COMMENTARY: The Hague 2016, the South China Sea and Ten Years of Sovereign Impunity

Introduction: An Ignored Verdict That Keeps Shaping the Indo-Pacific

July 12, 2016: When The Hague Said No to Beijing

On July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal of The Hague constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rendered a historic ruling: nearly all of China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, based on the "nine-dash line," were declared contrary to international law. China had no historic rights over these waters. The artificial islands it was building generated no exclusive economic zones. The decision was clear, comprehensive and legally binding on the parties to UNCLOS — including China.

Ten Years Later: What Remains of the Verdict?

As the tenth anniversary of this verdict approaches in July 2026, the answer is bitter: China has ignored the ruling from day one, declared it "null and void," and continued to build, arm and control its artificial islands in the Spratlys and around Scarborough Shoal. The international community, for its part, wavered between verbal protests and practical inaction. Result: 3,200 acres of artificial islands built, seven militarized reefs, and a permanent Chinese naval presence in waters The Hague declared to belong to the common law of nations.

What China Has Built Since 2016: An Artificial Geography

3,200 Acres of Artificial Islands in the Spratlys

Since 2013, China has dredged and built 3,200 acres of artificial islands and platforms in the Spratly Islands — an area comparable to several large cities. These constructions are not simple observation posts: they house military aircraft runways, missile hangars, advanced radar systems, ports capable of accommodating large warships, and permanent garrisons. Each of these installations transforms a submerged reef, formerly accessible to all, into Chinese de facto territory.

Scarborough Shoal: The Floating Platform of May-June 2026

A recent incident illustrates the ongoing dynamic: in May-June 2026, China installed a floating platform of approximately 300 square feet with a crew of six people on Scarborough Shoal — an area the 2016 tribunal had explicitly declared accessible to Filipino fishermen. The platform was removed on June 17 after Philippine diplomatic protests — but its installation, even temporary, demonstrates that Beijing regularly tests international reactions to establish access precedents.

The Washington Times reported on June 25, 2026 that tensions around this disputed shoal continued to mount, despite the platform's removal. The 270 harassment incidents documented by Malaysia since 2013, the repeated intrusions into the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, and the naval skirmishes in the South China Sea compose a picture of systematic pressure that erodes confidence in international law's ability to protect weaker states.

The Philippines in 2026: Active Resistance Under the Marcos Presidency

Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and the Maritime Assertion Policy

Since his election in 2022, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has adopted a markedly firmer maritime assertion policy than his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, who had virtually shelved The Hague victory in exchange for Chinese investment. Marcos Jr. has strengthened defense agreements with the United States — notably the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that allows rotations of American troops at Philippine bases strategically located facing the South China Sea.

The Philippines, ASEAN Presidency in 2026

The Philippines holds in 2026 the ASEAN presidency — a role granting it a regional platform to put the South China Sea dossier on the organization's agenda. The 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, scheduled in Manila on July 21, 2026, should see the Philippines push for an explicit reference to the 2016 arbitral ruling in the final communiqué — a request China, as an ASEAN+3 dialogue member, will systematically oppose including.

ASEAN has never formally recognized the 2016 ruling in a collective document — the consensus rule and China's diplomatic and economic influence over the most dependent members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar) have blocked any joint declaration. This ASEAN institutional paralysis is one of Beijing's greatest diplomatic victories in the South China Sea dossier.

Malaysia and the 270 Incidents: The Discreet but Documented Voice

Kuala Lumpur Between Economic Dependence and Maritime Sovereignty

Malaysia is in one of the most uncomfortable positions in the region: it claims rights over certain South China Sea areas, has documented over 270 harassment incidents by Chinese vessels since 2013, but depends economically on China as its first trading partner. This tension between maritime sovereignty and economic dependence structures Malaysian foreign policy: not too fast, not too loud, measured protests, never a formal break.

