NARRATIVE: The Night Ukraine Struck 38 Targets in Crimea — Radar, Energy, Logistics

NARRATIVE: The Night Ukraine Struck 38 Targets in Crimea — Radar, Energy, Logistics

Introduction: The Night of June 25, 2026, in Occupied Crimea

A Large-Scale Coordinated Operation

On the night of June 25, 2026, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces struck 38 Russian military targets on the occupied Crimean Peninsula. This is not an abstract number — it is the result of a planned operation, coordinated across multiple units, simultaneously targeting coastal radars, energy installations, fuel depots, and air defense systems. Commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi confirmed the results.

That night, explosions were reported in the districts of Simferopol, Pervomaiske, Krasnoperekopsk, as well as in Sevastopol, Yevpatoria, and Yalta. Widespread power outages followed the strikes on thermal power plants. Crimea, which Russia has presented as its impregnable fortress since the illegal annexation of 2014, once again shook under Ukrainian drones.

The Units Involved: A Collective Strike Force

The operation involved the 1st Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces, the 20th Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces, the 9th Kairos Battalion of the 414th Brigade "Madyar's Birds", the Phoenix unit, and the 412th Nemesis Brigade. This distributed command architecture illustrates the operational maturity reached by Ukraine's drone forces in 2026: not an improvised strike, but a structured multi-unit operation.

The Coastal Radars Destroyed: MR-231, Neva-B, the Eyes of the Russian Fleet

Striking the Black Sea Maritime Surveillance Network

Among the 38 targets that night, the coastal radars represent the most strategically significant strikes. The MR-231 radar in the locality of Myrnyi and two Neva-B radar systems in the localities of Morske and Zaozerne were hit. These systems form the maritime surveillance infrastructure enabling the Russian Black Sea Fleet to monitor coastal approaches and coordinate its naval operations.

The destruction of these coastal radars is not merely a tactical victory — it is a strategic degradation of Russia's ability to see what approaches the coastline. As Ukraine develops its own naval drone fleet in the Black Sea, the progressive blindness of Russian coastal defenses creates growing operational opportunities for subsequent maritime strikes.

The Black Sea: A Theater That Is Turning

The context of this strike is essential: since 2022, Ukraine has used naval drones in the Black Sea to strike Russian warships, forcing parts of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to relocate from occupied Sevastopol to ports further east. Russia began developing its own naval drones in 2024–2025, equipped with smuggled Starlink terminals — the only long-range control system available after SpaceX blocked unauthorized access in February 2026. On June 24, 2026, the Ukrainian Navy and the Defense Intelligence Directorate (HUR) sank three Russian naval drones before they reached the shore.

Energy Infrastructure: Striking What Sustains the Occupation

The Tavriyskaya Thermal Power Plant in Simferopol

The strike on the Tavriyskaya thermal power plant in Simferopol, capital of occupied Crimea, directly caused widespread power outages across the peninsula. A similar strike targeted a 330/220/110/35 kV electrical substation in Sevastopol and another 330 kV Simferopolskaya substation. These three simultaneous energy strikes aimed to paralyze the electrical systems that power not only military infrastructure, but also civilian life under occupation.

The strategy behind this approach is documented in statements by President Zelensky himself: Ukraine's operation on Crimea is carefully calculated, and if Western partners make the necessary decisions on arms deliveries, Ukraine will be able to create conditions in which Russia will be forced to choose peace. Energy strikes are part of this calculated pressure.

Fuel Depots and Gas Compression Stations: Striking Logistics

An oil depot in the town of Dzhankoi and two gas compression stations in the Zhuravlivka and Klyuchi areas were also struck. These logistics strikes target the Russian military supply chain in Crimea — fuel for military vehicles, gas for base installations. Each strike on this logistical infrastructure increases the operational cost of maintaining Russian forces on the peninsula.

Russian Air Defense in Crimea: The ZU-23-2 Destroyed

An Anti-Aircraft Gun Eliminated Near Kumove

Among the 38 targets, an anti-aircraft ZU-23-2 gun near the locality of Kumove was destroyed. The ZU-23-2 is a Soviet short-range air defense system widely used by Russia to counter low-altitude drones. Its destruction contributes to degrading local anti-drone defense, facilitating future Ukrainian operations on the peninsula.

In the weeks preceding this attack, Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) had already conducted strikes on the infrastructure of Saky and Hvardiiske military airfields, and destroyed S-400 and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems near Kerch. The night of June 25 is part of a campaign of progressive, systematic degradation of Russian defenses in Crimea.

