DECODING: China's Lijian anti-drone lasers — the portable weapon rewriting the rules of combat

Introduction: Beijing unveils the weapon nobody believed possible yet

Three days in Beijing that change everything

From June 16 to 18, 2026, the Chinese capital hosted the Defence Information Equipment and Technology Exhibition, a restricted-access military trade show presenting the latest innovations in defense equipment. Among dozens of systems on display — encrypted communications, surveillance drones, electronic warfare equipment — one demonstration captured the attention of analysts in attendance and outside observers who gained access to images and technical data: the Lijian series, portable anti-drone laser systems developed by the company Harbin Xinguang Optic-Electronics Technology.

This is not the first time China has exhibited laser systems for defensive purposes. But what sets the Lijian apart from previous demonstrations is a combination of radical miniaturization and verifiable operational performance: a system weighing 25 to 30 kilograms capable of downing a drone in 4 seconds within a radius of 500 to 1,200 meters, operable by a single soldier, with a thermal recharge time of less than 5 seconds. These figures, if confirmed by independent testing, represent a generational leap in counter-drone warfare.

Why 2026 is the laser turning-point year

The operational context explains the urgency. Commercially modified drones weaponized as arms — a DJI Mavic dropping a grenade, a kamikaze FPV drone loaded with explosives — have demonstrated in Ukraine, Yemen, Ethiopia, and every recent conflict that they pose a devastating asymmetric threat to conventional forces. Counter-drone defense has become an absolute priority for all armed forces, and existing solutions — missiles, radio jammers, neutralization rifles — each carry serious limitations in cost, range, or reliability. A portable laser, usable by any infantryman with minimal training, represents a qualitatively different answer to this now-endemic problem.

The South China Morning Post and Tom's Hardware reported the detailed technical specifications presented at the June 19, 2026 demonstration. These data points, while not yet confirmed by independent real-world testing, allow us to gauge Harbin Xinguang's ambitions and compare them to competing systems developed in the West. The result of that comparison is troubling enough to warrant detailed analysis.

Technical specifications — what Harbin Xinguang showed Beijing

Lijian II and Lijian III: two formats, one doctrine

The Lijian series comprises several variants, two of which were publicly presented at the June 2026 exhibition. The Lijian II weighs 30 kilograms and the Lijian III weighs 25 kilograms. Both systems share a modular architecture in three components: a laser emitter, an air cooling system, and a portable control terminal. This modular architecture allows a single soldier to carry the system, potentially on a dorsal frame, and deploy it within minutes.

The laser power of the portable versions is approximately 2 kilowatts. The effective range against drones is around 500 meters for the portable models, extending to 1,200 meters for the tripod-mounted version. The declared engagement time — 4 seconds to burn through a drone — applies to a standard commercial-size drone under normal visibility conditions. The active cooling system enables continuous firing cycles with less than 5 seconds between engagements, theoretically making it capable of neutralizing multiple drones in rapid sequence.

The Lijian-10G: the high-power fixed version

Beyond the portable models, Harbin Xinguang also presented the Lijian-10G, a fixed defense system of approximately 10 kilowatts, mounted on a vehicle platform or in a stationary installation. With a range of 1,200 meters and simultaneous multi-target engagement capability via an AI-assisted targeting system, the Lijian-10G provides perimeter defense for military installations, air bases, and command centers. Harbin Xinguang confirmed that units of the Lijian-10G are already deployed at certain Chinese military airfields, making it an already-operational system, not a trade show prototype.

The advertised price for the portable systems is approximately 2 million yuan per unit, roughly $295,000 USD. That figure may sound high, but it must be placed in perspective against the cost of alternatives: a short-range missile costs between $10,000 and $100,000, but can only be used once. A laser, with a service life measured in thousands of hours, offers a dramatically lower cost per engagement once the initial investment is absorbed. This is the fundamental economics of directed-energy weapons beginning to shift military calculations.