The Shanghai Symposium of April 2026

In April 2026, a symposium in Shanghai bringing together Chinese researchers attempted an original academic approach: arguing that the 2016 ruling was itself "illegal" under international law — not by contesting its conclusions, but by attacking the tribunal's competence to issue it. These arguments, already developed since 2016 by Chinese state-funded jurists, seek to build an academic counter-narrative aimed at Global South countries susceptible to being won over by a presentation of the ruling as an imposition of Western law on non-Western legal traditions.

This academic strategy is sophisticated: it cannot convince international law scholars trained at Western universities — but it can influence political decision-makers in countries looking for an academically respectable reason not to apply rules that would cost them economic relations with Beijing.

The American Role: Freedom of Navigation and Its Limits

FONOPs and Their Limited Effects

The United States regularly conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea — transits by American warships within 12 nautical miles of Chinese artificial islands to assert that these waters are not territorial waters under international law. These operations, conducted on average one to two times per month, have not slowed Chinese construction, have not reversed the reef occupation, and have not convinced China to recognize the 2016 ruling. They have however maintained an important symbolic message: the United States does not recognize Chinese sovereignty over these waters.

The Trump Administration and the Economic Priority Over the South China Sea

The Trump administration maintained — contrary to what some had feared — FONOPs in the South China Sea. But it simultaneously engaged in trade negotiations with Beijing that created tensions in the signals sent: on one side, American warships challenging Chinese claims in the China Sea; on the other, American diplomats seeking a trade deal with Beijing that avoids making the South China Sea a major friction point. This strategic dissonance is perceived by regional allies — Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia — as a lack of coherence that weakens the credibility of the American commitment in the region.

China meticulously analyzes this dissonance: when Washington hesitates between its commercial interests with Beijing and its regional security commitments, it advances. The construction of artificial islands, incidents at Scarborough Shoal, the deployment of floating platforms — all are calibrated to stay below the threshold of American armed response while establishing faits accomplis.

Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei: The Silent Claimants

Hanoi Between Pragmatism and Resistance

Vietnam is perhaps the country whose position on the South China Sea is the most ambivalent: it claims the Paracel Islands (occupied by China since 1974) and part of the Spratlys, while maintaining significant economic relations with Beijing. Hanoi has developed a doctrine of "bamboo diplomacy" — flexible like bamboo, capable of bending without breaking — to navigate between American alignment demands and Chinese economic constraints. This posture, which has allowed Vietnam to maintain its economic growth, has also allowed China to maintain its pressure in disputed areas without triggering a coordinated regional response.

Jakarta and the Natuna Maritime Zone

Indonesia does not formally claim in the South China Sea — but the Natuna maritime zone, in the southern part of this sea, is regularly the theater of intrusions by Chinese coast guard vessels accompanying fishermen in areas Indonesia considers its EEZ. Jakarta has recently increased naval patrols in this zone and officially renamed the relevant waters "North Natuna Sea" — a symbolic act of sovereignty that asserts a claim without entering direct confrontation.

This strategy of symbolic resistance through vocabulary illustrates the helplessness of medium-sized states facing a determined great power: you rename things you cannot physically defend. This is not cowardice — it is survival pragmatism. But it does not solve the underlying problem.

Ten Years of Lessons: What 2016 Really Taught the World

The Limits of Courts Without an Executive Arm

The great lesson of The Hague ruling is a lesson in institutional humility: a court without an executive arm cannot enforce its decisions on a state that decides to ignore it and has the military and economic power to absorb the diplomatic costs of its resistance. International law is not inherently powerless — it works when states have an interest in respecting it or when a hegemonic power enforces it. In the South China Sea, neither of these two conditions was met in 2016 — and they still are not in 2026.

What Ukraine Teaches About the Comparison With the South China Sea

Ukrainian resistance offers an instructive mirror: when a state resists militarily with the support of an international coalition, even a great power cannot impose its conquests. The Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia do not have this military resistance capacity — their combined military would not hold against the Chinese navy. And without American support at a level comparable to that given to Ukraine, the dynamic in the South China Sea will remain what it is: a slow, constant, calculated pressure that international law alone cannot stop.

