COMMENTARY: Beijing Arms Moscow, Threatens Taiwan: The Great Chinese Threat as Seen from the West

COMMENTARY: Beijing Arms Moscow, Threatens Taiwan: The Great Chinese Threat as Seen from the West

Introduction: the double threat that should keep the West awake at night

Two theaters, one authoritarian threat

Here is a fact that too many Western leaders still struggle to fully absorb: the war in Ukraine and the threat to Taiwan are not two separate crises occurring simultaneously by unfortunate coincidence. They are two manifestations of the same strategic challenge: the rise of China and its convergence with Russia in active resistance to the liberal international order that the West built and has benefited from since 1945. Understanding the link between these two crises is the prerequisite for a coherent strategic response.

In June 2026, the signals are clear and converging: Beijing has responded to the American expansion of its 1260H designation list by imposing export controls and banning government entities from dealing with designated American companies, according to the ISW report of June 26, 2026. Taiwan is conducting five-day «immediate combat readiness» military exercises with tanks in the streets. NATO and the Pacific are filling with ships for RIMPAC 2026 and Valiant Shield 2026. European powers are issuing a «rare warning» about the Chinese threat to Taiwan. The fault lines of the 21st century are drawing themselves clearly.

Beijing: the West's trading partner and financier of the Russian war

China occupies an extraordinarily contradictory position in the international system. It is the largest trading partner of many Western countries, an indispensable actor in global supply chains, a major creditor to much of the developing world. At the same time, it is Russia's principal economic and diplomatic partner since 2022, providing the resources and political cover that allow Russia to continue its war against Ukraine.

This ambivalence is not a mistake in Chinese foreign policy: it is a deliberate strategy. Beijing maximizes its benefits on both sides while refusing to choose. It buys Russian oil at discounted prices. It sells Russia dual-use military-civilian goods. It blocks UN resolutions condemning Russian aggression — all while maintaining its exports to Western markets and professing neutrality in the conflict. This calculated hypocrisy is frustrating, but it is also, in its way, an admission of China's dependence on Western markets it cannot yet afford to lose.

The 1260H list and the Chinese retaliation: technological escalation

What the 1260H list is and why it irritates Beijing

The 1260H list is an American designation identifying companies with links to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the People's Republic of China. Companies designated on this list face restrictions on their transactions with American entities and can be subject to additional measures. The expansion of this list by the United States in June 2026 targeted new Chinese technology companies involved in areas such as military artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, and secure communications systems.

China's retaliation — export controls on certain materials and products, bans on government entities dealing with designated American companies — is a measured but significant response. It demonstrates that Beijing views this escalation in designations as an economic attack meriting an economic response, and that it is prepared to use its weight in global supply chains as a pressure instrument. It is a declaration of covert economic war, conducted according to tacit rules of gradation.

The U.S.-China technology war: stakes and trajectory

The technology war between the United States and China centers primarily on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and next-generation military technologies. The United States seeks to maintain its technological edge by limiting China's access to cutting-edge technologies. China seeks to develop technological autonomy so it no longer depends on Western supply chains in critical domains.

This technological competition is both economic and military: the same chips that power autonomous vehicles also power missile guidance systems. The outcome of this technology race will largely determine the military balance of power over the next decade. China has made significant progress in this domain, even if it remains behind in certain critical technologies. American restrictions are aimed precisely at slowing that catch-up.

Taiwan under pressure: military exercises and simulated quarantine

The "immediate combat readiness" exercise of June 2026

Taiwan conducted a five-day military exercise in late June 2026 titled «immediate combat readiness», including tanks patrolling the streets of Taiwanese cities — a deliberately unusual image designed to familiarize the civilian population with the reality of military mobilization. This exercise, reported by the Washington Post on June 22, 2026, was a direct response to military exercises by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that Beijing had described as training «toward actual combat».

This action-reaction cycle reveals a progressive escalation of military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait. China is conducting increasingly realistic exercises around Taiwan. Taiwan responds with its own readiness exercises. The United States maintains a naval presence in the region and intensifies exercises with its allies. It is a dance of threat and deterrence that closely resembles what we saw in Europe in the years before 2022 — and we know how that can end.

