EDITORIAL: Hormuz Reopens, Brent Falls to $73 — But Oil Normalization Will Take Months

Introduction: the reopening of a vital artery of the world

The Strait of Hormuz: 20% of global oil through a 33-kilometre chokepoint

Twenty percent of global oil transits through a passage just 33 kilometres wide at its narrowest: the Strait of Hormuz, between Iran and Oman. This statistic, repeated by geopolitical analysts for decades, had never been more viscerally felt than during the 106 days of the USA-Iran war. When Iran closed or disrupted that passage, the entire global economy breathed in sync with every incident in the Persian Gulf.

Brent stood at roughly $70 per barrel on February 27, 2026, the eve of the outbreak of hostilities. At the April 2026 peak, it exceeded $125 — a rise of nearly 80% in under two months. Then, with the USA-Iran agreement of June 15 and the gradual reopening of Hormuz, Brent dropped back below $75 for the first time since February 27, 2026. The round trip took less than four months.

A real but partial reopening

Gulf sources indicate that in the first five days following the formal reopening of the strait, only 25% of normal commercial traffic had resumed. That figure illustrates precisely what this editorial wants to state clearly: the physical reopening of a strait and the normalization of the traffic that uses it are two very different things, separated by weeks if not months of logistical, contractual, and insurance readjustments.

25% in five days — that is a beginning, not a normalization. Markets, in their eagerness to price in good news, tend to confuse the starting gun with the finish line. That risk of over-anticipation deserves to be named honestly in an editorial that aims to tell the truth about the actual state of affairs.

The timeline of the oil shock: from $70 to $125 and back

February 28, 2026: the onset of the shock

On February 28, 2026, at the outbreak of the USA-Iran war, Brent was hovering around $70 per barrel. That was already a price level incorporating a geopolitical premium — USA-Iran tensions had been building for weeks. But actual war, with military operations in the Persian Gulf and disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, drove prices to levels unseen in years.

The upward dynamic was both direct — less oil available via Hormuz — and indirect: anticipation of damage to regional oil infrastructure, prohibitive insurance premiums on Gulf vessels, and costly rerouting of maritime lanes around the Cape of Good Hope or through the Suez Canal.

April 2026: the peak at $125

At the April 2026 peak, Brent exceeded $125. That level represented the maximum pain point for oil-importing economies — Europe, Japan, South Korea, India, and even the United States for domestic consumption. Gas stations were posting record prices. Energy inflation was feeding into general inflation. Central banks found themselves trapped between the need to fight inflation and the risk of triggering a recession.

Those $125 also had a paradoxical effect: they immediately made profitable unconventional oil deposits that would never have been exploitable at normal prices. American shale producers ran at full capacity. Strategic reserves were released. The April peak was also the starting signal for a supply response that would contribute to the subsequent price decline.

Brent below $75: back to pre-war levels

The symbolic significance of the $75 threshold

Anadolu Agency reported on June 25, 2026 that Brent had returned to $73.87 — "back to pre-war levels." That formulation is technically accurate — Brent was around $70–73 before February 28 — but it conceals a more complex reality.

The current price incorporates several new factors that did not exist on February 27: OPEC+ production increase commitments, the prospect of Iranian oil returning to markets, and Iraq's production increase to 4.2–4.3 million bpd. Had these supply factors not combined, prices would likely still be significantly above pre-war levels despite the agreement.

BNP Paribas and the durable $75 floor

BNP Paribas, in its market analysis published on June 25, 2026, sets $75 per barrel as the durable floor for Brent. Below that level, the economic logic of many producers turns unprofitable — which should mechanically reduce supply and support prices. That is the market equilibrium theory.

But practice is more complex. OPEC+ members have repeatedly shown they prefer to produce more even at lower prices rather than lose market share. And American shale producers — whose costs vary considerably — will keep producing as long as they are marginally profitable. The $75 floor is an economic analysis, not a law of physics.