The Strategy of Sustained Pressure

Crimea is not merely a political symbol — it is a logistical and military hub that allows Russia to project power toward southern Ukraine. Every strike on its energy, logistical, and defense infrastructure increases the cost of maintaining Russian military presence on the peninsula. This is not a strategy to retake Crimea tomorrow — it is a strategy to make its occupation progressively untenable.

The Railway Bridge Over the North Crimean Canal: It No Longer Exists

The Destruction of the Rail Logistics Corridor

On June 23, 2026, two days before the 38-target attack, Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SOF) announced that the railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal — located near the village of Rozdolne — no longer exists. The operation was conducted in coordination with members of the SOF underground resistance movement on the peninsula. The SOF published images showing the bridge attack.

This bridge was part of a transport corridor used to move cargo, resources, and military supplies in two directions: from Russia through Crimea to support forces operating in the southern direction, and toward occupied territories of southern Ukraine, in the Kherson region and along the Azov Sea coast. Occupation authorities immediately suspended all passenger train services within Crimea.

Rail: The Backbone of Russian Military Logistics

Ukraine's SOF described rail as the crucial backbone of Russian military logistics. The destruction of the Rozdolne bridge — described as the first railway bridge eliminated in Crimea — significantly complicates the rail movement of troops, ammunition, and fuel. The movement of goods and personnel toward central and western Crimea and toward the land corridor leading to occupied southern Ukraine becomes, according to the SOF, considerably more complicated.

60 Targets: The Context of the Broader Campaign

38 Targets in One Night, 60 in a Few Days

The operation of June 25, 2026 on 38 targets fits into a broader framework. According to Ukraine's Special Operations Forces, their operations during the June 2026 period struck 60 Russian targets in temporarily occupied territories, including Crimea. These targets include, beyond the 38 already mentioned, oil storage tanks at the Kerch thermal power plant and a "Western Crimea" electrical substation in the village of Kariyerne.

This accumulation of strikes on Crimea in June is not random. It is part of a deliberate strategy of maximum pressure on the peninsula's military infrastructure, at the very moment when Ukraine is in a phase of increasing its long-range strike capability. June 2026 represented approximately 35% of all successful strikes on Russian territory for the entire year.

The Internal Resistance Operation

The mention of coordination with the SOF underground resistance movement for the destruction of the Rozdolne bridge is significant. It indicates the existence of an active resistance network on the occupied peninsula, capable of providing intelligence, identifying targets, and facilitating special operations. This human intelligence dimension in Crimea is a Ukrainian asset that purely military analyses tend to underestimate.

Power Outages: When the War Enters the Homes of Crimeans

An Inevitable Civilian Impact Under Occupation

The widespread power outages that followed the strikes on Crimean thermal power plants affected the civilian population of the peninsula. This is a war reality that Ukraine acknowledges without evasion: striking military energy infrastructure entails consequences for civilians living under occupation. Ukrainian doctrine seeks to minimize these effects, but cannot eliminate them entirely.

The ethical question is real and deserves to be asked plainly. Ukraine strikes infrastructure that serves both military and civilian purposes — that is the nature of power plants and railways. These strikes are legally defensible in the context of a military occupation, but they carry a human cost for Crimeans who are not combatants. That cost must be acknowledged, even by those who support Ukrainian operations.

The Psychological Pressure on Populations Under Occupation

Beyond the material effects, repeated strikes on Crimea have a documented psychological effect on populations under occupation. They signal that Russian occupation does not provide protection — that essential infrastructure can be struck, that life under occupation is not the stability promised by the Kremlin. For those who have doubts about the occupation regime, these strikes constitute a powerful political signal.

The Black Sea Fleet Cornered: From Sevastopol to Eastern Ports

A Naval Retreat Forced by Drones

The progressive destruction of naval and defense infrastructure in Crimea has already produced a major strategic effect: significant parts of the Russian Black Sea Fleet have been forced to relocate from occupied Sevastopol to ports further east — in Russia proper. This movement represents a Ukrainian strategic victory: the Russian fleet has lost its main Black Sea base, reduced its footprint in Crimea, and now operates under considerable logistical constraints.

Ukraine achieved this naval retreat without a conventional navy — solely with naval drones and missiles. This is a demonstration of asymmetric power that surprised military analysts. Russia is trying to replicate this capability with its own naval drones, but faces the communications problem: it must use smuggled Starlink terminals, which SpaceX cut off in February 2026 at Kyiv's request.

