COMMENTARY: The Russian Exemption Expired — Trump Tightens the Tap After Leaving It Wide Open

June 17, 2026 — the date that ends an anomaly

On June 17, 2026, the United States let the third and final sanctions exemption on Russian oil expire without renewal. This ends a cycle of three successive 30-day waivers granted since March 12, 2026. For three months, the U.S. Treasury maintained a license permitting the trade of Russian oil on international markets, even as Ukraine was being bombed. The official justification: protecting energy-vulnerable nations.

In reality, these three months gave Vladimir Putin an extraordinary window of oil revenue. Russian crude oil exports went from 4.9 million barrels per day in February to 6 million barrels per day in May 2026. During the same period, Russia collected more than $2 billion in additional revenue thanks to rising energy prices. And those profits were used to fund attacks.

Three consecutive waivers granted while Ukraine was burning under Russian drones. The Trump administration gave Putin exactly what he needed to fund his war — and then is surprised the war continues. The logic escapes me.

The direct connection between oil and Ukrainian missiles

This is not speculation. Olga Khakova, senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center, said it unambiguously: "These exceptional profits funded an unprecedented scale of drone and missile attacks against Ukraine in the spring." The causal link is direct. The U.S. Treasury was permitting trade in Russian oil. Russia was selling more oil. The revenue funded the attacks. Ukrainians died.

The figures for Russian oil exports speak for themselves. From 4.9 million b/d in February to 5.5 million in March, 5.6 million in April, 6 million in May — a steady progression across exactly the period covered by the American waivers. Treasury Secretary Bessent had justified the second and third waivers by the need to ensure energy supply for the most vulnerable nations. This is a legitimate argument in the abstract. In the reality of 2026 oil markets, with Iran now able to trade freely, it becomes considerably less convincing.

Secretary Bessent said these waivers protected vulnerable nations. I am prepared to believe him. But when the two billion in additional profits end up in Putin's accounts to fund strikes on Kyiv, one can legitimately question the weighting of that cost-benefit analysis.

June 16 — a warning issued on the eve of the expiration

On June 16, 2026 — one day before the third waiver's expiration — Senators Jeanne Shaheen (Democrat-New Hampshire, senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee) and Warren (Democrat-Massachusetts) published a joint statement urging the Trump administration not to renew. Their formulation was precise: "Extending this license one more time would give Vladimir Putin another opportunity to collect windfall profits while he continues his brutal war against Ukraine."

The administration ultimately followed their recommendation — not because it was persuaded by their moral argument, but because the geopolitical context had changed. The deal with Iran was opening the Strait of Hormuz and promising a new source of oil on the markets. Trump himself had declared at the G7 in France on June 16: "We will be able to do it [increase sanctions on Russia] because the oil is flowing now." This is not moral rigor — it is market mechanics.

Trump let the waiver expire because Iran was becoming an oil supplier again, not because he had decided to punish Putin for the drones on Kyiv. Motivations must be called by their names, even when the result is the right one.

Évian-les-Bains: the promise of a tighter grip

The G7 convened at Évian-les-Bains in France produced a collective commitment: the leaders of the seven major democracies pledged to progressively strengthen sanctions on Russia's war economy, including the oil and gas sectors. This announcement is welcome. It follows months during which Western pressure on Russian energy exports had been deliberately softened by the American waivers.

The question now is one of follow-through. G7 commitments on sanctions have a mixed history — stated firmly in communiqués, implemented more variably in practice. Russia has mastered the art of sanctions evasion, notably by redirecting oil exports toward Asian buyers with significant discounts. The non-renewal of the American waiver is a step. It is not a victory.

G7 communiqués on Russian sanctions have the unfortunate habit of being stronger on paper than in practice. I hope the commitment holds this time. But Ukraine has learned at bitter cost that promises of pressure on Moscow do not automatically translate into reality on the ground.

Asian buyers as Russia's lifeline

The expiration of the American waiver does not mean the end of Russian oil exports. Olga Khakova makes this clear: even without the American waiver, Russia will use its sanctions evasion tactics — the shadow fleet of uninsured tankers, non-dollar currency transactions, intermediaries in third-party countries — to continue exporting oil to Asian buyers, primarily China and India, with significant discounts.

