INVESTIGATION: Bashneft, Kapotnya, Ryazan: the secret map of refineries Ukraine wants to extinguish

A campaign of strikes following a precise industrial logic

When you connect the dots on a map — Kapotnya south of Moscow, Ufa in the Urals at 1,300 km from Ukraine, the Ryazan installations, the Crimea depots — a coherent picture emerges. Ukraine is not striking at random. It is following an industrial map of the Russian petroleum economy, methodically targeting the most strategic nodes of the national refining system. This is not an improvised campaign of tactical opportunities — it is a planned campaign with a precise industrial logic: extinguish, one by one, the refineries feeding Putin's war machine.

This investigation attempts to reconstruct the map of these strikes, understand their logic, and assess what remains on the list of potential targets. Everything that follows rests exclusively on open sources — OSINT analyses, published industry data, official or unofficial confirmations gathered by accredited journalists or researchers. I have no access to classified information, and I will make no speculation about future operations beyond what available data allows us to infer.

Russian oil as military infrastructure: why it is a legitimate target

To understand why Ukraine targets Russian refineries, you first need to understand how Russian oil integrates into the military supply chain. The aviation kerosene produced by these refineries fuels the bombers striking Ukraine. The diesel drives the tanks, armored vehicles, and logistics trucks of the Russian army. The gasoline keeps running the thousands of light vehicles of the armed forces. Without these refined products, Russian military operations slow down, weaken, and contract.

International humanitarian law recognizes dual-use industrial installations — serving both civilian and military purposes — as legitimate military targets when they directly contribute to the enemy's war effort. Russian refineries clearly fall into this category. This is not a defensible opinion — it is a direct application of the law of armed conflict, to which Ukraine is a signatory and whose principles it seeks to uphold, unlike its adversary.

This investigation matters to me especially because it attempts to do what war journalism should always do: go beyond the isolated event to understand its systemic logic. A strike on Kapotnya, a strike on Ufa — each was covered as a standalone event. But together, they tell a story of industrial strategy that few articles have tried to tell. That is what I want to do here, with the available data and without inventing what I do not know.

A refinery at the heart of Moscow's energy system

The Kapotnya refinery is the most symbolic and most strategic target in the Ukrainian campaign. Located on the southern bank of Moscow, in the industrial district bearing its name, it processes 11 million tons of crude oil per year and supplies roughly 40 percent of the Moscow region's fuel needs. It is one of the ten largest refineries in Russia. It produces gasoline at three standard grades, diesel, aviation kerosene, bitumen, and polymers — a complete spectrum of petroleum products whose military applications are direct and documented.

The strike of June 16, 2026 triggered a major fire in the complex. Two days later, on June 18, a second strike targeted the ELOU-AVT-6 unit — the primary crude distillation apparatus, without which no other unit in the refinery can function. According to two industry sources cited by Reuters on June 24, 2026, resuming operations is not feasible before 2027. Throughout that entire period, the Moscow region will have to source fuel from other locations — at considerable logistical cost.

The symbolic weight of striking the capital

The decision to target an installation so close to Moscow is as political as it is military. By striking in the outskirts of the Russian capital, Ukraine sends a message that Putin's propaganda struggles to counter: the war is here, visible from the rooftops of Moscow's buildings. The smoke from Kapotnya is visible from several districts of the city. The capital's residents see it, even as official media minimize the fact.

This psychological dimension is not secondary. Moscow houses Russia's ruling class — the senior officials, oligarchs, and military and political elites who supported or accepted this war. Watching refinery smoke from their windows creates a symbolic pressure that victorious war bulletins cannot entirely eclipse. The war becomes real for those who launched it — and that is a poetic justice historians will note.

I sometimes wonder what the residents of Kapotnya really think. That district is not the Moscow of the elites — it is an industrial zone, with workers, small businesses, ordinary families. These people saw the fires, breathed the smoke, heard the explosions. They are not part of the nomenklatura that decided this war. That thought troubles me. Economic warfare also has civilian collateral victims who are not the guilty parties.

