DECODING: The Ankara Gamble: Turning The Hague's Promises into Real Tanks, Shells and Missiles

DECODING: The Ankara Gamble: Turning The Hague's Promises into Real Tanks, Shells and Missiles

Introduction: the summit that must move from words to deeds

Ankara, July 7–8, 2026: the hour of reckoning and commitment

On July 7 and 8, 2026, the leaders of NATO member states will gather at the presidential Beştepe Palace in Ankara, Turkey. This summit arrives at a pivotal moment: as the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, as the Russian threat to the Alliance's eastern flank remains acute, and as fundamental questions about NATO's cohesion and strategic direction remain unanswered. This is not a celebration summit: it is a summit of accountability.

The agenda is known: defense spending at 5% of GDP, continued military support for Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East, and managing a transatlantic relationship strained by the unpredictability of the Trump administration. Mark Rutte, NATO's Secretary General, had announced in advance that "tens of billions" in new defense contracts would be announced at this summit — an ambitious promise that puts not only his personal credibility on the line, but that of the entire Alliance.

From The Hague to action: closing the gap between promises and reality

The The Hague summit, which preceded Ankara in the NATO meeting cycle, produced the Gdansk Declaration — a reaffirmation of the 5% of GDP defense spending target and a reinforcement of the eastern flank. Strong words, solemn commitments. But between signing a declaration and delivering actual tanks, shells, and missiles to armies that need them, there is a gap that Ankara must begin to close.

Available figures show that defense spending by European and Canadian allies increased by more than 20% in 2025, and that over the decade 2016–2026, an additional 1.2 trillion dollars were spent compared to the previous trajectory. That is a real improvement. But the 5% target remains ambitious for many allies, and the translation of that target into concrete capabilities on the ground is the question Ankara must answer.

The 5% of GDP target: ambition or reality?

Who is there, who is not, who can get there

The target of 5% of GDP devoted to defense spending — pushed insistently by Mark Rutte and supported by the Trump administration — is a mark that far exceeds the current levels of most allies. In 2026, only a handful of NATO countries reach or exceed 2% of GDP — the old target that was already hard for many to hit. Getting to 5% within a reasonable timeframe represents a considerable effort for countries like Germany, Italy, Spain, or Belgium.

The countries of the eastern flank — Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, Romania — are furthest along in this direction, already spending between 3 and 4% of their GDP on defense. These are the countries that understand best, for geographic and historical reasons, what "security" means when your neighbor is Russia. Their examples should be the norm, not the exception.

The content of spending: quality vs quantity

The 5% of GDP question matters, but it says nothing about what is being bought with that money. Poorly targeted defense spending can generate bloated military bureaucracies or equipment ill-suited to real threats. What matters for the security of NATO's eastern flank is the combination of heavy ground forces capable of territorial defense, robust air defense capabilities, sufficient munitions to sustain high-intensity combat, and interoperable command and communication networks.

NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander General Stringer stressed one concrete point: the need to quadruple 155mm shell production. That is one of the most practical lessons of the war in Ukraine: the ability to sustain a high rate of fire over months is a logistical constraint that Western armies had not factored in since World War II. Relearning how to produce munitions in industrial quantities — not just sophisticated weapons systems in small numbers — is one of the most urgent capability challenges for NATO.

Rutte and the tens of billions in contracts: who pays for what

The defense contracts announced at Ankara: what do we know?

Mark Rutte announced, during a conversation at the Atlantic Council on June 25, 2026, that "tens of billions" in new defense contracts would be announced at the Ankara summit. These contracts will cover military equipment, air defense systems, munitions, armored vehicles, and likely missile systems. The objective is to demonstrate that spending commitments translate into real industrial orders, effective production, and deliveries on credible timelines.

The distribution of these contracts among national defense industries will be politically sensitive. The United States has traditionally dominated the NATO armaments market. But the strategic awakening since 2022 has pushed toward greater European defense industrial autonomy. Programs like the Leopard 2 tank, SHORAD systems, European-produced munitions — all technically competitive — are competing for a larger share of allied orders. This industrial rebalancing is healthy for the Alliance's long-term resilience.

