DECODED: Beijing Applauds the US-Iran Deal — But China’s Strategic Calculus is Lethal

Introduction: Beijing's Smile Atop the Ruins of the Middle East

A Perfectly Timed Diplomatic Volley

On June 18, 2026, while American and Iranian delegations were still trading suspicious glances in Switzerland, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Lin Jian, took the floor at his daily press conference with barely veiled satisfaction. China "welcomes" the preliminary agreement between Washington and Tehran — a memorandum of understanding that marks the end of more than one hundred days of conflict triggered by the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Tehran on February 28, 2026. The phrasing is polite, measured, almost benevolent. But behind this diplomatic veneer hides a strategic calculus of surgical precision.

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in its China-Taiwan update of June 18, 2026, the PRC welcomed the preliminary US-Iran peace agreement while highlighting its own diplomatic efforts to end the war. This is the heart of the problem: Beijing presents itself as a defender of international peace, but the ISW notes that China allegedly provided military equipment to Iran in violation of UN sanctions, even while pleading for a greater role for the Security Council in the peace process. The contradiction is total. And it is deliberate.

One Memorandum, Sixty Days, and a Thousand Ambiguities

The agreement itself — a 60-day roadmap signed electronically by the American and Iranian presidents on June 17, 2026, with an official ceremony in Switzerland on June 19 — is less a peace treaty than a framework to begin negotiating. It provides for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a gradual lifting of the U.S. naval blockade, and a sixty-day negotiation period on the Iranian nuclear program and sanctions relief. According to Al Jazeera, Iran has a stockpile of 440 kg of highly enriched uranium — a Sword of Damocles that negotiators will have to dismantle or secure. Qatar and Pakistan, serving as mediators, confirmed in a joint statement that the High-Level Committee has "agreed on a roadmap toward a final agreement within 60 days."

It is in this context of extreme fragility that China intervenes. Not to save the peace, but to reap its dividends — economic, strategic, and symbolic. To understand Beijing's calculus behind its support for this agreement is to understand how China plays firefighter by day while fueling the fire by night.

The Oil Axis: Hormuz, Beijing’s Vital Artery

Eighty to Ninety Percent of Iranian Oil Goes to China

The first lever of China's calculus is one of absolute economic brutality: according to the ISW, China purchased between 80 and 90% of Iranian oil in recent years. During the war, when the Strait of Hormuz was blocked or disrupted, Iranian energy flows took alternative routes that were more expensive and less reliable. Reopening the strait is not just a diplomatic victory for Trump — it is a breath of fresh air for the Chinese economic engine. Beijing depends on this maritime corridor for a considerable portion of its hydrocarbon imports, and any instability in the Gulf translates directly into pressure on energy prices in China.

According to Modern Diplomacy, China contributed behind the scenes to shaping the negotiating framework and influencing Tehran to accept the deal with the United States, precisely to safeguard its vital interests in the continuous flow of Iranian oil. This is a remarkable admission: Beijing didn't just cheer from the sidelines — it reportedly participated, discreetly, in the architecture of the peace. Not out of altruism, but out of strategic energy necessity.

The Belt and Road Initiative at the Heart of the Game

Iran is not just an oil supplier for Beijing: it is a crucial geographical and strategic node in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to Modern Diplomacy, Tehran represents an essential hub for China's continental infrastructure ambitions — a position that makes Iranian stability directly linked to the realization of Xi Jinping's geopolitical plans. An Iran at war, under embargo, and economically gutted is a partner that cannot fulfill its commitments in the BRI.

The US-Iran peace, however fragile, conditional, or limited to sixty days, restores the minimum conditions for large-scale economic cooperation between China and Iran. For Beijing, the agreement is not just good regional news — it is the restoration of a masterpiece on its Eurasian chessboard. Chinese pragmatism has no moral boundaries: peace is good if it serves the interests of the Belt and Road.