The "maritime quarantine" tabletop: what this exercise reveals

Bloomberg reported on June 25, 2026 that a simulation exercise (tabletop) had simulated a «maritime quarantine» of Taiwan by Chinese forces. This scenario is particularly revealing: rather than a direct invasion — militarily and politically costly — China is exploring the option of a naval blockade that would isolate Taiwan without immediately triggering the threshold for a direct U.S. military response under the mutual defense treaty.

A maritime quarantine would be legally ambiguous — is it an act of war? — and geopolitically destabilizing. It would force the United States and its allies to decide whether ships seeking to break the blockade risk a direct confrontation with the Chinese navy. This calculated ambiguity is precisely what makes this scenario attractive to Chinese military planners: it exploits Western hesitations and creates divisions among allies over the appropriate response.

RIMPAC 2026 and Valiant Shield: the West flexes its muscles in the Pacific

The largest naval demonstration of the decade

RIMPAC 2026 — the Rim of the Pacific Exercise — running from June 24 to July 31, 2026, brings together approximately 40 ships, 25,000 military personnel, and 31 nations. It is the world's largest multilateral naval exercise, and its 2026 edition carries particular significance: it is being conducted simultaneously with Valiant Shield 2026 (launched June 22) in a context of heightened tensions with China. The ThinkChina article of June 25, 2026 aptly asked: «Why is the Pacific filling up with warships?»

The strategic answer is clear: the United States and its regional allies — Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, India — are seeking to demonstrate their collective capacity to operate in the western Pacific, to maintain freedom of navigation, and to deter any Chinese attempt to unilaterally modify the status quo by force. This collective show of strength is the Pacific counterpart of NATO's reinforcement in Europe.

The significance of 31 nations gathered together

The participation of 31 nations in RIMPAC 2026 is an important signal about the structure of the coalition supporting the international order in the Pacific. This is not a bilateral U.S.-Japan exercise: it is a demonstration of the breadth of the coalition opposing China's revisionist vision. Countries as diverse as Chile, Indonesia, Canada, France, Peru, and Singapore are participating, signaling that freedom of navigation in the Pacific is a public good defended by a real coalition — not by unilateral American hegemony.

This multilateral coalition is one of the most effective responses to the Chinese narrative that the United States is defending its own imperial interests rather than the international order. When 31 nations, from every part of the world, converge to defend the principles of freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes, it demonstrates that these principles have a universal value that transcends American interests.

The European warning on Taiwan: rare and significant

When Europe finally speaks up about the Chinese threat to Taiwan

On June 24, 2026, according to Yahoo News, European powers issued a «rare warning» about the Chinese threat to Taiwan. That qualifier — «rare» — says everything: until now, Europe generally avoided public comment on Taiwan's situation, preferring to maintain a posture of neutrality that protected its commercial relations with China. The fact that this warning was issued marks a notable shift in posture.

This shift reflects a growing awareness in Europe that the Taiwan question is neither geographically remote nor politically neutral: if China were to seize control of Taiwan by force, the implications for the international order, global maritime freedom of navigation, and the credibility of Western deterrence would be directly relevant to European security. The war in Ukraine accelerated this awareness by demonstrating that territorial aggression is possible and that its consequences are felt far beyond the directly affected geographic zone.

The Europe-Indo-Pacific strategic link: a reality asserting itself

The European warning on Taiwan is also an acknowledgment of a strategic link between the two theaters — European and Indo-Pacific — that some European leaders had been slow to accept. If China is watching how the West responds to Russian aggression in Ukraine, its conclusions directly affect its calculations regarding Taiwan. If the West yields on Ukraine, the message sent to Beijing is that Western resolve in the face of aggression can be worn down. If the West holds, the message is the reverse.

This interdependence of theaters justifies a coordinated strategic approach between NATO policy in Europe and the Indo-Pacific policies of the United States and its allies. Europe cannot afford to ignore the Chinese threat on the pretext that it is geographically distant, just as Indo-Pacific allies have a stake in the maintenance of Ukrainian resistance. Security is global; threats are too.

