EDITORIAL: Divided G7, Beijing Thanks You — a Disunited West is the Greatest Gift to Xi Jinping

Introduction: The West Fractures While China Cashes In

Évian-les-Bains, June 15, 2026 — the summit of the fracture

There is one image that sums up the entire Évian-les-Bains G7. On one side, Emmanuel Macron, convening an unprecedented video call with China, attempting to federate his allies, speaking of industrial overcapacity, unfair subsidies, and the flood of Chinese products drowning European markets. On the other, Donald Trump, arriving in Évian ready to play the lone ranger, publicly thanking Xi Jinping for his neutrality on the Iranian file, and leaving China off the White House’s list of priorities for this summit. Two irreconcilable visions of the same threat.

According to Politico, the American president arrives in France "ready to go it alone on China," even as Macron tries to rally member states to a common approach to "tackle a flood of subsidized Chinese exports disrupting global markets." The White House, for its part, simply didn't put China on the summit's priority list. This isn't a diplomatic nuance. It’s a brutal strategic signal, and Beijing hears it loud and clear.

China as the elephant in the room

The phrase is now established: China is "the elephant in the room" at the Évian G7. It isn't invited, it doesn't take part in the discussions, but every working session, every negotiation corridor, and every final declaration revolves around it. Matt Pearl, Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS, summarizes Macron's maneuver in Fortune: the French president is trying to "play China off of the U.S., and to make the Trump administration aware of that in order to create some leverage." A clever tactic, but one that above all reveals the depth of the transatlantic rift.

While the seven major democracies clash over the method, China recorded a record trade surplus of $1.2 trillion in 2025. One trillion, two hundred billion. And the European Union's trade deficit with Beijing reached approximately 360 billion euros, or nearly one billion per day, according to figures cited by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during the European Council of June 18-19, 2026. The West bickers. China, meanwhile, cashes in.

Trump in Évian: Going It Alone as Doctrine

The doctrine of American unilateralism toward Beijing

The Trump administration's positioning at the Évian G7 is no improvisation. It is a doctrine. A senior administration official told reporters bluntly the Saturday before the summit, according to Politico: "The United States is not waiting for the world to hold hands and find a coordinated way to address [China's behavior]. We're taking action now through a variety of measures." The message is clear: Washington prefers to act alone rather than wait for its allies to align.

This posture has an internal logic. Trump’s tariffs effectively reduced Chinese exports to the United States by 37% between January and April 2026 compared to the same period in 2025, according to the U.S. Commerce Department cited by the San Francisco Chronicle. The administration can thus boast of concrete results. The problem is that these Chinese products don't disappear — they are massively redirected toward Europe and the rest of Asia. Washington protects its market but floods those of its allies.

The G2 dream: when Trump thinks in pairs with Xi

The most worrying manifestation of this unilateralist doctrine is undoubtedly what Politico calls Trump's "G2 ambitions." During a recent bilateral summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing, the American president himself described the meeting as a "G2." He told reporters: "This is the G2," comparing their duo to a variant of the G7. Since then, he has evoked the idea again, hinting at the possibility of replacing the format of the seven major democracies with a Washington-Beijing face-to-face.

And as if to confirm this bilateral logic, Trump and Xi Jinping have already scheduled a new summit in Washington in September 2026. Meanwhile, a mechanism called the "U.S.-China Board of Trade" has been launched to expand trade and reduce tariffs in strategic sectors. The Trump administration is preserving a "fragile trade truce" with Beijing, set to expire in November 2026. The G7 isn't even in the equation.

Macron Facing the Ingratitude of His Allies

The French initiative: ambitious, solitary, partially in vain

Credit must be given to Emmanuel Macron. The French president deployed considerable diplomatic energy to make the Évian G7 a turning point on the China question. On June 11, 2026, he organized a video call described as "unprecedented" — the first collective G7 contact with China in over twenty years — in the presence of Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing. He attempted to frame the discussion not as an anti-China offensive, but as work on "global macroeconomic imbalances," carefully avoiding naming Beijing directly in the final communiqué.

The result? The Élysée presented this call as a success. Economists, however, were less enthusiastic. Agathe Demarais, from the European Council on Foreign Relations, noted that China had no interest in changing its economic model to please the French presidency. A telling sign: Beijing had sent a Vice Premier, not Xi in person — a perfectly coded diplomatic signal indicating the level of seriousness accorded to the initiative. Macron’s phrasing on "imbalances" is politically clever, but it leaves China entirely comfortable.

