EDITORIAL: G7 Evian — The China Split Fractures the West and Portends the Worst

Introduction: Evian-les-Bains, Lake Geneva, and the Rift That Can No Longer Be Hidden

A summit on the edge of a diplomatic abyss

The 52nd G7 summit was held from June 15 to 17, 2026, in Evian-les-Bains, this small French spa town known more for its mineral water than for its geopolitical fireworks. And yet, it was there, facing Lake Geneva, that the seven major industrialized democracies — United States, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Japan — staged their most alarming disunity in decades. China was not at the table. But it loomed over every discussion like a shadow that no one dared to name directly.

French President Emmanuel Macron, host of the French G7 presidency, had two stated ambitions: to facilitate a constructive dialogue between Donald Trump and the other six members of the group, and to strengthen the G7's ties with major emerging economies. According to an analysis by Chatham House published on June 18, he technically achieved both of these goals — but at a derisory price. Because behind the thematic communiqués and carefully crafted diplomatic formulas, the reality was brutal: the G7 is fractured, and China knows it.

The Macron method: Avoiding the explosion, not resolving it

To avoid a visible debacle, Paris multiplied procedural precautions. We pushed back the start of the summit by one day so as not to infringe on Trump's 80th birthday. We abandoned the idea of a unified final communiqué — replaced by nine thematic statements — to hide the divergences between Washington and its allies. We even organized a dinner between Macron and Trump at the end of the summit to prevent him from leaving in a huff, as he did at Charlevoix in 2018. The empty chair policy was avoided. The policy of a gaping fracture was not.

According to El País on June 15, the rift between the United States and its traditional allies was the true thermometer of the summit. And the thermometer measured a worrying fever. On China — the most defining issue for the future of the West — no consensus emerged. Neither between Europe and the United States. Nor even among the Europeans themselves.

The G7 without a final communiqué: The institutional admission of impotence

The second consecutive year without a unified declaration

This is no longer an anomaly. It is a trend. According to the Xinhua agency, echoing diplomatic sources cited by Kyodo News, the Evian summit concluded without a unified final communiqué — for the second consecutive year after a similar failure at the Kananaskis in 2025 summit. The organizers had themselves abandoned the idea of a common communiqué during the preparatory phase, opting for thematic documents in order to "mask the differences" between the United States and its allies. That is the term Kyodo used. Mask, not resolve.

Nine thematic statements were published, covering geopolitics, the global economy, public health, online child protection, critical minerals, and artificial intelligence. Each was carefully calibrated to include Washington without irritating it too much. Macron hailed "a moment of unity, quality discussion and real cooperation". The formula would have been honest had it not been preceded by the structural abandonment of the G7's most fundamental tool of collective expression.

When the absence of visible disagreement masks the collapse of consensus

Trump did not leave early. There were no public domestic scenes. Observers called the Evian summit "much smoother" than previous ones. But the surface fluidity should not be deceiving. As Chatham House notes, the G7 can only exercise real influence if its members share common core values, trust each other enough, and if no policy area is excluded a priori from the discussions. However, since the start of Trump's second term, these three conditions are no longer met. Climate change, the future of the global trading system, international monetary and financial stability, digital governance — all these subjects were prudently avoided in Evian.

What remains, when the G7 is stripped of every subject where Washington would refuse to sign, is a weakened, partial format, and one increasingly unable to propose concrete solutions to global problems. The West finds itself leading the world with a broken tool. And China is not waiting.

Is Trump going it alone: The temptation of the G2 and the abandonment of allies

Washington prefers the bilateral to the multilateral on China

The main fracture of the Evian summit is there, in black and white, in the very title of a Politico Weekly Trade newsletter published on June 15, 2026: "Trump, G7 split on China strategy". On one side, Macron, who seeks a coordinated approach to Chinese subsidized exports that are devastating global markets. On the other, Trump, who prefers to "go it alone." The White House had not included China on its list of priorities for the summit. Washington was pursuing its bilateral talks with Beijing on trade and other issues — and Trump and Xi Jinping had already scheduled a new bilateral summit in Washington for September.

A high-ranking official from the American administration, cited by Politico, was explicit: "The United States is not waiting for the world to join hands to find a coordinated way to address China's behavior. We are acting now, through a variety of measures." This sentence says it all. Washington does not reject the concern about China. It rejects the collective method. It prefers direct, bilateral power dynamics to a multilateral coalition. It is a consistent strategy. It is also a strategy that deprives the West of its main lever: unity.

