ANALYSIS: Beijing, the US-Iran Deal, and the Great Taiwanese Calculation — What the ISW Reveals

Introduction: On June 18, 2026, the ISW Lifts the Veil on Beijing's Global Strategy

An update that goes beyond the regional scope

On June 18, 2026, the Institute for the Study of War published its weekly China & Taiwan Update. On paper, it is a routine document. In reality, this report constitutes one of the densest strategic readings of the year: in a few thousand words, ISW analysts map out how Beijing simultaneously reads three chessboards — the Middle East, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. This is an overall vision that Western chancelleries would do well not to ignore.

The US-Iranian agreement, formalized as a memorandum of understanding on June 17-18, 2026, offers the People's Republic of China a golden opportunity to reposition itself on the international stage. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian was quick to welcome the agreement, praise Xi Jinping's peace efforts, and demand a strengthened role for the UN. Behind the diplomatic facade, the reality is murkier: Beijing reportedly provided military equipment to Tehran in violation of UN sanctions.

Why this update is crucial for understanding Taiwan

At first glance, the US-Iran deal has nothing to do with Taiwan. But the PRC's geopolitical logic is systemic: every retreat of American power in one region constitutes a signal exploitable elsewhere. The ISW writes it bluntly — Beijing prefers a security architecture in the Middle East that reduces American influence in the region. This is a reproducible calculation, potentially transferable to the Indo-Pacific.

This ISW report should not be read as an isolated news bulletin. It is part of a series of converging indicators: delays in the Taiwanese defense budget, Chinese sanctions against a Philippine minister, the deployment of a People's Liberation Army carrier strike group east of the Philippines, and the expansion of the Pentagon's 1260H list. All these are pieces of a puzzle that the West must assemble quickly.

The US-Iran Deal: Beijing Applauds, but Its Hands Aren't Clean

A meticulously orchestrated facade diplomacy

On June 15, 2026, spokesperson Lin Jian stated that China welcomes the memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran on the cessation of military operations and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Lin claimed the PRC worked "tirelessly" to end the fighting and highlighted Xi Jinping's four-point proposal — peaceful coexistence, national sovereignty, international rule of law, and coordination between security and development. This proposal, presented in April, is not a concrete peace plan: it is a statement of principles vague enough for Beijing to claim credit without being constrained.

On June 17, Wang Yi called Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi — at the latter's request — to reiterate Chinese support for the agreement. Araghchi publicly thanked China for its active role in the negotiations. Trump himself stated that Beijing likely helped facilitate the de-escalation thanks to its "neutral position." The stagecraft is perfect. But the ISW emphasizes that the PRC's actual role in negotiating the memorandum remains uncertain.

Chinese weapons in the US-Iranian war

The picture becomes significantly more complicated when examining actions rather than speeches. The US Treasury Department's OFAC office sanctioned nine Chinese individuals and entities on June 10, 2026, for supporting Iran's weapons procurement program, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Similar sanctions had already been imposed on May 8. Iran reportedly even used a Chinese-made man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) to shoot down an American F-16 on April 3, though the ISW specifies the exact acquisition date remains unknown. The PRC also provided satellite imagery that aided Iranian targeting, chemicals for missile fuel manufacturing, and possibly an advanced radar system.

Simultaneously, the PRC's deputy representative to the UN, Sun Lei, denied on June 9 the legitimacy of active UN sanctions against Iran — just days before the signing of the peace deal. Beijing is contesting the "snapback" mechanism activated by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Translation: the PRC allows itself to arm a belligerent while demanding a larger role for the UN in the peace process. The cynicism is absolutely consistent.

Xi's Four-Point Proposal: Strategic Ambiguity or Rhetorical Void?

A plan without constraints, a position without risks

The ISW is explicit: Xi Jinping's four-point proposal is not a peace plan. It is a declaration of general principles — peaceful coexistence, sovereignty, international law, security-development coordination — abstract enough that Beijing can claim any outcome as a victory. If the war ends, Xi claims mediation. If it continues, Xi denounces American intransigence. It is a cost-free posture.