European solitude in a disjointed G7

The 27 EU member states are unanimous on one diagnosis: the current level of trade imbalances with China is no longer "politically sustainable," as the European Commission declared in late May 2026. But a unanimous diagnosis does not generate unanimous action. According to Euronews, states like France, Poland, Belgium, and Sweden favor a more assertive posture, while Germany, Spain, and Greece fear devastating reprisals from Beijing. And Chinese imports to the EU have increased by 45% over the last five years.

The outcome of the June 18-19, 2026 European Council, documented by Simon Gros, is enlightening: leaders mandated the Commission to develop and "eventually complement the toolbox in the area of trade defence and industrial policy," according to the official conclusions. No specific tariffs decided. No immediate concrete measures. A framework of "de-risking, not decoupling" — a cautious formula that says everything and nothing at once. Europe wants to strike but doesn't dare raise its fist.

The "China Shock 2.0": A Tangible Industrial Threat

The dumping of subsidized products and its consequences

Behind the diplomatic phrasing lies a brutal economic reality that the San Francisco Chronicle calls the "China Shock 2.0." In the 2000s, China’s entry into global trade wiped out hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs in the American heartland and contributed to the political rise of Donald Trump. Twenty years later, history is repeating itself — but this time in Europe. American tariffs have pushed Chinese exports toward more open markets, notably European ones, creating what the San Francisco Chronicle describes as "a European sequel to the China Shock."

The numbers are staggering. In 2025, China posted a record global trade surplus of $1.2 trillion, despite all Western sanctions and tariffs. Its exports of electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, and machine tools are flooding European markets at prices that no Western industrialist can compete with on a level playing field. The EU is already imposing tariffs of up to 35% on Chinese EVs, but these measures remain insufficient to stem the tide. The European pharmaceutical, chemical, and automotive sectors are under direct pressure.

Critical minerals: the other front of dependence

The question of critical minerals adds an existential dimension to this picture. China controls most of the global supply chains for rare metals and critical materials indispensable for the defense industry, technology, and green energy. The demonstration was stinging: according to Politico, following the assertive stance of the new Japanese Prime Minister on Taiwan, Beijing restricted exports of rare earths to Japan for over four months, directly threatening Japanese automobile and smartphone production. This is an economic weapon that China knows how to use with surgical precision.

It is precisely for this reason that the Évian G7 dedicated an entire session to the question of critical minerals, with the goal of diversifying supply chains away from China. Leaders agreed on enhanced coordination, coordinated stockpiling, and a new expanded platform centered around the International Energy Agency. But as the US News report notes: these are "first steps." First steps at the edge of a precipice.

China Arming Russia: What the EU Has Now Proven

Military training: a line crossed

On June 15, 2026, in Luxembourg, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas spoke words her predecessors had never dared to formulate so clearly: "We have also now verified reports that the Chinese military has been training Russian military personnel to fight in Ukraine." The EU says it has verified what Reuters revealed in May: the Chinese army reportedly secretly trained about 200 Russian military personnel in China in late 2025, as part of an agreement signed by senior officers of both countries in Beijing in July 2025, with sessions focusing on the use of drones. Some of these soldiers reportedly returned to fight in Ukraine.

Beijing has categorically denied this. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson called the claims "pure slander and smearing." But the political weight of Kallas’s statement is considerable: for the first time, the European Union is officially asserting, with evidence based on its own findings, that China is not neutral in the Ukrainian conflict. It is, in a way, a co-belligerent. Not with boots on the ground, but with direct military training that makes a difference on the battlefield.

Sanctions against Chinese firms: a strong but insufficient signal

On the same day, June 15, 2026, the EU added several Chinese entities to its sanctions list as part of a "mini-package" of restrictive measures. Shenzhen Minghuaxin was sanctioned for providing drone components to the Russian military. Xinxiang Richful Lubricant Additive Company was targeted for the delivery of chemical lubricant additives for mechanical use intended for Russian armed forces. Two Hong Kong companies — Glory Shipping HK and Nord Axis — were targeted for facilitating the export of Russian oil, contributing to the maintenance of Moscow's energy revenues.