The China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: A Double-Edged Relationship

Lin Jian Made It Clear: Beijing is Tehran’s Comprehensive Strategic Partner

On June 18, 2026, Lin Jian made a point of reminding everyone, during the same press conference, that China stands ready to "consolidate and deepen mutual political trust with Iran, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, and advance the China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership." These words are not trivial. They signal that, US-Iranian agreement or not, Beijing intends to remain Tehran's preferred partner. Peace with Washington does not mean the end of Chinese influence over Iran — quite the contrary.

This partnership is an asset Beijing has cultivated over decades. According to Modern Diplomacy, China has maintained the flow of Iranian oil while simultaneously strengthening its extensive economic partnerships with Gulf States. This double game — being a friend to both Tehran and Riyadh, both Iran and the Emirates — is the signature of Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East: never an exclusive commitment, always a presence.

Strategic Partnership as Leverage Against American Influence

The ISW is direct in its analysis: China likely prefers a security architecture in the Middle East that reduces American influence in the region. By positioning itself as the champion of a new regional security architecture, by calling on the UN Security Council to play a larger role — a role where China holds a veto — Beijing is patiently building a multilateral framework that dilutes Washington's unilateral power.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke with his Pakistani counterpart Ishaq Dar on June 16 to emphasize China's engagement with the United States and Iran. He repeated the same message during a call with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on June 17: support for peace talks and backing for a new regional security architecture. Translation: American influence in the Gulf must be bracketed, limited, and multilateralized.

Under-the-Table Arms: Beijing Supplies War While Preaching Peace

MANPADS, Satellites, and Missile Fuel

The June 18, 2026 ISW report reveals the darkest side of China’s calculus. According to the Institute, Iran was in discussions with China in early 2026 to acquire man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS). Even more troubling: Iran reportedly used a Chinese-made MANPADS to shoot down an American F-16 on April 3, 2026 — although the exact acquisition date is not specified. If this is proven, it means China was directly arming America's adversary during an armed conflict.

That is not all. According to the ISW, China also provided Iran with satellite imagery that facilitated targeting, chemicals for the manufacture of missile fuel, and possibly an advanced radar system during the war. In parallel, on June 10, 2026, OFAC (the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control) sanctioned nine Chinese individuals and entities for supporting Iran's arms procurement, specifically for the benefit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This was not the first wave: similar sanctions had already been imposed on May 8, 2026.

Sanction Denial as Legal Cover

How does Beijing justify this behavior? By denying the legitimacy of the UN sanctions themselves. On June 9, 2026, just days before the signing of the peace agreement, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Sun Lei, stated that the Security Council had ceased its review of the Iranian nuclear program when the decade-long sanctions regime on Iran expired on October 18, 2025. When the United Kingdom, France, and Germany — the so-called "E3" group — triggered the "snapback" mechanism to restore lifted sanctions, citing Iran's failure to meet its nuclear obligations, Sun Lei refused to recognize that these sanctions were in effect.

The logic is remarkably perverse: according to the ISW, China reportedly uses its non-recognition of UN sanctions on Iran — including an arms embargo — to justify its arms sales to Iran, while simultaneously arguing that the Security Council should play a larger role. Beijing wants the benefits of UN multilateralism without accepting its constraints. It is the veto power applied to reality.

Xi Jinping and the Four-Point Proposal: The Art of Appearing Without Acting

A "Peace Proposal" That Wasn’t a Peace Plan

Lin Jian made sure to mention, during his June 18 conference, Xi Jinping's four-point proposal for peace in the Middle East, first presented in April 2026. According to the ISW, this proposal was not a peace plan, but a general statement supporting principles: peaceful coexistence, national sovereignty, the primacy of international law, and the coordination between security and development. In other words: pious wishes without an enforcement mechanism, without concrete commitments, without a timetable.

Yet, Lin Jian cites it as proof that China has worked "tirelessly" to stop the fighting. The ISW notes cautiously that it is not established that China played any role in negotiating the US-Iran memorandum. Beijing's diplomacy in the Middle East often looks like this: being present in statements, absent in difficult compromises, and yet reaping the laurels of the mediator.

Wang Yi as Self-Proclaimed Arbiter

The telephone calls from Wang Yi — with Ishaq Dar on June 16, with Abbas Araghchi on June 17 — serve primarily to reaffirm Beijing's presence in the file. Wang insisted that the phase-two negotiations will likely be more difficult and that the international community should support the process. This is a comfortable position: providing verbal support for the tough talks ahead without committing to pay the price of a potential failure.

