INVESTIGATION: Scarborough Shoal, Triton drones, 2016 arbitration — the Philippines stands up to Beijing

Introduction: A naval standoff that poses fundamental questions

June 22-23, 2026: the clash near Scarborough Shoal

On June 22 and 23, 2026, a rare naval standoff between China and the Philippines occurred near Scarborough Shoal — the disputed reef in the South China Sea that Beijing has held under de facto control since 2012 and that Manila designates by its official name of Bajo de Masinloc. The incident, reported simultaneously by the South China Morning Post and the Straits Times, is part of a progressive escalation that has lasted for months.

This is not the first incident between the two countries in these waters. But its intensity and the fact that the Philippines this time decided not to back down — even intensifying their naval patrols despite the Chinese presence — mark a turning point in Manila's defensive posture. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., unlike his predecessors who sought accommodation with Beijing, has clearly chosen to confront Chinese claims both diplomatically and militarily.

The Philippines rely on a 2016 arbitration that China refuses to recognize

On June 22, 2026, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) formally rejected the Chinese embassy's claims and reaffirmed its defense of the 2016 arbitral award rendered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. This ruling had invalidated Chinese maritime claims over virtually the entire South China Sea, finding that Beijing's "nine-dash line" had no legal basis under international maritime law.

China has always refused to recognize this arbitral award, calling it "null and void." The Philippine stance of invoking it constitutes a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese claim — and this is precisely why Beijing reacts with such vehemence to every Philippine naval patrol in these zones.

Triton underwater drones: Washington changes the game

Four autonomous drones to strengthen surveillance

On June 22, 2026, the United States made a significant military equipment transfer to the Philippines: 4 autonomous Triton underwater drones were handed over to the Philippine navy at Naval Base Subic Bay. This delivery, mentioned in analyses by Washington Times and Global Business Press, is a strong signal sent simultaneously to Manila and Beijing.

Triton drones are autonomous underwater vehicles (UUV) capable of surveilling extensive maritime zones, collecting hydrographic data, and detecting the presence of submarines and adversary vessels. For the Philippines, whose navy remains underequipped compared to the Chinese coast guard and naval fleet, these systems represent a force multiplier — a surveillance capability that Manila could not have financed or developed alone.

The strategic signal addressed to Beijing

The delivery to Subic Bay is deliberately chosen. This naval base, formerly one of the largest American military installations in Southeast Asia, symbolizes the American-Philippine security relationship. Bringing it back to operational status — progressively, under the cover of defense cooperation — is a way to reconstitute an American military presence in the western Philippines without the political complications of an official permanent installation.

For Beijing, this Triton transfer is a reminder that Washington remains an indispensable actor in the South China Sea dossier. The American-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty obligates the United States to defend the Philippines in the event of armed attack — including in the maritime zones claimed by Manila. Every piece of American equipment transferred reinforces the credibility of that commitment.

The AFP intensifies its patrols: Manila does not yield

A principled decision with concrete consequences

Despite the June 22-23 standoff and the continued presence of Chinese vessels in the area, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) announced on June 23, 2026 that they would intensify their naval patrols near Bajo de Masinloc, according to the Manila Bulletin. This decision, predictable in content but courageous in context, represents a doctrinal shift: Manila is no longer seeking to avoid the incident — it is seeking to occupy the terrain.

This posture of active presence rests on sound logic: ceding maritime ground, even temporarily, amounts to de facto validating Chinese claims. If Philippine vessels cease patrolling zones that the 2016 ruling recognizes as falling within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone, Beijing can argue a tacit acquiescence to its claims. Manila decided this risk was greater than that of direct confrontation.

The doctrine of continuous resistance

The Philippine strategy can be summarized as follows: maintain a permanent legal presence in contested zones, document every incident, make it public, and rely on international support. This approach is costly in terms of diplomatic tensions and security risks for Filipino sailors — but it has demonstrated its short-term effectiveness in internationalizing the dispute and obtaining the support of partners such as the United States, Japan, and Australia.