China as Russia's "arsenalist": the evidence accumulates

Dual-use components and the evidence on the ground

The evidence of China's contribution to the Russian war effort is mounting. Electronic components manufactured in China have been found in Russian military equipment captured in Ukraine: chips, sensors, communications components. These components are not weapons in themselves — they are dual-use civilian-military goods — but they directly contribute to Russia's capacity to produce and maintain its armaments.

Chinese companies are supplying Russia with vehicles, optical equipment, composite materials, and other goods that have military value even when officially sold as civilian products. American and European intelligence services have documented these flows and have applied pressure on third-country governments to stop serving as intermediaries. Some actors have reduced their activities under that pressure; others continue, calculating that economic advantages outweigh diplomatic risks.

Beijing's official line and the reality of trade flows

Beijing officially maintains that it does not supply lethal weapons to Russia and that it respects relevant sanctions. This official position is technically defensible on lethal weapons proper — China has not, to public knowledge, delivered missiles or artillery to Russia. But it is manifestly insufficient in the face of the reality of dual-use goods flows that are fueling the Russian war effort.

The distinction between lethal weapons and dual-use goods is a legally clever but morally hollow line of defense. If the chips China sells to Russia end up in missiles that kill Ukrainian civilians, the distinction carries little practical value. The West has been too timid in confronting Beijing on this reality, out of fear of disrupting commercial relationships on which European and American economies remain heavily dependent. It is strategic capitulation masquerading as economic pragmatism.

Taiwan's 2026 exercises: a society learning to defend itself

Tanks in the streets: normalizing military readiness

The image of tanks patrolling the streets of Taiwan's cities during the June 2026 exercise is deliberately chosen for a precise communication effect: to show the civilian population that military defense is real, possible, and organized. This communication aims to reduce the panic such a sight might cause during a real emergency, and to reinforce the sense that the country is prepared and determined to defend itself.

It is a lesson drawn directly from the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian resistance in 2022 was facilitated by a civilian population that had developed a culture of national defense and by prior preparations — territorial defense training, crisis communications, psychological preparation for war. Taiwan is drawing those lessons and applying them. Exercises with tanks in the streets are part of a broader strategy of total societal defense that makes the option of a direct invasion more costly for the adversary.

The doctrine of "total defense" in Taiwan

Taiwan is developing a «total defense» doctrine partly inspired by the Finnish model — an entirely mobilized society for defense in the event of aggression. This doctrine includes emergency supply reserves, government continuity plans, civilian training in first aid and resistance, and transparent communication with the population about threats and preparations. It complements conventional military capabilities with a social resilience that any occupying power would have to factor into its calculations.

This approach is particularly relevant in the face of a threat of maritime quarantine rather than direct invasion: if Beijing chooses to economically isolate Taiwan rather than militarily invade it, the social and economic resilience of the island — its ability to function under blockade for an extended period — becomes a determining factor. The exercises Taiwan conducts today are preparing that resilience, not only conventional military defense.

The paradox of Western economic dependence on China

Cutting dependence without cutting the economy

One of the most uncomfortable realities of the Western relationship with China is the level of economic dependence that democracies have allowed to develop over decades. Supply chains for batteries, rare earths, electronic components, and active pharmaceutical ingredients run through China in alarmingly high proportions. This dependence is not merely economic: it is strategic, because it gives Beijing real leverage over Western economies.

«Decoupling» — the reduction of this dependence — has been a declared priority of American and European governments for several years. Real progress is slow, costly, and partially offset by new trade flows that recreate dependencies in other areas. Building national or allied alternatives to Chinese supply chains takes years and billions. It is nonetheless one of the most important decisions the West can make for its long-term security.

The risk of an accelerated break triggered by a Taiwan crisis

If a crisis broke out in Taiwan — a quarantine, a partial invasion, a significant military escalation — the West would find itself in an even more difficult situation than it faced in 2022 regarding Russia and energy: dependent on essential Chinese goods for its economy, forced to choose between economically painful sanctions and the acceptance of aggression. The lesson of Europe's dependence on Russian gas should accelerate the reduction of Western dependence on critical Chinese imports. It is accelerating that process, but not fast enough.

This challenge is structural: private companies have immediate economic interests in maintaining their relationships with China, even if the long-term strategic interests of their countries argue for diversification. Aligning private interests with national security strategic interests is the central task of Western industrial policies in the coming years. It is achievable — subsidies for semiconductors, batteries, and other critical sectors are pointing in that direction — but the timeline is tight.