The G2 temptation: The danger of a two-way reshuffle

In another article from Politico dated the same June 15, entitled "Why Trump's talk of a 'G2' hits a nerve with allies", the deeper logic of this divergence is illuminated. Trump is entertaining the idea of a two-polar world — the United States and China — managing things between themselves, leaving the Europeans and Japanese in the role of spectators. This prospect terrifies European allies. Because if Washington and Beijing negotiate the rules of world trade, critical technologies, and security in their corner, Europe loses its place at the table of fundamental decisions. And the European Union, already weakened by its own internal divisions over China — Paris for a hard line, Berlin for caution — would not be in a position to weigh in on this two-party agreement.

The Europeans are not ready to adopt Trump's most aggressive trade policies, such as unilateral tariffs, fearing reprisals from Beijing that "could turn into a disaster very quickly," according to Politico. They prefer a diplomatic approach — intensified dialogues with Beijing, diversification of trade partners. But this divergence of method, in a context of strategic urgency, amounts to the absence of a common strategy. And the absence of a common strategy is precisely what Beijing hopes for.

China: The elephant in the room dictating the agenda

A $1,200 billion trade surplus and a grip on raw materials

China was not in Evian. And yet, as Fortune headlined on June 16, it was "the elephant in the room". The numbers speak for themselves. China posted a record trade surplus of $1.2 trillion without even being present at the negotiating table. It controls 95% of the world's production of permanent rare earth magnets — those essential components for drones, precision missiles, electric vehicles, and wind turbines. It accounts for nearly 70% of global rare earth production. The International Energy Agency warned in 2026 that if Chinese export controls were "fully implemented", a considerable value of global industrial production outside China could be paralyzed.

Wednesday's session on "balanced, shared and sustainable growth" was, according to Euronews, "coded diplomatic language" for the China problem. The G7 communiqué did not name China directly. But it spoke with "concern" about the "persistent and growing global imbalances," urged "countries recording significant persistent external surpluses" to strengthen their "domestic sources of growth" and to avoid "distortive policies with negative spillover effects." Everyone knew who was being discussed. No one said it. This double-talk is itself revealing of the collective fear.

The West's structural dependency: Supply chains and AI

According to Fortune, the Evian G7 was shot through with two intertwined anxieties: the group's dependence on Chinese supply chains, and its dependence on American artificial intelligence. The United States and China together control 90% of global computing power. Nearly 80% of AI firms created in the G7 last year were based in the United States, according to the Stanford 2026 AI Index Report. Europe finds itself caught in a pincer: dependent on Washington for the AI software layer, dependent on Beijing for the physical layer — critical minerals, manufacturing chains, energy transition infrastructure.

Matt Pearl, director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), summarized Macron's strategy: using China as a lever against Trump — "playing China against the United States" to force the American administration to perceive that Europe has other options. It is a balancing act. It is also an admission that Europe no longer has the means to weigh in on its own, and must play partners against each other to exist strategically. This is not a position of strength. It is a position of weakness disguised as pragmatism.

Rare earths: The promise of 60% and the reality of 95%

A bold 2030 objective in the face of near-total dominance

One of the rare concrete commitments to come out of the Evian summit concerned rare earths and critical minerals. According to Fortune on June 17, 2026, the seven G7 nations pledged to ensure that no single country can provide more than 60% of rare earth imports by 2030. Leaders from the UK, Canada, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the US also expressed their intention to achieve a 50% reduction in their dependency "as soon as possible". The declaration also announced a G7 Alliance for Mining Resilience and Production — non-binding, but symbolically significant.

Except that the reality is ruthless. China controls 95% of the global production of permanent magnets. Reducing this share to 60% within four years is, according to expert Meredith Schwartz, "definitely an ambitious goal" — an academic euphemism for a colossal challenge. Japan has been trying for over fifteen years and has yet to achieve only a marginal impact. The United States has certainly allocated $277 million via the CHIPS and Science Act to develop production by USA Rare Earth, and the company MP Materials has received federal funding to boost its capacity. But the processing chain — from extraction to refining to component manufacturing — remains dominated by Beijing at levels that defy any rapid conversion.

