall It Built

Growing and irreversible isolation

Faced with NATO's expansion and its reinforced forward presence, Russia has only limited options. A direct attack on an alliance member would trigger Article 5 — which Putin has so far shown he wants to avoid. The alternative is to continue the war of attrition in Ukraine, hoping the West grows tired before Russia does. That is the bet he has made. And so far, he is losing that bet too.

Russia's international isolation is structurally deeper than before the invasion. Relations with Europe are severed for a generation. Russia is excluded from key international institutions. Its dependence on China grows as its alternatives shrink — and this dependence places it in the position of a client rather than an equal partner. Putin wanted Russian greatness; he got NATO enlargement and dependence on Beijing.

What Russia should do — but probably will not

I admit it: I do not know what can make Putin change course. I am neither a psychologist nor a Kremlin adviser. What I can say is that the way out of this isolation exists for Russia: withdrawal of troops from Ukrainian territory, negotiation of a peace agreement in conformity with international law, acceptance of a regional role that does not rest on threat and force. This would be a different Russia — and likely more prosperous for its own population.

But that Russia would require the end of Putin's political system. And this is why that path is probably closed as long as he is in power. Russia's geopolitics are held hostage by Russian domestic politics. This observation makes me humble about short-term peace prospects — and determined in my support for Ukraine, which must preserve its positions until Russian geopolitics change.

Conclusion: Moscow, You Triggered All This — and You Lost on This Front

The strategic balance of NATO enlargement

I close this open letter with a simple assessment: Putin's strategy aimed at preventing NATO enlargement and weakening the alliance has produced the exact opposite result. NATO has two additional Nordic members. It has 9 forward presence battalions where there were 4 in 2022. Members' defense spending has increased substantially. The alliance's political cohesion is stronger than it has been since the Cold War.

This is a major strategic defeat for the Kremlin — perhaps the most significant of this conflict, even beyond the losses on the battlefield. Putin wanted a world without NATO at Russian borders. He got a world with a stronger, more determined, and geographically closer NATO than ever before. The resilience of democracies under authoritarian pressure is the most important lesson of the past four years.

What I ask of Western political leaders

Finally, I address Western decision-makers: do not squander what Ukrainian courage and collective Western resistance have built. Maintain the sanctions. Continue the weapons deliveries. Formalize the security guarantees at Ankara. And do not yield to the temptation of a quick deal that would sacrifice Ukraine's territorial integrity on the altar of diplomatic convenience. The 9th FLF Finland battalion is not a destination — it is a step on a trajectory that must lead to a Europe that is safe, free, and founded on the rule of law.

Zelensky and the Ukrainian people deserve more than a peace that would be merely an armed truce. They deserve a peace that guarantees their freedom, their sovereignty, and their European future. Everything else — including this 9th NATO battalion — is only the means of reaching that end. I am not letting go. And neither should you, I hope.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Why this open letter, and to whom it speaks

I am Maxime Marquette, a geopolitics columnist. The open letter is a particular genre: it formally addresses a specific recipient (here the Kremlin's strategists and Western decision-makers), but in reality it speaks to all readers. It is a rhetorical tool that allows naming the stakes directly and taking positions without diluting them in analytical neutrality. I own this — my positions are clear: pro-Ukraine, pro-NATO, opposed to Russian aggression.

The facts about the creation of FLF Finland, the June 2026 Defense Ministers' meetings, and NATO spending commitments are based on public official sources. I have not invented facts or exaggerated available figures. Where I express opinions and expectations — notably on security guarantees for Ukraine — I do so clearly within the framework of the open letter genre.

What I do not know

I do not know the precise composition and exact troop strength of the FLF Finland battalion — this information is partially classified for operational security reasons. I also do not know what precise commitments will be made at the Ankara summit on Ukrainian security guarantees — these negotiations are underway at the time of writing. I work with the available public information, contextualizing it within the broader analytical framework of the conflict.

My method for this article: official NATO sources, communications from allied governments, international reference press reports, and analyses from European security experts. Links to these sources are available below.

Sources

Primary sources

Strengthening NATO's eastern flank — NATO official

NATO Defence Ministers make good progress ahead of the Ankara Summit — NATO, June 18, 2026

E5 leaders' joint statement on Ukraine — UK Government, June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

Zelensky and Nordic-Baltic support for Ukraine's NATO membership — Nordic Post, June 10, 2026

Poland and Lithuania exploring a larger role in nuclear deterrence — Washington Times, June 3, 2026

Russian provocations against the Baltic states and Poland — The Guardian, June 26, 2026