These sanctions are symbolically important. They mark an expansion of the front of European coercive measures toward Chinese companies — what the Bird & Bird report calls a "widening front." But EU sanctions envoy David O'Sullivan was particularly lucid in an interview with Euronews in early June: China remains a "very big problem" because it masters the art of "backfilling" — replacing sanctioned suppliers with new circuits as quickly as the EU identifies them. The race is not yet won.

The June 18-19 European Council: Breakthrough or Tactical Retreat?

An ambiguous mandate for a Commission under pressure

The European Council that immediately followed the G7 gave Ursula von der Leyen a mandate to develop new trade tools toward China. According to Euronews, the 27 leaders unanimously recognized the economic threat posed by Beijing's trade policy and asked the Commission to work on two axes: constructive dialogue with major economic partners, and the development "of a toolbox in terms of trade defense and industrial policy." Von der Leyen had summarized the situation in May: the trade relationship with China was now "unsustainable."

Among the tools discussed is an unprecedented diversification instrument, which would force companies in vulnerable sectors to source from at least three different international suppliers, so that no single country — implying China — holds the entire chain. It’s an ambitious idea that, if adopted, would profoundly restructure European industrial sourcing strategies. But as Mila Sourcing notes after the summit: the formal conclusions did not mention China by name. The art of diplomatic compromise at its peak.

Fracture lines within the 27

The European Council also decided to extend economic sanctions against Russia for twelve months — compared to the usual six — a historic decision that creates increased predictability for Ukraine at a time when Kyiv is making gains on the ground. But on China, fractures remain. Germany, Spain, and Greece are still holding back. Berlin fears economic devastation if Beijing decided on targeted sectoral reprisals against the German automotive or chemical industries. For these capitals, the watchword remains: dialogue first, act if necessary.

According to the Brussels Signal website, European leaders ultimately "stopped short of concrete action" regarding China. The Commission did receive the green light to build tools — and it has a September 2026 deadline to present new trade protection measures according to its internal schedule. But for now, no tariffs have been decided, no retaliation mechanism is in place. Europe has a toolbox, to paraphrase von der Leyen, but it still hesitates to open it.

The G7 Facing Its Contradictions: Iran, Ukraine, China

The Iranian dynamic swallowed everything

One of the deep explanations for the marginalization of the China question at the Évian G7 lies in the Iranian file. Trump arrived at the summit crowned by a ceasefire agreement with Tehran announced the Sunday before the opening, and the dynamic of the entire summit was captured by this subject. European allies — Macron, Merz, Starmer, Meloni — had previously criticized unilateral American intervention against Iran. But faced with the fait accompli of a partial agreement, they chose to hail "President Trump's strong leadership" in the final declaration, according to the Élysée.

The result, according to the ICAS, is unambiguous: the G7 talked little about China. Iran and Ukraine dominated the discussions. Trump even publicly thanked Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin for their neutrality in the conflict with Iran — an explosive phrasing that directly contradicted the message of collective firmness the G7 was trying to project toward Beijing. "I just want to thank them, because they made it a lot better," Trump said in reference to Xi and Putin, according to PBS.

G7 unity on Ukraine: a light in the fracture

It should be noted — intellectual honesty requires it — that the G7 nonetheless displayed remarkable unity on Ukraine. The seven leaders, Trump included, joined their voices to provide "unwavering support" to Kyiv and agreed to increase pressure on Moscow through additional sanctions. Volodymyr Zelensky, present in Évian, stated that G7 leaders had agreed that Russia was not winning the war — and measures for reinforced pressure on the Russian war economy were discussed.

Trump even considered reimposing sanctions on Russian oil, indicating that thanks to the Iranian deal, "oil is now flowing" — Iranian oil that could partially replace Russian oil and allow for a tightening of the screws on Moscow. Western support for Zelensky remains a pillar. But the posture on China remains, for its part, deeply disjointed. And it is precisely this disjointedness that Beijing exploits.

Beijing’s Strategy: Divide and Conquer, Slowly but Surely

The exploitation of Western disunity as state doctrine

China's strategy toward the G7 is dauntingly consistent. Beijing did not seek to prevent the Évian summit. It did not seek to boycott it loudly. It agreed to participate in Macron's June 11 video call — by sending a Vice Premier, a coded signal of low priority — and let the dynamic of internal G7 divisions do its work. The disunity between Washington and its European allies is the best service the West can provide to Beijing, and China is perfectly aware of it.

