OPEN LETTER: To Those Who Still Doubted Ukraine Could Build a War Industry

The morning of June 18, 2026 over Kapotnya

To you, European policymakers, skeptical journalists, experts who spent two years repeating that Ukraine lacked the industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged war of attrition. Look at the black smoke rising over Moscow from the Kapotnya district, 15 kilometers from the Kremlin. It is coming from the Moscow oil refinery — the one that supplies up to 40% of the fuel needs of the Russian capital region. It was struck on June 16, 2026, then again on June 18. Twice in three days. This is not coincidence. It is strategy.

This strike was not carried out with missiles reluctantly supplied by cautious allies. It was executed with Ukrainian drones — FP-1 Lyutyi munitions and other loitering weapons manufactured in Ukraine, according to open-source imagery analysis relayed by Militarnyi. Drones designed, produced, and launched by a defense industry that barely existed in its current form eighteen months ago. That is what this smoke is saying. That is what you did not see coming.

The industrial transformation nobody believed possible

In June 2024, Ukraine was producing a few hundred military drones per month. In June 2026, it is producing tens of thousands. Ukrainian forces have received orders for 150,000 drones manufactured in Ukraine — deliverable before year-end. The Netherlands signed a cooperation memorandum to fund drone production for Ukraine at 250 million euros. This is not philanthropy: it is recognition that Ukraine has developed an industrial expertise that even the great military powers of NATO struggle to match in terms of iteration speed.

This scaling up is not merely quantitative — it is qualitative. The June 18 strike on the Kapotnya refinery involved Bars drones, drone-cruise missile hybrids with an estimated range of between 350 and 500 miles, now operational over Moscow. These are systems that Ukraine was still developing in the laboratory eighteen months ago. From startup to arsenal, the cycle has been breathtakingly rapid.

To those who spent months saying that Ukraine "could not" industrialize its war: the Kapotnya refinery is burning. I say this without triumphalism — people are suffering on both sides of this war. But the reality of the facts demands a revision of every pessimistic forecast about Ukraine's ability to hold out and to strike.

The economics of defensive urgency

Ukraine adopted after 2022 a war-time industrial doctrine that conflict economists call "the economics of defensive urgency." It consists of accepting looser industrial standards in order to produce quickly, multiplying sub-contractors and startups, massively declassifying specifications to enable decentralized innovation, and incorporating real-time battlefield feedback. Ukrainian engineers have described improvement cycles of two to four weeks — where Western defense contractors count in years.

The number and variety of drone types used in the June 18 strike illustrate this industrial diversity. Open-source analysts identified at least three distinct types of Ukrainian drones: FP-1, Lyutyi, and a Ukrainian Shahed-type munition. Each type was developed by a different company or cell, often originally in startup form, and then integrated into production lines. This redundancy is a strength: if one type is neutralized by Russian countermeasures, the others keep striking.

The Moscow strikes as an open-air proving ground

The Kapotnya refinery has become in 2026 the open-air proving ground of Ukraine's deep-strike doctrine. It has been targeted at least four times since September 2024. The June 16, 2026 strike damaged the primary distillation unit ELOU-AVT-6, forcing the plant to shut down. The June 18 strike worsened the damage. According to Reuters, as cited by Militarnyi, the refinery is unlikely to resume operations before 2027. This facility, which processes 11.6 million tons of crude per year and supplies 50% of the Moscow region's diesel, is out of service for at least six months.

The consequences are measurable. By May 2026, eight of Russia's ten largest refineries had been struck by Ukrainian drones. Russian oil production fell by 13% compared to prior levels. Russia was forced to consider importing fuel by sea to manage its gasoline shortage. For an oil-exporting country, this is a strategic humiliation of considerable magnitude.

These strikes are not symbolic. They hit Russia's material capacity to finance and wage its war. Every offline refinery means less oil revenue for Moscow, less fuel for its armored vehicles, less kerosene for its planes. Ukraine's deep-strike economic strategy is proving that it works.

Coordinating a saturation attack

The June 18 strike mobilized, according to available sources, between 190 and 200 drones directed at Moscow in a single night. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced having shot down 555 Ukrainian drones nationwide during that same night. Even if these figures must be taken with caution — Russia has a track record of overstating its interceptions — they reveal the scale of the operation. Organizing such a strike, coordinating hundreds of drones of different types, launched from different points, following varied flight paths to saturate air defenses — requires sophisticated operational command.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin acknowledged that several drones had reached the refinery despite the interception of 194 aircraft on approach to the capital. Moscow's multi-layered air defenses — considered among the densest in the world — were not enough. This is a strategic message of considerable power: if Moscow is not safe, no Russian infrastructure is.

The political message in smoke visible from the Kremlin

There is something in the June 18 strike that goes beyond military tactics. The black smoke from Kapotnya, visible from the windows of the Kremlin, is a message addressed to the Russian public: your leader is lying when he tells you the war is happening far from home. For Volodymyr Zelensky, who publicly framed this strike as a direct riposte to the Russian attack on Kyiv, this is the embodiment of a strategic reciprocity doctrine: strike deep into Russia every time Ukraine's own depth is targeted.

