ESSAY: Trump and Ukraine — how pressure on Moscow switched sides

Trump: executioner and reluctant savior

In November 2024, Russian nationalists celebrated Donald Trump's election as a strategic victory. They believed that Moscow would crush a Ukraine deprived of American weapons, roll over Kyiv without resistance, and dictate peace on its own terms. They were wrong. Profoundly. What has unfolded since looks less like a Ukrainian defeat than a historic reversal that even the greatest optimists in Kyiv had not dared hope for.

Since the G7 summit held in France in late June 2026, the diplomatic reality has radically shifted. Trump, who had told Zelensky to his face that he did not have "the cards," now describes the Ukrainian president as "very courageous" and says he is "doing pretty well" against Russia. This shift in language, from a man so consistent in his rhetoric, is not trivial. It is a signal. A reconfiguration of American policy toward a firmer stance against Moscow.

The leash broken, the war changed

There is a cruel irony in this story. By cutting military aid to Ukraine, Trump also removed the main control lever that Washington had over Kyiv. Under Biden, the money came with conditions: do not strike deep inside Russian territory, do not "escalate." Once the leash was broken, Ukraine struck. Oil refineries. Weapons factories. Logistical lines. All the way to a major refinery on the outskirts of Moscow on June 18, 2026.

I must admit I did not anticipate this reversal. Neither did anyone else, really. When Trump cut the aid, I believed, like many, that it was the end for Kyiv. What I had underestimated was Ukraine's capacity to reinvent itself without American oversight — and the brutal functional reality of a war where freedom of action can weigh more heavily than dollars.

A joint declaration that changes everything

At the G7 summit held in France, Donald Trump for the first time endorsed a joint declaration in which the United States describes itself no longer as a neutral mediator, but as an ally of Ukraine. This detail, technical in appearance, is in reality a major geopolitical break. For months, Moscow had played on this American ambiguity, telling itself that Trump was negotiating "in a balanced way." That is no longer the case.

Trump also spoke of Zelensky in explicitly complimentary terms, praising his efforts to "contain Putin." According to sources reported by RBC Ukraine, the American president is "generally pleased" with Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russian territory. This is not benevolent abstention. It is active support, even if it is never said aloud.

Putin loses his compliant interlocutor

The Kremlin no longer knows what to make of this new reality. Sergey Lavrov publicly disputed Secretary of State Marco Rubio's statements that the Anchorage summit had produced no agreement. Dmitri Peskov also expressed his confusion, noting that Moscow had "never considered the United States a neutral country." The Kremlin's defensive rhetoric is revealing: Moscow is no longer controlling the narrative. Trump has reversed the diplomatic equation.

What strikes me about the Russian reaction is the barely concealed panic. Lavrov contradicting Rubio. Peskov complaining about Macron. These seasoned statesmen suddenly seem off-balance. And when Moscow is off-balance, it is generally because a reality it did not want to see has just imposed itself on them.

Strikes of unprecedented reach

Since Washington stopped imposing operational restrictions on Kyiv, Ukraine has intensified its deep strikes on Russian territory. On June 26, 2026, Ukraine launched the largest drone attack of the year, hitting targets from Moscow to Crimea. On June 18, a major refinery on the outskirts of Moscow was struck. In Crimea, fuel is now so scarce that the government declared a state of emergency. Gas stations are no longer serving ordinary motorists.

These strikes produced a devastating economic effect on Russia. Damage to refineries has at times taken nearly a quarter of Russia's refining capacity offline. By late May, Russian refining had fallen to its lowest level in two decades. Dozens of regions have introduced fuel rationing. An oil power unable to supply its own population with gasoline: this is an image that Putin cannot erase.

Russian logistics under constant pressure

Ukrainian medium-range drones have made the zone behind Russian lines extremely dangerous, severely disrupting military logistics. Ukraine is also striking supply lines to occupied Crimea, progressively cutting the peninsula off from the rest of the Russian war machine. The city of Cheboksary, approximately 1,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, was hit by Flamingo missiles. During the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June, a Ukrainian strike targeted the city's oil terminal and black smoke covered the sky. A warship burned in the harbor.

These images — the black smoke over St. Petersburg, the lines at gas stations in Crimea — are more powerful than any speech. They are cracks in the narrative of "invincible Russian power." And every Ukrainian strike that hits its target tells the Russian population something Putin is desperately trying to conceal: this war is turning against him.

