EDITORIAL: Scarborough Shoal — China tests the West while it looks the other way

Introduction: A naval standoff that goes beyond the Philippines

June 23, 2026 at Scarborough

On June 23, 2026, a rare naval confrontation erupted between China and the Philippines near Scarborough Shoal, known in Filipino as Bajo de Masinloc. It was not an accidental skirmish. It was a deliberate test — a probe designed to measure the reaction of Manila, Washington, and the international community in a charged geopolitical context.

The world had its eyes fixed on the Middle East. The Strait of Hormuz crisis was monopolizing geostrategic analysis. And in the meantime, Beijing was moving its pieces in the South China Sea with the cold precision of a chess player exploiting its opponent's distraction. Scarborough is not an isolated incident. It is an episode in a long-term strategy China has been pursuing since 2012.

Fourteen years of progressive occupation

Scarborough Shoal has been under de-facto Chinese control since 2012. In 2016, the international arbitration tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that China had no legal title over these waters. Beijing ignored that ruling with a nonchalance that speaks volumes about its relationship to international law.

Since then, China has consolidated its presence — permanent coast guard vessels, harassment of Filipino fishermen, blocking of supply runs to Philippine outposts. These 14 years of progressive occupation represent one of the most blatant and least-sanctioned violations of international maritime law since the end of the Cold War.

The Philippines intensify their patrols — a signal of resistance

The AFP is not retreating

Despite the imposing Chinese naval presence, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) announced on June 23, 2026 that they would intensify patrols near Bajo de Masinloc. This decision, reported by the Manila Bulletin, represents a notable shift in posture compared to the caution of previous years.

This Philippine hardening is not trivial. It comes in a context where Manila has considerably strengthened its defense alliances — with the United States first, but also with Japan, Australia, and European partners. The Philippines of 2026 are not those of 2012: they have allies, new equipment, and the political will to defend their sovereign rights.

The fear of a permanent seizure

The scenario most feared by Manila is a definitive seizure of Scarborough Shoal by China — a transformation of the de-facto occupation into permanent control, with the construction of military installations as happened on other reefs in the South China Sea. This scenario, analyzed by Türkiye Today on June 22, 2026, is not a theoretical exercise.

China has demonstrated its capacity to transform shoals into fortified artificial islands — the Spratly Islands are proof. If Scarborough suffered the same fate, the Philippines would permanently lose access to certain traditional fishing zones and China would gain an additional strategic position within reach of Luzon. The Philippines' security stakes would be fundamentally altered.

The four American underwater vehicles — concrete aid or symbol?

The Subic Bay transfer

On June 22, 2026, the United States transferred to the Philippines 4 Ocean Aero Triton autonomous underwater vehicles at a ceremony at the Subic Bay naval base in Zambales. These devices gather intelligence data without constituting offensive weapons — an important legal and diplomatic distinction in the context of regional tensions.

This transfer is part of a systematic reinforcement of US-Philippines defense cooperation. The EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) has opened 6 additional American bases in the Philippines since 2023. Basa Air Base has been transformed into a strategic hub for surveillance and power projection in the western South China Sea.

The strategic value of submarine drones

Autonomous underwater vehicles of the Ocean Aero Triton type represent a persistent and discreet surveillance capability the Philippines previously lacked. They allow for mapping the movements of Chinese submarines and surface vessels, collecting acoustic data, and strengthening maritime domain awareness in a zone where China operates with calculated opacity.

This new capability complements the annual US-Philippines military exercises, whose latest major phase concluded on June 20, 2026. Together, these elements sketch a defense architecture that aims to make any Chinese action costly and visible. Deterrence through transparency — making clandestine action impossible — is a strategy beginning to take shape.

The ASEAN Code of Conduct — accelerator or illusion?

The Hormuz crisis as a Philippine lever

The Philippines made an intelligent rhetorical choice: using the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis to justify the urgency of a Code of Conduct agreement in the South China Sea. The argument is simple — the closure of a strategic strait paralyzes the world economy. The South China Sea is a vital corridor for 40% of global maritime trade. The risk of a similar crisis there is real.

The Straits Times of June 24, 2026 reports that the Philippines explicitly use this comparison to accelerate negotiations. ASEAN brings together 10 members, of which 4 have claims in the South China Sea — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Convincing those members to align behind a common position against Beijing is a considerable diplomatic challenge.