The question of long-term contract financing

Announcing contracts is one thing. Financing them within national budgets, year after year, in often adverse political contexts, is another. The history of NATO armaments programs is littered with projects announced with great fanfare and then reduced or cancelled a few years later during budget reviews. Allies must — and Ankara must demand it — present credible multi-year plans that bind summit commitments to national budgetary realities.

This is particularly true in the context of Trump pressures. If the American administration were to decide over the next year or two to reduce its contribution to NATO or to partially withdraw from its posture in Europe, European allies would have to absorb additional capabilities and costs. Planning for that contingency — even if it is not certain — is a strategic responsibility that European leaders can no longer ignore.

Hegseth and the threat of a reduced American presence

The six-month review of US presence in Europe

Pete Hegseth, the American Secretary of Defense, announced a six-month review of US military presence in Europe. This review, whose conclusions could be known before or during the Ankara summit, is being watched by European allies with real anxiety. The Guardian reported on June 27, 2026 that NATO leaders fear they "can no longer rely on US help if Russia attacks." That is a frank formulation that says everything about the level of concern in European chancelleries.

This anxiety is not irrational. The Trump administration has sent contradictory signals about its commitment to European allies. On one hand, formal declarations of support for NATO and Article 5. On the other, public challenges to the Alliance's value, commercial pressures deployed as foreign policy instruments, and the constant rhetoric that Europeans "don't pay enough." This dissonance creates costly strategic uncertainty.

What the American presence concretely represents

To understand what a significant reduction in American presence in Europe would mean, one must look at the concrete numbers. The United States maintains approximately 100,000 troops in Europe, a significant portion of them in eastern flank countries. They provide critical capabilities that European allies cannot yet replicate alone: certain intelligence and surveillance systems, advanced command-and-control capabilities, high-level airpower, and — crucially — nuclear deterrence.

A reduction in this presence, even partial, would send a disastrous signal to Moscow and could encourage precisely the kind of miscalculation on Putin's part that NATO is working to prevent. That is why the Ankara summit is so critical: it must either confirm the maintenance of the current level of American engagement, or present a credible plan for Europeans to compensate for a potential reduction.

The eastern flank: the boundary that must not bend

From the Baltics to Romania: a defensive line under construction

NATO's eastern flank stretches from the Baltic states in the north to Romania and Bulgaria in the south. It is a line more than 2,000 kilometers long, sharing land or maritime borders with Russia, Belarus, or the Black Sea. Strengthening this line is not one strategic option among others: it is the fundamental condition for the credibility of NATO's deterrence.

Since 2022, the reinforcement of the eastern flank has been significant but still insufficient according to NATO planners' own assessments. Forward presence battalions have been reinforced and are expected to evolve toward brigades. Large-scale exercises have been conducted. Crisis reinforcement plans have been updated. But the level of pre-positioned forces still falls short of what eastern flank countries are asking for, and reinforcement timelines in a crisis remain sources of concern for military planners.

Poland as the pivot of Eastern European defense

Poland has emerged as the pivot of Eastern European defense. With a defense budget exceeding 4% of GDP, one of the highest in NATO, and an ambitious acquisition program including Abrams tanks, F-35 aircraft, Patriot missile systems, and K9 Thunder artillery pieces, Poland is becoming one of the most significant land military powers in Europe.

This Polish rearmament is a rational response to a real geographic threat: Poland shares a border with Russia (at Kaliningrad) and with Belarus. It has a historical memory of what aggression from its neighbors means, and it does not rely on diplomatic promises alone to guarantee its security. The Polish model — high spending, diversified acquisitions, political resolve — should inspire its less determined allies.