A paradox that unsettles

On June 29, 2026, The American Prospect published an analysis by Ryan Cooper titled "Has Ukraine Turned the Tide?" The thesis is provocative: by cutting American aid to Ukraine, Trump may have inadvertently given Kyiv its greatest freedom of action since the beginning of the war. Under Biden, the money came with constraints. Under Trump, no more money — but no more constraints either. Ukraine chose to strike.

The analysis notes that Europe has filled most of the funding gap caused by the American withdrawal, and that Ukraine's domestic military industry has matured enough to fill a large part of the ammunition shortfall. The result: Ukraine now possesses, according to Cooper, a decisive advantage on the ground. He takes care to note that it is "far too early to proclaim inevitable victory" — but the reversal of the balance of power is now observable.

Putin facing a strategic dead end

For Putin, options are narrowing. He could attempt a total mobilization — but this would cause serious disruptions in Russian society and the economy, aggravating the labor shortage, risking fueling runaway inflation and triggering serious social unrest. The war of attrition he hoped to win through numbers is turning against him. Ukraine holds, strikes, and advances. Russia bleeds slowly.

Cooper's analysis is honest about its limits — and that is what makes it credible. He does not say Ukraine has won. He says something has changed. And in a war lasting more than four years, that "something" may be the greatest change of all: Ukraine is no longer absorbing blows. It is choosing when and where to strike.

A clear-eyed diagnosis from an unpredictable leader

According to several diplomatic sources reported in the period from June 25 to 30, 2026, Trump reportedly declared that Putin will do nothing without pressure. This formulation — as cold as it is pragmatic — is in reality a clean break from the conciliatory posture of the early months of Trump's second term, when he was multiplying symbolic gestures toward Moscow. The American president appears to have reached an operational conclusion: only pressure works.

It is precisely this diagnostic shift that explains the signal sent to Kyiv: an informal White House endorsement to tighten sanctions against Russia. After months of ambiguity, Washington is beginning to send a clear message. The displayed neutrality was a posture. The actual position of the United States — even under Trump — remains structurally incompatible with a Putin victory.

Zelensky: from "you don't have the cards" to "very courageous"

The contrast is striking. Early in 2025, Trump humiliated Zelensky in the Oval Office, publicly telling him he did not have "the cards." At the G7 in France, Trump describes him as "doing pretty well," adding that the Ukrainian president "is holding his positions." This is no longer the same language. It is even, from Trump's mouth, something that resembles respect — even involuntary respect.

This shift in language from Trump deserves attention. A man who rarely humiliates his own partners in public, and who had crushed Zelensky with words, now acknowledges that the Ukrainian president is "doing pretty well." For Zelensky, this may be the most symbolic victory of all: having survived Trump himself.

Moscow demands explanations

Faced with this reversal, the Russian reaction oscillates between confusion and poorly contained anger. Sergey Lavrov called it "impolite" that Marco Rubio publicly announced the absence of an agreement at Anchorage. Dmitri Peskov also issued public complaints, noting that Russia had never believed in American neutrality. These statements are revealing: Moscow finds itself demanding explanations from the White House — a posture of diplomatic inferiority that Putin has always refused to display.

In June, Russia formally requested clarifications from the United States following Trump's apparent shift. This request, relayed by RBC Ukraine on June 26, 2026, illustrates how deeply destabilized the Kremlin is by the new situation. A country waging war with the certainty that America was in passive-waiting mode does not ask for explanations. It demands them because it feels the ground slipping beneath its feet.

The Telegraph: "Despite his best efforts, Trump may have won the war for Kyiv"

On June 29, 2026, The Telegraph published an analysis by Sir William Browder — British financier and determined Putin opponent — titled "Despite his best efforts, Trump may just have won the war for Kyiv." Browder notes that Ukrainian strikes have altered the course of the war more than anything that had come before. He calls for going further: more weapons, more air defense, the confiscation of $300 billion in frozen reserves from the Russian central bank, and secondary sanctions against Russian oil buyers in India, China, and Turkey.