Three Russian Naval Drones Sunk Before Reaching the Shore

On June 24, 2026, the Ukrainian Navy and the Defense Intelligence Directorate (HUR) destroyed three Russian naval drones before they reached the Ukrainian coast. These drones had been detected near the Kinburn Spit, south of Ochakiv, along the Mykolaiv-Kherson coastline. They were equipped with Starlink terminals obtained through third-party supply chains, despite the official block on service in Russia.

Madyar and the "Madyar's Birds": The Human Face of Ukraine's Drone War

Robert Brovdi, "Madyar": The Commander Who Confirms Results

The confirmation of 38 targets struck came from Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, a commander whose units — "Madyar's Birds" — are among the most widely covered in Ukraine's drone war. His brigade, the 414th, is known for its innovative operations that have been documented and analyzed by military experts worldwide. His public communication of operational results is an integral part of Ukraine's strategy of selective transparency.

Ukrainian military communication on strike results — with precise place names, types of systems destroyed, units involved — stands in sharp contrast to Russian opacity. This selective transparency serves multiple purposes: sustaining domestic morale, informing partners, and signaling to Russia that its losses are documented and known. This is an informational dimension of the war that Ukraine handles better than its adversary.

The 412th Nemesis Brigade: The Other Force in the Shadows

The 412th Nemesis Brigade, also involved in the June 25 operation, is less widely covered but just as operationally active. Its participation in a multi-target strike operation on Crimea illustrates the depth of Ukraine's drone force — not one or two elite units, but an ecosystem of specialized brigades, each with their own tactics and capabilities, able to operate in coordination.

Zelensky's Signal: Crimea as a Lever for Peace

If the West Delivers the Weapons, Russia Will Be Forced to Choose

President Zelensky's statement about operations in Crimea is remarkable for its strategic content. He did not speak of immediately retaking the peninsula — he said that if Western partners make the necessary decisions on arms deliveries, Ukraine will be able to create conditions in which Russia will be forced to choose peace. This formulation is calculated.

It means that Zelensky is using Crimea not as an objective for immediate reconquest, but as a negotiating lever. By making the occupation progressively more costly, more difficult, more untenable, he is creating conditions for pressure that could force Moscow to a negotiating table with revised positions. This is a strategy of graduated coercion — documented and coherent.

Crimea in Ukraine's Strategic Horizon

Crimea remains Ukraine's ultimate strategic objective. Its return under Ukrainian sovereignty is a non-negotiable requirement of international law — the peninsula was illegally annexed in 2014 in violation of the United Nations Charter. Ukrainian strikes do not seek to destroy the peninsula — they seek to make its occupation so costly that Moscow eventually calculates the real price.

The Russian Narrative of an Impregnable Crimea: Progressive Collapse

A Kerch Bridge That Has Already Burned, Defenses That Crumble

Russia had presented Crimea as an impregnable fortress since 2014: the Black Sea fleet, S-400 systems deployed across the peninsula, the Kerch bridge as a symbol of irreversible integration. That narrative has collapsed in stages. The Kerch bridge has already been struck. The S-400 and Pantsir-S1 were destroyed by the SBU. The fleet has retreated. And now, the first railway bridge in Crimea no longer exists.

Each element of this supposedly impregnable fortress crumbles under Ukraine's repeated blows. Kremlin propaganda can dispute the figures, minimize the effects, refute the images. But the power outages in Simferopol, the suspended trains, the fuel depots burning in Dzhankoi are experienced by the inhabitants of the peninsula, who know what their own eyes show them.

The Legal Dimension: An Illegal Occupation Under Constant Pressure

The legal framework bears restating: Crimea is internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, illegally occupied since 2014. Ukraine is conducting military operations on its own territory against an occupying power. International humanitarian law applies, but within the framework of an illegal occupation that the international community — with the exception of a few authoritarian regimes — has condemned.

The Impact on the Black Sea and the Maritime Logistics Corridor

Dzhankoi: The Logistical Hub at the Heart of the Peninsula

The strike on the oil depot in Dzhankoi is strategically significant. Dzhankoi is a key rail and logistics hub in northern Crimea — it is through this city that fuel and equipment supplies from Russia via the Kerch bridge pass. Strike on its oil depot, strike on the Rozdolne railway bridge nearby, strikes on gas compression stations — this is coherent logistical pressure on the northern corridor of the peninsula.