Wang Yi, during his June 16 calls with Pakistani counterpart Ishaq Dar and June 17 with Araghchi, reiterated that the UN Security Council should play a larger role in the peace process and that Middle Eastern countries should work together on a new regional security architecture. This formula — designed to sound progressive — is actually a disguised call to exclude the United States from an architecture Beijing hopes to shape. The West must read this rhetoric for what it is.

Energy, the real driver of Chinese engagement

China has bought between 80 and 90% of Iranian oil for several years. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz — closed since the start of hostilities — is therefore an existential issue for the Chinese economy. Beijing welcomes the US-Iran deal not out of diplomatic idealism, but because the stability of the strait directly serves its energy and trade interests. The agreement notably provides for the suspension of sanctions on Iranian oil exports, a measure of which Beijing is one of the primary beneficiaries.

This economic reality explains why Beijing maintained a measured posture throughout the conflict. China doesn't need to take military risks to profit from the situation. It only needs to wait, sell, and reap the diplomatic dividends when the storm subsides. It is a strategy of silent accumulation that Western defense analysts must integrate into their models.

The Taiwanese Defense Budget: A Crack Beijing is Watching Closely

Nine months of deadlock, billions in limbo

The Taiwanese Executive Yuan submitted its general budget proposal for fiscal year 2026 in August 2025. It is now June 2026: opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), which together hold a majority in the Legislative Yuan, have blocked the budget review for over nine months. They threaten to cut entire sections of funding, particularly for Taiwan's armament and international outreach programs. The general budget allocates 561.4 billion Taiwan dollars (approximately 17.8 billion US dollars) to the Ministry of National Defense — an increase of about 20% compared to 2025.

This budget funds concrete capabilities: personnel, logistics, maintenance of key weapon systems like the Harpoon anti-ship missile. It aligns with President William Lai Ching-te's goal of reaching 3.3% of GDP spent on defense. Taiwan currently spends about 2.4% of its GDP on its defense. In May, a reduced special defense budget was adopted — but without the funding for domestic drones and US-Taiwan joint drone development, which the KMT and TPP blocked.

Washington sends an alarm signal

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the functional equivalent of the US embassy, stated that further delays in military funding constituted a "concession to the Chinese Communist Party." Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May, affirmed that the US expected its allies to spend 3.5% of GDP on defense and would prioritize cooperation with these "model allies." Trump, for his part, has mentioned up to 5% of GDP eventually. Taiwan is not yet at that level — and its parliament is actively blocking progress.

The ISW is clear: Taiwan's failure to adopt a defense budget without major cuts could negatively impact international perceptions of Taiwan's defense capability. This isn't just a budgetary issue. It is a signal sent to Washington, Tokyo, Seoul — and especially Beijing. Every month of deadlock is information that the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee records and analyzes. Taiwan's internal disunity is Beijing's objective ally.

President Lai Facing the Drone Gap: Seeking Funds Elsewhere

Innovation bypassed by domestic politics

On June 16, 2026, President Lai Ching-te announced he would seek other methods to develop Taiwan's unmanned systems capabilities, including by allocating additional funds in the general budget. The realization is bitter: the special defense budget adopted in May, under pressure from the KMT and TPP, excluded all funding for the development of a national drone industry and for joint US-Taiwan production of unmanned systems. This choice is militarily irrational in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, which demonstrated that drones have become decisive force multipliers on any modern battlefield.

The PLA is investing heavily in its drone capabilities. Beijing has learned the lessons of Ukraine. If Taiwan enters a conflict with the PRC in the foreseeable future, the lack of indigenous unmanned systems will be a critical vulnerability. The KMT and TPP are playing domestic politics at the expense of national security — and in doing so, they offer Beijing a potential advantage on the ground before the first bullet is even fired.

The dilemma of external dependence

One recurring criticism from the KMT and TPP is that Taiwan depends too much on American arms deliveries, which are often delayed. Sixty-six F-16Vs ordered from the United States have still not been delivered. The frustration is understandable. But the answer to external dependence cannot be to reduce defense budgets and block domestic capabilities: it is exactly the opposite of what should be done. Developing a national drone industry is precisely about reducing dependence on Washington while increasing the island's resilience.