Browder is pushing in the right direction. What he says between the lines is that this window of opportunity is real but fragile. Ukraine has the tactical advantage now. But if the West does not accompany this with the right tools — secondary sanctions, confiscated reserves, continued armament — the dynamic can reverse. Wars are not won through inertia.

Alternative funding that held

When Trump cut the aid, many thought Europe could not compensate. They were wrong. According to the American Prospect analysis, Europe has filled most of the funding gap left by the American withdrawal. This was not guaranteed. It required difficult political decisions, massive financial commitments, and European solidarity unprecedented since the end of the Cold War.

At the same time, Ukraine's own military industry has matured profoundly. Flamingo drones, domestically developed long-range missiles, enhanced electronic warfare capabilities: the Ukraine of 2026 is not the Ukraine of 2022 that waited for Western deliveries. It is an autonomous military-industrial actor, capable of striking 1,000 kilometers away without depending on a foreign arsenal.

The geopolitical signal to China, Iran, North Korea

This turning point has implications that extend well beyond Ukraine. China is watching what is happening and drawing its own conclusions about resistance to an occupying power. Iran, already weakened by American pressure, sees that Western resolve is not dead. North Korea, which has supplied ammunition to Russia, is beginning to understand that Moscow may not be the reliable partner it thought. Ukrainian resistance is a global message: democracies can survive and strike back.

What Ukraine has accomplished since Trump removed the leash is a lesson in sovereignty. Not the rhetorical sovereignty invoked in speeches. The real sovereignty — the kind exercised through weapons, through industry, through the capacity to strike the enemy on its own ground. It is also a message to the West: it is possible to resist. It is possible to win. Provided one accepts to truly fight.

Confiscate the reserves, sanction the buyers

Sir William Browder and other analysts are calling for concrete additional measures. The first: confiscating the $300 billion in frozen reserves of the Russian central bank, immobilized in Western institutions since 2022. These funds belong to an aggressor state. Leaving them in place amounts to offering it an economic lifeline it does not deserve. Confiscating them means directly funding Ukraine's reconstruction with the money of its very destroyer.

The second measure: secondary sanctions against refineries in India, China, and Turkey that buy Russian oil at a discount. These countries are profiting from the war without paying its moral cost. Secondary sanctions would force them to choose between the Western market and Russian oil — a choice they prefer to avoid but will have to make. Economic pressure on Moscow will only be complete once this energy lifeline is cut.

The EU must accelerate — not wait

The European Union has already imposed sanctions on Chinese companies supporting the Russian war effort. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas declared on June 15 that Brussels had confirmed through its own channels the Sino-Russian military training and was assessing its implications. This is good news. But assessing is not acting. The moment is now. The battlefield dynamic is favorable. If Europe acts immediately with durable economic tools, it can lock in this advantage.

The West has an unfortunate habit: waiting for Ukrainian victories to be too obvious to deny before acting. This delay costs lives. If Ukraine now has the tactical advantage, the duty of Europe and America is to amplify it immediately — not to admire it from a distance while waiting to see if it holds.

Trump despite himself — or Trump calculating?

The question remains open: is Trump acting out of transactional instinct, discovering that supporting Ukraine gives him leverage over Putin that he did not have by playing neutral? Or has he simply followed the battlefield reality, unable to ignore any longer that Ukraine was winning decisive battles? In either case, the result is the same: the American position has hardened, pressure on Moscow has intensified, and Zelensky — whom one had sought to humiliate — is now treated as a leader who holds his positions.

This is not the end of the war. The American Prospect says it clearly: it is far too early to proclaim inevitable victory. But something has changed. Russia is in economic, military, and diplomatic difficulty. Ukraine is striking. And Trump — the supposed ally of Putin — finds himself, despite himself, on the right side of history.

I do not know whether Trump will eventually fully own this role. I do not know whether Putin will choose to negotiate before the pressure breaks him completely. What I know is that the wind has turned — and in a war of this nature, the wind matters as much as the weapons.

Ukraine has survived the worst — and is advancing

More than 1,580 days of war. Bombed cities. Hundreds of thousands of dead. American aid cut. A humiliation in the Oval Office. And yet: Zelensky is still there. The Ukrainian army is still there. Ukrainian drones strike Moscow. Fuel is scarce in Crimea. The Russian war industry burns. This resistance is not an accident. It is the result of a people who collectively decided they had no choice but to win.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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