ANALYSIS: 620 Chinese nuclear warheads — SIPRI sounds the alarm on an unchecked arms race

Introduction: A disarmed world watching China rearm

A report landing in a deafening diplomatic silence

On June 8, 2026, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — SIPRI — published its annual yearbook on armaments, disarmament, and international security. The document is exhaustive, technical, produced by researchers who are not chasing headlines. And yet the figures it contains on China's nuclear arsenal deserved to explode across the front page of every newspaper in the world. China now possesses 620 nuclear warheads, up from 600 the previous year — an increase of 20 units in one year. Its stock of deployed warheads rose from 24 to 34. And above all: it is expanding its network of land-based missile silos at a pace no other nuclear state currently matches.

These figures are not alarmist estimates. They are data collected by SIPRI — an independent institution founded in 1966, funded primarily by the Swedish government, recognized worldwide as the reference on armaments data. The precision of the emotion, in this case, is understanding that behind each nuclear warhead lies a ballistic delivery vehicle, a launch code, an assigned target. These 620 warheads are not an abstract collection. They are 620 potentialities of city-scale destruction.

The context of collapsed disarmament

The publication of these figures comes in a context where global nuclear disarmament has practically collapsed. The New START treaty — the last strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and Russia — expired on February 5, 2026 without renewal. Russia had suspended its participation in 2023, and American attempts to negotiate a successor treaty produced nothing concrete. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains technically in force, but its verification and enforcement mechanisms are powerless against a nuclear power that does not formally violate the treaty while ignoring its spirit.

SIPRI counted at January 1, 2026 a global total of 12,187 nuclear warheads, of which 9,745 are in active military stockpiles and 4,012 are deployed on operational delivery vehicles. These global figures are dominated by the American and Russian arsenals, which together account for more than 90% of the world total. But the worrying dynamic is not in those stable or slightly declining arsenals — it is in the rapid and deliberate growth of China's arsenal, which shows no pause, no slowdown, and engages in no limitation negotiations whatsoever.

The silo expansion program — 775 land-based sites

A silo construction drive unprecedented in modern nuclear history

Beyond the warhead count, it is the frantic construction of land-based silos that most clearly reveals Beijing's long-term intentions. The SIPRI 2026 Yearbook counts 775 missile silo sites under construction or recently completed on Chinese territory — a figure confirmed by commercial satellite imagery analyses that various research organizations have published since 2021. These silos, distributed across China's interior deserts — notably in Gansu, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia provinces — are designed to house DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads.

To grasp the scale of this program, a historical comparison is warranted. At its peak, the Soviet Union possessed approximately 1,400 land-based ICBMs — the maximum reached in the 1980s at the height of the Cold War. The United States currently holds 400, all in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. China, which began the 2010s with fewer than 100 land-based missiles, is constructing the infrastructure for an arsenal that could exceed 1,000 land-based ICBMs by 2030 or 2035 — if all identified silos are actually equipped and activated.

China's nuclear triad nearing completion

Historically, China's nuclear arsenal rested primarily on land-based missiles, with a limited airborne component and a developing submarine force. Beijing's current objective is to complete a full nuclear triad — comparable to those of the United States and Russia — combining land-based missiles, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and strategic bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The Type 094-class submarines and the Type 096 program under construction constitute the maritime component. The H-6N variants of the H-6 bomber, capable of launching long-range cruise missiles, represent the airborne component under development.

This triad nearing completion fundamentally changes the nature of nuclear deterrence in Asia. An adversary seeking to neutralize China's nuclear arsenal through a preemptive strike — what American doctrine calls a "counter-force strategy" — must now simultaneously counter three distinct delivery systems, including submarines on patrol at sea that are, by definition, extremely difficult to locate and destroy. The survivability of China's arsenal increases drastically as the triad completes, reinforcing its second-strike capability — the guarantee of nuclear retaliation even after an initial adversary strike.

The global comparison — 620 warheads in a world of 12,187

Nine nuclear powers and their trajectories

The SIPRI 2026 Yearbook counts nine states possessing nuclear weapons: the United States (5,550 warheads), Russia (5,580 warheads), China (620), France (290), the United Kingdom (225), Pakistan (170), India (172), Israel (~90, unofficial), North Korea (~50, estimate). These figures are estimates based on available data — only the United States, Russia, and (partially) the United Kingdom publish official data on their arsenals. China's figures are SIPRI's analytical estimates, unconfirmed by Beijing, which maintains total opacity on its arsenal.

