OPEN LETTER: FP-9 at 855 km — Putin, Moscow is now within range of Ukrainian missiles

What you did not foresee in February 2022

Vladimir Putin, when you ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, you had calculated a victory in 72 hours. You believed Kyiv would fall before the world had time to react. You believed the Ukrainians would flee or submit. You believed Russia was too large, too powerful, too nuclear to be seriously challenged. That calculation was wrong. And now, in June 2026, you are living with the consequences of that mistake — in the form of a Ukrainian ballistic missile in development whose range approaches 855 km, sufficient to reach the Kremlin from Ukrainian territory.

I write this letter not to threaten you — that is not my role. I write it to name a reality you can no longer deny: the Ukraine you set out to destroy is in the process of building a domestic ballistic missile arsenal that is redefining the strategic balance of this conflict. The FP-9, developed by Fire Point, is scheduled for tests in the summer and autumn of 2026. Its range of 855 km puts Moscow within reach of an entirely Ukrainian vector. And this is only the beginning.

A letter to history as much as to a man

This letter is also addressed to all those who, around Putin, continue to fuel this war — the generals, the oligarchs, the propagandists, the industrialists producing the missiles that fall on Ukrainian cities. Ukraine will not die in silence. Zelensky has said it. The FP-5, FP-7, and FP-9 prove it. This open letter is the testimony of a columnist who has followed this conflict hour by hour and who sees in the FP-9, not a provocation, but the logical and deserved consequence of four years of aggression.

I do not celebrate destruction. I observe that Ukraine has the right to defend itself, to deter, and to respond. And that developing a national ballistic strike capability is the most legitimate exercise of that military sovereignty.

I don't know whether Putin reads columns written by Canadian journalists. But I write this letter because words serve a documentary function: in ten or twenty years, when historians analyze this moment, I want it recorded somewhere that the international community watched with clear eyes what was happening — and that many of us understood exactly what was at stake.

Fire Point and the Ukrainian missile revolution

In just a few years of war, the Ukrainian company Fire Point has become one of the most extraordinary defense startups in modern military history. Starting from nothing in 2022 or shortly after, it delivered the Flamingo FP-5 — a cruise missile with a range of 900 km, already used in 8 confirmed strikes in 2026. It developed the FP-7, an anti-missile interceptor that reached an altitude of 25 km during testing — comparable, according to data from Eurosatory 2026, to the performance of the American Patriot, but at a cost of $700,000 versus $3.8 million for an equivalent American missile.

And now the FP-9 — a ballistic missile in development targeting a range of approximately 855 km. Zelensky confirmed that Fire Point is advancing toward mastery of ballistic missile production, with the FP-7 and FP-9 being prepared for serial production. Tests on the FP-9 are scheduled for the summer and autumn of 2026. If those tests succeed, Ukraine will have a domestic ballistic strike capability that no one imagined possible four years ago.

Why 855 km changes everything

The 855 km range of the FP-9 is a strategically loaded figure. Moscow lies approximately 800–850 km from the Ukrainian border, depending on the point of departure. A Ukrainian ballistic missile at that range can therefore reach the Russian capital — on a ballistic trajectory far harder to intercept than a drone or cruise missile. Ballistic missiles fly higher and faster, and require specific defense systems that Russia has not deployed in sufficient numbers to cover its entire territory.

Moreover, Fire Point has established a solid-fuel production plant in Denmark — giving it a manufacturing capability independent of the supply chains that could be disrupted on Ukrainian territory. That industrial foresight signals a serious, well-funded program with a long-term vision — not a strategic communications announcement.

Fire Point building a solid-fuel plant in Denmark — that is long-range industrial planning. This is not the sign of a company improvising under the pressure of war. It is the sign of a team building to last, building to produce at scale, building to give Ukraine a permanent strategic capability. I find that both impressive and reassuring for European security.

An articulated doctrine, not hollow rhetoric

Zelensky warned Putin about the creation of Ukrainian ballistic missiles with words that are more than a declaration: "We will not die in silence." That phrase distills a doctrine: Russia must understand that every strike on Ukrainian territory will be answered on Russian territory. Every factory producing missiles to bomb Kharkiv can be hit. Every military installation can be targeted. And soon — if the FP-9 delivers on its promise — with homegrown ballistic missiles.

This doctrine of active deterrence is Ukraine's answer to the impossibility of nuclear deterrence. Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees that proved worthless against Russia. It is now rebuilding a long-range conventional deterrent capacity autonomously. The FP-9 is, symbolically and strategically, the belated answer to the broken promises of the Budapest Memorandum.