The targeting system — artificial intelligence at the heart of the threat

Automated acquisition and tracking: the end of human error

One of the most significant innovations of the Lijian system is not the laser itself, but its AI-assisted targeting system. Modern drones move quickly, change direction erratically, and can operate in swarms. Manually holding a precise laser beam on such a mobile target for 4 seconds is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an untrained human operator. The Lijian's automated targeting system solves this problem by taking over target acquisition and tracking, leaving the operator only the firing decision.

According to information disclosed by Tom's Hardware on June 20, 2026, the Lijian's portable control terminal integrates a high-resolution camera coupled with a real-time target recognition algorithm. The system can distinguish drones from birds and other flying objects, calculate the projected trajectory, and automatically orient the laser emitter toward the optimal interception point. The claimed latency between detection and the start of fire is under one second. These capabilities, if confirmed, place the Lijian in a radically superior category to the radio-jamming systems that currently form the bulk of portable counter-drone defense.

Resistance to countermeasures: stealth and the digital dimension

An often-overlooked advantage of laser weapons over missiles or jammers is their resistance to electronic countermeasures. Radio jamming systems are ineffective against a drone using purely inertial or GPS navigation with cryptographic protection. Missiles can be decoyed by thermal countermeasures. A laser, by contrast, strikes at the speed of light, without warning, without a prior electronic signal, and with no possibility of thermal decoy. The only effective defense against a laser is a reflective shield — an impractical solution for commercial or lightly armored military drones.

This immunity to traditional countermeasures is particularly significant in the context of recent conflicts. In Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian drones evolved in an environment of intense electronic jamming, forcing designers to develop increasingly robust navigation systems. The emergence of lasers as a countermeasure opens a new cycle of arms competition: drone manufacturers will now have to design reflective structures or envelopes capable of withstanding laser irradiation, adding weight and complexity to platforms whose lightness is their primary virtue. This technological cycle is exactly what Harbin Xinguang seeks to trigger with the Lijian.

Harbin Xinguang — portrait of an unsung player in China's arsenal

A niche company turned national priority

Harbin Xinguang Optic-Electronics Technology is a relatively little-known company outside specialized Chinese defense circles. Based in Harbin, capital of Heilongjiang province in northeastern China, it is part of the civil-military industrial ecosystem (Civil-Military Fusion) that Beijing has systematically developed since the 2016 directive. Its core expertise is precision optics and laser systems, initially developed for industrial and medical applications before being redirected toward military uses.

The name Lijian — which can be translated as "sharp swords" — reflects a clear military branding intent. It is not an internal technical codename; it is a commercial product name intended for sale, implying that Harbin Xinguang is planning exports. China already sells armament systems to several dozen countries, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. A portable anti-drone laser system, economical to operate and technically accessible, could find buyers in those markets — with technology proliferation implications that Western intelligence services will need to monitor closely.

Integration into the civil-military industrial network

Like the majority of Chinese companies active in defense, Harbin Xinguang operates within the framework of the Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) policy promulgated by Xi Jinping. This policy mandates permeability between civilian research and military applications, and grants innovative civilian companies access to military contracts in exchange for the availability of their technologies to the armed forces. The result is an innovation ecosystem far broader and more agile than the traditional state armaments groups such as Norinco or AVIC.

This is precisely the model that worries American and allied intelligence services. When a company like Harbin Xinguang develops laser technology initially for industrial cutting or ophthalmic surgery, and that technology then migrates into military weapons systems via CMF, Western export controls on precision laser components — pump sources, high-precision optical elements, laser crystals — become of critical strategic importance. Every Western component entering Harbin Xinguang's production chain potentially contributes to the PLAN's laser arsenal.

The international comparison — where the Lijian stands in the global landscape

American laser systems: more powerful, less mobile

The United States has been developing directed-energy laser systems for several decades, with considerable investment. Deployed systems include Lockheed Martin's High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS), ship-mounted, with a power output of 60 kilowatts. The US Navy also tested the Solid-State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) aboard the USS Ponce. The US Army is developing the High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD), a truck-mounted 10-kilowatt system.