This doctrine has a dual dimension. Tactically, it aims to degrade Russian economic and logistical capacity. Psychologically, it aims to erode popular support for the war in Russia. Airport closures during attacks, fuel shortages in regions as distant as Kamchatka — these signals remind the Russian public that the war affects them too.

Putin built his legitimacy on the idea that the war was distant, clean, victorious. The smoke from Kapotnya refutes that narrative more convincingly than any speech ever could. And it is Ukraine that lit this signal — with drones it built itself.

The Dutch memorandum and the industrial partnership

At a meeting in Berlin in June 2026, European leaders reaffirmed their commitment to deeper defense cooperation. The Dutch memorandum of 250 million euros for Ukrainian drone production is the most recent example. Dutch and Ukrainian companies signed their first joint production agreements. This is the beginning of a defense industrial partnership that goes beyond simple military aid — it is an integration of production chains between a NATO country and a partner nation at war.

Ukraine has shown European defense manufacturers something essential: that rapid iteration, tolerance for industrial risk, and integration of combat feedback can produce capabilities that conventional procurement procedures cannot reach. Companies such as German manufacturer Helsing AI have delivered their first AI-equipped HX-2 Karma drones to Ukraine. The industrial alliance between Europe and Kyiv is becoming a unique military innovation laboratory.

What European defense manufacturers are learning from Kyiv

Europe's major defense companies — Rheinmetall, MBDA, Thales — have all established partnerships or observation programs in Ukraine to draw lessons from the conflict. The Ukrainian iteration speed contrasts painfully with the ten-to-fifteen-year development cycles that characterize conventional European armaments programs. Some defense industry leaders have begun to speak openly of "the Ukrainian lesson" as a model to partially adopt. This is not gratuitous humility: it is recognition that real-time warfare teaches what no laboratory can simulate.

Ukraine's drone program also illustrates a broader principle: in modern warfare, quantity and diversity can sometimes outperform individual sophistication. A thousand relatively simple drones that saturate a defense may sometimes be worth more than ten precision missiles that get intercepted. This saturation logic is reshaping the military doctrines of NATO members observing the Ukrainian conflict.

Europe has not yet grasped how fast the military-technological world is changing. It funds programs over ten years while Ukraine builds capabilities in eighteen months. This gap in pace is the real vulnerability of European defense — and it is not a budget problem. It is a problem of institutional culture.

The logic of deep strikes against the Russian economy

Volodymyr Zelensky has articulated his deep-strike doctrine around a simple equation: if Russia strikes Ukraine in its economic depth, Ukraine must have the ability to do the same. This equation is not merely military — it is political. It responds to Western public opinion fatigue by showing that Ukraine can act, not only absorb blows. It also responds to allies' skepticism about Ukrainian sustainability by proving that Kyiv can inflict real costs on Moscow.

This doctrine has one important limitation that I note clearly: while Ukraine now strikes at 500 kilometers from its borders, it does not yet possess operational ballistic missiles in sufficient numbers to target the most heavily protected military installations. The Ukrainian defense ministry, Mykhailo Fedorov, announced preparations for ballistic missile strikes — but these systems are still under development.

What the industrial war has not yet achieved

The industrial war is not yet won. It is in the process of being won. Ukrainian air defenses remain vulnerable to Russian missile salvoes, as recent attacks on Kryvyi Rih and other cities have shown. Ukraine still suffers significant civilian and infrastructural losses. Its refineries, power stations, and port facilities have been repeatedly struck since 2022. The symmetry is not perfect — but the trend is: Ukraine is scaling up, Russia is suffering deepening industrial degradation.

What has changed over eighteen months is the trajectory. And in a war of attrition, trajectory matters more than the current state of forces. An army that is building industrial competence beats an army that is losing its refineries — provided its allies do not give up before the finish line.

I choose to be honest with my readers: I do not know how this war will end. What I know is that the arguments of those who presented Ukraine as a state incapable of building a durable war industry have been refuted by the facts. Kapotnya is burning. And that changes everything in Russia's strategic calculus.

The Russian response: adaptation and reprisals

Russia is not passive in the face of Ukrainian strikes. It is adapting its air defense countermeasures around Moscow, relocating industrial assets to areas less accessible beyond the Urals, and intensifying strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Putin has also announced investments in electronic warfare capabilities aimed at neutralizing Ukrainian drones. The technological race is ongoing, and time works against both sides in different ways.

There is also a risk of miscalculated escalation that I do not want to minimize. Repeated strikes against civilian infrastructure near Moscow — even if primary targets are industrial — could trigger a disproportionate Russian response, potentially involving non-conventional weapons. Putin has publicly floated this threat on multiple occasions since 2022. So far, he has not acted on it. But each strike on Kapotnya reduces everyone's room for maneuver.

The question of the international legality of deep strikes

Ukraine's doctrine of deep strikes against Russian economic infrastructure raises questions of international humanitarian law. Targeting an oil refinery — even one supporting the war effort — can be considered a strike on dual-use civilian infrastructure. International law scholars are divided on the legality of such strikes in the context of an invasion war. I note this ambiguity without pretending to resolve it: that is not my role as a columnist. But it exists, and Western allies of Ukraine must be aware of the line they are helping draw.