The 2030 missile-artillery concept: an integrated architecture

The FP-9 is not an isolated development — it is part of the Concept for the Development of Missile and Artillery Forces approved by Syrskyi in June 2026. That strategic document defines Ukraine's roadmap to 2030: development and serial production of domestic ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 km, a gradual transition toward Ukrainian-built systems, and the retirement of aging Soviet systems incapable of modernization.

That integrated architecture signals something essential: Ukraine is not planning only for the remaining duration of this war. It is planning for its long-term security, for the coming decade, for a post-war world in which it must maintain its deterrence against a Russia that remains an existential threat. The FP-9 is one brick in a national security edifice that Kyiv is building for future generations.

Ukraine is building its national conventional deterrent because the international community failed to provide it with a credible one. The 1994 Budapest guarantees were promises on paper. The FP-9 is metal and solid fuel — far more reliable. I am not saying it is a good thing that nations need arsenals to protect themselves. I am saying that in this imperfect world, it is necessary.

The transformation the war has produced

There is a deep truth in this war that Putin seems incapable of absorbing: by attacking Ukraine, he triggered exactly what he claimed he wanted to prevent — the emergence of an independent and formidable Ukrainian military power. Ukraine in 2026 has a national defense industry, operational long-range cruise missiles, a ballistic missile in testing, an interceptor comparable to the Patriot, and a drone manufacturing output growing at +12.7% per month.

In 2022, Ukraine had none of this. The Russian threat created precisely the Ukrainian military capability that Putin claimed to fear. That is the tragic paradox of this war: the aggression generated the very response it sought to prevent. And that transformation is irreversible. Even if the war ended tomorrow, Ukraine would not disarm. It would consolidate, develop, and extend the military capacity built under fire.

The letter history will write about you

Putin, the history you intended to write — the reconstruction of a Russian imperial sphere of influence, the submission of Ukraine, the demonstration that democracies are weak — that is not the history being written. The history being written says this: a Russian leader launched a war that transformed Ukraine into a military power, solidified NATO, accelerated the accession of Finland and Sweden, exhausted the Russian army, created fuel shortages in 15 Russian regions, and ended with the development of a Ukrainian ballistic missile capable of reaching Moscow.

That is not the glory you were seeking. And this open letter is not a verdict — it is a documented record. The war you chose to wage is producing the opposite of what you intended. The FP-9 is its most eloquent proof.

I hold no hatred for the Russian people. I hold anger toward a regime that dragged them into a war of aggression whose bill they were already starting to pay at the gas pump. And I hold admiration for a Ukrainian people who, rather than bending, built ballistic missiles in response. That is what resistance looks like. That is what national dignity looks like.

The FP-9 and the debate over weapons ranges

The development of the FP-9 arrives at a moment when the Western debate over which weapons to supply Ukraine — and what strike ranges to permit — remains politically sensitive. Some governments continue to impose restrictions on using their own systems against Russian territory. The FP-9, like the Flamingo FP-5, is Ukraine's answer to those restrictions: build your own weapons and depend on no one's permission to conduct your own defense.

That operational sovereignty is healthy and necessary. It also relieves Western allies of some of their diplomatic anxiety: when Ukraine strikes with its own missiles, the allies are not directly implicated in the decision. That decoupling is strategically convenient for everyone — and it makes the question of range restrictions on Western weapons progressively less relevant as Ukraine develops its own capabilities.

Eurosatory 2026: Ukraine takes its place in European defense

The Eurosatory 2026 exhibition in Paris, where more than 80 Ukrainian companies presented their systems (compared to just 5 stands in 2024), gave concrete shape to that integration of the Ukrainian defense industry into the European architecture. The Fire Point–HENSOLDT cooperation on the FREYJA anti-missile system, the partnerships with MBDA on the Neptune platform, the agreements with French, Swedish, and Czech companies — all of it weaves a fabric of industrial integration that makes Ukraine irreplaceable in the European defense landscape.

When the FP-9 enters serial production — probably in 2027 if the summer and autumn 2026 tests are conclusive — it will not simply be a Ukrainian weapon. It will be the product of an industrial ecosystem that ties Ukraine to Europe structurally. That is also the most concrete answer to the question of Ukrainian security after the war: not guarantees on paper, but integrated defense industries.

80 Ukrainian companies at Eurosatory versus 5 in 2024 — that sixteen-fold increase in two years says it all. Ukraine is no longer a country that receives weapons. It is a country that manufactures them, sells them, and co-develops them with Europe's leading defense firms. That transformation is one of the most positive and most lasting consequences of this terrible war.