The asymmetry between resolution and means

Columbia Energy Policy noted on June 18 that while G7 nations agreed on the diagnosis — China dominates price setting and intermediate processing — they remained divided on the remedy: higher administered prices, tariffs, or fiscal support. Each approach has its defenders and opponents. France leans toward collective European action and targeted tariffs. Germany, traditionally exposed to China via its automotive exports, remains more cautious. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer was clear: Washington will not wait for Europe to align its policies.

This divergence on tools, in a context where China is advancing at a forced march toward the domination of strategic raw materials, is a catastrophe in the making. The trade deficit of the European Union with China reached 360 billion euros last year and continues to grow in 2026. Every month of Western disagreement is one more month that Beijing uses to cement its competitive advantage. History will judge whether this wait-and-see attitude was wisdom or cowardice.

Ukraine at the G7: Zelensky gets strong words, Trump retreats on sanctions

Displayed solidarity: Air defense system deliveries and pressure on Moscow

Amidst the diplomatic chaos over China, Ukraine managed to wrest solid commitments from G7 partners. According to Euronews, Ukraine was designated as "the big winner" of the Evian summit. G7 leaders pledged to accelerate the deliveries of air defense systems, to provide additional support for Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and to strengthen sanctions against Russia — including in the oil and gas sector. They stated they were "ready to consider" granting Ukraine licenses for domestic military production — a long-standing request from Kyiv.

Trump, who had previously categorically rejected this idea, said he "would look into the matter". This is not a promise. But it is a retreat from his initial position. Even more remarkable: Trump stated that it is Russia, and not Ukraine, that "should make a deal" — an unprecedented formulation on his part, which recognizes, for the first time clearly, Putin's responsibility in blocking a resolution to the conflict. Trump also mentioned the possibility of restoring sanctions on Russian oil and gas "soon", which were temporarily lifted to ease the global energy crisis triggered by the war in Iran.

Zelensky in a position of relative strength

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Evian in a position incomparably stronger than in February 2025, during the humiliating confrontation at the White House where Trump had treated him as the guilty party. According to El País, Ukraine is inflicting significant human losses on Russia, destroying Russian energy infrastructure on Russian soil, and the Kremlin is unable to advance territorially — even losing ground in some areas. These military successes have changed the political balance: Zelensky now has leverage. European G7 allies worked to convince Trump to maintain the pressure on Putin to cease hostilities and accept negotiations — without it being a Ukrainian capitulation.

Macron hailed an "Evian moment" that brought all the leaders together around Ukraine. It is a real success, and it must be recognized. In this world of fragmentation, the fact that Trump co-signed a declaration of "unwavering support for Ukraine" with commitments to strengthen anti-Russian sanctions is not insignificant. But the danger is in confusing this displayed consensus on Ukraine with a global strategic unity of the West. On China — the long-term structural threat — there is no Evian moment. There is only cacophony.

China supports Putin: The invisible link at the heart of the G7

Beijing, supplier of the Russian war machine

A fact rarely stated clearly in official communiqués, but documented by the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union (ISS): China is supporting the Russian war effort. This support is not always direct, but it is substantial — exports of dual-use components, expansion of trade and energy ties with Moscow, technological cooperation allowing Russia to partially bypass Western sanctions. Beijing exports equipment that ends up in the missiles killing Ukrainian civilians. This is a fact, not a hypothesis.

The ISS formulated it clearly before the summit: the anti-Western alliance led by China is consolidating rapidly, while the Western alliance is weakening. This coalition includes Russia, Iran, North Korea — the "quartet of woes" that the West struggles to face in a unified manner. North Korea supplies ammunition and troops to Putin. Iran was financing his war effort until the Evian agreement with Trump. And China is deploying its technological and financial cooperation to project its norms onto the "Global South" and marginalize those established by the United States and Europe.

The Sino-Russian axis: A reality the G7 refused to name

The Evian summit did not confront Beijing’s support for Moscow head-on. Geopolitical statements from the Elysée reaffirmed the G7's opposition to any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and across the Taiwan Strait. They expressed "deep concern" at the nuclear and ballistic programs of North Korea. But China's concrete support for Russia remained off the agenda — no doubt because naming it would have forced G7 members to answer an uncomfortable question: how can one want to negotiate commercially with Beijing while knowing that Beijing is helping Putin kill Ukrainians?

It is this fundamental contradiction that the Evian G7 did not resolve — and could not resolve in its current format, with a Trump who prefers his bilateral G2 with Xi. Strategic hypocrisy has become the common currency of Western summits. And like all poorly managed fiat currencies, it eventually loses its value.