The trajectory is the critical indicator. American and Russian arsenals are stable or slightly declining — constrained by past agreements and budgetary commitments. France's arsenal (290 warheads) is stable and has even slightly decreased over recent decades. The British arsenal (225 warheads) has been subject to recent political debate but remains within defined ceilings. Only China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are on expansion trajectories. And among these four, China is the one whose expansion is fastest in absolute terms and most clearly tied to a great-power strategy.

The ratio between total warheads and deployed warheads

One often-overlooked aspect of SIPRI's figures is the distinction between total warheads and deployed warheads. Of China's 620 warheads, only 34 are considered deployed — that is, mounted on their delivery vehicles, ready to be launched. This figure is remarkably low compared to American (1,700 deployed) and Russian (1,558 deployed) standards. It reflects China's so-called NFU (No First Use) doctrine — China claims it will never use nuclear weapons first — which theoretically implies systems at lower constant alert levels.

However, several analysts question the reliability of this doctrine in a real high-intensity conflict situation. The construction of 775 silos does not align with a strict NFU doctrine, which requires survivability capacity but not massive quantitative expansion. The jump from 24 to 34 deployed warheads in one year represents a 42% increase — a growing alert rate that SIPRI explicitly highlights in its June 8, 2026 press release. This increase in the deployment rate suggests a practical re-examination of the NFU doctrine, even as Beijing officially maintains this position.

The end of New START — the nuclear normative vacuum

February 2026: the last dam breaks

The expiration of the New START treaty on February 5, 2026 marks the end of an era in nuclear arms control. New START, signed in 2010 by Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev, capped American and Russian arsenals at 1,550 deployed warheads each and 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. It also included a robust verification regime with regular on-site inspections — the last mechanism of mutual transparency between the two largest nuclear powers in the world. Russia suspended its participation in February 2023, officially in response to Western involvement in Ukraine. The American administration failed to negotiate a successor agreement.

The direct consequence is a normative vacuum without precedent since the 1960s. No bilateral treaty now caps American and Russian arsenals. China was never party to New START or its predecessors — its rapidly expanding arsenal has never been constrained by any arms control agreement. The three principal global nuclear powers now operate in a space with no common rules, no verification mechanisms, and no effective multilateral forum to manage escalation risks.

The absence of nuclear dialogue with China

American attempts to engage China in nuclear arms control discussions have systematically run into a Beijing refusal. China's official position is that its arsenal is too small to warrant limitation — an argument no longer defensible in the face of 775 silos under construction, but one Beijing maintains with remarkable diplomatic consistency. Discussions at the G20 Summit and UN Security Council meetings have produced no concrete Chinese commitment on nuclear limitation or transparency.

SIPRI noted in its June 8, 2026 press release that elevated geopolitical tensions create "heightened escalation risks" in the current nuclear environment. This measured formulation, from an institution that weighs every word in its official communications, conveys genuine concern: without direct communication mechanisms on nuclear postures, the risk of miscalculation and unintentional escalation increases significantly. This is precisely the dynamic that led to the establishment of the hotline between Washington and Moscow after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 — a historical lesson that the three major nuclear powers seem to have collectively forgotten.

The DF-41 and DF-5 — the vectors of the threat

The DF-41: the MIRV ICBM aimed beyond the Pacific

China's intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal relies principally on the DF-41 (Dongfeng-41), a solid-fuel ICBM of intercontinental range capable of carrying between 3 and 10 independently guided nuclear warheads (MIRV). Its declared range exceeds 14,000 kilometers — sufficient to reach any point on US territory from silos in China's interior. The DF-41 can also be deployed on mobile TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launcher) launchers, increasing its survivability by enabling constant movement to evade counter-force strikes.

The 775 silos counted by SIPRI will not all be equipped with DF-41s. Expert analysis suggests a mix of armed active silos, empty silos used as decoys to complicate adversary counter-force calculations, and silos awaiting future arming. This decoy-silo strategy is deliberate: forcing any adversary contemplating a preemptive strike to multiply its own missiles to cover every potentially armed silo, thus increasing the cost of any preventive disarmament attempt. It is a deterrence doctrine built on uncertainty.