OPEC+ in offensive mode: third consecutive monthly increase

188,000 additional barrels per day in July

The OPEC+ decision to increase production by 188,000 barrels per day in July represents the third consecutive monthly increase by the cartel. This series of hikes reflects a deliberate strategy: exploit the window of opportunity created by the USA-Iran agreement to win back market share lost to non-OPEC producers during the high-price period.

The reasoning is classic cartel economics: when prices are high, producers outside the cartel increase their output (American shale, Canada, Brazil) and chip away at OPEC+ market share. To reclaim it, the cartel must lower prices by increasing its own production — even if that reduces unit revenues.

OPEC+ internal discipline: a permanent question

OPEC+ internal discipline is always a critical variable. Announced quotas and actual production frequently diverge — some members chronically overproduce. Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Kazakhstan have all exceeded their quotas at various points.

If that overproduction tendency resurfaces in the current lower-price environment, corrective mechanisms will be less effective than at high prices. An oil cartel that does not respect its own production commitments ceases to be a cartel — it becomes a group of producers competing against each other. That dynamic would press prices further down.

Iraq and the production increase: the Arab contribution to normalization

4.2–4.3 million barrels per day: a strong signal

Iraq's announcement on June 21, 2026 of a planned production increase to 4.2–4.3 million barrels per day is significant for several reasons. Iraq is OPEC's second-largest producer and has rapid expansion capacity in its well-developed oil fields. A rise in its production sends a strong signal to markets about the direction of supply in the months ahead.

This Iraqi decision fits within a regional geopolitical context in which Baghdad seeks to balance its relationships with Washington and Tehran — two powers on which Iraq depends asymmetrically. Contributing to oil price stabilization after the USA-Iran war is a diplomatic message as much as an economic decision.

Iraq as bridge between OPEC and American interests

Iraq occupies a unique geopolitical position: an OPEC member, a U.S. military partner since 2003, and a country with considerable Iranian influence over its domestic politics. Its decision to increase production supports the American strategy of normalizing oil markets in the post-Iran-deal environment.

This convergence is not accidental. The Trump administration has applied diplomatic pressure on its regional allies to contribute to oil market stabilization — thereby reducing American inflationary pressure and weakening Russia's revenues. Oil geopolitics is a form of indirect economic warfare, and Baghdad is, for once, on the right side.

ANZ and restoration projections: a cautious timeline

2 to 3 million bpd in the first four weeks

The Australian bank ANZ has published detailed projections on the pace of recovery of oil traffic via Hormuz. According to its estimates, 2 to 3 million barrels per day will be restored in the first four weeks following the effective reopening of the strait. That is a meaningful progression — but represents only a fraction of the total volume that transited Hormuz before the war.

For the third quarter of 2026, ANZ projects 1 to 2 million additional barrels potentially restored. These conditional projections — the word "potentially" is important — reflect the many unknowns weighing on the pace of normalization.

The practical obstacles to rapid normalization

The normalization of oil traffic via Hormuz faces several practical obstacles that financial markets tend to minimize. Maritime insurance premiums for vessels crossing the Persian Gulf remain very elevated — insurers are pricing in the possibility of a return to hostilities. As long as these premiums do not return to normal levels, some carriers will continue seeking alternative routes.

Oil buyers — particularly Asian refiners who had restructured their supply contracts to avoid the Persian Gulf — will not immediately return to pre-war circuits. Those contracts have terms, commitments, and logistics that cannot be unwound in a matter of weeks. Commercial normalization is a process of months, not days.

The CNBC analyst at $65–70: the optimistic scenario

The full-resolution scenario: $65–70 per barrel

A CNBC analyst, interviewed on June 19, 2026 — before the Burgenstock talks — estimated that if the Iran agreement holds fully, Brent prices could land in a range of $65 to $70. That level represents the complete optimistic scenario: final agreement signed, full sanctions lifted, massive return of Iranian oil, OPEC+ discipline maintained.