The largest petrochemical hub in eastern Russia

Ufa, capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan, houses the Bashneft complex — three refineries controlled by Rosneft that together form one of the largest petrochemical hubs in all of Russia east of the Urals. Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim, Bashneft-Novoil, and Bashneft-UNPZ: three installations of which two were hit in the strike of June 25, 2026, according to OSINT analyses from the Astra Telegram channel.

The distance from Ukraine — over 1,300 km — represents a qualitative leap in the reach of the Ukrainian campaign. Before this strike, most analysts estimated that installations more than 1,000 km from Ukrainian territory were beyond the practical range of Ukrainian drones. Ufa proved that estimate wrong. It demonstrated that Ukrainian drone range exceeds projections, and that the map of potential targets extends well beyond Russia's border zones.

Bashkiria: a region discovering its vulnerability

The strike on the Ufa refineries has a local impact that goes beyond the military dimension. Bashkiria is a region economically dependent on its petrochemical industry. The Bashneft complex is one of the region's principal employers, a local fiscal pillar, and a symbol of regional industrial power. Its partial shutdown disrupts not only national fuel production but the local economy of an entire region.

Governor Khabirov attempted to deny and minimize. The mobile internet restrictions imposed during the alert signaled that authorities feared what residents might see and share. But the smoke was there, visible, irrefutable. And in a region whose sons go off to fight and die in Ukraine in disproportionate numbers, this strike on local industries creates a dissonance between the official narrative of a victorious war and the daily reality being lived.

The Bashkiria region illustrates a fundamental contradiction of Putin's regime in this war: the non-Russian regions of the federation are both the most heavily mobilized militarily and the most affected by the economic consequences of Ukrainian strikes. It is as if this war punishes doubly those who had the least reason to support it. I do not know whether this injustice will produce political effects. I know it exists.

The Ryazan refinery: a strategic target near Moscow

The Ryazan refinery, roughly 180 km southeast of Moscow, is one of Russia's most important. It belongs to the Rosneft group and processes millions of tons of crude oil per year. Its location — closer to Moscow than most major Russian refineries, but less exposed than Kapotnya — makes it a secondary-priority target within the logic of the Ukrainian campaign. It is already within range of Ukrainian drones and appears in vulnerability analyses of the Russian oil industry.

Information published through open sources has reported alerts and air defense mobilizations around Ryazan during several past Ukrainian raids. If Kapotnya represented the central symbolic target, and Ufa the demonstration of range, Ryazan could represent the next logical step in the campaign — a strike that would further complicate fuel supply to the Moscow region and its surroundings.

The geography of Russian refining: a structural vulnerability

Russia's refining industry is concentrated in a limited number of large installations. According to available data, roughly 30 to 35 major refineries account for the bulk of Russia's refined petroleum product output. This concentration creates a structural vulnerability: unlike an industry dispersed across thousands of small units, a few targeted strikes on the most important installations can produce effects disproportionate to their number.

The Ukrainian campaign has exploited this vulnerability with precision. By targeting Kapotnya — which covers 40 percent of the Moscow region's needs — and Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim — one of the largest units in the Ufa hub — Ukraine aimed at the most critical nodes in the network, not the easiest installations to reach. This is a logic of maximum impact per strike — the economic rationality of an army whose drone resources, while considerable, are not unlimited.

The concentration of Russian refining in a limited number of large installations is one of those structural vulnerabilities that Soviet planners never anticipated in the context of a modern asymmetric war. They designed a centralized, efficient system for a planned economy — and that centralized system is precisely what makes it vulnerable to a targeted strike strategy. The Soviet legacy becomes a weakness in the context of 21st-century drone warfare.