The Gdansk Declaration: what it says and what it does not

An ambitious text on paper

The Gdansk Declaration, adopted at the meeting preceding the Ankara summit, reaffirms the 5% of GDP target, the strengthening of the eastern flank, and robust support for Ukraine. It is a strong text, without the constructive ambiguities that characterized some earlier communiqués. The language on Russia as an "existential threat" is maintained. The commitment to Ukraine is reaffirmed without conditionals that would have weakened its credibility.

But summit declarations do not in themselves create military capabilities. They create a political framework that must be translated into national budget decisions, procurement programs, and actual deployments. The gap between the text of the Gdansk Declaration and its concrete implementation is the real challenge of the Ankara summit and the months that follow it.

Accountability mechanisms: a structural weakness of NATO

NATO has no binding mechanism to compel allies to honor their spending commitments. The 2% of GDP targets — lower than the 5% now being aimed at — were not met by the majority of allies for decades. The 5% target will only be credible if it is accompanied by stricter monitoring mechanisms, more openly assumed mutual political pressure, and possibly concrete consequences for countries that do not honor their commitments.

This is where Trump's pressures — inelegant in form, often counterproductive in tone — have paradoxically had a useful effect: they ended the culture of mutual complacency that allowed allies to promise spending increases without ever delivering them. The public embarrassment and threats of a reduced American security umbrella accelerated decisions that NATO processes alone would never have imposed at this speed.

Ukraine at the Ankara summit: a symbolic and crucial presence

Candidate status vs member status

Ukraine will be present at Ankara as a country that is a candidate for NATO membership, not yet as a full member. This distinction carries deep political and strategic meaning. Ukraine's membership in NATO remains formally conditional on the end of the conflict or on circumstances still undefined, creating a deliberate ambiguity that allies have chosen in the absence of consensus on a more direct answer.

For Zelensky, Ankara is an occasion to recall that the security guarantees given to Ukraine under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum — in exchange for its relinquishment of Soviet nuclear weapons — were violated by Russia and were not adequately compensated for by the West. That historical lesson weighs heavily on any discussion of Ukraine's security after a potential end to the war.

Bilateral security guarantees as a stopgap

In the absence of formal NATO membership, Ukraine has sought to obtain bilateral security guarantees from key Alliance members. These agreements, signed with several countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, cover long-term military and economic support commitments. They do not replace Article 5 protection, but they create a framework of commitments that signatories will find politically difficult to repudiate.

The solidity of these commitments will be tested at Ankara. Zelensky will push for stronger guarantees, clearer armament timelines, and a more credible membership prospect. Allies will balance these demands against their own internal political constraints and their calculation of what is achievable without provoking an escalation no one wants.

The European defense industry in acceleration mode

The industrial awakening of a Europe that had forgotten how to defend itself

One of the most durable effects of the war in Ukraine is the European defense industrial awakening. After thirty years of a "peace dividend" that had bled European military industrial capabilities dry, the return of war to the continent triggered a rapid reorientation. Ammunition factories have been reactivated or expanded. New weapons development programs have been launched. Trans-European industrial partnerships that had stagnated for years have accelerated.

Companies like Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, Leonardo, Thales, and MBDA have seen their order books explode. Governments have signed multi-year contracts to give their industrial investments visibility. The European Union has created shared financing mechanisms to support munitions production. This dynamic is real and positive, even if industrial lead times remain long relative to the operational urgency.

The lead time problem: between order and delivery

The main challenge of this industrial effort is the lead time between order and delivery. Tanks, aircraft, missile systems cannot be built in a few months. Military production cycles are long, supply chains complex, technical certifications demanding. A contract signed today for a sophisticated weapons system can take three to five years before the first unit is delivered.

That is why the quadrupling of 155mm shell production — stressed by General Stringer — is so important. Ammunition is one of the few types of military equipment whose production can be significantly accelerated within a relatively short timeframe. And that is precisely what Ukrainian and NATO armies need most urgently: not revolutionary weapons systems, but sufficient munitions to sustain a high-intensity conflict.