China as Ukraine conflict arbiter: a dangerous illusion

The Chinese peace plan and its real conditions

Several attempts to present China as a potential mediator in the Ukrainian conflict have been made by various international actors. China's twelve-point peace plan, Beijing's professed «neutrality», discussions on the margins of international summits — all of this builds an image of China as a responsible peace power. That image is a carefully maintained fiction.

China cannot be a neutral mediator in a conflict where it is economically and diplomatically aligned with one of the parties. No credible mediator can simultaneously buy the aggressor's oil at reduced prices, sell it military components, shield it at the UN, and claim neutrality. This contradiction is so evident that repeating it in official texts sometimes seems overly generous toward the seriousness of the Chinese approach. Beijing wants to appear constructive without taking risks or positions.

The Xi doctrine on Taiwan and the real red lines

Xi Jinping has declared on multiple occasions that the «reunification» of Taiwan with mainland China is an inevitable historical objective and that China does not renounce the use of force to achieve it. These declarations are not empty rhetoric for domestic consumption: they reflect a genuine strategic doctrine, implemented through massive military investments, exercises simulating amphibious operations, and constant economic and diplomatic pressure on Taiwan.

The question is not whether Xi wants to «reunify» Taiwan — he says so clearly — but whether and when he judges conditions ripe to do so by force. Those conditions include: sufficient military capacity to force a rapid surrender before the United States can intervene effectively; an international configuration where the costs of such action are acceptable; and perhaps an assessment that Western resolve, tested by the Ukrainian crisis, is weak enough for the risk to be manageable.

The Ukrainian lesson for Taiwan and the West

What the war in Ukraine teaches about deterrence

The war in Ukraine has provided several crucial lessons about deterrence that Taiwan and its allies must draw on. First lesson: deterrence fails when the adversary believes the enemy will not fight seriously or that allies will not provide meaningful support. Putin calculated that Ukraine would capitulate in a few days and that the West would respond only symbolically. He was badly wrong, but his initial calculation was not entirely irrational given the signals sent before 2022.

For Taiwan, the lesson is clear: deterrence requires a credible demonstration of the will to resist, military capabilities that make an attack costly for the aggressor, and sufficiently committed external support to discourage the calculation of a quick victory. The June 2026 exercises, American arms acquisitions, firm political declarations from Washington — all contribute to that deterrence. But deterrence is only credible if the adversary believes in it.

American strategic ambiguity on Taiwan: asset or weakness?

American policy on Taiwan has traditionally rested on «strategic ambiguity»: the United States has no formal defense commitment to Taiwan (unlike what NATO's Article 5 would imply), but it maintains substantial relations with the island and sells arms to its forces. This ambiguity was designed to simultaneously deter a Chinese attack and a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan that would provoke China.

In the post-2022 context, some American analysts are arguing for strategic clarity — an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan — that would make deterrence more credible. Others maintain that ambiguity remains useful because it preserves flexibility of response and avoids rhetorical escalation. This debate is real and important. What is clear is that ambiguity can only function as deterrence if the forces and willingness to make threats credible are available — and that is where exercises like RIMPAC play their role.

The Indo-Pacific as the second front of the liberal order

American alliances in the region: robust but fragile

The network of American alliances in the Indo-Pacific — Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, India in a different format — is the foundation of the region's deterrence policy. These alliances are broadly robust, but they present real vulnerabilities: uncertainties about the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific policy, historical tensions between Japan and South Korea, the complex position of India seeking to maintain relationships with both Russia and China while drawing closer to the West.

AUKUS — the strategic partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States centered on Australian nuclear-powered conventional submarines — is one of the most significant developments in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. It strengthens submarine defense capabilities that are essential in a theater where China is investing massively in its own surface and submarine navy. It also signals a more engaged Europe (through the United Kingdom) in regional security.

What Ukraine asks of Pacific allies and vice versa

South Korea, Japan, and Australia support Ukraine diplomatically and economically, with some providing direct military equipment. This support is not free: it reflects their own interest in maintaining an international system in which aggression does not pay. If Russia won in Ukraine, the message sent to China about Taiwan would be immediately relevant to their own security.

