OPINION: China and Its Treaties — The Country That Signs Everything and Respects Nothing

Scarborough Shoal, June 2026: the latest provocation

During the week of June 25, 2026, the Philippines published photos of a floating platform of approximately 28 square meters, equipped with a communications antenna, installed by China near Scarborough Shoal — a reef claimed by both Beijing and Manila. Philippine authorities feared it was a precursor to a permanent presence. The platform was ultimately removed after a few days — but the message had been sent.

This small episode is part of a long list. China took effective control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, despite a ruling by an international tribunal that in 2016 declared its claims illegal under international law. It built military bases on several islands and reefs in the South China Sea, promising in 2015 to President Obama that it would not escalate tensions — then doing exactly the opposite. I could continue this list for pages.

The question that haunts me

So here is my question, one I have been asking for years, one I will pose in this opinion with all the frankness of an exhausted but unresigned columnist: is there a single international treaty that China genuinely respects, durably, without exception or workaround, when its provisions are unfavorable to it? I ask honestly — and I await honest answers.

I am aware that this piece is partial. I am aware that other powers — the United States included — have also violated international treaties. But I am tired of false balance. What is happening in the South China Sea is a systematic contempt for international law, documented, repeated, and unabashed. That deserves to be named clearly.

The 2016 ruling: a decision Beijing simply refuses to apply

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) delivered an unambiguous ruling: China's claims over nearly the entire South China Sea — materialized by the "Nine-Dash Line" — are illegal under international law. The ruling also invalidated Chinese claims over Scarborough Shoal.

Beijing's response was of a bewildering clarity: China declared that the tribunal had no jurisdiction, that the ruling was "null and void," and that it did not recognize it. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun, in a statement published on June 25, 2026, was still repeating: "Under Chinese domestic law and international law including UNCLOS, China has an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf in the waters to the east of [the island in question]." In other words: China applies UNCLOS when it suits, and ignores it when it does not.

The floating platform: the textbook fait accompli

The floating platform at Scarborough Shoal perfectly illustrates the Chinese gray zone strategy — or "gray zone warfare." It does not formally constitute a military base. It can be removed if pressure becomes too great. It does not provoke a direct military response. But it accumulates faits accomplis: presence, habit, normalization. In 2012, China took Scarborough Shoal by the same method — a naval standoff without shots fired, a presence that drags on, a de facto acceptance by an international community that does not want escalation.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. expressed his government's concern in exactly the right words: "If it is a precursor to a more permanent presence, or a precursor to other malicious activities, then it is worrying." Of course it is worrying. And of course it almost certainly is a precursor.

The fait accompli method may be the most effective one ever invented by revisionist powers. It is slow, gradual, plausibly deniable. It never triggers the threshold of a military response. And in the end, it wins, because democracies do not have the patience to resist permanent low-intensity pressure.

Systematic contempt for WTO commitments

China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, committing to respect market-opening rules, eliminate unfair subsidies, and protect intellectual property. Two decades later, the track record is damning according to Western nations: massive subsidies to state industry, forced technology transfers as a condition of market access, systematic intellectual property theft, currency manipulation.

China has won rulings at the WTO — and lost some too. But its strategy when faced with decisions that go against it is often the same as its response to the 2016 UNCLOS ruling: contest jurisdiction, delay implementation, introduce compensatory measures that circumvent the spirit of the rule without formally violating it. That is not bad faith in the vulgar sense — it is a deliberate doctrine of selective instrumentalization of international law.

Trump gets one thing right

I am not an admirer of Trump's methods. But I must acknowledge that he put his finger on a reality his predecessors had long avoided: China does not respect the rules of the international commercial game it formally accepted. The tariffs Trump imposed, the WTO complaints, the criticisms of intellectual property theft — all of it points to a real problem that conventional diplomacy had failed to address.

The paradox is that the brutality of Trump's methods sometimes made allied democracies less capable of building a united front against Beijing, by turning them into tariff targets themselves. But the substance of the grievance — China's contempt for its international commercial commitments — is real and documented.

I find myself in an uncomfortable position: I am not a Trumpist, but I must admit that on the question of Chinese violations of trade rules, Trump was right in the diagnosis, even if wrong in the treatment. This kind of intellectual discomfort is what reality produces when you refuse to simplify it.

CERD, CRC, and the new ethnic unity law

China is a signatory to numerous international human rights conventions — the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), among others. In March 2026, the National People's Congress adopted a new ethnic unity law that Chinese Human Rights Defenders described as contravening those international obligations.