According to the Washington Times, China will be absent from the G7 but will be "the elephant in the room," an invisible presence that determines the agenda without participating in it. This capacity to weigh on discussions without being represented is a form of power in itself. And Macron’s formula for framing the problem — "China produces too much, the US consumes too much and the Europeans invest too little" — while analytically correct, politically dilutes Beijing's responsibility by embedding it in a diffuse global problem.

Strategic patience versus Western tactical impatience

The Washington-Beijing summit scheduled for September 2026 perfectly illustrates Chinese strategic patience. Beijing knows Trump wants a deal. Beijing also knows that Trump does not coordinate with his G7 allies. So Beijing can negotiate with Washington on bilateral trade, make limited and publicized concessions, while maintaining its practices of overcapacity and subsidies toward the rest of the world. It is a strategy of division from the top: dealing separately with each partner to prevent the formation of a common front.

China's reaction to threats of European sanctions is identical. Beijing canceled diplomatic meetings with the EU "without a reason being given" according to WSWS, a characterized intimidation signal. The Global Times, the Communist Party's nationalist mouthpiece, warned that "the EU cannot and should not afford a trade war with China." This isn't diplomacy. It's coercion. And this coercion works on capitals that are afraid.

AI and Minerals: Two New Front Lines

Artificial intelligence as a field of strategic competition

The Évian G7 innovated by inviting over a dozen CEOs of major AI companies — including Sam Altman of OpenAI, Dario Amodei of Anthropic, and Alex Wang of Meta/Scale AI. The discussion on artificial intelligence revealed another dimension of the West’s structural dependence. The United States and China together control 90% of global computing power and attract the bulk of AI investments, according to the 2026 Stanford AI Index cited by Fortune. For other G7 members, the room for maneuver is narrow.

The Trump administration imposed export controls on frontier models from Anthropic — Fable 5 and Mythos 5 — making them inaccessible to certain foreign partners, which complicated discussions on G7 alignment regarding AI. According to Andrea Renda of the Centre for European Policy Studies cited by Fortune, G7 commitments to a more inclusive AI are unlikely to catch Washington's attention. The American-Chinese technological duality leaves little room for European ambitions. It’s a new domain where Western unity is fragmented before it has even been built.

Steel as a precursor: the sectoral trade defense model

On critical minerals and industrial dependence, the G7 agreed to strengthen cooperation to reduce dependence on China — coordinated stockpiling, a new platform around the IEA, traceability of supply chains. These are concrete advances, even if they remain modest. The EU, for its part, has already announced a measure that foreshadows the scale of future decisions: starting July 1, 2026, it is reducing its duty-free steel quota by 47% and doubling the out-of-quota tax from 25% to 50%, according to Mila Sourcing. This is the steel sector as an experimental field for a broader trade defense.

The Commission plans to present new trade protection tools in September 2026. The sectors most often cited: chemicals, machine tools, green technologies — solar and batteries. If this schedule is met, and if the 27 members manage to align on its use, the fall of 2026 could mark a turning point. But the "if" is huge. The required unanimity among the 27 member states remains the Achilles' heel of any ambitious European policy toward Beijing.

Breaking the Coordinated Protectionism Taboo

The word one doesn't dare utter in Western chancelleries

There is a word that G7 leaders carefully avoid, as if its mere pronunciation would trigger a catastrophe: "protectionism." They speak of "de-risking,""reducing strategic dependencies,""trade defense," or "rebalancing." All these phrases are euphemisms to describe what everyone knows is necessary: building a coordinated trade wall against unfair Chinese practices. China, for its part, has no taboos on this subject. It massively subsidizes its industries, controls its supply chains, and does not hesitate to use trade as a geopolitical weapon.

The reality that some European capitals refuse to admit is simple: the WTO system, designed for an era of optimistic commercial liberalism, does not possess the instruments to handle an economy like China's — an economy that claims to play by market rules while benefiting from large-scale state planning. Macron is right on the substance when he calls for "fair protection measures" — a phrase he used when speaking to workers in Amiens. But he lacks his allies, and without allies, pressure on Beijing remains a dead letter.

Trump’s example: effective but not directly transferable

Trump’s unilateral approach is not entirely without merit. Chinese exports to the United States dropped by 37% in the first quarter of 2026. The American market is partially protected. But the problem, as perfectly analyzed by Chad Bown cited by Politico, is that this unilateral protection works in a closed loop: it protects the United States while dumping the Chinese surplus onto European markets. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said it bluntly: Washington will not wait for Europe to align its policies. The result is an asymmetry of protection that weakens the most exposed allies.