The 20th and 21st packages: tightening the economic vise

Ukrainian strikes on refineries do not operate in an economic vacuum. They are complemented — and their effect amplified — by the Western economic sanctions regime against Russia. The European Union extended its sanctions by an additional year at the June 19, 2026 renewal, according to Euromaidan Press on June 26. This "until 2027" maintenance of restrictions on Russian trade, banking, energy, and crypto-assets is a politically significant decision — it signals that the EU is committed for the long term.

In parallel, the EU is preparing its 21st sanctions package against Russia, according to information published on June 27, 2026 by Daily Finland. This package should include additional measures targeting refining technologies — preventing Russia from acquiring the equipment needed to quickly rebuild its damaged installations. This is the perfect scissor effect: drones destroy, sanctions prevent rapid reconstruction.

The two EU countries resisting: an obstacle to unanimity

The mechanics of European sanctions are complicated by the unanimity rule that governs foreign policy decisions in the EU. According to Pravda Eng on June 25, 2026, two EU member states oppose the entry ban for Russian nationals — a measure under discussion as part of sanctions reinforcement. These internal objections sometimes limit the scope of sanctions packages and create laborious negotiations that slow decisions.

These obstacles are not new. Unanimity on sanctions has regularly been difficult to achieve, with some member states maintaining economic dependencies or political ties with Russia that incline them to slow the most ambitious measures. The Baltic states and Poland, pushing for the toughest sanctions, must work within these constraints in a system that requires everyone to agree. This is one of the structural limits of the EU's sanctions policy.

Unanimity as the decision rule for European sanctions: this is an institutional mechanism I have always found problematic in the context of this war. It gives every member state a veto right, including those with the closest ties to Moscow. Reforming this rule — moving to qualified majority for sanctions — is an idea that has circulated for years. It has still not been adopted. And in the meantime, two countries can block measures that 25 others want to adopt.

The vectors identified in the strikes

The drones used in the Kapotnya strikes of June 2026 were identified through OSINT analysis of available imagery as FP-1, Lyutyi, and Ukrainian Shahed-type drones — an adaptation of the Iranian vector supplied to Russia. The Ufa strikes used next-generation drones capable of covering more than 1,300 km with a payload sufficient to damage an industrial unit.

The Lyutyi — whose Ukrainian name means "fierce" or "savage" — is a Ukrainian long-range drone developed specifically for deep-strike missions on Russian territory. Its exact technical specifications remain partly classified, but documented strikes suggest a range of at least 1,000 to 1,500 km, a cruise speed low enough to evade radars, and sufficient accuracy to target specific industrial units within a larger complex.

Ukrainian production: thousands of units per month

Ukraine's drone industry, which started from practically zero in 2022, now produces thousands of units per month in a variety of configurations. From small FPV drones for tactical front-line engagements, to long-range reconnaissance drones, to medium-range strike drones for targets in border-region Russian territory, and now long-range vectors capable of reaching the Urals — Ukraine has built a complete range of capabilities in just a few years.

This industry is deliberately decentralized. Production workshops are dispersed across many locations, often in warehouses or unremarkable industrial zones, regularly changing sites to avoid Russian strikes. This distributed architecture is a direct response to Russian attempts to destroy Ukrainian production capacity. It makes the industry resilient against bombardment — a lesson Ukraine learned painfully and quickly.

There is a pleasing irony in the fact that some of the Ukrainian drones burning Russian refineries are adaptations of the Iranian Shahed drones that Russia uses against Ukraine. Kyiv studied the adversary's vectors, understood their principles, reverse-engineered and improved them. That is the definition of adaptation under fire. Iran gave Russia a technology that is now being turned back against it by Ukraine. The world turns.

Designed for ballistic missiles, not for slow drones

Russia's air defense systems — S-300, S-400, S-500, Pantsir-S1, Tor-M2 — were designed and optimized to detect and intercept targets at high altitude, high speed, and with significant radar signatures: ballistic missiles, fast cruise missiles, fighter aircraft. Ukrainian long-range drones offer a radically different profile: low altitude, slow speed, small size, and very low radar signature.