President Lai clearly sees this contradiction. His pledge to reach 3.3% of GDP in defense spending and his commitment to the domestic drone industry are policies consistent with the asymmetric defense doctrine that Washington has been recommending for years. Parliamentary obstruction is not just a political quarrel — it is a threat to Taiwan's strategic credibility.

The Pentagon's 1260H List: Alibaba and Tencent Join the "Chinese Military Companies"

A significant expansion that irritates Beijing

On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense expanded its list of Chinese entities considered affiliated with the PRC military — the 1260H list — by adding 65 new entities. Among them are tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent, as well as drone and robotics companies, biotechnology, and battery manufacturing. Ten entities were removed. There are now 188 entities on this list. Starting June 30, 2026, the DoD will be prohibited from contracting directly with these companies. Starting June 30, 2027, DoD subcontractors will also be prohibited from sourcing from them.

The PRC Ministry of Commerce expressed "firm opposition" to this announcement, claiming it goes against the consensus reached by Xi Jinping and Donald Trump during their meeting in May 2026 and harms bilateral interests. The paradox is delightful: Beijing invokes a diplomatic agreement concluded a few weeks ago to contest American national security measures legally mandated since 2023. The PRC's military-civil fusion strategy is precisely what Washington is seeking to counter.

Trump's restraint: Postponing the blacklist of 100 firms

According to Reuters on June 16, the Trump administration decided not to add more than 100 additional Chinese firms to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) blacklist to avoid escalating tensions with the PRC. This restraint confirms the ambivalent nature of Trumpian policy toward Beijing: tough on the 1260H list, conciliatory on the BIS entity list. Trump navigates between competitive pressure and managing the bilateral relationship, oscillating between confrontation and management. It is the "necessary evil" in its purest form.

This double register illustrates the fundamental tension of US policy toward China under Trump: containing the PRC's technological and military rise while preserving communication channels that avoid uncontrolled escalation. Western allies must understand that this ambivalence is not a weakness — it is a tactic. But it has limits, and Beijing is methodically probing them.

The Philippines Sanctioned by Beijing: Rhetoric That Recalls Taiwan

Gilberto Teodoro: First sitting minister sanctioned by the PRC

On June 11, 2026, Beijing sanctioned Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro for making "erroneous" remarks about the PRC and undermining Chinese sovereignty. The sanctions prohibit Teodoro and his family from entering China or doing business there. This is the first time the PRC has sanctioned a sitting minister of a nation it diplomatically recognizes. Teodoro had stated in a Reuters interview on May 30 that the PRC was a "serious territorial threat" to the Philippines. He had called a Chinese aid offer "deceptive" and rejected the "nine-dash line" claim.

Beijing's reaction is disproportionate to the remarks — and that's precisely the point. The PRC seeks to impose individual costs on officials who resist its expansion in the South China Sea, without alienating the entire Philippine population. This surgical calculation reveals a coercive sophistication: punishing dissenting voices within partner state apparatuses while maintaining the facade of a functional bilateral relationship.

A mirror of the discourse on Taiwan

The ISW notes a striking correspondence between the language used against Teodoro and that employed against the Taiwanese government of Lai Ching-te. A PRC spokesperson called Teodoro a representative of "a small group of anti-China elements" whose actions would harm the interests of the Philippine people. This formula is nearly identical to the designations of "die-hard separatists" that Beijing applies to Taiwanese officials. Chinese state media used similar language to target Teodoro and the Taipei government.

This parallel rhetoric reveals a strategy of narrative normalization: by treating the Philippines as a test case, Beijing refines the coercive mechanisms it could apply to Taiwan on a larger scale. This isn't analytical paranoia — it is pattern recognition documented by the ISW. The South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait are two theaters of the same play.