Turkey as host: symbolism and calculations

Ankara, a choice that says something about Turkey in NATO

The choice of Ankara as the summit venue is not incidental. Turkey is a NATO member whose foreign policy under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has often been in tension with that of its allies. It long blocked Finland's and Sweden's accession to the Alliance. It maintains commercial relations with Russia that irritate its allies. It purchased the Russian S-400 missile system. And yet, Ankara is where this pivotal summit is being held.

This choice reflects the reality that Turkey remains a strategically important Alliance member, controlling access to the Bosphorus Strait and possessing the second-largest NATO army in terms of troop numbers. Holding the summit in Turkey is also a gesture of engagement toward Ankara, a signal that the Alliance is working to keep within its fold a country whose geopolitical autonomy impulses are very real.

The internal NATO tensions the summit must manage

Beyond the Turkish question, the Ankara summit will have to manage several internal Alliance tensions: disagreements over the level of support for Ukraine, disagreements over defense spending, concerns about American reliability, and tensions over burden-sharing between wealthier and less wealthy members. These tensions are not new in NATO's history, but they carry particular acuity in the current context.

Mark Rutte's skill will be in turning these tensions into positive momentum rather than paralysis. His style of direct diplomacy, less protocol-bound than his predecessors', can be an asset. But the stakes at Ankara are heavy enough to test the talents of any Secretary General.

Scenarios for the post-Ankara period

The optimistic scenario: renewed and credible commitment

In the best scenario, the Ankara summit produces concrete, credible commitments: substantial defense contracts signed, verifiable multi-year spending plans presented, confirmation of the American posture in Europe, and a strong signal to Russia that NATO remains unified and resolute. This scenario is possible. It depends on the political will of the leaders gathered at Ankara to put their personal credibility behind their commitments.

In this scenario, Rutte emerges from Ankara strengthened, Ukraine receives additional guarantees, and the dynamic of European defense spending growth consolidates. This is not the end of the war or the resolution of all tensions within the Alliance. But it is an important step in the right direction, at the right time.

The pessimistic scenario: another summit for nothing

In the worst scenario, Ankara produces an ambitious but hollow final declaration, "tens of billions" in contracts of which half are re-announcements of previous commitments, and an ambiguous American posture that leaves eastern flank allies in uncertainty. In this scenario, Russia draws the obvious conclusions about Alliance cohesion, and the following months see an intensification of its destabilization attempts on the eastern flank.

Preventing this pessimistic scenario is the real issue at Ankara. It requires the leaders gathered in the Beştepe Palace to transcend their immediate national interests to honor their collective commitments. That is always the challenge of any alliance. And it is always harder to do than to proclaim.

Brookings and the think tanks: the intellectual debate on rebalancing

The debate on European strategic autonomy

The Brookings Institution, in its analysis published on June 24, 2026 under the title "A Rebalancing NATO Gathers in Ankara," poses the underlying question: does Ankara mark the beginning of a durable rebalancing of NATO, with a more autonomous and more self-responsible Europe for its own security, or is it a cyclical adjustment that will fade once American political pressure reduces?

The answer depends largely on whether European defense spending increases are anchored in structural changes — new budget laws, industrial reforms, new military doctrines — or whether they are simply ad hoc responses to external pressure. Signs are mixed. Some countries have made deep structural reforms. Others seem primarily to be meeting summit criteria without fundamentally altering their underlying posture.

What Ukraine has taught NATO about modern warfare

One of the paradoxical but real contributions of the war in Ukraine is the set of military lessons it has generated for NATO armies. The war in Ukraine has revealed the importance of drones, electronic warfare, loitering munitions, multi-layer air defense systems, and high-intensity logistics — domains that Western armies had neglected after decades of low-intensity asymmetric wars against non-state actors.

These lessons are being integrated into NATO armies' doctrine and acquisitions. It is a slow process, but it is underway. And it is financed by the defense spending increases that the Ankara summit seeks to consolidate. In that sense, every euro spent on the right capabilities — not just any military capability, but the right ones — is a direct investment in the security of the Alliance's eastern flank.