This mismatch is structural and difficult to resolve quickly. Adapting existing systems to handle drone-profile targets requires software modifications, additional low-altitude radars, and small, cheap interception systems. These adaptations take months or years, while Ukrainian drones continue striking. Russia is in a race between its defensive adaptation and the continuous improvement of Ukrainian offensive capabilities — a race where it starts with a structural handicap.

Saturating defenses through vector diversity

Ukraine has also learned to saturate Russian defenses by diversifying its vectors. By simultaneously using low-altitude drones, cruise missiles, and long-range drones following different trajectories, it forces Russian defense systems to handle multiple threat types simultaneously. Operators of Pantsir or S-400 systems must prioritize their engagements in real time — and in that prioritization, some drones get through.

The documented reality of the Kapotnya and Ufa strikes confirms that this saturation-through-diversity approach works. Despite air defenses covering Russia's most strategically important industrial zones, Ukrainian drones successfully reached their targets with sufficient precision to put critical industrial units offline. This success is not accidental — it is the result of an offensive doctrine refined across hundreds of operations.

The vulnerability of Russian air defenses to slow drones is one of the most important military lessons of this war for global military doctrine. Billions of dollars in S-400 and S-500 systems do not effectively protect against a drone flying at 200 km/h at ground level. That is a lesson that military planners in every country are absorbing right now. And the Ufa refineries have provided the definitive proof.

The economic logic of future strikes

I want to be precise about what I can and cannot say here. I have no access to Ukrainian army objectives, and I am not going to speculate about the next targets with a precision that rests on no verifiable information. What I can do is analyze the economic logic of the campaign to identify what types of installations match the profile of priority targets according to the doctrine described in available data.

This logic suggests certain criteria: strategic importance for supplying the armed forces, accessibility in terms of drone range, impact on the civilian economy (to create additional political pressure), and production concentration (to maximize impact per strike). The large refineries in the Volga, Ural, and Western Siberian industrial regions meet these criteria. Without naming specific targets — which would be irresponsible — the campaign trend indicates a progressive expansion eastward.

Range limits and what they mean for future targets

The strike on Ufa at 1,300 km has redefined the known limits of Ukrainian drone range. If this range can be extended further — which the pace of innovation in the Ukrainian drone industry suggests is plausible — installations even deeper in Russian territory could become accessible. The map of Russian refineries extends eastward, toward the major complexes of Western Siberia — Omsk, Tobolsk, Angarsk — representing considerable production volumes.

But extending range is not without constraints. Greater ranges require larger drones with more fuel, which complicates stealth and penetration of defenses. There is a balance between range and stealth that Ukrainian engineers must manage. The Ufa strikes may represent the current limit of the optimal range-to-stealth ratio — or perhaps Ukraine has not yet shown the full extent of its capabilities.

I must resist the temptation to speculate about the next targets. It is analytically tempting, but it would be irresponsible. What I can say is that the logic of the Ukrainian campaign has not reached its end. It continues to expand, adapt, and find new vulnerabilities. And each successful new strike will recalibrate the mental map that both sides carry of this war.

Russia as a disruptive OPEC+ member

OPEC+, which includes Russia in its production agreements, must manage an unprecedented situation: a member whose refining capacity is being systematically degraded by ongoing military strikes. OPEC+ production quotas are theoretically calculated on the basis of each member's actual capacity. If Russian capacity is structurally reduced by Ukrainian strikes, the cartel's internal balances are affected.

Russia has already struggled to meet its OPEC+ production commitments due to sanctions on drilling and extraction technologies. The refinery strikes add another layer: even if Russia can extract as much crude as before, it can no longer fully refine it for export. The distinction between crude and refined products in Russian export data will become an increasingly important indicator for assessing the real impact of the Ukrainian campaign.