The violations of the rights of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, of Tibetans, of the people of Hong Kong whose freedoms have been progressively erased since 2020 — all of this is documented by independent bodies, journalists, and foreign governments. China systematically denies it, reclassifies everything as "internal affairs," and threatens those who speak out.

Obama's 2015 promise and what happened next

In 2015, during a state visit to Washington, President Xi Jinping promised in front of President Obama that China would not militarize the islands built in the South China Sea. Beijing built bases equipped with missiles and electronic warfare equipment on those islands in the months that followed. That promise — made before the cameras of the entire world — was broken without explanation or apology. If China does not honor its commitments made before the visiting President of the United States, why would it respect those it signs in multilateral treaties?

No one seems to have asked Xi Jinping that question to his face. And that is part of the problem: the international community has gotten into the habit of allowing China to violate its commitments without substantial consequences. Every violation without consequence teaches Beijing that it can continue.

I am discouraged — yes, the title of this opinion says "discouraged columnist" and that is honest. Discouraged not by China — its interests are understandable, even if its methods are condemnable. Discouraged by the international community, which keeps repeating the same mistakes: signature, violation, tepid protest, normalization. The cycle has been repeating since 2012.

If the rules don't apply to China, why would they apply to anyone else?

The liberal international order rests on a necessary fiction: that rules apply to everyone, including the powerful. When a permanent member of the UN Security Council systematically violates its international commitments without substantial consequences, that fiction erodes. And when the fiction erodes, other actors — Russia with Ukraine, North Korea with its nuclear weapons, Iran with its nuclear program — wonder why they should play by rules that great powers ignore.

That is the real danger of China's contempt for its international obligations: it does not only threaten the Philippines or the Uyghurs. It threatens the very fabric of the international order that the West patiently built since 1945. Every unsanctioned violation is a kick at the foundations of that edifice.

The collective response: sanctions, alliances, law

Despite my discouragement, I am not preaching despair. Responses do exist: targeted sanctions against the entities and individuals implicated in the most serious violations, reinforced support for the Philippines and other countries resisting Chinese coercion, strengthening freedom of navigation through patrols, a coalition diplomacy that isolates Beijing on specific files. The United States is transferring naval drones to the Philippines — that is a concrete example of a proportionate response.

But these responses require consistency and duration. They require the West to be willing to pay an economic price to defend principles. And they require governments to explain to their citizens why a disputed reef in the South China Sea is a cause worth defending. That is an enormous political challenge — but it is also the definition of responsible international leadership.

At bottom, what discourages me most is the West's capacity to look away. As long as trade with China generates profits, as long as supply chains rely on Chinese factories, the pressure to turn a blind eye to the violations is immense. This economic hypocrisy is the silent accomplice of China's contempt for its treaties.

Forced licensing and intellectual property theft

Beyond the seas and land borders, China systematically violates treaties governing intellectual property and digital commerce. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), signed under the WTO of which China has been a member since 2001, prohibits in principle forced licensing without fair compensation and the violation of foreign patents. The reality, documented by the USTR (US Trade Representative) in its annual reports, is entirely different: foreign companies operating in China are regularly forced to transfer their technologies as a condition of market access.

The most affected sectors are semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, batteries, and renewable energy. Huawei has been accused of systematically copying technologies from Cisco, Qualcomm, and other American and European companies. These accusations, documented in American legal proceedings and in reports from the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, reveal a coherent pattern: China treats intellectual property treaties as statements of intent, not as legal constraints.

Digital barriers: how Beijing blocks foreign competitors

More than 12 countries have introduced digital services taxes to make platforms like Google, Facebook, or Amazon pay on their local revenues. China solved the problem differently: it simply banned these platforms and replaced them with domestic equivalents — Baidu, WeChat, Alibaba. In doing so, it created a de facto protected digital market that violates the spirit of the market-access commitments made at its WTO accession in 2001. But no WTO dispute settlement proceeding has succeeded in forcing Beijing to open its digital market.

The problem is structural: the WTO appellate body has been paralyzed since 2019, partly because the United States is blocking the appointment of new judges. China thus benefits from an institutional vacuum to perpetuate its digital protectionist practices without effective sanction. And when countries try to respond with digital taxes on Chinese companies present in their markets — such as TikTok — Beijing cries discrimination and threatens commercial retaliation. The hypocrisy is total and unabashed.

China understood before anyone else that international trade treaties are tools — not constraints. It signed them to gain access to global markets, then built walls to prevent reciprocity. That is one-way free trade elevated to the rank of state strategy.