What these American systems do not yet offer is individual portability. Currently operational or advanced-testing US systems are all platform-based — ships, military vehicles, fixed installations — requiring substantial electrical power and a team of operators. The 25-kilogram Lijian III, if its specifications are accurate, therefore represents a real Chinese lead in the specific category of portable individual laser weapons. It is not that the United States is not working on this problem — it is that they have not yet solved it at this scale of miniaturization.

Israel, Europe, and other players

Israel is probably the country that has most invested in small-scale operational anti-drone laser defenses. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems' Iron Beam system, developed in partnership with Elbit Systems, is a high-energy laser designed to intercept rockets, mortars, and drones. In its first real-conditions demonstration in April 2022, Iron Beam successfully intercepted drones, rockets, and missiles. However, Iron Beam is a theater defense system, not individual equipment — it requires fixed or semi-fixed infrastructure.

In Europe, France and Germany are jointly developing anti-drone laser systems under the CILAS (Compagnie Industrielle des Lasers) program and the German HELMA-P (High Energy Laser for Military Applications) program. These systems are at varying stages of advancement, generally less operationally mature than American or Israeli systems. The emergence of the Chinese Lijian in the portable category creates a new technological benchmark that will accelerate these European programs — or at least should, if the governments concerned grasp the full implications of what was unveiled in Beijing in June 2026.

Implications for the South China Sea conflict — drones versus lasers

The maritime drone war and the laser response

In a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, drones will play a central role in reconnaissance, target designation, and direct attack. Taiwan, the United States, and their regional allies have invested heavily in maritime and aerial drone capabilities — stealth reconnaissance drones such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, armed drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper, and swarms of small tactical drones. People's Liberation Army Navy vessels equipped with Lijian-10G systems would have close-in drone defense that complements existing missile defense systems.

Integrating anti-drone lasers on Type 052D and Type 055 destroyers — which have sufficient electrical power to feed laser systems of 10 to 30 kilowatts — would create a multi-layered protection bubble: HHQ-9 missiles for long-range threats, 30mm cannons for close-in threats, and lasers for slow-moving drones and projectiles at very short range. This integration is already underway, according to consulted sources, with laser systems experimentally deployed on certain units of the Northern Fleet.

Island and coastal defense: the Lijian on the front line

Beyond naval warfare, the portable Lijian gives the PLAN anti-drone defense capability across all terrain types. In the context of the South China Sea islands — including China's artificial islands in the Spratlys that Beijing militarized despite the 2016 UNCLOS ruling — the primary threat is precisely surveillance and attack drones deployed by rival navies. A coast guard detachment armed with Lijian IIIs can now create a drone-exclusion protection zone around these installations without heavy infrastructure, without fixed electrical power, and with an operational discretion difficult to detect by satellite.

The same logic applies to a scenario of defending the Chinese coast against Taiwanese or American drone operations. Light infantry units equipped with Lijian II and III systems can be quickly deployed along the Fujian coastline, facing Taiwan, to create anti-drone coverage protecting radars, missile batteries, and military ports from adversarial reconnaissance drones. It is a low-signature defensive capability, economical to deploy, and difficult to counter from a distance.

Potential proliferation — who will buy the Lijian

China's priority export markets

China is the world's third-largest arms exporter, behind the United States and Russia. Its main markets are Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, several African countries, and Middle Eastern states. An anti-drone laser system like the Lijian, at a hypothetical export sale price of between $150,000 and $300,000, would be accessible to countries that lack budgets for sophisticated missile defense systems but face growing drone threats.

Ethiopia, which used combat drones purchased from China during the Tigray war, is one potential customer. Iran, which both develops and exports drones itself, has both offensive and defensive interest in this technology. Pakistan, confronted with Indian tactical drones in any potential conflict with New Delhi, would be an obvious buyer. The proliferation of the Lijian to these state actors — and potentially to their non-state allies — represents an amplification of the global drone threat that Western intelligence services will need to incorporate into their assessments.