China calls for a greater role for the Security Council in the peace process. Knowing that Beijing holds a permanent veto power there, this demand is less an act of multilateral altruism than a maneuver to ensure an institutional right of oversight on any final agreement. If the phase-two negotiations lead to a definitive agreement framing the Iranian nuclear program, China wants to be at the table — not to facilitate, but to block what does not suit it.

The Winner’s Calculus: Beijing Wins on Every Front

The US-Iran Peace as a Strategic Godsend

Paradoxically, the US-Iran deal that Beijing applauds is more an American victory than a Chinese one — at least on the surface. Trump can claim to have ended the conflict, reopened Hormuz, and avoided nuclear proliferation. But fundamentally, China emerges as the winner in this configuration. According to the website abhs.in, which analyzed market data, at the time of the agreement, Russia and China had both vetoed a Security Council resolution aimed at keeping Hormuz closed in April 2026 — a maneuver that showed the two powers did not have the same calculus regarding the crisis.

Throughout the duration of the conflict, China was receiving Iranian oil at heavily discounted prices via alternative routes. With the normalization of Hormuz, Iranian oil returns to the global market at more transparent prices — which reduces the scarcity premium Iran enjoyed in its negotiations with Beijing. This is a slightly less favorable situation for Beijing in the short term, but long-term stability is well worth the sacrifice. A stable and reconstructing Iran is a far more profitable trade partner than an Iran under blockade.

The Pentagon Blacklist and Beijing’s Counter-Offensive

The peace deal does not prevent Sino-American strategic friction from intensifying. According to the ISW, the U.S. Department of Defense expanded its list of Chinese entities considered affiliated with the PRC military — the famous "1260H list" — to include 65 new entities, including tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent. This list takes effect on June 30, 2026, banning the Pentagon from contracting with these companies. Beijing responded by denouncing these measures as illegitimate interference.

This is one of the fundamental paradoxes of the period: even while they smile at each other over the Iranian issue, Washington and Beijing are clashing head-on over technology, Taiwan, and the list of militarized entities. The US-Iran peace is an episode in a much broader structural conflict — and China is never the simple benevolent observer it claims to be.

Taiwan in the Background: The Iranian Lesson as Read from Taipei

The US-Iran Deal as a Signal for Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy

The US-Iran conflict and its resolution offer Beijing valuable lessons for its Taiwan file. The ISW, whose June 18 update covers both the Iranian issue and the China-Taiwan dynamic, notes that Taiwan was hoping for a new package of American arms sales during the same period. The Taiwanese president had stated that Taiwan was "not provoking" China — a revealing defensive phrasing.

The Chinese reading of the Iranian crisis is simple: the United States can be militarily decisive — the February 28 strikes on Tehran proved it — but they also seek quick negotiated exits. An agreement in sixty days, a fuzzy roadmap, and Trump can claim victory. For Beijing, this means any military action against Taiwan must be calibrated to be too fast and too accomplished to allow for a comparable American response. The US-Iran dynamic directly feeds the PRC's military calculus regarding Taiwan.

Regional Security Architecture as an Exportable Model

Wang Yi called for a new regional security architecture in the Middle East — an architecture that would reduce American influence and place regional and global powers, including China, at the center of decisions. It is a model that Beijing would like to duplicate in the Asia-Pacific. If China succeeds in being recognized as an indispensable actor for peace in the Middle East, it strengthens its legitimacy to play a similar role in Asian regional issues — including the one concerning Taiwan.

The consistency of Chinese strategy is striking here: accumulate diplomatic capital in the Middle East to reinvest it in negotiations over Taiwan, Pacific issues, and the reform of international institutions. Every agreement where Beijing is present reinforces the narrative of a responsible China. It is a long-term construction of legitimacy that directly serves Xi Jinping’s power interests.