The countries benefiting from Russian disruptions

Any disruption of Russian refined petroleum product supply creates opportunities for other producers. Refineries in India, China, and the Middle East that had access to markets Russia was serving can increase their exports and improve their margins. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait — all these producers and refiners are potentially benefiting from a sustained reduction in Russian refining capacity.

This distribution of economic benefits from Ukrainian strikes is a geopolitical dimension that is little discussed but real. It means that certain economic actors — not just Ukraine's defenders — have an economic interest in the continuation and success of the Ukrainian campaign. This is not a consideration that should override the humanitarian and strategic stakes, but it is a factor influencing geopolitical calculations.

The economic beneficiaries of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries — certain Middle Eastern oil producers, certain Asian refineries — are not the most visible actors in this war. But they exist. And their existence means that the geopolitical map of this war is more complex than a simple West-Russia opposition. Diverse economic interests align, sometimes involuntarily, with the Ukrainian strategy.

Without Western equipment, repairs will take much longer

The most underestimated dimension of the strikes-plus-sanctions combination is the impact of sanctions on Russia's ability to repair its damaged installations. Before 2022, the Russian refining industry imported specialized equipment from Europe and the United States: chemical catalysts, precision valves, industrial control systems, turbines, heat exchangers. These items are now under embargo.

To rebuild the ELOU-AVT-6 unit at Kapotnya, Russian engineers will have to either use domestically manufactured equipment — slower to produce, often of lower quality — or import from China or India — with longer delivery lead times, higher costs, and sometimes compatibility problems. According to industry sources cited by Reuters, the estimate of six months minimum before resuming operations may be optimistic under these conditions. A timeline of twelve to eighteen months would be more realistic.

The technological value chain: where sanctions really bite

The most effective sanctions against Russia's refining industry are not those blocking crude oil exports — Russia circumvents those restrictions via third countries. They are the sanctions on precision industrial technologies — industrial control software, measuring instruments, specialized sensors, advanced materials — that bite deepest into the maintenance and reconstruction capacity of Russian refineries.

The EU has included refining technology measures in successive sanctions packages, and the 21st package under preparation should tighten these restrictions further. The combined strikes-sanctions-technology-blockade creates a three-level constraint: physical destruction of installations, inability to import replacement equipment from Western suppliers, and the delays and surcharges of Chinese alternatives. This is a comprehensive degradation strategy, not a simple one-time strike.

Technological sanctions on Russia's refining industry are the least headline-grabbing but perhaps the most effective aspect of the Western economic pressure on Russia. They do not make news the way a drone strike does. But they create lasting, difficult-to-circumvent constraints that multiply the effect of Ukrainian strikes. This is the strategy of patience — less spectacular, but deeply effective over the long term.

What open sources cannot reveal

I want to be transparent about the limits of this investigation. Data on the precise extent of damage to struck refineries rests on OSINT analyses and anonymous industry sources — not on direct inspections or verified Russian official data. Russia actively censors information about strikes, and estimates available through open sources may be incomplete or partially incorrect.

Production figures for the impact — the one-third reduction in Russian refining output cited by Rutte — are estimates based on models and multiple sources, not verified official figures. They provide a plausible order of magnitude, but their precise accuracy remains uncertain. I report them with this nuance, and I invite the reader to treat them as directional indicators rather than certainties.

Unknowns about future targets and Ukrainian capabilities

I do not know the exact capabilities of Ukrainian long-range drones, available stockpiles, the precise objectives of the 40-day campaign, or the operational decisions of the Ukrainian general staff. This information is classified for obvious security reasons, and it would be irresponsible to claim to know it or to infer it with a precision that rests on no verifiable source. This investigation describes what has happened and analyzes its logic — it does not claim to predict precisely what will happen next.

What this investigation can assert with confidence, on the basis of available sources, is that the Ukrainian campaign of strikes on Russian refineries is deliberate, coherent, and productively effective. It has put important installations offline, disrupted Russian fuel supply, and imposed real and cumulative economic costs on the Kremlin's war economy. The map of this campaign is still being drawn.