What is needed — and what neither Trump nor the Europeans managed to build in Évian — is a joint tariff mechanism: a coordinated response that aligns American and European protection levels on subsidized Chinese exports. Not to trigger a gratuitous trade war, but to signal to Beijing that the rule of subsidized dumping will no longer be tolerated on either side of the Atlantic. This is precisely what Macron was looking for in Évian. This is precisely what Trump refused.

What Western Unity Would Actually Change

The leverage of a coordinated position

Imagine for a moment that the Évian G7 had concluded with a coordinated tariff agreement against subsidized Chinese exports — electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, machine tools — with levels aligned among the US, EU, Japan, Canada, and the UK. The effect would be immediately transformative. Export markets representing the bulk of the record Chinese trade surplus would close simultaneously. Beijing would no longer have the possibility of redirecting its surpluses from one market to another based on unilateral sanctions. It would be forced into serious negotiation.

This is precisely what China fears. Xinhua and the Global Times have ramped up warnings against the emergence of a coordinated anti-China Western bloc. Threats of Chinese reprisals are real — but they are also designed to scare, to divide, to extract concessions before the negotiation even begins. A united West would bring down this rhetoric of intimidation. Because no economy, not even China’s, can afford to simultaneously cut itself off from its primary export markets.

Ukraine as a test of Western capacity for unity

The war in Ukraine has paradoxically proven that Western unity is possible when political will is present. The EU has mobilized tens of billions of euros in support. NATO has provided weapons, intelligence, and training. Even Trump, in Évian, stayed the course on support for Zelensky and recognized "unwavering support for Ukraine" in the final communiqué. The June 18-19 European Council decided to extend sanctions against Russia for one year — an unprecedented decision that breaks with the six-month cycle and sends a signal of stability.

This capacity for unity therefore exists. It manifests when the peril is perceived as immediate and existential. The challenge for Western leaders is to convince their public opinions and their electorates that the Chinese economic threat is just as existential as Russian military aggression. It’s a harder sell, because the cheap products flooding supermarket shelves don't look like tanks. But the gradual dismantling of the Western industrial fabric by unfair competition is an aggression — just a slow-motion aggression.

The September Trump-Xi Summit: Opportunity or Trap?

American bilateralism and its effects on Western architecture

The bilateral Trump-Xi summit scheduled for Washington in September 2026 is the event concentrating all the anxieties of G7 allies. The stake isn't simply what the two presidents will decide together — it’s what this bilateral format means for the architecture of Western relations with China. If Washington and Beijing conclude a new phase of their trade deal, with mutual concessions, without prior consultation with European or Japanese allies, the political message will be devastating: the United States is dealing with China over the heads of its partners.

The concerns of allied capitals are documented. According to Politico, discussions about the idea of cutting out Europe, Canada, and Japan — via an exclusive G2 format — are fueling suspicions that Trump might conclude investment deals harmful to the interests of his traditional partners. A year of punitive tariffs, threats over Greenland, and assertions about Canada being the 51st American state has already deeply cracked transatlantic trust. A Washington-Beijing agreement concluded outside any G7 framework would be the final blow to the idea of a common Western front.

The November trade truce: a sword of Damocles

The trade truce between the United States and China expires in November 2026. The Trump administration is seeking to extend it to avoid a return to the trade war that shook global markets the previous year. It is in this context that both the September summit and the already launched U.S.-China trade coordination mechanisms fit. The dynamic is paradoxical: while Washington presses Beijing on bilateral trade, Beijing continues to flood European and Asian markets with its subsidized exports. The American truce preserves the US market but leaves allies exposed.

The big question of autumn 2026 will therefore be: will Trump go to Washington in September to conclude a phase-two U.S.-China deal that secures American markets while leaving Europe and Japan to fend for themselves? Or will he agree to link this bilateral summit to a broader G7 coordination framework? Everything points, at this stage, to the first scenario being much more likely. And if that is the case, a disunited West will have given Beijing exactly what it was looking for: divide and rule, one summit at a time.