Russia in the Equation: A Cumbrous Ally with Divergent Interests

Moscow Wanted Chaos, Beijing Prefers Peace — For Now

The US-Iran deal reveals a fundamental divergence between Moscow and Beijing that Western commentators tend to downplay. According to the analysis by abhs.in, the Russian calculus regarding the Iranian crisis was simple and brutal: closing Hormuz kept oil prices high, which directly fed the Kremlin's revenues to finance the war in Ukraine and counterbalance Western sanctions. Moscow had a direct interest in prolonging the conflict.

China, on the other hand, had the opposite interest: the reopening of Hormuz, price stability, and the return of trade flows. Beijing co-voted with Moscow in the Security Council to block attempts to isolate Iran, but for different reasons. Where Moscow wanted the maintenance of a combative Iran as a disruptor of the American order, Beijing wanted an Iran that was stable, profitable, and integrated into its system of trade partnerships. These two visions are fundamentally incompatible in the long run.

The Sino-Russian Alliance: A Marriage of Convenience with Separate Agendas

The war in Ukraine remains the prism through which the Sino-Russian relationship must be read. Putin needs China as an economic lifeline, a buyer of devalued oil, and diplomatic support. Beijing takes advantage of Russian weakness to establish itself as the dominant partner in the bilateral relationship — a historic reversal of the balance of power between the two giants. But the divergence over Iran shows that their interests are not aligned.

For Ukraine and its allies, the key lies precisely in this fissure between Beijing and Moscow. If China prefers a stable Middle East and a functional global economy, it paradoxically has an interest in seeing the war in Ukraine — which destabilizes markets, fuels inflation, and weakens global supply chains — come to an end as well. The West has not yet known how to exploit this angle with enough finesse. It is a strategic opportunity that remains largely untapped.

The Soft Power of Peace: Beijing as Global Narrative Architect

Posing as a Mediator While Serving as a Co-Belligerent

There is a cruel irony in the Chinese posture: while potentially having armed Iran — via MANPADS, satellite imagery, and chemicals for missiles — Beijing presents itself as an architect of peace in the Middle East. This position is not intellectually tenable, but it is very effective politically. In the capitals of the Global South, which do not have access to ISW reports or OFAC press releases, the message that sticks is simple: China wanted peace, and it arrived.

According to Modern Diplomacy, China played a diplomatic bridge role, often unrecognized, between Tehran and Washington. This cautious phrasing — "often unrecognized" — translates exactly the problem: Beijing invests in actions whose effects can be attributed to its goodwill, even when those effects are ambiguous or contradictory. The narrative of China as a peacemaking power is a considerable soft power asset, particularly in countries in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.

The Diplomacy of Systematic Presence

Lin Jian at the June 15 conference. Wang Yi on the phone on the 16th. Wang Yi again on the 17th. Lin Jian again on the 18th. The Chinese diplomatic presence is systematic, repetitive, and deliberate. Every statement, every call, every communique builds an image of China as an indispensable actor. This is not diplomacy in the classical sense — it is large-scale reputation manufacturing, conducted with the precision of an institutional marketing campaign.

In comparison, Western responses to the Iranian crisis have often been reactive, divided, or late. The European Union, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany issued joint statements reminding that "Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon" — a phrasing that implicitly recognizes that the risk remains. Meanwhile, Beijing reaps the laurels of a peace it did not forge, for reasons it does not reveal.

Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Time Bomb Beijing Leaves Ticking

440 kg of Enriched Uranium and a List of Unanswered Questions

At the heart of the crisis remains the Iranian nuclear program. The sixty days of negotiation are supposed to resolve what has not been resolved for decades. Al Jazeera reminds us that the main dilemmas remain intact: Can Iran continue to enrich uranium? What do we do with the stockpile of 440 kg of 60% enriched uranium — a rate to be compared to the 90% threshold for weapons? What level of international inspections will be allowed? At what pace will sanctions be lifted?

The ideal American position, according to Al Jazeera, would be to ban Iran from all enrichment for about twenty years. Iran, for its part, insists on its sovereign right to peaceful enrichment guaranteed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These positions are structurally incompatible. The sixty days risk looking more like a delay than a solution. And in this interval, who is monitoring the Iranian nuclear program?