Honesty about an investigation's limits is as important as its content. I could have filled these pages with more or less grounded speculation about future targets and operational timelines. I chose not to. Not for lack of imagination, but out of respect for the truth and for the operational risks such speculation could create. Rigorous analysis has its limits, and acknowledging them is a form of intellectual courage.

Billions invested to protect what is not protected

Russia has invested tens of billions in its air defense systems: the S-300, S-400, and S-500, long-range radars, detection and interception units deployed across the entire territory. These systems are formidable against the threats for which they were designed: ballistic missiles, jet aircraft, targets flying high and fast. Against small-sized drones flying at low altitude, following terrain for thousands of kilometers — they are structurally under-optimized.

The strike on Ufa is the most eloquent demonstration of this failure. None of the systems deployed to protect the petrochemical installations of Bashkiria prevented Ukrainian drones from reaching their targets at 1,300 km from Ukrainian territory. Governor Khabirov claimed that defenses had "repelled the attack" — but the black smoke above the Bashneft refineries refuted that claim before the entire world. Russia has a fundamental technological blind spot, and Ukraine is exploiting it methodically.

The cost of anti-drone defense: a race Russia cannot win

In response to the drone threat, Russia has begun deploying specific anti-drone systems — electronic cannons, jammers, physical interception. But the problem is arithmetic: protecting every refinery, every fuel depot, every strategically important industrial installation across a territory as vast as Russia is impossible without infinite resources. Ukraine can choose its target from a catalog of thousands of installations, all vulnerable. Russia must defend all of them simultaneously.

This fundamental asymmetry — the attacker chooses, the defender must cover everything — is one of the foundational principles of asymmetric warfare. It explains why the Ukrainian long-range drone campaign is so difficult for Moscow to counter, even with massive defense investments. Every ruble spent protecting a refinery is a ruble not financing operations on the Ukrainian front. This is the war of budgetary attrition, and Ukraine is waging it brilliantly.

The failure of Russian air defenses against Ukrainian drones is one of the most important military lessons of this war. It tells armies worldwide that investments in conventional high-technology systems are no longer enough. You also need specific counter-drone capabilities, adapted to low-cost and high-volume threats. NATO member countries would do well to integrate this lesson into their planning — not only to defend their own territory, but to understand the adversary's vulnerabilities.

The refinery as an economic weapon

The economic effect of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries goes beyond the simple energy question. Every refinery taken offline is a reduction in Rosneft's revenues, and therefore in the federal budget that depends on oil exports to finance the war. The Russian budget deficit, exceeding 80 billion dollars according to United24 Media on June 23, 2026, is aggravated by every additional month the major refineries remain offline.

Total Russian refining production has fallen by one third, according to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — a figure representing a significant economic constraint for a country devoting more than 70 percent of its tax revenues to defense. Russia must now import gasoline by sea — a logistical humiliation for the world's leading hydrocarbon exporter — and pay market premiums for products it was producing in surplus just months ago.

Russia's war debt: a growing and hard-to-carry burden

To finance a growing deficit in a context of declining oil revenues, Russia is issuing sovereign debt at increasingly high rates — Russian bond yields reaching 15 percent, reflecting the risk premium investors demand for lending to a war economy with uncertain prospects. This rising borrowing cost is itself a factor of economic degradation: each new tranche of debt costs more, reducing resources available for other priorities.

This spiral — refinery strikes → reduced oil revenues → widening deficit → more expensive debt issuance → pressure on other spending → weakened war-financing capacity — is precisely what the Ukrainian strategy aims to trigger. It will not cause an immediate collapse. But it creates cumulative constraints that make each month of war more costly than the last for Russia.