In return, Ukraine benefits from a support network that extends well beyond traditional European allies. This globalization of Ukraine support is one of the positive surprises of this conflict: it demonstrates that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and resistance to aggression have far broader support than the Russian narrative of the «collective West» against Russia would have us believe.

The West facing the double threat: decisions yet to be made

Investing in defense on two theaters simultaneously

The West faces the strategic challenge of maintaining credible deterrence on two geographically distant but strategically linked theaters: Europe facing Russia, and the Indo-Pacific facing China. None of the major democracies can address one to the detriment of the other without creating an invitation for escalation on the neglected theater. This dual demand is the strongest argument for the substantial increases in defense budgets that NATO and Pacific allies are implementing.

This challenge is also industrial: producing the weapons systems, munitions, and naval platforms needed for two theaters demands an expansive and resilient defense industrial base. The United States and its allies are working on this expansion, but industrial lead times are long and constraints on skilled labor and supply chains are real. It is one of the domains where reducing dependence on China is both most urgent and most difficult.

Consistency of message: not giving China the impression the West will be less firm on Taiwan than on Ukraine

The most important message the West can send Beijing about Taiwan is a concrete demonstration of its resolve in Ukraine. If Putin does not win, if Ukraine recovers its territorial integrity, if economic sanctions have a real effect — then the signal sent to China is that the costs of aggression are real and lasting. If Ukraine is abandoned, if Russia «wins» on terms acceptable to it, then the signal sent to Beijing is that the West is decisive in its speeches and hesitant in its actions.

This strategic coherence is perhaps the most important thing this commentary seeks to establish: the war in Ukraine and the Taiwan question are linked not only in their nature — potential aggressions against democracies by authoritarian powers — but also in the meaning of our responses. Winning in Ukraine is also protecting Taiwan. Losing in Ukraine is risking Taiwan. The stakes are doubled, and so are our decisions.

The diplomacy of firmness: sanctioning Beijing without triggering an economic rupture

The dilemma of economic interdependencies

The West is caught in a structural contradiction: it depends on China for its supply chains in rare earths, electronic components, and manufactured products, while recognizing that this dependence is a strategic vulnerability. Western companies have invested massively in China since the 1990s, and a brutal decoupling would cause economic shocks that few governments can afford politically. This reality explains the slowness of sanctions against Beijing compared to the speed of sanctions against Moscow in 2022.

Yet instruments exist. The 1260H list, export controls on semiconductors, screening of Chinese investments in critical infrastructure — these are graduated pressure tools that do not require a total break. The principle is reciprocity: where China restricts foreign market access, the West can reciprocate. Where it finances Russian aggression, economic costs can be imposed. The difficulty is coordinating these measures among the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Australia so they have a real rather than symbolic effect.

The role of Indo-Pacific allies in the collective response

The Western response to the Chinese threat cannot be exclusively transatlantic. It must integrate Indo-Pacific allies — Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, India to varying degrees — who are themselves directly exposed to Beijing's military buildup. The RIMPAC 2026 and Valiant Shield 2026 exercises are precisely demonstrations of this emerging coalition: an Indo-Pacific security architecture that complements NATO in Europe.

AUKUS, the security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States focused on nuclear submarines and advanced technologies, is another pillar of this architecture. It signals to Beijing that the West is prepared to transfer high-value military capabilities to its regional allies to rebalance the regional power ratio. These multilateral initiatives are fundamental: they prevent China from dealing with its neighbors individually, intimidating them, and dividing them — the classic strategy of a hegemonic great power facing smaller ones.

The Taiwan question and American nuclear credibility

Strategic ambiguity: an asset eroding

America's «strategic ambiguity» policy toward Taiwan — neither explicitly promising to defend the island militarily, nor explicitly excluding it — functioned as a deterrence mechanism for decades. It deterred China from attempting military action due to uncertainty about the American response, while deterring Taiwan from unilaterally declaring independence. This dual deterrence maintained the status quo.