This scenario is not impossible — but it requires several conditions to materialize simultaneously within a very short timeframe. It incorporates in particular the complete return of Iranian oil to world markets, which will take several months given the infrastructure reconditioning required inside Iran.

Why $65 would be problematic for some key actors

Paradoxically, a price of $65 would be too low for some of the key players in the equation. American shale producers whose marginal costs exceed $65 would be forced to reduce output. Some OPEC+ members — notably Angola, Nigeria, and Venezuela — whose state budgets require higher prices would face severe financial difficulties.

These contradictory pressures suggest the market will find an equilibrium somewhere between the $65–70 optimistic projections and the BNP Paribas floor at $75. The real oil market equilibrium is the outcome of dozens of competing interests — and it is rarely where projections place it.

Russia under pressure: the counter-intuitive effect of the price drop

Moscow had needed elevated prices to finance the war

Putin's Russia had built its war budget on the assumption of a barrel around $80. At $73, the Russian fiscal deficit widens significantly. At $65 — the CNBC analyst's optimistic scenario — Russia's financial difficulties would become very serious.

Anadolu Agency ran the headline on June 25, 2026: "Lower oil prices after the USA-Iran accord could turn the tide against Moscow." That headline says it all: the USA-Iran détente is bad news for the Russian war machine. Every dollar less on the barrel means several billion fewer rubles in the Kremlin's coffers.

Ukraine as indirect beneficiary of a successful American diplomacy

For Volodymyr Zelensky's Ukraine, the oil price decline following the USA-Iran agreement is good geopolitical news. A financially pressed Putin must make choices: fund the war, pay salaries, maintain infrastructure, sustain the social programs that secure his popular base. Financial pressure forces painful trade-offs.

These trade-offs do not show up instantly on the military front in Ukraine — the effects of financial constraints take months, sometimes quarters, to materialize. But they ultimately affect Russia's capacity to sustain a prolonged war effort. Oil geopolitics is a front of war whose effects are slow but potentially decisive.

Iranian oil infrastructure: war damage as a brake on normalization

Damaged infrastructure: an obstacle to rapid normalization

One of the most underestimated factors in oil market normalization projections is the state of Iran's oil infrastructure after 106 days of war. The oil terminals, pipelines, and processing facilities — everything that allows Iran to export its oil — suffered damage whose full extent is not yet known.

Iran's return to global oil markets is therefore not merely a political question (sanctions relief) or a commercial one (contract renegotiation). It is also a question of engineering and infrastructure rehabilitation. Rebuilding or repairing a damaged oil terminal is a matter of months and billions in investment.

The $300 billion reconstruction promise as energy rehabilitation driver

The promise of $300 billion for Iranian reconstruction necessarily includes a component of oil and energy infrastructure rehabilitation. That serves both parties' interests: Iran needs those oil revenues for its reconstruction; global markets need Iranian oil to normalize prices.

But these investments must be planned, financed, contracted, and executed. Even with political will on both sides, the minimum rehabilitation timeline for serious oil infrastructure is measured in quarters. The promised $300 billion is a necessary condition for oil normalization — but not a sufficient or immediate one.

The impact on global shipping and maritime routes

Alternative routes and their additional costs

During the USA-Iran war, oil tankers that would normally have used Hormuz were forced onto alternative routes — circumnavigating the Arabian Peninsula to the south, using the Cape of Good Hope, or routing through the Yanbu oil terminal in Saudi Arabia to export via the Red Sea. These detours represented considerable extra costs: fuel, navigation time, and vessel wear.

With Hormuz reopened, these alternative routes will become less attractive. But shipowners have long-term contracts with oil companies — they will not immediately shift back to Persian Gulf routes the day after the reopening. Contractual and logistical inertia in the maritime industry is measured in weeks and months.

Maritime insurance premiums: the most honest market signal

Maritime insurance premiums for vessels crossing the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz are the most honest market signal about the actual state of the security situation. These premiums, set by insurers who have no incentive to either overstate or understate risk, reflect the real probability that market actors assign to a return to hostilities.