What Now? Three Concrete Paths for Western Unity

A permanent G7 tariff coordination mechanism

The first priority is institutional: a permanent tariff coordination mechanism within the G7 must be created, forcing member states to consult before adopting any major trade measure toward China. This mechanism doesn't need to be legally binding — it simply must create a political norm whereby no G7 member signs a bilateral agreement with Beijing without informing its allies. This is the minimum of strategic coordination. This is what was missing at Évian. This is what will be missing in Washington in September if nothing changes.

A precedent exists: Westerners demonstrated their ability to coordinate sanctions regimes against Russia within the framework of the Ukrainian conflict — numbered packages, unanimous decisions, regular reviews. This model of multilateral coordination can and must be adapted to trade policy toward China. Not to trigger an economic war, but to speak with one voice in negotiations with Beijing. The strength of coordination is that it transforms pressure into real leverage.

Coordinated reindustrialization and diversified supply chains

The second priority is industrial. The diversification instrument proposed by the European Commission — the one that would force companies to source from at least three distinct sources — must be adopted, and adopted quickly. It must be expanded to the G7 level, not just the European one. The American Critical Minerals Act, the G7 critical minerals initiatives, and efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese rare earths — all this must be coordinated in a common framework with mutual funding and shared goals.

Western reindustrialization is not a protectionist slogan. It is a strategic necessity. The Japanese rare earths episode — four months of restrictions that threatened the entire automotive production of a G7 country — is the blueprint Beijing would use in an even graver crisis. Preparing alternative supply chains takes time, massive public investment, and industrial coordination that neither the market alone nor a single state can achieve. It is exactly the type of project that requires the cooperation of the entire G7.

Conclusion: Unity Is the Only Response Equal to the Threat

What history will remember of the Évian G7

The Évian-les-Bains G7, held from June 15 to 17, 2026, will be remembered as a double-faced summit. On one hand, remarkable unity on Iran and Ukraine — Trump and his allies spoke together, supported Zelensky, hailed the Tehran deal, and extended sanctions against Moscow. On the other, a deep and concerning disunity on China: Macron pushes, Trump goes it alone, Europe hesitates, and Beijing observes with the serenity of one who knows time is on their side. The final communiqué on global trade imbalances is real, but vague. The commitment on critical minerals is concrete, but limited. The transatlantic rift over method remains wide open.

The dynamic of the following weeks — the June 18-19 European Council, the mandate given to von der Leyen, the new sanctions against Chinese firms supporting Russia — shows that Europe is waking up. Slowly, perhaps too slowly, but it is waking up. The question is no longer whether China constitutes a threat to the Western economic and security order. All G7 members agree on this point. The question is whether the West will be able to agree on the response before the window of opportunity closes.

The strategic urgency that no one dares name

A disunited West is the greatest gift democracies can offer Beijing. Every summit that concludes without a binding agreement, every bilateral treaty negotiated without consulting allies, every rift exposed on the international stage is an invitation for China to move its pawns forward. China trains Russian soldiers, arms Moscow with drone components, floods European markets with subsidized products, holds the Japanese hostage with its rare earths, and threatens companies that comply with Western sanctions. This is not a recalcitrant trade partner. It is the first systemic threat the West has faced since the Cold War.

Faced with this threat, the response cannot be every man for himself. The response cannot be the Washington-Beijing bilateral deal at the expense of allies. The response cannot be waiting for a European consensus that never comes. The response is the one that history has always validated against revisionist powers: unity, firmness, coherence. The G7 demonstrated in Évian that it is capable of this on Ukraine. It must prove, before the fall of 2026, that it is equally capable of it on China. Otherwise, in twenty years, we will wonder why no one wanted to see what was right in front of us.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

Politico — Trump, G7 split on China strategy — June 15, 2026

The Straits Times — EU says China trained Russian troops to fight in Ukraine war — June 16, 2026

Simon Gros — Europe's Strategic Turn: Ukraine, China, Russia, and the New Architecture of EU Power — June 21, 2026

Secondary Sources

WSWS — EU summit accelerates war course: Arms build-up, trade war, social cuts and anti-refugee measures — June 20, 2026

Politico — Trump's 'G2' ambitions haunt summit in France — June 15, 2026

San Francisco Chronicle — China Shock 2.0: Surging Chinese exports threaten Europe's economy, raising concern at G7 summit — June 16, 2026

Élysée — G7 Summit in Evian: Day Three — June 17, 2026

Euronews — EU summit: von der Leyen gets go-ahead to take tougher action on China — June 18, 2026