But in the context of 2026, this ambiguity is showing its limits. China has massively expanded its military capabilities. The maritime quarantine tabletop exercise simulated in June 2026 explores precisely the gray zones where American ambiguity is exploitable. If Beijing imposes a naval quarantine without firing a single shot, American strategic ambiguity does not apply clearly. That is why several defense experts are pushing toward «strategic clarity» — an explicit U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. This debate, still open in Washington, is one of the most important of the decade.

What the West risks losing if Taiwan falls

Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world's most advanced semiconductors, notably through TSMC. A Chinese takeover of these production capabilities would be catastrophic for the global economy and would give China an unprecedented economic coercion lever over the defense industries, artificial intelligence, automotive, and telecommunications sectors of all countries dependent on these chips. The West's vulnerability on semiconductors has been known since the 2020 pandemic — but it has been insufficiently addressed.

Beyond semiconductors, the loss of Taiwan to China would send a devastating signal to all democracies in the region: the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Australia would understand that the American security guarantee is conditional and revocable. It would be the beginning of a regional realignment under Chinese hegemony, with repercussions on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, on global trade routes, and on the Pacific security architecture. The stakes go well beyond the island itself.

Conclusion: Beijing cannot be our partner and our threat simultaneously

The choice the West has deferred for too long

The West must finally make a choice it has been deferring for too long: is China a competitive partner with whom the rules of engagement are mutually accepted, or is it a strategic adversary exploiting our economic openness to finance and prepare a regional hegemony incompatible with the international liberal order? These two realities coexist today in a tension that the usual diplomatic formulas no longer suffice to manage.

Decisions on dual-use components, the 1260H list, export restrictions, investments in alternatives to Chinese supply chains — these are the concrete decisions through which the West is progressively choosing its response to this dilemma. The coherence and speed of these decisions will determine whether the West enters the next decade from a position of strength or vulnerability in the face of the double Chinese and Russian threat.

Zelensky, Taiwan, and the liberal order: one and the same struggle

Volodymyr Zelensky resisting Russian aggression and the government of Taiwan preparing its defense against potential Chinese aggression are defending fundamentally the same thing: the right of democracies to choose their own destiny, the refusal of hegemony imposed by force, the preservation of an international order where rules apply to everyone — including great powers. These values are worth defending. They come at a cost. That cost is less than the alternative.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Position, biases, and limits

This commentary is clearly favorable to the defense of democracies against authoritarian regimes — China and Russia. I consider China a strategic threat to the international liberal order, not merely a commercial rival. This position informs my analysis. I declare it so the reader can evaluate it with full knowledge of that fact. The data on military exercises, the 1260H list, and RIMPAC comes from verifiable open sources: ISW, Washington Post, ThinkChina, Bloomberg, Yahoo News.

My analysis of Chinese intentions regarding Taiwan is based on Xi Jinping's public declarations, observable military investments, and documented exercises. I do not claim to know with certainty when or whether China will use force against Taiwan. These projections are exercises in strategic analysis, not certified predictions.

What I do not know

I do not know the precise nature of the dual-use goods China provides to Russia, nor their measurable impact on Russian military capabilities. Available estimates are fragmentary. I also do not know what Xi Jinping would decide in the event of a perceived opportunity regarding Taiwan, nor what internal factors within the Chinese Communist Party influence that calculation. Authoritarian regimes are opaque by design, and any external analysis of their intentions rests on inferences.

I also acknowledge that my critique of Western economic dependence on China simplifies a very complex reality involving hundreds of millions of jobs and supply chains. The «decoupling» I implicitly advocate carries real economic costs that I do not minimize but do not develop in detail in this commentary.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW: China retaliates against expansion of 1260H list with export controls — ISW, June 26, 2026

Taiwan: combat readiness exercise, tanks in streets, response to PLA — Washington Post, June 22, 2026

Taiwan tabletop drill simulates Chinese maritime quarantine — Bloomberg, June 25, 2026

Why the Pacific is filling with warships: RIMPAC 2026 and the military competition — ThinkChina, June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

European powers issue rare warning about Chinese threat to Taiwan — Yahoo News, June 24, 2026

EU maintains its full economic sanctions wall against Russia through 2027 — Euromaidan Press, June 26, 2026

Russia increases war spending with indirect Chinese economic support — Bloomberg via Ground News, June 23, 2026