This model has been well established since 2022. It will not disappear overnight because Washington decided not to renew a license. Export volumes may drop marginally. Revenue will decrease somewhat — discounts on the Asian market reduce margins. But Putin has proven he can wage war with discounted oil. The economic pressure is real. A complete funding cutoff is not.

Russia's shadow fleet keeps sailing. Indian and Chinese refineries will keep buying Putin's oil at reduced prices. The expiration of the American waiver is more of a political signal than a real economic rupture. I accept it as a positive signal while refusing to make it a definitive victory.

Economic pressure as a lever for peace or capitulation

The reduction in Russian oil revenues — even partial — has an effect on Moscow's capacity to fund its military operations long-term. Every billion less in the Kremlin's coffers is a billion less available for drone strikes, missiles, military equipment, mercenary recruitment, and the maintenance of a war economy. The stated objective of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Western allies is precisely to drain this funding until the continuation of the war becomes economically unsustainable for Russia.

But timing matters. Three months of exceptional oil revenues have already been spent. Unprecedented drone and missile attacks took place this spring — funded, according to Khakova, by the profits from the waiver period. Ukraine is paying the human price of this decision. The end of the waivers improves the situation at the margin. It does not bring back the victims of the spring strikes.

Zelensky needs economic pressure on Moscow. That is beyond dispute. But economic pressure that arrives after the oil has funded months of attacks on Ukrainian cities is medicine administered after the complications. Better late than never — but the scars remain.

March 2026 — Russian oil as a market buffer

The first waiver, granted on March 12, 2026, coincided with the start of the war between the United States and Iran. The logic was simple: the conflict with Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, cut part of global oil supplies, and send prices skyrocketing. Keeping Russian oil on the markets was presented as a tool for cushioning energy shocks. Bessent's argument about protecting vulnerable nations had a certain coherence then.

The problem is that this emergency logic was renewed three times. As the Iranian war evolved and the prospect of a deal took shape, the pretext of energy vulnerability weakened. The third waiver, granted on May 18 to expire on June 17, coincided with advanced negotiations with Iran. Maintaining the waiver until the Iranian deal was signed maximized the revenue window for Moscow — perhaps not intentionally, but that is the real result.

From the legitimate urgency of March to the unjustifiable waiver of May: that is how exceptions become default policies. Sanctions bureaucracy has its own inertial dynamics. And meanwhile, Putin cashes in.

The expiration as a beginning, not an end

What Ukraine is waiting for now: actions, not communiqués

The expiration of the waiver is the right signal. The G7 at Évian reinforced that signal with a collective promise to tighten sanctions. Trump himself expressed the will to increase pressure on Russia once Iranian oil compensates Russian volumes on the markets. These elements sketch a coherent change of direction — not driven by sudden ideological conviction, but because the economic conditions now permit it.

What this expiration does not guarantee: the rapid implementation of new effective sanctions on Russian oil and gas exports; the closing of evasion routes via China, India, and third-party countries; the end of ambiguities in the application of agreed price caps; and European political consistency on residual energy dependencies on Moscow. These challenges remain open. Ukraine cannot wait for all of them to be resolved. It is waiting for concrete actions, not communiqués.

A positive signal amid challenges still open. That is the honest summary of the situation. Ukraine deserves more than signals. It deserves sanctions that genuinely bite — and quickly.

The expiration as market necessity before moral virtue

The decision to let the Russian oil waiver expire is right. It was long overdue. But it arrived largely for reasons related to oil market mechanics — Iranian oil returning to the markets — rather than from a realization about the human consequences of Russian oil revenues for Ukraine. I am not saying the result is bad because the motivations are imperfect. I am saying we must be honest about what actually triggered this change.

What Ukraine needs now: for the G7 promise to translate into coordinated, effective, and non-circumventable sanctions on Russian energy exports. Zelensky is a man who fights with the tools he is given. For three months, his enemy was given the means to bomb him. The correction has begun. It must now be pursued with the same consistency that Putin applied to funding his war.

The right decision, at last. Now it must be maintained. And that is the hardest part — because sanctions policy is a marathon, not a sprint. Ukraine has been running since 2022. Its allies must hold the distance.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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