Europe torn: France-Germany, the fracture within the G6

Paris wants to hit hard, Berlin still hesitates

If the fracture between Washington and the rest of the G7 is the most visible, another intra-European fracture is just as worrying. According to El País on June 15, there is "not even a consensus among Europeans" on how to approach China. France is one of the most fervent advocates for a hard line within the EU — targeted tariffs, trade protection measures, active reduction of dependencies. Macron himself declared before workers in Amiens that tariffs and preference measures were "just protection".

Germany, on the other hand, remains structurally more cautious. Berlin is exposed to China like no other major European economy — notably as an export market for its automotive industry. Chancellor Friedrich Merz, traditionally more measured than his predecessors on the China issue, is showing signs of greater openness toward firm measures, according to reports from SeaNews on June 15. But this openness remains conditional — and any common European policy on China must go through Berlin.

The 360-billion-euro deficit and the European temptation of dialogue

The trade deficit of the European Union with China reached 360 billion euros last year and continues to increase in 2026. European industries — automotive, industrial machinery, electronics, renewable energy — are seeing their competitiveness eroded by subsidized Chinese exports. European Commissioner for Trade, Maroš Šefčovič, promised to address this imbalance. But European strategy vacillates between declaratory firmness and operational caution.

The conference convened by Macron on June 11 between the G7 and China — with the participation of Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang Guoqing — resulted in a simple agreement to "continue discussions at the G20" with the support of the IMF. Economists noted coldly: the meeting showed no progress. Worse: according to Agathe Demarais of the European Council on Foreign Relations, China "has no interest in modifying its economic model to suit the French presidency". And Beijing’s decision to send a Vice-Premier — and not Xi himself or his Premier Li Qiang — was interpreted by all analysts as a deliberate signal of a lack of seriousness.

Artificial intelligence: A new fracture within the fracture

American export controls irritate allies

As if the disagreement over China were not enough, the Evian summit revealed a second fracture between the United States and its allies: that of artificial intelligence. The Trump administration has decided to place export controls on frontier AI models from Anthropic — Fable 5 and Mythos 5 — limiting their access to non-American users. According to Andrea Renda, research director at the Centre for European Policy Studies, the other six members of the G7 are "really irritated and upset" by this differential treatment in accessing Claude Fable 5.

Renda called this decision the "inauguration of an era" where the United States is weaponizing its AI against its own traditional allies. The irony is biting: in a summit supposed to coordinate the response to the Chinese challenge, Washington simultaneously creates a new point of friction with its partners. The 11 AI CEOs present at the summit — including Sam Altman of OpenAI, Dario Amodei of Anthropic, and Alex Wang of Meta — were not enough to guarantee a true political convergence on access to the most advanced models.

The logic of the "trusted partners club" and the exclusion of China

According to The Japan Times and Politico Europe, G7 leaders discussed a "trusted partners" model for access to American frontier AI models — a democratic club logic sharing technology to deprive China of a decisive advantage. The strategic logic is consistent. But as the specialized site The Plumbline notes, no binding policy text has confirmed the existence of this club. G7 governors recognized that AI poses real risks requiring coordination — and decided almost nothing concrete about who decides, who is included, and who pays.

This void is itself revealing. AI is perhaps the most strategic technological challenge of the century. China is deploying its own AI platforms and services across the "Global South" to promote its norms and standards. And the G7 emerged from Evian with a request to Finance Ministers to "discuss further" the risks associated with AI in the financial sector. It is very little in the face of the deluge.

Macron’s strategy: Tactical audacity, strategic impasse

The art of the possible in the face of an unpredictable American partner

It would be unfair to reduce Macron’s strategy to a simple capitulation. In a context where Trump refused to sign a joint communiqué, rejected European priorities on climate and AI, and favored his bilateral agenda with Beijing, Macron navigated the constraints of the possible with a certain mastery. He kept Trump at the table. He obtained a declaration of "unwavering support" for Ukraine. He structured nine thematic declarations where others would have had zero. He integrated Brazil, India, Kenya, and South Korea — expanding the G7's geopolitical footprint.

But as Chatham House analyzes, France made a strategic choice: prioritize the G6-US dialogue and avoid any risk of alienating Trump. In doing so, it renounced formulating "non-G7" statements — supported by the G6 and partner countries but without the United States — on subjects blocked by Washington. Macron could perhaps have gone further. He preferred to preserve the appearance of unity. This caution was tactically understandable. It was strategically insufficient in the face of the urgency of the Chinese threat.