The risk of proliferation to non-state actors

Beyond official government sales, the miniaturization of weaponized laser systems opens a diversion risk that deserves serious attention. High-power industrial lasers are already available on the commercial market, and well-funded groups have demonstrated their ability to modify commercial equipment for military purposes — commercial drones converted into kamikazes by ISIS and Yemeni groups being the most widely known example. A captured or resold Lijian III would place an anti-drone — and potentially anti-civilian aircraft — capability in the hands of non-state actors with unpredictable intentions.

This scenario is not apocalyptic speculation. It is the normal cycle of military technology diffusion: a weapon developed by a state ends up, within five to ten years of entering service, in the arsenals of para-state actors via grey markets and depot raids. The MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems) supplied to Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s resurfaced in dozens of regional conflicts for three decades. There is no reason to believe the Lijian will escape this dynamic.

The Western response — urgency and gaps

Delayed programs and acquisition timelines

The Lijian's presentation in Beijing in June 2026 triggered discreet but real reactions in Western defense circles. The fundamental problem is that of acquisition timelines. Even if a Western government decided tomorrow to accelerate a portable anti-drone laser program, the path from operational prototype to mass production and large-scale deployment to infantry units typically takes five to ten years within Western acquisition systems. Defense bureaucracy, competitive tender processes, testing and certification requirements, parliamentary budget constraints — all of this creates institutional friction that the Chinese defense industry, operating under centralized authority, does not manage to the same degree.

The Pentagon acknowledged this gap in its 2023 counter-drone strategy, which identified portable directed-energy systems as a medium-term development priority. Programs such as RAVEN (Ruggedized Advanced Nexus) and DEIMOS are under development, but none had yet reached a stage of public demonstration comparable to the Lijian at the time of the Beijing exhibition. This development asymmetry is not fatal, but it is concerning.

Stopgap solutions: jamming, missiles, passive defense

Pending operationally ready portable laser systems, Western armies rely on several complementary solutions. GPS and radio jamming (systems such as DRONE DEFENDER, DroneGun MKIII) can neutralize manually controlled or GPS-guided drones, but are ineffective against autonomous inertially navigated drones. Short-range missile systems such as the AIM-9X Sidewinder in air-to-ground mode can intercept drones, but at a prohibitive cost of several hundred thousand dollars per engagement. Rapid anti-aircraft cannons such as the 20mm Phalanx CIWS are effective but cannot be carried by light infantry.

The tactical reality is that Western infantry deployed forward — in Estonia, Poland, Romania, Korea, in the Ryukyu Islands — remains exposed to drones without portable protection equivalent to the Lijian. Soldiers at an advanced NATO forward base facing a drone saturation currently have only their shoulder weapons to attempt to down fast aerial targets — an archaic solution of marginal effectiveness. This gap is known, documented, and insufficiently addressed.

The economics of laser weapons — cost per engagement and deterrence

The revolutionary calculation of cost per engagement

The economics of counter-drone defense are brutally unbalanced in the current system. A commercially modified kamikaze drone costs between $500 and $5,000 to manufacture. Intercepting it with a missile costs between $10,000 and $3 million depending on the system used — a cost-effectiveness ratio that massively favors the attacker. This economic asymmetry is precisely what has made drones so attractive for resource-constrained actors and so formidable for well-equipped conventional forces. Laser defense radically changes this equation.

The marginal cost of a laser engagement — the electricity cost required to produce a burst of a few seconds — amounts to a few cents. The maintenance cost of the system itself, spread over thousands of engagements, brings the effective cost per neutralization to a few tens or hundreds of dollars at most. If the Lijian delivers on its technical promises, it offers a complete reversal of the economic asymmetry of drone conflicts: defending becomes cheaper than attacking, for the first time since commercial drones invaded battlefields.

Implications for regional deterrence

If China equips its ground, naval, and air forces with Lijian systems at scale, it creates a drone-exclusion zone around its military deployments that radically complicates the reconnaissance and attack-by-drone tactics that Taiwan and its allies are planning. The surveillance drones Taiwan uses to monitor military movements in Fujian province and the strait's waters would become vulnerable to systematic neutralization. The drone swarms that the American military trains as attrition weapons against Chinese air defense systems would encounter a distributed countermeasure difficult to saturate.