As long as these premiums remain significantly above pre-war levels, it means the economic actors most directly exposed do not fully trust the agreement's durability. Insurance premiums are geopolitics' lie detector — and they deserve far more attention than official statements.

Europe: between immediate relief and strategic vigilance

The European energy bill lightened

The decline in Brent is a breath of fresh air for European economies. Since the USA-Iran war, energy prices in Europe had returned to the peaks that had fueled the inflation of 2022–2023. Energy-intensive industries — chemicals, steel, cement — had again been forced to cut production in the face of unsustainable energy costs.

Brent returning below $75 eases that pressure. But Europe should resist the temptation to use this lull as a reason to slow investment in the energy transition. The dependence on imported hydrocarbons — whose vulnerability the USA-Iran war once again exposed in vivid terms — is the structural risk that no temporary price drop resolves.

American LNG and diversification: the lesson still holds

The USA-Iran war reminded Europe of the lesson it had already learned from the war in Ukraine: diversifying energy supply is not a luxury but a national security imperative. American LNG had played an important role in reducing European dependence on Russian gas — but oil dependence on the Middle East remained structural.

Investing now in renewables, energy storage, and energy efficiency is the only way for Europe to stop depending on the geopolitical vagaries of unstable regions for its energy. Oil at $73 should not be a reason to go back to sleep — it is a window of opportunity to invest before the next oil crisis arrives.

The Nakitte brief of June 22: the week of the turning point

WTI below $80: the week of June 15–22

The Nakitte Energy Brief of June 22, 2026 documented the week of June 15–22 as the oil turning-point week. WTI fell below $80 for the first time in months, in a context of OPEC+ production hikes, signals of progress in the USA-Iran talks, and a slight dip in global demand.

That week of June 15–22 was when markets began pricing in a change in the oil regime — the shift from a war-tightened market to one anticipating normalization. Once that shift in market sentiment begins, it has a self-fulfilling logic: bearish expectations generate sales of futures contracts that effectively drive prices lower.

OPEC+ futures contracts and market signals

The announcement of consecutive OPEC+ production hikes played an amplifying role in the decline. When the cartel announces successive increases, operators holding long positions (bets on price rises) began liquidating them, accelerating the bearish move. The mechanics of futures markets can turn modest fundamental shifts into strong trends through leverage.

This mechanism illustrates why oil markets are sometimes more reactive to signals than underlying fundamentals would justify. Financial markets do not react to economic reality — they react to expectations of economic reality. And those expectations can build or collapse at a speed that far outpaces adjustments in the physical market.

Scenarios for the second half: between normalization and relapse

Base case: $70–80 on the back of a held agreement

The base case for the second half of 2026 — USA-Iran agreement signed before August 17, OPEC+ discipline maintained, gradual restoration of Hormuz traffic — would place Brent in a range of $70 to $80. That is a comfortable zone for most actors: acceptable for consumers, viable for the majority of producers.

This scenario requires that several things go as planned — which, in the current geopolitics, is always a risky assumption. But it is the most probable scenario, and it is the one that markets have currently priced in.

Relapse scenario: $100 and above if the agreement fails

If USA-Iran negotiations derail before August 17, 2026 and hostilities resume, the barrel would quickly head back toward $100 and beyond. The speed of the recovery would depend on the intensity of the renewed conflict and the scale of disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. A complete Hormuz closure — as in the worst moments of the war — could send Brent back toward its April 2026 peak of $125.

This relapse scenario is not the most likely — but it is not marginally improbable either. The narrative divergences from Burgenstock, the tensions with Israel, the Iranian hardline factions, and the confrontation logic that led to war in the first place are all still present. A diplomatic agreement does not erase the root causes of a conflict — it puts them on pause.