This comparison is not to despair. It is to clarify: if the West wants the Hague ruling to one day have practical meaning in the South China Sea, it will need to invest in the defense capacity of claimant states, maintain credible naval presences, and build regional alliances that raise the cost of Chinese pressure. Statements are not enough. Verdicts are not enough. Forces are needed.

Consequences for Taiwan: The Most Dangerous Precedent

When Beijing Ignores The Hague, Taiwan Watches

The way the international community has responded — or failed to respond — to China's disregard of the 2016 ruling is watched with the greatest attention in Taiwan. If China can build 3,200 acres of artificial islands in violation of international law without serious consequences, what signal does that send about the international community's ability to defend an island whose status is even more contested? Taiwan's deterrence rests not only on F-16s and Harpoon anti-ship missiles — it rests on the credibility of American commitment and on the consistency of Western responses to previous violations of international law.

The Risk of Normalizing Impunity

Every incident in the South China Sea not followed by significant consequences reinforces what strategists call the "normalization of impunity": the conviction, in Beijing, that calculated violations of international law do not cost enough to deter the next ones. If this conviction proves correct, the probability of more aggressive military action regarding Taiwan increases — because the cost-benefit calculus in favor of military adventurism becomes progressively more favorable. This is why monitoring the South China Sea dossier is not an esoteric international law exercise — it is war prevention.

The ruling of The Hague in 2016 was just. It was necessary. It established a legal reference standard that remains valid and will serve as the foundation for any future resolution of the conflict. But justice without enforcement remains an unfulfilled promise — and unfulfilled promises in international law are invitations to adventurism for those who have decided that force trumps law.

Conclusion: Ten Years After The Hague, the Truth Is Still Standing

A Verdict That Time Cannot Erase

The ruling of July 12, 2016 remains the most comprehensive and clearest international legal decision ever rendered on rights in the South China Sea. China can ignore it. Shanghai symposiums can produce academic counter-arguments. ASEAN can avoid mentioning it. But the ruling exists, it is entered in the archives of international law, and it will constitute the legal foundation for any future resolution of this conflict — whether that comes in ten years or in fifty. Legal truth has a longer shelf life than the regimes that ignore it.

What We Must Do in the Next Ten Years

The tenth anniversary of The Hague should be the occasion for a renewed commitment by Indo-Pacific and Atlantic democracies: strengthen the naval capabilities of the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia; maintain regular and visible FONOPs; build regional coalitions around respect for the law of the sea; and publicly name Chinese violations with proportionate diplomatic and economic consequences. This is not hostility toward China. It is consistency with the rules the world set for itself to prevent force from replacing law. In a world without these rules, nobody — including China — is secure.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Method and sources

This commentary draws on verified information regarding the 2016 arbitral ruling, recent developments in the South China Sea (Washington Times of June 25, 2026, The Diplomat), and analyses from the MP-IDSA Institute. Data on artificial island construction come from satellite analyses published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI).

Editorial positioning

The columnist firmly believes in international law and the UNCLOS Convention as foundations of a stable maritime order. He condemns Chinese violations while acknowledging the complexity of the positions of regional states whose economic dependence on China constrains their diplomatic room for maneuver.

Sources

Primary sources

Washington Times — Tensions in the South China Sea at Scarborough Shoal — June 25, 2026

The Diplomat — China Floating Platform at Scarborough Shoal — May 2026

MP-IDSA — South China Sea: Hague Tribunal 10th Anniversary Assessment — June 2026

Secondary sources

AMTI CSIS — South China Sea Island Construction Tracker — 2026

The Diplomat — ASEAN and the South China Sea 2026 — June 2026

Foreign Policy — Ten Years After the South China Sea Ruling — June 2026