What I can say with certainty is that Russia has targeted Ukrainian civilian infrastructure — hospitals, schools, power plants — since the first day of the 2022 invasion. Ukrainian reciprocity, limited to dual-use industrial facilities, falls well short of the brutality of Russian strikes on civilian populations. This context does not settle the legal question, but it illuminates the moral one.

I am not a specialist in international law. But there is something absurd to me about debating the legality of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries when Moscow has been bombing Ukrainian hospitals for 1,500 days. Proportionality exists — and in this case, it clearly favors Ukraine.

The Ukrainian lesson for defense manufacturers

Europe, which has been watching the war in Ukraine since 2022, should emerge from it with revolutionary industrial conclusions. Conventional European armaments programs take fifteen to twenty years from design to delivery. The FCAS Franco-German-Spanish fighter aircraft program fell a decade behind. The German F126 frigate has yet to be delivered. Meanwhile, Ukraine designed, tested, and mass-produced a drone arsenal in under two years. The contrast is stark.

The Ukrainian lesson is not to copy the emergency-war model — Europe has the luxury of planning without the immediate existential constraint. But it must draw inspiration from it to accelerate innovation cycles, reduce acquisition bureaucracy, and create fast-track pathways for defense startups with revolutionary ideas. Countries such as Estonia and Latvia have already adopted accelerated procurement models inspired by the Ukrainian experience. The rest of Europe should do the same.

Funding Ukraine is funding your own security

The question is not whether Europe can afford to fund Ukraine's war industry. The question is whether it can afford not to. Every euro invested in Ukrainian drones is a euro that degrades Russia's industrial and military capacity — without a single European soldier being exposed. It is the best return on security investment that Europe can make. The Dutch 250 million euros is a demonstration of this. More must follow.

When the smoke from Kapotnya clears, it will leave behind a truth no one can deny: Ukraine has proved it can strike where it hurts. What is needed now is ensuring it has the means to keep going — not only for itself, but for the entire European security architecture that depends on the outcome of this war.

Europe can continue to hesitate, to calculate, to condition its aid on guarantees that no one can give in a war. Or it can look at the smoke from Kapotnya and understand that Ukraine is fighting for all of us. This is not rhetoric. Geography and history are saying it.

The documented economic impact of Ukrainian strikes

To grasp the strategic scope of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries, here are the economic data as available in open sources. In May 2026, eight of Russia's ten largest refineries had been struck. Russian oil production had fallen by 13% — a figure calculated by specialized analysts from maritime flow data and customs data, not an official Russian figure, which I note as such. The Kapotnya refinery alone, offline until 2027, represents a loss of processing capacity of 11.6 million tons of crude per year. These are concrete, documented losses with direct consequences for Russian state revenues.

Oil and gas revenues represent a structurally important share of the Russian federal budget — between 30 and 40% depending on the year. Any significant reduction in production creates fiscal pressure that, over time, constrains military spending. This vicious cycle — Ukraine strikes refineries, Russia loses revenue, Russia has fewer resources for its war — is precisely what Ukraine's doctrine seeks to trigger. It is working.

Sourced figures and figures to treat with caution

I must be rigorous here: some figures I cite in this article deserve a note of caution. The production figure of 150,000 drones ordered is data reported in Ukrainian sources, not officially confirmed. The 13% reduction estimate in Russian oil production comes from energy-market analysts, not verified government data. Russia has not published reliable oil extraction statistics since 2022. These figures are corroborated by multiple independent sources, but they remain estimates. I cite them with this explicit caveat.

What is certain, however, is this: the Kapotnya refinery is offline. Satellite images and residents' testimony confirm it. Moscow's mayor acknowledged it. Reuters reported it. On this point, the facts are beyond dispute. And it is on indisputable facts that I build my argument.

An industrial lesson for all of European defense

What Ukraine has accomplished in eighteen months is not merely a military performance. It is an industrial lesson for an Europe that is struggling to rearm. Speed of iteration, real-time integration of combat feedback, willingness to embrace the risk of innovation — all of this, Ukraine has mastered under existential pressure. Europe can draw lessons for its own defense industries, provided it has the humility to acknowledge that Kyiv has done in eighteen months what defense bureaucracies have not done in thirty years.

The war of attrition has a potential industrial winner

If the current trend holds — Ukraine producing at scale, Russia suffering deep degradation of its energy infrastructure — the question of Russian sustainability will arise in increasingly acute terms. The Kremlin can absorb considerable human losses. But the destruction of a refinery that will not come back online until 2027, fuel shortages across entire regions, oil losses estimated at 13% of production — these constraints accumulate. Ukraine has understood this. It remains for Europe to act accordingly.

This open letter closes with a question I address to all those in Europe who still hesitate over the level of aid to grant Ukraine: if you do not support Ukraine now that it is proving its industrial capacity, when will you? The drones over Kapotnya showed that Ukraine can win. It remains to be seen whether Europe will choose to stand by its side when it counts.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.