A roadmap to 2,000 km range

The Concept for the Development of Missile and Artillery Forces approved by Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi in June 2026 traces an ambitious and coherent roadmap. By 2030, Ukraine aims to possess a national long-range strike capability covering up to 2,000 km — encompassing cruise missiles and ballistic missiles of Ukrainian manufacture. That architecture rests on a gradual transition from Soviet artillery systems to modern Ukrainian systems, and on the integration of drones into a combined-strike doctrine.

This is not wishful thinking. It is a strategic document approved by the chain of command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with identified milestones, priorities, and investments. The FP-9 is a key element — but it sits within a broader whole that also includes improved reconnaissance capabilities, reduced dependence on foreign ammunition supplies, and the creation of a modern artillery-reconnaissance system.

A national missile architecture reaching up to 2,000 km — formally approved by the Ukrainian command. This is an institutional commitment, not a political promise. Ukraine is equipping itself with a national long-range strike doctrine, independent of foreign deliveries. It is the lesson drawn from Budapest 1994 and the Western hesitations of 2022–2025: never depend on the goodwill of others for your own survival.

From prototype to industrial production

The transition from prototype to industrial production is one of the hardest challenges in the defense industry. Fire Point has already demonstrated it can be done with the Flamingo FP-5 — which went from concept to 8 confirmed strikes in less than two years. The same trajectory is expected for the FP-9, with tests scheduled for the summer and autumn of 2026 and a potential entry into serial production in the months following, should results prove conclusive.

The solid-fuel plant established in Denmark is an investment that anticipates mass production. Solid fuel is one of the most critical and most difficult components to manufacture for ballistic missiles — the fact that Fire Point has secured that capability outside Ukraine reveals industrial planning that goes well beyond a simple test program.

A solid-fuel plant in Denmark for Ukrainian missiles — that is precisely the kind of industrial integration that makes Russian attempts to isolate Ukraine futile. The Ukrainian missile program is now anchored in several European countries simultaneously. Destroying one part of that infrastructure will not destroy the program. This is structural resilience, built deliberately.

Striking farther to negotiate from a position of strength

The question of the FP-9 and Ukraine's ballistic strike capability cannot be separated from the diplomatic context of the search for an end to the war. Zelensky has always held that the best negotiating position is a position of military strength. An operational FP-9 capable of reaching Moscow is a negotiating argument that no amount of external diplomatic pressure can erase — not even Trump's pressure for a quick peace.

This is the logic of conventional deterrence: you negotiate from a different position when you can strike your adversary's capital than when he can strike yours but you cannot reply in kind. Ukraine has endured that asymmetry for four years. The FP-9 is the instrument through which it reverses it — or at least reduces it. And reducing that asymmetry is precisely what can make a lasting peace possible, because it makes Ukrainian resistance credible over the long term.

I wonder whether Putin truly grasps what the FP-9 means for future peace talks. A Ukrainian ballistic missile capable of reaching Moscow changes the geometry of any negotiation. This is no longer Ukraine asking for mercy. This is two powers holding each other at risk — one of which has everything to gain from peace and the other everything to lose from continuing.

To Putin and to the Russians who supported him

To you, Putin, and to all those who supported this war from the comfort of their Moscow apartments, from their factories along the Volga, from their posts inside the state apparatus: the FP-9 is the documented answer to your aggression. Ukraine turned your attack into a lesson. It turned its desperation into innovation. It turned its limitations into military sovereignty. And the ballistic missile that will soon be tested on the Ukrainian steppes is the direct product of your choices.

I do not write out of hatred. I write out of documentary necessity. Because in a few years, when people try to understand how we arrived here, it will matter that people like me named this moment clearly, without illusion, with the full weight of the facts. The FP-9 is not a threat — it is a consequence. And consequences never lie.

To Ukraine and its allies

To Ukraine and those who support it: this ballistic missile in development is a symbol of resilience that deserves to be named and recognized. Not because war is beautiful — it is horrific, and every death is a tragedy. But because the capacity of a people to rise from an existential assault and build its own deterrent deserves acknowledgment. Ukraine in 2026 is not the Ukraine of 2022. It is stronger, better armed, more sovereign. And this letter is its testimony.

In ten years, I will reread this open letter with a particular emotion. Either because the war will have ended and the FP-9 will have become a symbol of post-war Ukrainian deterrence — or because the war continues and the promised missiles have been deployed. In either case, the words I wrote here will be true. And that is all I ask of my work.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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