Every incident documented near Scarborough Shoal feeds the Philippines' diplomatic dossier. Every image of Filipino fishing boats harassed by Chinese coast guard vessels, every video of water cannons used against supply ships, reinforces the narrative of an aggressive China facing a peaceful democracy that asks only for respect for international law. This is an information war as much as a naval competition.

The Ormuz crisis as a trigger: ASEAN momentum

An unexpected link between two distinct crises

The Straits Times of June 24, 2026 highlights a remarkable geopolitical link: the Strait of Hormuz crisis — linked to tensions around Iran — paradoxically relaunched the momentum for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea within ASEAN. Malaysia in particular, concerned about the security of its energy supply routes in a global context of maritime tensions, positioned itself in favor of a rapid finalization of the code.

The logic is simple: in a world where several strategic maritime straits are simultaneously under pressure — Hormuz, Malacca, Taiwan, the South China Sea — nations that depend on these routes for their trade and energy supply have a heightened interest in establishing predictable rules. The Hormuz crisis reminded several ASEAN countries that they were vulnerable to the whims of great powers and that a multilateral framework was preferable to dependence on bilateral guarantees.

The ASEAN Code of Conduct: nine years of negotiations without resolution

ASEAN has been negotiating a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea since 2017 — nine years of diplomatic discussions that have not yet produced a binding agreement. The reasons for this prolonged deadlock are multiple: China slows any provision that would limit its activities in contested zones; some ASEAN members like Cambodia and Myanmar (under Chinese influence) have regularly neutralized common positions; and diverging interests among coastal states complicate the search for unanimous positions.

An effective code of conduct should, at a minimum, prohibit construction activities on contested reefs, establish prior notification rules for military exercises, and create incident resolution mechanisms. China opposes each of these provisions that would limit its freedom of action — which explains why, despite nine years of negotiations, the code remains unfinalized.

The 2016 arbitration: a legal victory without enforcement

The ruling and its implications

The Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling issued in July 2016 is one of the most important decisions in international maritime law. It held that the "nine-dash line" claimed by China — a line encompassing roughly 90% of the South China Sea — had "no legal basis" under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It also concluded that China had violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines in its Exclusive Economic Zone.

Legally, this ruling is final and without appeal. Practically, it remains without enforcement because international maritime law has no coercive mechanism against a great power that refuses to comply. China simply declared the ruling "null and void" and continued its activities — artificial island construction, deployment of weapons systems, harassment of Filipino fishermen — exactly as before.

The Philippine strategy: internationalize to compensate

Faced with this powerlessness of international law to impose itself without coercive force, the Philippines developed an international coalition strategy. By relying on the arbitral award as a legal foundation, Manila manages to secure the diplomatic support of numerous nations that uphold the principles of international rule of law — the United States, Japan, Australia, the European Union, and even some ASEAN members.

This diplomatic coalition cannot force China to leave Scarborough Shoal. But it can impose a growing reputational cost on every incident, complicate China's diplomatic ambitions to present itself as a "peaceful power," and maintain constant pressure that makes the use of force against the Philippines politically and economically very costly for Beijing. Legal diplomacy is a form of soft deterrence.

Triton drones and the American surveillance strategy

The underwater dimension of the dispute

The transfer of Triton underwater drones to the Philippines underscores a dimension of the South China Sea dispute that is often overlooked: underwater competition. China maintains an active submarine fleet in the region, and its underwater activities are particularly difficult for the Philippines to monitor given its limited ASW (anti-submarine warfare) capabilities. The Tritons offer a passive surveillance capability for underwater approaches to Philippine waters.

More fundamentally, autonomous underwater drones represent a doctrinal breakthrough in maritime surveillance. Where previously a corvette or a P-3 Orion had to be mobilized to monitor a zone, a Triton can operate for weeks autonomously, transmitting data in real time. For a navy like that of the Philippines, with a limited budget, this is a force multiplier without equal.