Scarborough Shoal: Beijing Installs, Tests, Then Withdraws — Only to Start Again

The floating structure and the game of normalization

In late May 2026, the PRC installed for the first time a manned floating structure inside Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc), a reef claimed by the Philippines located well within their exclusive economic zone. Beijing claimed it was a "comprehensive scientific research" mission. The structure, which housed up to six personnel, was removed on June 16, 2026, according to the ISW — just days after the announcement of the US-Iran deal. The Philippines maintained that Scarborough Shoal is and will remain "a vital part of Philippine territory."

The withdrawal is not a concession. It is a boiling frog tactic: install, let a diplomatic protest be voiced, withdraw, repeat with slightly more permanent infrastructure. The PLAN had also deployed a carrier strike group east of the Philippines since May 19 and had mobilized significant naval assets in response to the US-Philippine Balikatan exercises. These activities are part of a broader effort to exercise de facto control over Scarborough Shoal since 2012.

The maritime militia and gray zone warfare

China's strategy in the South China Sea relies on the maritime militia — armed fishing boats that are neither quite military nor quite civilian, allowing Beijing to maintain a permanent presence without triggering the threshold for an allied military response. Chinese Coast Guard vessels patrolled Scarborough Shoal 352 days out of 365 in 2025, according to available data. In 2025, the days of presence by Chinese vessels at Scarborough Shoal more than doubled compared to 2024.

The ISW notes that the PRC has used environmental pretexts to assert its territorial claims, notably by establishing a "nature reserve" around Scarborough Shoal and accusing the Philippines of causing environmental damage to structures the PRC claims. This instrumentalization of international law is a proven operating mode. Beijing subverts the multilateral institutions it claims to defend. What we see in the South China Sea today, Taiwan could experience in the Strait tomorrow.

The American Posture: Selective Firmness in a Context of Triangulation with Beijing

Shangri-La, allies, and the 3.5% GDP threshold

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2026, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that the US expected its allies to spend 3.5% of their GDP on defense and would prioritize cooperation with these "model" allies. Trump mentioned up to 5% of GDP over ten years. These figures are not arbitrary: they reflect the American strategic recalibration seeking to offload part of the defense responsibilities onto Indo-Pacific allies while maintaining American preeminence.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States identifies China as the primary threat and defines the defense of the Indo-Pacific as the second regional strategic priority after the defense of the American homeland. It explicitly calls for "erecting a solid defense-by-denial along the First Island Chain" — impossible without Taiwan. Yet, Washington is sending contradictory signals: tough on the 1260H list, soft on the BIS list, attentive to the dividends of the Xi-Trump meeting in May.

The Xi-Trump meeting in May and its ambiguities

The Xi-Trump meeting in May 2026 has become a constant reference in diplomatic disputes between Washington and Beijing. Beijing invokes the "consensuses" reached during this meeting to contest American measures — 1260H lists, OFAC sanctions, export controls. Washington responds that these measures are independent of bilateral diplomacy. This tension reveals a structural problem: summit meetings generate expectations that bureaucracies cannot honor without compromising national security imperatives. Trump plays both sides — which is perhaps his only strategic virtue in this context.

The ISW notes that the Trump administration decided not to add more than 100 Chinese firms to the BIS list to avoid escalation. This decision reflects the Trumpist doctrine of the "necessary evil": keeping channels open with Beijing while maintaining competitive pressure. It is a risky strategy — but perhaps the only practicable one in a world where Sino-American economic interdependence remains colossal.

The Strait of Hormuz, China's Energy Dependence, and the Arc of Vulnerability

Hormuz as both lever and brake

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz since the start of US-Iranian hostilities has inflicted considerable damage on the Chinese refining sector. Beijing is the largest buyer of Iranian oil — between 80 and 90% of Iranian exports were destined for it. The disruption of supplies put pressure on domestic fuel prices and shook the logistics of Chinese heavy industry. The reopening of the strait is not just a diplomatic victory: it is a breath of economic oxygen for Beijing.

But this energy vulnerability is also a lever that the West should document more seriously. A Beijing dependent on Iranian oil — and therefore on the Strait of Hormuz — is a Beijing that cannot afford to totally destabilize the Middle East. Beijing's containment strategy has a natural limit: its dependence on energy flows that American naval power still controls. This is not an argument for Western complacency. It is a negotiating lever the West does not exploit enough.