This deterrence is not absolute — large forces can be developed to saturate even effective laser defenses — but it shifts the tactical balance significantly. The quantity of drones needed to saturate a defensive perimeter equipped with Lijian is exponentially greater than against conventional defenses. This makes drone operations against Chinese targets more costly, riskier, and less predictable in outcome — exactly what Beijing seeks to achieve.

Operational constraints — what the brochures don't say

Physical limits of lasers in real conditions

Every laser weapon suffers from a fundamental limitation: performance degrades in adverse atmospheric conditions. Rain, fog, smoke, and dust absorb and scatter the laser beam, reducing its effective range and power on target. The 500-meter range claimed for the Lijian III is probably a performance in optimal visibility conditions, in clear and dry weather. Under the variable meteorological conditions of the Taiwan Strait — sea haze, monsoon rain, sand dust from the mainland — that effective range could be significantly reduced.

There is also the question of electrical power supply in combat conditions. A 2-kilowatt system requires a substantial portable energy source. High-density lithium-ion batteries can power the Lijian III for a limited duration — probably a few tens of minutes of effective firing. In sustained operations, either spare batteries would be needed, or connection to a military vehicle or generator. This logistical constraint does not negate the system's utility, but it limits its employment in prolonged high-intensity operations.

Training and employment doctrine

Harbin Xinguang's Beijing presentation emphasized the Lijian's ease of use. Operational reality is probably more nuanced. An effective soldier with an anti-drone laser must understand optimal engagement angles (a laser is more effective against the underside of a drone than its upper surface), weather conditions that degrade performance, safety procedures to avoid damage to allied human eyes, and tactics for managing drone swarms rather than single targets. This employment doctrine does not yet exist — it will be developed by the PLA over the coming years of training and exercises.

The army that first masters tactical doctrine for portable anti-drone lasers will hold a considerable advantage over one that limits itself to technical training in system operation. As with all new weapons — from the rifled musket to the portable anti-tank missile — it is employment doctrine, more than the technology itself, that determines real operational effectiveness. China, with its combat trials in intensive training scenarios and its confirmed airfield deployments, has a head start in this doctrinal development.

Confirmed deployments — what we know about current installations

Military airfields: the first line of deployment

The most significant confirmation in the information reported by SCMP and Tom's Hardware is the current operational deployment of Lijian systems — presumably fixed Lijian-10Gs — at certain Chinese military airfields. This confirmation, even partial and unofficial, means the Lijian is not a trade show prototype but a system in active service. Defending airfields against drones is one of the absolute priorities of modern air forces — a small explosive-laden drone can destroy multi-million-dollar fighter jets parked on the runway.

Which airfields are involved? Sources do not specify with precision. But one can reasonably assume that the most sensitive air bases — notably those in Fujian province, facing Taiwan, and the installations on artificial islands in the South China Sea — would be among the first beneficiaries of this protection. The Lijian-10G's 1,200-meter range creates a protection bubble sufficient to cover an entire standard-sized airfield against commercial or light military drones.

The transition to the surface fleet

Integration onto surface vessels is the next logical step after land-based airfields. Type 052D and Type 055 destroyers possess electrical power output of several tens of megawatts, sufficient to power laser systems far more powerful than the Lijian-10Gs. Naval laser CIWS — directed-energy Close-In Weapon Systems — are the holy grail of naval defense against drones, rockets, and short-range missiles.

Analysis satellite imagery reportedly showed unusual test platforms on certain vessels of the Northern Fleet between 2024 and 2026, interpreted by some analysts as experimental laser systems in the process of naval integration. Without official confirmation, this information remains at the level of reasoned hypothesis. But the logical progression of the Lijian program — from land airfield to naval platform — is clear enough for allied strategists to treat it as a probable evolution within a 3-to-5-year horizon.