The Chatham House proposal: A "third pole" for the global economy

Faced with the G7 impasse with Trump, Chatham House proposes a radical idea: creating a permanent alliance of market-oriented economies — a "third pole" in the global economy — which would include neither China nor the United States, and could be based on the deepening of the trade and investment alliance between the EU and the CPTPP. This "third pole" would be a response to both American bilateralism and Chinese mercantilism.

The idea is intellectually seductive. It is politically heroic in the sense that it asks Europe to assert itself as an autonomous power, without an American safety net. It assumes a united Europe — which the Franco-German split on China makes difficult. And it assumes that potential members of this pole — Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia — would agree to engage in a coalition that risks irritating Washington as much as Beijing. But it is perhaps the only way for the West to survive its own disunity.

The silence on "China shock 2.0": When economics becomes a weapon

Chinese exports submerge the European economy

Even before the summit, a study published by the Associated Press on June 15 warned of "China Shock 2.0": rapidly growing Chinese exports are threatening the European economy and raising serious concerns in Evian. The phenomenon is documented. China has built a phenomenal industrial capacity — subsidized by the state — in sectors where Europe was once a leader: automotive, industrial machinery, electronics, renewable energy, high tech. It exports these products at artificially low prices, destroying jobs and the European productive base.

The EU does impose tariffs on certain Chinese products — up to 35% on electric vehicles, for example. But its general tariffs remain relatively low according to WTO rules. And the very logic of the WTO — based on the principle of fair competition between market economies — is structurally ill-suited to a state economy like China. Allowing a market economy to participate in the WTO while practicing large-scale state mercantilism is allowing the player who cheats to set the rules of the game. The G7 did not resolve this fundamental contradiction in Evian.

Conventional texts that fail to name reality

G7 statements on macroeconomic imbalances carefully avoided citing China by name. The "countries recording significant persistent external surpluses" were told to "strengthen their domestic sources of growth" — a conventional formula that imposes nothing. These texts were negotiated with a razor, each wording weighed so as not to provoke Trump on one side, nor to overly irritate Beijing on the other, nor to create embarrassing precedents for certain European members themselves. The result is a text that says everything without demanding anything. A toothless declaration in a situation that demands teeth.

It is here that the G7 fracture over China becomes truly dangerous. Not in public statements — but in what they reveal: a collective inability to face the systemic threat that the Chinese economic model represents for liberal democracies. As long as G7 leaders prefer diplomatic formulas to binding measures, Beijing will continue to advance — methodically, methodically, methodically.

Trump: The necessary evil the West must tame, not ignore

A disruptive but indispensable presence

It would be convenient, and false, to make Trump the sole person responsible for the G7 fracture. He aggravates it, without a doubt. His refusal to align with the multilateral priorities of his allies, his tendency to treat foreign policy as a commercial transaction, his attraction to Sino-American bilateralism — all this considerably complicates Western cohesion. But Trump did not create the deep divergences over China between Paris and Berlin, nor Europe's structural dependence on Chinese rare earths, nor the slowness of Western industrial conversion. These problems pre-existed.

And Trump also brings something that previous administrations did not: a will to confront Beijing directly. His policy of unilateral tariffs — which Europeans criticize — at least has the merit of signaling to China that the mercantilist model has a cost. The launch of a "US-China board of trade" to manage bilateral relations, the fragility of the trade truce that expires in November 2026 — all this shows that Washington is not naive about the Chinese threat. He diverges on the method, not on the diagnosis.

How to deal with an American partner imposing its conditions

The real question for European allies is not how to get rid of Trump — they do not have the means — but how to maximize points of convergence with Washington while building their own strategic autonomy. Chatham House suggests that the next big opportunity will be the G20 under the British presidency in 2027. But this forum will be even more difficult — with China and Russia at the table.

In the immediate term, Europeans must accept an uncomfortable reality: Trump is both the disruptor of Western unity and its ultimate military guarantor. NATO, security guarantees, the American presence in Europe — all of this depends on Washington. Europe cannot afford to do without the United States. But it also cannot afford to let a single actor — even an American one — indefinitely block the construction of a common strategy toward China. This paradox is the cross that the West will have to bear in the years to come.