The 300 billion reconstruction fund: Beijing as investor

The US-Iran memorandum of understanding also provides for a $300 billion private Reconstruction and Development Fund, more than half of which is reportedly already committed by companies from the Gulf, Asia, Africa, and South America. This fund — structured as a private investment vehicle rather than a government program — targets the Iranian energy, logistics, manufacturing, and transport sectors. Chinese companies are among the best positioned to benefit from this windfall, given their 25-year bilateral cooperation agreement with Tehran.

It is the classic pattern of Chinese economic diplomacy: let the Americans secure the region militarily, then move in as investor and builder once the dust has settled. This is what Beijing did in Iraq after 2003. It's what it will do in Iran after 2026. The West secures, China picks up the contracts. This model thrives because the West has not yet found a coherent economic response to the Chinese infrastructure strategy on a global scale.

The PRC's Military-Civil Fusion: From Technology to the Battlefield

Alibaba, Tencent, BYD — actors in national defense

The addition of Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and BYD to the Pentagon's 1260H list is not an arbitrary punitive measure. It is the recognition of a structural reality: under the PRC's military-civil fusion policy, any Chinese tech company is potentially at the service of the Communist Party's military priorities. Chinese national security laws require private companies to cooperate with intelligence services when requested. There are no truly private companies in China — there are private companies until the Party decides otherwise.

The DoD expressly cited the PRC's military-civil fusion strategy as justification for expanding the list. The new entities cover the drone, robotics, biotechnology, and battery sectors — fields directly linked to military modernization. The integration of commercial technologies into weapon systems is not unique to China, but the systematization of this integration through state policy makes the PRC unique in its kind.

Western defense supply chains under surveillance

Starting June 30, 2026, the DoD will no longer be able to contract directly with these 188 entities. Starting June 30, 2027, DoD subcontractors will no longer be able to source from them. This measure will have profound implications for Western defense supply chains, which often depend on components manufactured by Chinese companies. The weaning process will be painful and costly — but necessary.

What the ISW update highlights is the PRC's systemic consistency: providing weapons to Iran (via opaque channels), buying satellites for targeting, investing in regional infrastructure, and contesting the legitimacy of international sanctions — all while occupying dominant positions in global technological chains. This is not a coincidence. It is an integrated strategy.

The Detention of U Min Zin: Beijing Muzzles Foreign Researchers

An American academic arrested in Beijing

On June 12, 2026, Chinese MFA spokesperson Lin Jian confirmed that PRC authorities had detained U Min Zin, an American researcher specializing in the foreign policy of Myanmar and China. U Min Zin is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Berkeley and the founder and executive director of the Myanmar Institute for Strategic and Policy (ISP-Myanmar). His detention illustrates an alarming trend: Beijing targeting foreign academics and researchers whose work illuminates the blind spots of Chinese strategy.

This arrest is not isolated. It is part of a context of growing repression of critical voices regarding the PRC's foreign policy, whether they are academic, journalistic, or diplomatic. The message is unequivocal: producing knowledge about China carries real personal risks for foreign nationals on Chinese territory. Academic freedom is a Western value that Beijing considers a threat.

Information control as a strategic weapon

The detention of foreign researchers serves several objectives at once: it discourages independent analytical work on China, signals to Western governments the potential cost of criticism, and reinforces Beijing's position as an unavoidable actor in defining the official narrative of its own policy. A West less informed about the PRC's real strategy is a West less capable of countering it.

This dimension of informational control deserves to be weighed against the other elements of the ISW update. The PRC denies sanctions, conceals its arms transfers, reinterprets international law — and simultaneously arrests the academics who document its blind spots. Mastery of the narrative is an integral component of Chinese power strategy. The West must fund, protect, and amplify independent analytical voices on China with the same energy it puts into funding its material defense.