The electromagnetic dimension — lasers, jamming, and multi-spectrum warfare

The electromagnetic spectrum as a battlefield

Modern warfare plays out across multiple spectra simultaneously: radio for communications, radar for detection, infrared for guidance systems, and now the visible and near-infrared spectrum for laser weapons. Electronic warfare (EW) has long been a central component of any sophisticated military operation. The addition of laser weapons creates a new domain in this warfare: optical warfare, in which the ability to emit, detect, and degrade coherent light beams becomes a military skill in its own right.

The PLA's Lijian systems are not only offensive weapons against drones — they also represent a recognition that adversarial optical sensors (surveillance cameras, infrared guidance systems, laser rangefinders) constitute targets to be neutralized. A low-power Lijian, oriented toward the optical sensors of an adversary drone rather than its structure, can blind them without necessarily destroying the drone — a discreet and effective optical countermeasure that does not involve the physical destruction of the platform.

Synchronization with electronic warfare systems

The PLA has for several years been developing systemic integration of its electronic warfare, laser, and missile capabilities into a multi-domain combat doctrine. In this doctrine, a laser system like the Lijian does not operate in isolation — it is connected to the unit's command-and-control network, which coordinates the use of different capabilities against detected threats. An adversary drone entering the coverage zone of the Chinese defensive network faces a first radio jamming attempt, then a GPS jamming attempt, then — if these measures fail — a laser engagement. This automated sequence reduces operator cognitive load and increases the overall effectiveness of the defensive system.

This command integration is enabled by Chinese advances in encrypted military communications networks and AI-based combat management systems. The Lijian's deployment is part of a digital modernization effort in the PLA that goes far beyond laser weapons alone. It is a system of systems — and its added value can only be fully appreciated by understanding the entire network in which it is embedded.

Three unanswered questions — what we still don't know

Real performance under combat conditions: the critical unknown

The specifications presented at the Beijing exhibition are the figures that Harbin Xinguang chose to disclose at a military marketing event. Their validity under real combat conditions — dust, fog, countermeasures, operational stress — remains to be proven. No armed conflict has yet provided real performance data on Lijian systems. The airfield deployments confirm the system's existence, but not its performance under adverse conditions or against technologically sophisticated adversaries.

This uncertainty is not an argument for downplaying the threat. It is a reminder that military trade show announcements should be treated with appropriate skepticism. What we know with certainty: the system exists, it is in service, and the figures advanced — even optimistic ones — indicate a level of miniaturization that had not yet been publicly achieved. What we do not know: what is the performance degradation under adverse conditions, what is the real lifespan of laser components under thermal and mechanical stress, and what is the actual failure rate in deployed units.

Production scale — real capacity versus ambition

Harbin Xinguang's ability to produce the Lijian in quantities sufficient to equip infantry units at the scale of a large army is the second major unknown. Producing sophisticated laser systems involves high-precision optical components whose manufacture is complex, slow, and sensitive to quality issues. A mid-sized company like Harbin Xinguang can demonstrate an impressive prototype at a trade show, but its ability to produce thousands of units per year at consistent quality is an entirely different industrial question.

If China wants to equip a significant fraction of its 2 million active soldiers with Lijian systems — even a fraction of one percent would represent 20,000 units — it will require substantial industrial production scale-up. This ramp-up takes time, requires investments in specialized manufacturing equipment, and may encounter bottlenecks on specific components. China has demonstrated its ability to rapidly industrialize military technologies — its surveillance drones and anti-ship missiles are recent examples — but each new system has its own production challenge.

The response the West owes itself — urgency and method

Accelerating portable laser programs in the West

The Lijian's presentation in Beijing must serve as a wake-up call for defense decision-makers in North America and Europe. This is not about declaring a laser arms race at any cost — it is about identifying real gaps in portable counter-drone defense and addressing them with the seriousness they deserve. The American RAVEN and DEIMOS programs, Israeli CILAS developments, and existing European initiatives must be accelerated, better funded, and subjected to concrete operational delivery objectives rather than indefinite research horizons.

Portable counter-drone defense is one of the most glaring gaps in the equipment of NATO's forward-deployed infantry. Every year of delay in delivering an operational solution is a year during which forward-deployed soldiers have only conventional weapons to face fast aerial threats. China has demonstrated that a miniaturized solution is possible. It falls to the West to prove it can develop one that is even better — or at least comparable — and deploy it before the Chinese advantage becomes structural.