Internal political cohesion in democracies: the invisible challenge

Eurosceptic and isolationist parties as a systemic risk

The greatest challenge for NATO in the coming years is not Putin or Kim Jong-un. It is internal political resistance within member democracies to maintaining high defense spending levels over time. Right-wing and left-wing populist parties, often informally linked to Russia-friendly narratives, are gaining ground in several member countries. Their accession to power could destabilize the Alliance's cohesion from within.

This risk is real and documented. The response is not to dismiss the legitimate concerns of voters who support these parties, but to offer them credible political answers on the economic and social questions that fuel their discontent. Pro-NATO parties must win elections to honor their security commitments. That is obvious to state, but it is fundamentally true.

Strategic communication as a national security matter

Faced with Russian disinformation and anti-NATO narratives circulating on social media, Alliance member governments have a strategic communication responsibility. Explaining why defense spending is increasing, which threats it addresses, what benefits it brings in terms of concrete security — this educational work is just as important as arms contracts. A population that does not understand why it finances its military will not long sustain that financing.

Ankara must produce not only military decisions but also a clear, persuasive political narrative about why collective security has a price and why that price is justified. Rutte, with his experience as Dutch Prime Minister and his ability to communicate simply on complex subjects, may be the right person to carry this message. Making it heard in every language, in every member country, is the central political challenge of Ankara.

The Article 5 question: when ambiguity becomes dangerous

What Article 5 guarantees — and what it does not

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that an attack on one member shall be considered an attack on all, and that each member shall take such actions as it deems necessary. This deliberately vague formulation — "such actions as it deems necessary" — does not automatically imply a military response. It guarantees political solidarity, but leaves each member state the discretion to determine the nature and scale of its contribution. That is a less firm guarantee than NATO's official rhetoric sometimes suggests.

In 2026, reports from The Guardian — backed by conversations with European government sources — indicate that NATO leaders fear they can no longer count on American help in the event of a Russian attack on a member state, in the context of the Trump administration. This uncertainty is profoundly destabilizing. It pushes member states to develop greater national capabilities — hence the discussions on 5% of GDP — but it also undermines the credibility of collective deterrence, which is NATO's foundation. Rutte must find a way to maintain that credibility even in an uncertain American context.

European strategic autonomy: necessity or utopia?

In this context of uncertainty about American reliability, the concept of European strategic autonomy — long championed by France and regarded with suspicion by Central and Eastern European countries — is returning forcefully to discussions. The idea: that Europe should be capable of defending its territory and interests without being entirely dependent on the United States. This ambition runs into a brutal reality: no European state has the nuclear capabilities, command-and-control systems, and long-range power projection capabilities to replace the American security umbrella in the short or medium term.

Strategic autonomy is therefore not an immediate option, but a direction. The Ankara summit must show that Europe is moving in that direction — not because it wants to separate from the United States, but because it must be capable of complementing and supplementing American capabilities rather than being entirely dependent on them. Spending commitments, investments in the European defense industry, new command structures — all of this contributes to that direction. Ankara must be the moment when this direction becomes irreversible.

The Ankara summit: concrete indicators of success or failure

What the numbers will say the day after the summit

The day after the Ankara summit, July 7–8, 2026, a few concrete indicators will allow an assessment of whether NATO has delivered on its promises. How many members will have officially crossed the 2% of GDP bar in defense spending? How many will have committed to a credible trajectory toward 5%? Which specific industrial contracts — with figures, timelines, and signatories — will have been announced? Will Rutte's promise of billions in contracts be materialized?

These figures do not tell the whole story — defense spending alone says little about operational readiness, equipment quality, or force employment doctrine. But in the language of politics, what is measured is what is taken seriously. Quantified and verifiable commitments are the only way to prevent the Ankara summit from joining the long list of NATO summits where ambitious declarations were followed by disappointing implementation. NATO's credibility — and Rutte's own — is at stake.