Beijing's Global Taiwan Calculation: The Strategic Environment in mid-June 2026

What Beijing is observing in June 2026

Let's synthesize what Beijing records in this mid-June 2026: the United States has just concluded an agreement with Iran without totally humiliating Tehran, their coercive credibility is partially damaged. Taiwan has been blocking its own defense budget for nine months, signaling internal disunity. Washington is delaying the addition of Chinese firms to the BIS list to spare the bilateral relationship. The PLAN is deploying a carrier group east of the Philippines without provoking a significant military response. And Chinese military-civil fusion is progressing uninterrupted in global technological chains.

Each of these elements taken in isolation is manageable. Together, they draw a strategic environment increasingly favorable to a patient China. This is not to say that Beijing is considering imminent military action against Taiwan — ISW analysts themselves do not conclude that. But Xi Jinping's calculation feeds precisely on these signals: every time the West gives up an inch of credibility, Beijing takes note. The accumulation counts more than any individual event.

The consistency of the systemic threat

The ISW does not draw alarmist conclusions. But a careful reading of its June 18 update reveals an architecture: Beijing is simultaneously playing the role of peace mediator in the Middle East, clandestine arms supplier, coercive power in the South China Sea, technological rival to the United States, and actor-in-waiting on the Taiwan issue. This versatility is not the result of chance. It is the product of a long-range strategy the West recognizes too slowly.

Maxime Marquette's doctrine on this subject is simple: China is not a future threat. It is a present threat, active across several vectors simultaneously. The Western response must match this complexity — coherent, coordinated, sustainable — rather than reactive and fragmented. The ISW report of June 18, 2026, is a document that should be read in every chancellery of the Atlantic Alliance. Not as an alarm. As a roadmap.

Conclusion: Reading Beijing Systemically, Responding in Coalition

The convergence of signals can no longer be ignored

The ISW update of June 18, 2026, is not a document about China and Taiwan. It is a document on how Beijing is reorganizing its global strategic environment — Middle East, South China Sea, Indo-Pacific, global technological chains — with a coherence that the West still struggles to systematize in its own responses. The US-Iran deal, welcomed by Beijing, is analyzed here not as a victory for global diplomacy, but as an additional element in Xi Jinping's calculation regarding the American posture and the fragility of Washington's security commitments.

Taiwan remains the central issue. Not because an invasion is imminent — no serious person claims that today. But because every delay in the Taiwanese defense budget, every rhetorical concession from Washington, every MANPADS delivered in silence to Tehran, every structure installed at Scarborough is a message addressed to Taipei: you are alone if you do not arm yourselves, and your allies are easily fatigued. The West's response must be the exact opposite of that message.

Only one possible strategic conclusion

The West must treat China as what it is: the primary threat to the international liberal order, more sophisticated than Russia, more patient than Iran, more integrated into our economies than North Korea. This does not mean war. It means clarity — in alliances, in supply chains, in defense budgets, in the protection of researchers and journalists. The June 18, 2026, ISW report is a mirror. What the West sees in it, it is up to the West to decide what to do with it.

The war in Ukraine taught us that deterrence fails when it is not maintained with consistency and visibility. Zelensky understood this before anyone else — and he paid the price of truth against an aggressor Europe wanted to believe was reasonable. The Indo-Pacific must not repeat this mistake. The ISW update says, implicitly, what diplomats still hesitate to formulate clearly: the time to build deterrence is before, not during.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Sources primaires

ISW — China & Taiwan Update, June 18, 2026 (Adam Grace) — June 18, 2026

BSS/AFP — China says welcomes US-Iran deal, commends Pakistan mediation — June 15, 2026

The Straits Times — China says 'welcomes' Iran-US signing deal to end Middle East war — June 18, 2026

Sources secondaires

Newsweek — Why China won the US war against Iran — June 21, 2026

CNN — Analysis: China is counting its wins from the Iran war — June 20, 2026

Taipei Times — Military says budget delay threatens US$2.4bn in weapons buying, training — April 2, 2026

CNBC — Pentagon expands list of China military-linked firms to include Alibaba, Baidu — June 9, 2026

Philstar — Mission 'completed': Chinese floating platform gone from Scarborough Shoal — June 17, 2026