The ethnic unity law and repression in Xinjiang

In March 2026, China adopted a new law on national ethnic unity that Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) immediately qualified as "legalizing discrimination and repression." This law, which penalizes any expression of ethnic or cultural identity deemed "separatist" by the authorities, directly violates the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which China ratified in 1981. It also contradicts the commitments made by Beijing upon its accession to the UN Human Rights Council.

The situation in Xinjiang remains, according to reports from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and international NGOs, a case of massive and systematic violations: mass biometric surveillance, restrictions on the practice of Islam, arbitrary detentions in camps officially designated as "vocational training centers." China denies the bulk of these allegations and presents its Xinjiang policy as a legitimate response to terrorism. But the evidence documented through leaked documents (Xinjiang Papers, Xinjiang Police Files) is overwhelming.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child: ratified, violated

China ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1992. Among its commitments: protection of minority children's cultural identity, the right to education in one's mother tongue, and the prohibition of the arbitrary separation of children from their families. The boarding school programs in Tibetan and Uyghur regions, documented in 2026 by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education, constitute according to legal experts a direct violation of those commitments.

But China sits on the UN Human Rights Council — which gives it blocking power over condemnatory resolutions. It has built coalitions with Global South countries that, in exchange for investment and development aid, systematically vote against resolutions targeting it. That is a perfect example of how Beijing uses its economic power to immunize its human rights violations against the UN mechanisms supposedly designed to sanction them.

You ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1992 and you send Uyghur children to forced-assimilation boarding schools in 2026. If these two realities coexist without consequence, then human rights treaties are no longer treaties — they are wish lists. And it is we, the West, who have failed to build the tools to enforce them.

Economy before law: thirty years of willful blindness

The real question is not why China violates treaties — powerful actors have always tried to maximize their freedom of action at the expense of formal constraints. The real question is why the West allowed it for so long. The answer is economic: from 1995 to 2020, Western companies made considerable profits in China — and their governments did not want to disrupt that lucrative commercial relationship for legal or ethical considerations their own electorates did not understand.

The "commerce first, rights later" doctrine dominated Western policy toward China for three decades. It rested on a postulate — never truly demonstrated — that China's enrichment would gradually converge it toward liberal norms. Xi Jinping ended that illusion. He tightened the regime, reinforced Party control over the economy and society, and accelerated military ambitions — all while maintaining commercial exchanges with the West at record levels. Convergence never happened. Economic dependence, however, was very real.

Today's tools: between ineffectiveness and counterproductivity

Since 2020, the West has begun building new tools to hold China accountable: supply chain due diligence laws, restrictions on investments in critical Chinese technologies, reciprocity mechanisms in public procurement. These tools are useful — but they arrive after thirty years of structural dependence that will not be undone in a few years.

The fundamental tension remains intact: the West wants both to contain Chinese geopolitical ambitions and to maintain the commercial exchanges its economies depend on. This contradiction is unresolved, and will not be resolved until credible alternatives to Chinese supply chains have been built — which will take at least another decade. In the meantime, Beijing will continue signing treaties with the intention of selectively respecting them, knowing that the cost of confrontation is still, in the West's judgment, too high.

We chose low prices in our supermarkets over the solidity of the international order. That is a choice previous generations made — often without fully grasping its consequences. My generation inherits the problem. And the bill is arriving, in the form of artificial islands, destroyers, and laws that legalize the cultural erasure of an entire people.

My uncomfortable but honest thesis

My thesis, after these years of observation, is this: China treats international treaties as diplomatic ornaments useful to its international reputation, not as real legal constraints. It signs them because not signing them is politically costly. It violates them because the consequences of violations remain, most of the time, tolerable.

That is not a Chinese original — other powers have done the same throughout history. The difference is that China does it on the scale of an $18-trillion economy, with a rapidly growing military, at a moment when the rest of the world does not yet know how to respond. This silence of impotence is the real crisis of the contemporary international order.

What I would like to say to Xi Jinping

If I could address a direct word to the Chinese leader — which, of course, I cannot — I would say this: the power you are building is real. But a power that does not respect the rules it has accepted is not a legitimate power. And an illegitimate power always ends up provoking coalitions of resistance that even the world's largest economy cannot absorb. History has shown this every time. That is not a threat. It is just history.

I am a columnist, not an international judge. I have no power to force China to respect a single treaty. But I have a duty to name what I see: a state that has chosen to treat international law as a buffet — take what is useful, leave what is inconvenient. And as long as the West has not found the courage and the tools to respond to that, the problem will only get worse.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.