The world's energy future depends on the stability of the Strait of Hormuz

Hormuz and the global energy transition: a persistent interdependence

Even in an accelerated energy transition scenario, the Strait of Hormuz will remain a critical artery of the global economy for at least two more decades. Renewable energy is progressing rapidly — but it will not replace hydrocarbons overnight. Heavy industries, maritime transport, plastics, fertilizers — all of these sectors still depend massively on oil and gas. And a significant share of those resources transits via Hormuz.

The normalization of traffic through the strait is therefore a vital interest not only for fossil-fuel economies but for all economies in transition. Even the most advanced countries in the energy transition — Germany, France, South Korea — still import significant quantities of Gulf hydrocarbons. Hormuz stability is a condition of their economic development for years to come.

The role of naval forces in securing the strait

The American naval presence in the Persian Gulf, maintained for decades, is the ultimate guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. That presence — through the U.S. 5th Fleet based in Bahrain — was both the trigger and the guarantor of the USA-Iran agreement. It is because the United States had sufficient naval power that Iran agreed to negotiate.

During the 60-day negotiating period, the American naval presence continues to play its deterrence role. It ensures that Iran respects its commitment to not disrupt traffic in the strait. Diplomacy is effective when it is backed by power — and American naval power in the Gulf is the material foundation of the entire diplomatic construction around the MOU.

Conclusion: a normalization to be earned, not celebrated

The work that remains

The return of Brent below $75 is real progress — but conditional and fragile progress. The conditions for its durability are known: USA-Iran agreement signed before August 17, robust nuclear verification, gradual restoration of Hormuz traffic, OPEC+ production discipline. Each of these conditions can fail.

This editorial is a call for vigilance — not pessimism. The price decline is welcome, the negotiations are engaged, the mediators are working. But the work is not done. A normalization deserves to be celebrated when it is achieved — not merely when it has been started.

The message to Iran and the United States: finish what you started

What this editorial wants to address directly to all stakeholders — the American and Iranian delegations, the mediators, the regional allies — is a call for consistency and seriousness. The world paid a very high price for the 106 days of war. Markets have recovered a fragile equilibrium on the strength of an agreement that still needs to be finalized. The credibility of global diplomacy is on the line.

Failing to transform the June 15 MOU into a final agreement before August 17 is not simply a missed diplomatic opportunity. It is a betrayal of the expectations of the millions of people — consumers, workers, families — who have already adjusted their lives in the belief that peace was on its way. In diplomacy as in life, beginning something you do not finish is often worse than not having started at all.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Sources and method

This article is based exclusively on sources published between June 19 and June 25, 2026: Anadolu Agency, Reuters, CNBC, Al Jazeera, BNP Paribas, and Nakitte. All figures cited — Brent from $70 to $125, April 2026 peak, return to $73.87, Iraq 4.2–4.3M bpd, ANZ 2–3M bpd, CNBC analyst $65–70, BNP floor $75, 25% traffic in 5 days, OPEC+ 188,000 bpd — are drawn directly from the cited sources.

Maxime Marquette is a columnist-analyst, not an investigative journalist. The opinions expressed in the editorial passages are his own.

Editorial line

Maxime Marquette's editorial line is pro-democracy, pro-Ukraine, and supportive of a strong West. He considers that pressure on Russian oil revenues is an indirect form of support for Ukraine, and insists on the necessity of a verifiable nuclear agreement with Iran.

Sources

Primary sources

Anadolu Agency — Brent $73.87, back to pre-war levels, impact on Moscow — June 25, 2026

Reuters — Brent -3% after Iran progress, Iraq 4.3M bpd — June 22, 2026

Secondary sources

CNBC — Analyst: oil $65–70 if Iran deal holds — June 19, 2026

Al Jazeera — Oil prices back to pre-war levels on rising Middle East supply — June 25, 2026

BNP Paribas — Oil, durable $75/barrel floor — June 25, 2026

Nakitte — WTI below $80, OPEC+, week of June 15–22, 2026 — June 22, 2026