The lessons of Evian: What this summit says about the state of the West

A disunity that benefits our adversaries

Evian 2026 will go down in history as the summit that officialized Western disunity in the face of the Chinese threat. Not because the leaders argued — on the contrary, the facade was polite. But because the fundamental divisions over the method, the tools, and the priorities regarding Beijing were exposed without being resolved. Every disagreement among G7 members over China is valuable strategic information for Beijing. Xi Jinping can read the Evian declarations and legitimately conclude that democracies are not capable of coordinating effectively against him.

The European ISS formulated it unambiguously before the summit: the anti-Western alliance led by China is consolidating rapidly, while the Western alliance is weakening. Every SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) summit, every strengthening of Sino-Russian ties, every technological agreement between Beijing and Global South countries — all these movements methodically build an alternative world order. And meanwhile, the G7 debates its toothless formulas.

What Evian changes, and what it doesn't

Evian still produced real progress: the commitment on rare earths, support for Ukraine, the declaration on Taiwan and the China Sea, the implicit but clear condemnation of the Chinese economic model. These elements matter. They signal to Beijing that the G7, even divided on methods, retains a common strategic orientation. And for Ukraine, the concrete commitments to strengthen air defenses and anti-Russian sanctions represent tangible support in a war that is not over.

But Evian did not resolve the central contradiction: how to maintain a collective and effective response to China when the G7's most powerful member prefers to play solo? This question will remain unanswered until the G7 has found a new architecture — either by integrating Trump's constraints or by building a parallel format for the subjects Washington blocks. The West is at the foot of a wall. The question is how long it will take to decide to scale it.

Conclusion: The hour of choice for the fractured West

The urgency of a unified strategic response

The Evian summit administered a painful but necessary lesson: the West cannot afford the luxury of disunity in the face of China. Not because confrontation with Beijing is inevitable — it is not fatally destined to be military. But because China is methodically building an alternative order, and every year of Western disagreement is one more year where this order takes root. The 95% Chinese control of permanent magnets, the trade surplus of $1.2 trillion, the support for Putin's Russia, the technological colonization of the Global South — these are not talking points. They are facts shaping tomorrow's world order.

The West has considerable strengths. Its combined economies represent an unmatched power. Its democratic institutions, despite their fragilities, remain superior to anything the Chinese authoritarian model can offer in terms of creativity and adaptability. Ukraine, by resisting heroically since 2022, has reminded the world that democracies can fight and hold on. What is missing is the will to coordinate. And this will, Evian has shown, remains insufficient.

What history will remember of this spring of 2026

History will judge the 2026 G7 leaders on what they built — or allowed to unravel — in the decade to come. The Evian declarations will perhaps be seen, in twenty years, as the moment when the West understood the scale of the threat but had not yet found the courage to unite to face it. Or they will be seen as the beginning of an awakening that led to a reorganization of the Western order. Everything depends on what happens next. Everything depends on whether the promises on rare earths, the support for Ukraine, and the diversification of supply chains translate into concrete acts or remain pious wishes.

What is certain is that the West no longer has any room for error. China is moving forward. Putin's Russia continues to bleed Ukraine. Iran is negotiating, waiting for the next crisis. North Korea is testing its missiles. And the G7 emerges from Evian with nine thematic declarations and a gaping fracture on the most fundamental question of our era. It is not enough. It will never be enough — until the West decides, collectively and without ambiguity, to stand its ground.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

Politico Weekly Trade — "Trump, G7 split on China strategy" by Ari Hawkins — June 15, 2026

Fortune — "'Making China the elephant in the room': The G7 confronts…" by Mia Osmonbekov — June 16, 2026

Fortune — "The G7 just pledged to break China's rare earth grip — there's a lot of work to do" by Mia Osmonbekov — June 17, 2026

Secondary Sources

Chatham House — "Macron's Evian summit shows the limits Trump places on G7" by Creon Butler — June 18, 2026

Euronews — "Six takeaways from the G7 summit in Évian" by Jorge Liboreiro and Luca Bertuzzi — June 17, 2026

El País — "G-7 summit in France gauges the rift in the West" by Andrea Rizzi — June 15, 2026

EU Institute for Security Studies — "Why tensions between the US and its allies are now so critical" — June 5, 2026

SeaNews — "Macron Calls on G7 to Confront China's Trade Practices" (citing Politico) — June 15, 2026