China, the Silent Shareholder in Maintaining Iranian Nuclear Ambiguity

Iranian nuclear ambiguity indirectly serves Chinese interests. An Iran that retains a nuclear threshold potential — capable of building a bomb within a short timeframe — remains a thorn in the American side in the Middle East. It is a permanent source of strategic distraction for Washington, in the same way that North Korea is in Northeast Asia. If the sixty days lead to a solid nuclear agreement that definitively defuses the Iranian threat, America could regain a freedom of strategic movement that would be, de facto, a disadvantage for Beijing.

China therefore has no real interest in pushing for an overly ambitious Iranian nuclear deal. It can support the process in its speeches, applaud progress, and simultaneously ensure that negotiations stay within the limits of what is acceptable for Tehran — meaning, never too restrictive. It is the beauty of the double game: being present without ever forcing the final resolution.

Trump, Iran, and China: Three Actors in an Unstable Equation

Trump Claims Victory — Beijing Reaps the Dividends

President Donald Trump declared the deal "finalized" on social media, simultaneously authorizing "the toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz" and the "immediate lifting of the American naval blockade." The Trumpian phrasing is true to the man: triumphant, direct, and politically exploitable. He can claim to have ended a conflict of more than one hundred days, reopened the world's main oil artery, and forced Iran to commit on the nuclear issue.

What is less visible in Trump’s triumph is that the very framework of the agreement — sixty days, memorandum of understanding, a second phase to be negotiated — leaves all the difficult problems in suspense. Al Jazeera quotes an expert saying that "nothing significant has yet been negotiated on the nuclear program" and that "the memorandum serves as a framework to initiate negotiations, not as a result." Trump sold the packaging. The delivery remains to be made. And it is in this space between the announcement and the execution that China settles in comfortably.

Vice President Vance and the Agreement’s Contradictions

JD Vance, the American Vice President, defended the deal while denying Iranian claims about the release of $24 billion in frozen assets. According to him, "what is accurate is that Iran will have a much brighter and more prosperous future if it fulfills its commitments" — a conditional formula that is not a guarantee. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had for their part claimed that $12 billion would be released even before negotiations began. These internal contradictions in the US-Iranian agreement are exactly the type of instability that Beijing monitors — and is ready to exploit if the sixty days collapse.

The Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei approved the memorandum while expressing "serious reservations." This phrasing reveals the internal fragility of the process on the Iranian side. If the phase-two negotiations derail, Beijing will be there — with its pipelines, its comprehensive strategic partnerships, and its silent arms deliveries — to pick up the pieces.

The Gulf and the West: American Influence in Reconfiguration

Gulf Allies in an Uncomfortable Position

The US-Iran peace does not satisfy all regional actors. Israel continued strikes in Lebanon even after the deal was announced — raids that killed at least five people according to Lebanese media, reports The Straits Times. Lin Jian specifically pointed to Israel, calling on it to "comply with the general trend of regional peace and stability" and to do more to facilitate the implementation of the agreement and the phase-two negotiations. The fact that China allows itself to publicly warn Israel is itself revealing of Chinese diplomatic ambition in the region.

The Gulf States — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar — are navigating complex waters. Qatar played a mediating role in the US-Iran negotiations, as did Pakistan. This configuration illustrates that the Middle East is reorganizing around non-Western actors — a process China has actively encouraged for years. The reopening of Hormuz benefits everyone, but the diplomatic framework that led to it is increasingly less American.

Europe Absent from the Main Table

The European Union and its main members — France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy — issued a joint statement calling for the implementation of the agreement and reminding that Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon. CNN reported that the G7 had welcomed the interim agreement while calling for an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon. But Europe is not at the main negotiating table. It is the United States, Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar who are negotiating — with China in the wings.

This European marginalization is worrying. The West should not be content with commenting on the Iranian nuclear negotiations — it should be co-piloting them. Every time Europe is absent from a critical negotiating table, it is a space that China is ready to occupy. The power of the West lies in its unity, and this unity is cruelly lacking in the Iranian file.