The maritime component: Type 094 and 096 SSBNs

China's nuclear submarine force currently comprises 6 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Type 094 (Jin) class, each armed with 12 JL-2 missiles with a range of 7,200 km. This range is insufficient to reach the continental United States from Chinese territorial waters, forcing SSBNs to deploy into the deep Pacific to be within strike range. China is developing the Type 096, expected in service in the second half of the 2020s, which will carry the new JL-3 missiles with an estimated range exceeding 10,000 km — resolving the range problem by enabling launches from waters closer to the Chinese coast, better protected by PLAN anti-submarine forces.

The transition to the Type 096 and JL-3 will represent a significant increase in China's submarine second-strike capability. SSBNs on patrol are practically undetectable with current technologies — even the American navy, the most sophisticated in the world in anti-submarine warfare, cannot guarantee the location of all adversary SSBNs at all times. This invulnerability of the submarine component is the heart of modern nuclear deterrence, and China is acquiring a robust second-strike capability that will make any American or allied preemptive-strike thinking irrationally risky.

The India-Pakistan dynamic — proliferation within proliferation

The nuclear race in South Asia

China's nuclear expansion does not occur in a regional vacuum. It feeds and is fed by a nuclear arms race in South Asia between India and Pakistan. India, which possesses 172 nuclear warheads according to SIPRI 2026, is partly motivated in its expansion by the growth of the Chinese arsenal — New Delhi considers China its primary long-term strategic threat. Pakistan, with its 170 warheads, calibrates its arsenal primarily against India, but benefits from nuclear cooperation with China dating to the 1980s and continuing in various forms.

This Sino-Indo-Pakistani triangle creates a particularly unstable three-body escalation dynamic. India builds nuclear capabilities to counterbalance China; Pakistan builds to counterbalance India; China builds to counterbalance the United States. In this zero-sum game, every arsenal increase justifies others' increases, creating a proliferation spiral with no endogenous brake mechanism. This is precisely the kind of dynamic that arms control agreements — today defunct — were designed to break.

North Korea and the demonstration effect

North Korea possesses an estimated arsenal of 50 nuclear warheads, according to SIPRI, with an active ballistic program including Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-18 intercontinental missiles theoretically capable of reaching the continental United States. Pyongyang developed this arsenal in violation of all UN Security Council resolutions — with impunity that itself constitutes a model for other states considering nuclear weapons as life insurance against regime change.

The relationship between China and North Korea in the nuclear domain is ambiguous. Beijing claims to oppose North Korean nuclearization, but has never exercised the maximum economic pressure it is capable of to constrain Kim Jong-un. North Korea's arsenal implicitly serves Chinese strategic interests by immobilizing American and allied military resources in Northeast Asia, complicating NATO military planning in the region, and maintaining the Korean peninsula in a state of instability that prevents democratic consolidation liable to threaten the stability of Beijing's regime in the North.

Chinese doctrine — between declared NFU and real expansion

No First Use: sincere doctrine or strategic communication

China is the only permanent nuclear-armed member of the UN Security Council to officially maintain a No First Use (NFU) doctrine — the commitment to never use nuclear weapons first against an adversary. This position, affirmed since 1964, has long been considered a sincere political commitment, consistent with China's military doctrine of "active defense." However, several recent developments call into question its practical reliability in a high-intensity conflict scenario.

First, the construction of 775 silos is not consistent with a strict NFU posture, which does not require a first-strike capability. Second, declassified doctrinal documents and recent Chinese academic analyses cited by SIPRI and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies suggest internal debate over maintaining the NFU doctrine in the event of threats to regime survival. Third, the 2021 Chinese National Defense White Paper slightly nuanced the traditional NFU formulation, suggesting a possible doctrinal revision under extreme circumstances — notably in the event of a massive conventional attack that would endanger the Chinese Communist Party regime.

Deliberate opacity as a deterrence tool

Unlike the United States and Russia, which publish relatively detailed data on their arsenals under arms control treaties, China maintains near-total opacity on the size, composition, and posture of its nuclear arsenal. This opacity is not a communications deficit — it is a deliberate strategy. It forces adversary military planners to account for the worst-case scenario, amplifying the deterrent effect of China's arsenal without increasing its size.