The commitments to Ukraine: the true measure

Beyond national defense spending, the most immediate test of the Ankara summit will be the nature and scale of commitments to Ukraine. Weapons deliveries — air defense systems, artillery munitions, armored vehicles — with precise timelines? Long-term financing mechanisms for the Ukrainian war effort? More formal security guarantees for Ukraine, even if NATO membership remains conditional on the end of the conflict? These questions may not all be answered at Ankara, but a summit without tangible progress on this front would send a catastrophic message to Kyiv.

The presence of President Zelensky at the Ankara summit — even as a non-member guest — is symbolically and practically important. It allows Ukraine to plead directly for its needs before allied leaders. It reminds everyone that abstract debates about GDP percentages have concrete consequences for soldiers and civilians dying while the leaders talk. And it maintains moral and political pressure on allies who might be tempted to reduce their contributions in a context of public fatigue.

Conclusion: Ankara, the moment of truth for an alliance under pressure

Turning promises into action: the only measure that counts

The Ankara summit will be judged on its concrete, measurable results, not on its declarative formulations. Signed defense contracts, deployed capabilities, met timelines, voted budgets — that is what eastern flank countries and Ukraine expect from their allies. NATO in 2026 has the tools, resources, and leaders needed to meet that level of expectation. What it still must prove is the political will to do so.

Mark Rutte has staked his credibility on the "tens of billions" in contracts. The leaders gathered at Ankara have staked their collective credibility on the 5% of GDP target. The moment of truth is arriving. And this time, the eyes of history — and of Putin — are watching.

What Zelensky has the right to expect

Volodymyr Zelensky arrives in Ankara after more than two years of total war against a Russia armed by North Korea, backed by a Western coalition whose commitments have sometimes wavered. He has the right to expect from his allies not compassion, but resolve. Tanks. Shells. Missiles. Credible security guarantees. And a future prospect for Ukraine within the family of European democracies. That is what Ankara must give him. That is the real measure of the summit's success.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Assumed editorial biases

This decoding is favorable to NATO and to an increase in Western defense spending. I believe these expenditures are a necessity in the face of current threats, not an optional choice. This conviction guides my analysis. I declare it explicitly. The data on defense spending and arms contracts comes from open sources: Atlantic Council transcripts, European Parliament reports, US News/Reuters, The Guardian, Post-Gazette/AP. I do not have access to confidential summit documents or private diplomatic discussions.

My projections on post-Ankara scenarios are analytical exercises based on available information, not certified predictions. The political reality of a summit depends on many unpredictable factors that I cannot anticipate from my position as a columnist.

What I do not know

I do not know the exact nature of the contracts that will be announced at Ankara, their precise amounts, or the conditions attached to these commitments. I do not know how the Trump administration will ultimately position the United States on military presence in Europe. These uncertainties are central to my analysis and I have tried to present them as such rather than feigning knowledge I do not have.

The implications of Hegseth's six-month review of American presence in Europe are also uncertain: its conclusions could be known before or during the summit, or after. I present this process as a significant factor of uncertainty without prejudging its outcome.

Sources

Primary sources

Rutte: tens of billions in defense contracts for the Ankara summit — NATO/Atlantic Council transcript, June 25, 2026

NATO leaders fear they can no longer rely on US help if Russia attacks — The Guardian, June 27, 2026

NATO Ankara summit July 7–8: agenda and stakes — European Parliament briefing, June 26, 2026

NATO deputy commander calls for quadrupling 155mm shell production — Post-Gazette / AP, June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Rutte: billions in defense contracts to be announced at summit — US News / Reuters, June 25, 2026

Gdansk Declaration: 5% GDP reaffirmation and eastern flank reinforcement — Swedish Government, June 25, 2026

A Rebalancing NATO Gathers in Ankara — Brookings Institution, June 24, 2026