China blocks binding provisions

Beijing categorically refuses any binding provision in the Code of Conduct. China's position has been consistent for years: it accepts discussions, multiplies rounds of negotiation, but systematically blocks any dispute-resolution mechanism that would strip it of final control over the interpretation of commitments.

This delaying negotiation strategy is effective — it allows China to present itself as a dialogue partner while consolidating its physical presence on the ground. While diplomats have been discussing the Code of Conduct for years, Chinese artificial islands in the Spratlys have been militarized, reefs occupied, and Philippine fishing zones progressively closed to Manila's vessels.

The reaction of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs

Manila defends the 2016 ruling

The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) rejected on June 22, 2026 the claims of the Chinese embassy and defended the validity of the 2016 arbitral ruling. This public stance, reported by the Manila Bulletin, is important: it means Manila refuses the normalization of Chinese occupation and maintains a legal framework of contestation.

This posture of constant diplomatic resistance complements the intensification of military patrols. The Philippines are playing on two simultaneous registers — international legality and physical presence. It is a coherent strategy, but one that demands political endurance and institutional solidity that only a stable government can sustain.

China responds with official contempt

Facing Philippine protests, Beijing's response follows a well-worn script: denials, accusations of "provocation," invocations of "incontestable historical sovereignty." These formulas are performative — they are not addressed to Filipinos but to the Chinese domestic public and to certain partners who might interpret any flexibility as weakness.

China's historical sovereignty rhetoric in the South China Sea rests on no solid foundation in modern international law — the Hague tribunal said so clearly in 2016. Yet it is repeated with a consistency aimed at passing an illegal position off as an unquestionable fait accompli. It is institutionalized geopolitical disinformation.

EDCA and the reinforced American presence in the Philippines

Six additional bases since 2023

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) has given American forces access to 6 additional Philippine bases since 2023, some near the Luzon Strait and the South China Sea. This development represents the most significant reinforcement of the American military presence in the Philippines since the closure of the Subic Bay and Clark bases in 1992.

Basa Air Base is particularly strategic — its position allows rapid power projection toward areas of tension in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan. American investments in these facilities, combined with regular military exercises, sketch a presence that aims as much at deterring China at Scarborough as at protecting Taiwan in the event of a crisis.

Washington between bilateral support and regional calculations

American support for the Philippines is real but conditional. Washington has no automatic legal obligation to defend the Philippines on contested reefs — the exact scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty in such situations is deliberately ambiguous. The United States provides equipment, conducts exercises, but maintains diplomatic maneuvering room.

This calculated ambiguity sometimes irritates Manila, which would like a more explicit commitment. But from Washington's perspective, maintaining ambiguity deters Beijing without entering into a security guarantee that could drag the United States into an unwanted conflict. This is graduated strategic deterrence — a delicate balance that the Trump administration navigates with the same tensions as its predecessors.

Philippine civil society — resilience and support for national defense

A population supporting resistance

Behind governmental decisions and ship movements, there is the Philippine civil society that actively supports resistance to Chinese pressure. Fishermen who refuse to leave their traditional fishing zones despite intimidation, civil society organizations documenting Chinese violations, journalists keeping public attention focused on the South China Sea stakes — all of this forms a fabric of resistance that extends far beyond military and diplomatic decisions.

This popular support is a genuine strategic resource for the Philippine government in its negotiations with Beijing. A democratic regime that knows its population supports a firm line can negotiate from a position of domestic legitimacy that authoritarian regimes cannot invoke as readily. Philippine democracy is a force in this confrontation, even if it is sometimes looked down upon by those who prefer centralized decision-making.

Independent media and the documentation of violations

The role of independent Philippine media in documenting Chinese violations in the South China Sea is considerable. The Manila Bulletin, Philippine investigative media, and international press correspondents have maintained a continuous flow of information on incidents — photos, videos, fishermen's testimonies. This documentation constitutes a body of evidence that reinforces the Philippines' legal and diplomatic position.

In a confrontation where China holds an obvious military and economic advantage, information is a strategic resource that the Philippines cultivate intelligently. Making Chinese actions visible — the vessel blockades, water cannons against Philippine coast guard ships, intimidation maneuvers — denies Beijing the discretion it would need to impose its views without international resistance.