Lessons for the West: Decoding Beijing Before It’s Too Late

The Chinese Model of the Double Game: Peace as a Facade, Influence Behind the Scenes

China’s posture in the US-Iran crisis offers a practical manual for strategic double-dealing. Beijing has simultaneously: verbally supported the peace process, potentially supplied weapons to Iran, denied the legitimacy of UN sanctions, called for strengthening the role of the UN, claimed to be an indispensable mediator, and preserved its comprehensive strategic partnership with Tehran for the post-agreement era. Each element of this list logically contradicts the other. But together, they form a coherent strategy: maximize options, minimize commitments, and recover the benefits.

For the West — and in particular for the democracies that carry the weight of international security — the lesson is clear: Beijing's declarations are only worth something if they are accompanied by verifiable behaviors. The June 10, 2026 OFAC sanctions against Chinese entities linked to Iranian arms purchases are exactly the right kind of response: documented, targeted, and public. It will take more than that.

Building a Western Doctrine Against the Chinese Double Game

The Western response to the Chinese game must combine engagement, documentation, and deterrence. Engagement: continue to work with Beijing on files where interests converge, such as energy market stability and nuclear non-proliferation. Documentation: systematically make public Chinese behaviors that violate sanctions, fuel the arsenals of adversarial regimes, and contradict official peace rhetoric. Deterrence: ensure that the cost for Beijing of its violations — via targeted sanctions, technological restrictions, and a strengthened military presence in Taiwan and the South China Sea — is high enough to alter the Chinese strategic calculus.

This triptych is not easy to implement. It requires a transatlantic unity that Trump weakens with his unilateralist instinct. It requires a consistency between words and deeds that the West has not always demonstrated. And it requires a strategic patience comparable to Beijing's — which is perhaps the most difficult challenge for democracies subject to short electoral cycles.

Conclusion: Beijing Has Played Its Hand; the West Must Wake Up

A Peace Deal with China as the Silent, Major Beneficiary

The preliminary US-Iran agreement of June 17-18, 2026 is a partial diplomatic success — fragile, contested, and loaded with ambiguities regarding the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz. But it allows Trump to claim a victory, Iran to envision a way out of the crisis, and the region to catch its breath after more than one hundred days of brutal conflict. What is less visible in the headlines is that the People's Republic of China emerges strategically strengthened.

Beijing used the crisis to consolidate its partnership with Iran, build its reputation as a peace mediator, challenge the legitimacy of Western sanctions, maintain its channels of influence in UN institutions, and position its economic interests for the post-war Iranian era. All this without sending a single soldier, without assuming a single visible political risk. It is the triumph of strategic calculus over direct engagement.

What the Next Stage Demands of the West

The sixty days of negotiation now beginning will be decisive. If a solid nuclear agreement emerges, the West will have a window to strengthen verification and control mechanisms — and to ensure that China is not Tehran's main interlocutor for the years to come. If the negotiations fail, the instability of the Middle East will rebound, and Beijing will be there to profit from it.

The West must read Beijing as Beijing reads itself: without illusions, without naivety, but without hysteria either. China is not an irresistible empire — it has its own flaws, its own contradictions, its own economic and social fragilities. But it is, today, the most strategically coherent actor on the international stage. And it is exactly for this reason that the West can no longer afford to play in reaction. It must learn to play ahead.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

ISW — China & Taiwan Update, June 18, 2026: PRC welcomed US-Iran preliminary peace agreement — June 18, 2026

Chinese Embassy in Kenya — Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference, June 18, 2026 — June 18, 2026

Al Jazeera — Optics of peace first, details later: The US-Iran 60-day challenge — June 16, 2026

Secondary Sources

Modern Diplomacy — China's stance on the US-Iran agreement and its terms — June 16, 2026

The Straits Times — China says 'welcomes' Iran-US signing deal to end Middle East war — June 18, 2026

China Daily — China welcomes US-Iran MoU, urges Israel to champion peace — June 18, 2026

Times of Israel — Iran's foreign minister says 'major progress' made; US-Iran agree on 60-day roadmap — June 22, 2026

CGTN — Iranian, US presidents sign peace MoU digitally — June 18, 2026