The gas compression stations at Zhuravlivka and Klyuchi feed the peninsula's gas networks, including certain military installations. Their temporary or permanent disruption reduces the capacity of Russian military bases to maintain normal operations. This is, again, systemic pressure — not spectacular, but cumulatively effective.

The Black Sea as a Threatened Lifeline

The Black Sea is the maritime supply route alternative for Crimea, alongside the land route via the Kerch bridge. The pressure Ukraine simultaneously exerts on rail, road, and port infrastructure of the peninsula creates a situation of progressive siege. Crimea remains connected to Russia, but its supply lines are increasingly vulnerable, increasingly costly to maintain.

What June 2026 Reveals About Ukraine's Strategy

The Doctrinal Coherence Behind the Strikes

Taken in isolation, each strike on Crimea may appear tactical. Taken together — the Rozdolne bridge on the 23rd, the 38 targets on the 25th, 60 targets over the entire period — they reveal a coherent doctrine of progressive degradation. Ukraine is not seeking a spectacular theatrical blow. It is seeking to accumulate irreparable damage on Russian defense systems and military logistics in Crimea, until maintaining the occupation becomes prohibitively costly.

This strategy of graduated coercion is documented in Zelensky's speeches and the communications of the SOF and Drone Forces. It requires strategic patience and operational continuity that Ukraine has managed to maintain despite the enormous pressures of simultaneous ground warfare in the Donbas and on other sectors of the front.

The West Must Provide the Means for This Doctrine

This doctrine can only succeed if the West continues to supply the weapons and ammunition that make it possible. Ukrainian drones are manufactured in Ukraine, but they depend on a supply chain of electronic components, financing, and technologies that involves dozens of partners. If Western aid dries up, if deliveries slow down, the doctrine of graduated degradation loses its fuel.

Conclusion: The Narrative of a Crimea Russia Can No Longer Protect

38 Targets, One Bridge Destroyed, and a Political Message

The night of June 25, 2026 in Crimea is not merely a narrative of military strikes. It is the narrative of the progressive collapse of a myth: that of the impregnable fortress. The destroyed radars no longer see. The destroyed substations no longer power. The Rozdolne bridge no longer exists. And Zelensky says, clearly: if the West provides the necessary weapons, Russia will be forced to choose peace.

What This Narrative Says About the War in 2026

In June 2026, Ukraine crossed a threshold in its strike capacity against Crimea. It is no longer striking merely to cause damage — it strikes according to a coherent doctrine, with precise strategic objectives, in coordination between specialized units, with the support of internal resistance networks. This is a different war from that of 2022. And if the West understands this moment and responds to it, it could prove decisive.

Final Conclusion: Crimea Will Resist the Occupation

The Pressure That Makes the Status Quo Untenable

Crimea is Ukrainian in law. It has been illegally occupied since 2014. Every Ukrainian strike on its military infrastructure is an act of legitimate reclamation on its own territory. The accumulation of these strikes — radar, bridges, fuel, energy, air defense — creates pressure that, over the long term, will make the status quo untenable for Russia.

38 in One Night, Thousands More to Come

If 38 targets in a single night, if a railway bridge destroyed in a matter of days, if three Russian naval drones sunk before reaching the shore — these are the results of a single week of June 2026, the pressure is set to intensify. Ukraine produces more, strikes further, coordinates better. Crimea is no longer impregnable. And Moscow knows it.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and Method

This narrative draws on reports from Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, statements by Commander Brovdi "Madyar", communications from Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SOF), and reports from RBC Ukraine and Euronews. Target figures (38, 60) come from official Ukrainian communications. The destruction of Russian naval drones is confirmed by the Ukrainian Navy and the HUR. I reconstruct an event sequence from primary sources — without inventing scenes or testimonials.

What I Don't Know

The exact level of damage inflicted on struck targets cannot be independently verified. Ukrainian military communications on results are credible but not neutral. The real impact on Russian military capability in Crimea will only be fully visible in the medium term, through the operational evolution on the peninsula. These uncertainties are acknowledged and made explicit.

Sources

Primary sources

RBC Ukraine — Ukraine's drone forces reveal results of overnight strikes on Crimea — June 25, 2026

Euronews — Ukraine says key Crimea railway bridge no longer exists after drone strikes — June 23, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Russia's sea drones run on smuggled Starlink, Ukraine sank three before they reached shore — June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

United24 Media — Ukraine's drone swarms are overloading Russian air defense, June sets record for deep strikes — June 26, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Ongoing coverage of Ukrainian military operations — June 2026

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2026