American support — between formal guarantees and strategic ambiguity

The Mutual Defense Treaty and its grey zones

The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines is the cornerstone of Philippine security. It stipulates that both countries will defend each other in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific area, including their forces, public vessels, and aircraft. But its application to confrontations on contested reefs was long ambiguous, with each American administration nuancing the scope of that commitment differently.

The American administration recently clarified that the treaty applies to attacks against Philippine forces throughout the South China Sea, including reefs like Scarborough. This clarification is significant — it reduces the ambiguity on which Beijing could rely to calculate the risks of action. But a declaration remains a declaration until it is tested by events.

The four underwater vehicles — concrete signal of American support

Among the most concrete signs of American operational support for the Philippines is the recent transfer of 4 autonomous underwater vehicles to the Subic Bay naval base on June 22, 2026. These maritime intelligence devices allow the Philippines to better monitor the movements of the Chinese navy in waters where the numerical superiority of the PLAN would otherwise be crushing.

This transfer complements the US-Philippines military exercises that concluded on June 20, 2026. Equipment plus exercises plus additional EDCA bases together create a cooperation architecture that goes well beyond diplomatic statements. It is a concrete commitment, measurable, that modifies the real capabilities of Philippine forces in their contested zone of sovereignty.

Conclusion: Scarborough, laboratory of Asian power balances

A test whose results go beyond the Philippines

What is at stake at Scarborough in 2026 is a test whose results matter well beyond the Philippines. Taiwan is watching how the international community reacts to Chinese provocations. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei — which have their own claims in the South China Sea — are watching whether the Philippines are supported or abandoned. The precedent established here will shape the strategic calculations of the entire region for years to come.

If China can transform Scarborough into a permanent military installation with no real consequences, the message sent is clear: force overrides law, international tribunal rulings are optional, and smaller states can only count on the goodwill of great powers. This is a vision of the world the West cannot accept without betraying itself.

The intensification of patrols as a message

The decision by the Philippines to intensify their patrols despite Chinese pressure is an act of resistance that deserves concrete support. Speeches of solidarity are no longer sufficient — Manila needs tangible diplomatic, economic, and military backing that makes the cost of a Chinese seizure of Scarborough prohibitive. The moment for strategic clarity has arrived: either the West supports international law in the South China Sea, or it accepts that power overrides law in this region.

The West cannot selectively defend international law in Ukraine while ignoring it in the South China Sea. Consistency of principles is the condition of their credibility. And credibility is the only currency that genuinely deters revisionist powers like China from crossing red lines.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Sources and method

This editorial relies on sources published between June 22 and 25, 2026: South China Morning Post, Manila Bulletin, Straits Times, Türkiye Today, and Washington Times. The figures cited — number of EDCA bases, drone transfer date, 2016 arbitral ruling — are all drawn directly from these identified primary and secondary sources.

I am an analyst and columnist, not a field correspondent in the South China Sea. My analysis is based on open, publicly available sources. I have no personal contacts in Manila or Beijing. My personal opinions, distinguished by em tags, reflect my editorial judgment, not field expertise.

Editorial positioning

This text adopts a position of support for international law and for the rulings of international jurisdictions, including the 2016 arbitral ruling. It holds that China is violating international maritime law in the South China Sea. This position is grounded in documented legal elements, not in arbitrary hostility toward China as a nation.

The Western interest in this region — freedom of navigation, international law, support for smaller states facing revisionist powers — is considered legitimate and necessary for global stability. This editorial line is stated openly and transparently.

Sources

Primary sources

South China Morning Post — Rare China-Philippines naval standoff near Scarborough — June 23, 2026

Manila Bulletin — AFP to intensify patrols near Bajo de Masinloc despite Chinese presence — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

Straits Times — Hormuz crisis, Philippines, and ASEAN Code of Conduct — June 24, 2026

Türkiye Today — Philippines fear permanent Chinese seizure of Scarborough — June 22, 2026

Manila Bulletin — DFA rejects Chinese embassy claims, defends 2016 ruling — June 22, 2026

Washington Times — Tensions rise around disputed shoal — June 25, 2026