This investigation has convinced me of something I suspected but had not fully measured: the map of Russian refineries that Ukraine wants to extinguish is also a map of the degradation of Russia's budgetary capacity. Each point on that map represents not only one fewer industrial installation, but one fewer revenue source for a war budget already under maximum pressure. Zelensky understood before many others that modern wars are also won on income statements.

The fundamental unknowns that open sources cannot resolve

A journalistic investigation based on open sources has limits I must name clearly. I do not know with precision what the next targets of the Ukrainian campaign will be. I have no access to Kyiv's military planning. Available OSINT imagery allows for assessing visible damage to known installations, but it does not capture the precise state of damaged units, internal repair timelines, or future Ukrainian operational decisions.

Economic data on the precise impact of the strikes is also uncertain. Output figures often rest on estimates by industry experts or anonymous sources I cannot independently verify. The one-third reduction in Russian refining production is a figure from the NATO Secretary General — credible, but based on intelligence data that is inaccessible to me. I cite it with this explicit caveat.

What I can assert with confidence about the campaign's logic

Despite these limits, certain conclusions stand with sufficient solidity. The Ukrainian campaign of strikes on Russian refineries follows a coherent industrial logic — it targets the most strategic nodes of the Russian refining system, with increasing precision and constantly expanding range. It produces real economic effects — installations offline for months or years, reduced revenues, aggravated budget pressure.

And it demonstrates a Ukrainian technological capability that many had underestimated — the ability to strike at 1,300 km of depth with domestically manufactured drones, in the context of total war and constant bombardment of Ukrainian territory. This is the map this investigation attempts to draw: not the complete map of what will be struck, but the already visible map of what has been accomplished and the logic guiding it.

I end this investigation with more humility than I had when I began it. The more I tried to map precisely the Ukrainian campaign of strikes on Russian refineries, the more I realized the extent of what I do not know. But that is the nature of a good investigation: it reveals its own limits as much as its findings. And the findings of this one are significant enough to be worth sharing, with all their uncertainties explicitly noted.

What we know, what we infer, what we do not know

This investigation has attempted to reconstruct the logic of the Ukrainian campaign of strikes on Russian refineries from data available as of June 27, 2026. We know that Kapotnya is offline until 2027. We know that two installations in the Bashneft complex at Ufa were damaged on June 25. We know that Russian refining production has fallen by one third according to available estimates. We know that Russia is planning to import gasoline by sea.

We infer, based on the campaign's logic, that other installations match the criteria that guided the previous strikes. We infer that Zelensky's 40-day campaign has not reached its end. We infer that Ukrainian long-range capabilities will continue to improve. What we do not know is the precise timeline, the exact targets, the coming operational decisions. The map of this economic war is still being drawn.

The significance for the war's outcome

The campaign of strikes on Russian refineries will not decide the war's outcome on its own. It does not replace the ground battles in the Donbas, the prisoner exchanges, the diplomatic negotiations, or Western support in weapons and financing. But it adds an economic dimension to this conflict that is progressively shifting the balance of power. It imposes on Russia costs that accumulate, vulnerabilities that multiply, and a strategic dilemma that Kremlin planners had not anticipated: how do you defend a vast territory against drones that can reach 1,300 km of depth?

The honest answer is that they cannot. Not completely. Not without a cost that exceeds their capacity. And that is precisely what Zelensky and his strategists understood, and put into practice with a consistency that commands analytical admiration even from those who once doubted their capabilities. The map of refineries Ukraine wants to extinguish is not yet complete — but the first lines have been drawn in fire.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

The map I've drawn in this investigation — Bashneft in Bashkortostan, Kapotnya in Moscow's southern suburbs, Ryazan south of the capital — is a geography of strategic leverage that no one fully anticipated when the war began. Ukraine found it through necessity and executed it through innovation. The Alliance should be asking itself a harder question: why did it take a non-member state fighting for its survival to develop the most effective long-range attrition campaign against Russian industrial infrastructure? What does that say about NATO's own strategic thinking? The answers are uncomfortable. They should be.