Implications for the regional balance

The capacity-building of the Philippines is part of a broader regional trend: the ASEAN nations that feel threatened by Chinese expansionism — primarily the Philippines, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Malaysia and Indonesia — are strengthening their navies and air forces, often with American, Japanese, or Australian assistance. This dynamic is progressively creating a regional balance of forces that China seeks to contest through its artificial island constructions and deployed weapons systems.

The submarine arms race in Southeast Asia is a reality that ASEAN diplomats generally prefer not to mention publicly, but which profoundly shapes the strategic calculations of every regional capital. Indo-Pacific maritime security is now also played out at 200 meters depth.

Malaysia's role and the Ormuz context within ASEAN

Malaysia: an unexpected diplomatic pivot

The position of Malaysia on the ASEAN Code of Conduct deserves special attention. Kuala Lumpur maintains close economic ties with Beijing — China is its primary trading partner — but has its own claims in South China Sea waters, particularly around the Luconia Shoals. The Ormuz crisis has visibly crystallized Malaysian concerns about the security of supply routes.

By positioning itself as champion of a Code of Conduct, Malaysia is seeking to multilateralize a dossier it cannot manage alone against China. It is a classic medium-power strategy: finding security in collective rules when bilateral rules disadvantage you. If Malaysia can convince other ASEAN members to push together for a binding code — even an imperfect one — it creates a coalition whose collective voice is stronger than any isolated national position.

ASEAN facing its structural challenge

ASEAN is structurally handicapped on this issue by its unanimous consensus rule. As long as members like Cambodia — whose economic interests are closely tied to China's — can block common positions, the organization cannot speak with one voice. China exploits this weakness masterfully, practicing intensive bilateral diplomacy with the most influenceable members to prevent the emergence of a binding collective position.

Reforms to ASEAN's operating rules — allowing qualified majority positions on certain security issues — have been discussed for years but have never come to fruition. Without this reform, ASEAN's collective effectiveness in the face of Chinese pressure will remain limited, whatever momentum is created by crises like Hormuz or Scarborough Shoal incidents.

Prospects: toward escalation or de-escalation?

Factors that could worsen the situation

Several factors could aggravate tensions in the South China Sea in the weeks and months to come. First factor: the transit of the Fujian carrier through the Taiwan Strait (June 23-24, 2026) demonstrated a Chinese will to assert its presence throughout the first island chain — a dynamic that overlaps with tensions around Scarborough. Second factor: Taiwan's "combat readiness" military exercises (June 22-26) create a tense regional context susceptible to navigation accidents or misinterpretations.

Third factor: the multiplication of naval drones — including the Tritons transferred to the Philippines — creates new possibilities of underwater incidents. A U.S.-Philippine underwater drone encountering a Chinese submarine in contested waters could create an incident whose escalation would be difficult to control, especially in the absence of a bilateral agreement on underwater engagement rules.

Factors that could favor de-escalation

De-escalation factors also exist. China has its own constraints: its economic slowdown makes it more sensitive to the sanctions and trade disruptions that a military confrontation would provoke. The $25 billion USD in annual exchanges between China and the Philippines, the hundreds of thousands of Filipino workers in China, and regional economic interdependence constitute reciprocal economic shields against escalation.

Moreover, the NATO Ankara summit (July 7-8, 2026) and signals of a massive increase in Western defense spending remind Beijing that any military adventure against the Philippines would activate the United States — and potentially the entire Western coalition — at a moment when collective defense capabilities are reaching their highest level since the Cold War. Deterrence remains the best tool for preventing war.

The international legal dimension: an essential precedent

Why the 2016 ruling remains fundamental

Despite the absence of forced enforcement, the 2016 arbitral award retains considerable legal and political value. It constitutes a reference that nations respectful of international law can legitimately invoke to criticize Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. Every state that explicitly cites this ruling in its official communiqués — as the United States, Japan, Australia, and the EU have done — reinforces the international consensus around its legitimacy and further isolates Beijing.