Intelligence sharing on adversary laser capabilities

The Five Eyes intelligence community — the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand — must integrate the evolution of Chinese laser capabilities into its threat assessments with the same priority as ballistic and naval capabilities. Real performance data for the Lijian in deployment conditions — at the military airfields where it is already in service — is exactly the type of information that technical intelligence can collect. These assessments must be shared with Indo-Pacific allies — Japan, South Korea, Australia — who will be the first exposed to these systems in a regional conflict scenario.

Transparency among allies on adversary capabilities is a readiness multiplier. Every allied country that precisely understands the Lijian's performance and limitations can adapt its drone employment doctrine accordingly — altering flight profiles, developing reflective countermeasures, training operators to saturate adversary targeting systems. This doctrinal-technical adaptation is less costly and faster than developing competing systems. It must be undertaken now, not when the Lijian is deployed at mass scale.

Conclusion: When light becomes a weapon of war

A technological turning point that cannot be ignored

The Lijian may not be the absolute breakthrough that some enthusiastic analysts wish to see in it. Its limitations — meteorological, energetic, in production — are real. But it represents a symbolic and technical turning point that Western military and political decision-makers would be imprudent to ignore. China has succeeded in miniaturizing an anti-drone laser system sufficiently for a soldier to carry it — and this achievement, even if imperfect in its performance details, changes the parameters of the drone threat for every army that faces it.

Drones redefined modern warfare by giving weak actors asymmetric strike power against conventional forces. Portable lasers like the Lijian could potentially nullify that advantage — but only for those who possess them. If China masters and industrializes this technology before the West, it will have reversed one of the tactical asymmetries that until now favored the decentralized defense approaches that Taiwan, its allies, and NATO armies have developed over recent years. This is a stake that deserves all the urgency that Chinese military exhibitions seem deliberately designed to trigger.

The race for light has begun

The message sent from the Defence Information Equipment and Technology Exhibition in Beijing, from June 16 to 18, 2026, is clear: the portable laser war has begun. China has laid its cards on the table. It falls to the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, France — all those developing defense technologies — to respond. The window of technological advantage is rarely permanent in military history. But the few years during which an adversary holds a deployment advantage can determine the outcome of a conflict in a crucial region. The Lijian deserves an urgent response, not a footnote in an intelligence report that nobody will read before the summer of 2027.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning

I am a columnist and analyst, not a field journalist. My role is to analyze and contextualize facts reported by third-party sources. I did not attend the Defence Information Equipment and Technology Exhibition in Beijing, and my technical analyses are based on information published by reputable specialized media. My editorial opinions are clearly identified in the italicized passages. I maintain a pro-Western position and consider the technological military buildup of authoritarian China a serious structural threat to international stability.

Methodology and sources

This article is based on dated and identifiable public sources. The Lijian's technical specifications are those reported by the South China Morning Post and Tom's Hardware, not personal assessments or classified data. Comparisons with Western systems are based on official public data from the relevant defense programs. Any factual uncertainty is explicitly flagged in the text.

Nature of the analysis

This decoding is a journalistic analysis of specialized public sources on defense and military technologies. It does not constitute an intelligence assessment or an official military report. Its objective is to inform the English-speaking reader of a significant military technological development that deserves broader coverage in mainstream media.

Sources

Primary sources

South China Morning Post — China showcases portable laser weapons a single soldier can use to shoot down drones — June 19, 2026

Tom's Hardware — China Shows Off a Backpack-Sized Anti-Drone Laser That One Soldier Can Carry — June 20, 2026

19FortyFive — China's Portable Laser Anti-Drone System: A Game Changer? — June 2026

Secondary sources

Military Times — China's new portable laser weapon targets drone threat — June 2026

Foreign Policy — China's Laser Push: A New Phase in the Drone Wars — June 2026

Asia Times — China's backpack laser rewrites anti-drone battlefield math — June 2026