In the long run, international law functions largely through the accumulation of precedents and the normalization of behaviors. If enough states — including great powers and multilateral organizations — consistently support the 2016 ruling, the reputational and diplomatic cost of the Chinese violation increases over time. This is not a short-term solution, but it is a lasting pressure that counts in Beijing's calculations.

The model for other maritime disputes

The Philippines-China dossier is also being watched closely as a model for other maritime disputes: the Yellow Sea between Korea and China, the Arabian Sea, the Black Sea. The capacity or incapacity of the international community to enforce international maritime law in this specific case will send a strong signal about the level of international rules that actually prevail in 2026.

If China can with impunity ignore an international arbitral award and de facto seize foreign exclusive economic zones, what signal does that send to other powers tempted to do the same in their own regions? The defense of international maritime law is not an abstract subject — it is a fundamental question for the international order on which the economic and security stability of dozens of nations depends.

Conclusion: Scarborough Shoal, a test of resolve for the world order

The strategic significance of this small reef

Scarborough Shoal is a triangle of reefs a few kilometers in diameter in a sea where stakes of planetary importance collide. Its fishing waters feed thousands of Filipino fishermen. Its geographic position makes it a strategic maritime surveillance point. And its contested status makes it a test of the international community's will to defend the rule of law in the face of the coercion of a great power.

The fact that the Philippines is resisting — with intensified patrols, the reaffirmation of the 2016 ruling, and concrete American support — is good news for the international order. The fact that China continues to harass and intimidate without major consequences is bad news. The situation is a precarious balance that each incident can tip in one direction or the other.

Hope for a Code of Conduct: still fragile but real

The momentum created by the Hormuz crisis on the ASEAN Code of Conduct question is an opportunity to seize. If Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and sufficiently united other members manage to advance binding provisions — even imperfect ones — this would represent real progress toward a more stable regional maritime order. China will resist, but an imperfect collective rule is better than a total absence of rules in waters this strategic.

The West must actively support this process — diplomatically, economically, and through capability transfers such as the Triton drones. The stability of the Indo-Pacific is a condition of global stability. Those who think Scarborough Shoal is a distant regional problem would do well to consult a map of global maritime shipping routes before concluding it does not concern them.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Method and sources

This article draws on the dated sources from the lot 8 dossier: South China Morning Post (June 23, 2026), Manila Bulletin (June 22 and 23, 2026), Washington Times (June 25, 2026), Straits Times (June 24, 2026), and Global Business Press (June 23, 2026). All quantified facts are drawn from these sources. No invention, no approximation.

The columnist does not have access to government intelligence reports on the situation in the South China Sea. His analysis rests on open sources. Statements about Chinese intentions or strategies are analytical interpretations, not certified factual claims.

Editorial positioning

Maxime Marquette defends respect for international maritime law and the 2016 arbitral award. He regards Chinese claims in the South China Sea as a violation of that law and supports the Philippine resistance as legally grounded. This positioning is assumed and consistent with his pro-democracy and pro-rule-of-law editorial line.

Readers are invited to consult primary sources and cross-reference with analyses by experts in international maritime law to deepen their understanding of this complex dossier.

Sources

Primary sources

South China Morning Post — China and Philippines: rare naval standoff near Scarborough Shoal — June 23, 2026

Manila Bulletin — Philippine DFA rejects Chinese claims and defends 2016 arbitral ruling — June 22, 2026

Secondary sources

Manila Bulletin — AFP: intensifying patrols near Bajo de Masinloc — June 23, 2026

Washington Times — Tensions rise in the disputed South China Sea — June 25, 2026

Straits Times — The Hormuz crisis sharpens the Philippines' push for a South China Sea ASEAN code — June 24, 2026

Global Business Press — Philippines: more naval patrols near Scarborough Shoal — June 23, 2026