This opacity also complicates arms control negotiations. Without reliable and verifiable data on China's arsenal, it is practically impossible to negotiate credible quantitative ceilings. China can maintain its refusal to participate in any arms control regime by arguing that its arsenal is too small compared to American and Russian arsenals — knowing that nobody can independently verify these comparisons. It is a diplomatically impregnable position precisely because it rests on data that only China controls.

The American response — between modernization and diplomatic deficit

The American nuclear modernization program

The United States launched a nuclear triad modernization program estimated at more than $1.7 trillion over thirty years. This program includes replacing the Minuteman III ICBMs with the new LGM-35A Sentinel, developing the stealth bomber B-21 Raider, and developing the Columbia-class submarine to replace the Ohio-class. These programs are motivated in part by Russian nuclear modernization and in part by the growth of China's arsenal documented by SIPRI.

America's problem is not so much the size of its arsenal as managing it in a bipolar context that has become tripolar. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was organized in relation to a single major adversary. Today, Washington must simultaneously deter Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and potentially Tehran — each with its own strategic calculations, vulnerabilities, and red lines. This multipolar deterrence is a fundamentally more complex equation than Cold War bipolarity, and the doctrines and force structures inherited from that era are not necessarily adapted to this new context.

NATO allies and the nuclear sharing question

The growth of China's nuclear arsenal has repercussions on debates within NATO on nuclear sharing and extended deterrence. Several European allies — notably Poland and the Baltic states — have revived discussions about deploying American tactical nuclear weapons closer to Russian borders, as part of a deterrence reinforcement against Russia. But China, geographically distant from Europe, remains outside NATO's direct perimeter — even though the 2023 Vilnius Summit declaration had formally identified the "challenges" posed by China to Euro-Atlantic security.

America's Asian allies — Japan, South Korea, Australia — are on the front line of concerns related to China's nuclear expansion. Quiet discussions have taken place on extending American nuclear guarantees in the region, potentially including deploying tactical nuclear weapons in allied countries such as Japan or South Korea — a prospect both countries have officially rejected, but that certain domestic political factions are increasingly pushing in the context of the growing nuclear threat.

Escalation risks — SIPRI's real message

The phrase "heightened escalation risks" — what it really means

SIPRI's June 8, 2026 press release uses the precise formulation of "heightened escalation risks" to characterize the current nuclear environment. For an institution that weighs every word in its official communications, this is a serious alarm signal. What does this heightened escalation risk concretely mean? It designates the combination of several factors: the absence of direct communication mechanisms between major nuclear powers, the increase in high-intensity military exercises near borders, the development of conventional systems capable of threatening nuclear infrastructure, and the proliferation of actors capable of actions that might be misinterpreted as preludes to a nuclear strike.

A concrete example: China is developing conventional capabilities — ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, hypersonic weapons — that use the same delivery vehicles as its nuclear missiles. A Chinese ballistic missile launch detected by American early warning systems will initially be indistinguishable from a nuclear attack — the decision to respond will have to be made within minutes, before the warhead can be identified as conventional. This payload ambiguity is one of the most serious risks of unintentional escalation identified by arms control experts.

The hypothetical nuclear crisis in the Taiwan Strait

The most worrying scenario is not deliberate nuclear war — no major nuclear power has rational interest in it. It is the unintentional slide toward nuclear escalation within a conventional crisis that spirals out of control. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait — an increasingly credible scenario as tensions rise — would pit the conventional forces of the United States and its allies against those of China. If this conventional conflict went badly for either side, the pressure to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons would increase dramatically.

China, facing imminent conventional military defeat in the Taiwan Strait, might be tempted by a nuclear demonstration — firing a low-yield warhead on an unpopulated objective — to force a ceasefire. This question is not purely theoretical. Similar scenarios have been analyzed by American military think tanks, which generally conclude that the risk is real but manageable if lines of communication remain open. The problem is precisely that these lines of communication — a Sino-American nuclear hotline of equivalent quality to the US-Soviet hotline — do not yet exist in a robust and tested form.

The international community's reaction — between paralysis and urgency

The Security Council powerless

China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and holds veto power over any resolution that would constrain its nuclear behavior. This structural veto makes the Security Council powerless against the growth of China's nuclear arsenal — exactly as it is powerless against the Russian arsenal or, to a certain extent, against the American arsenal. This is one of the fundamental contradictions of the international security architecture inherited from 1945: the five permanent members are precisely the actors against whom the Security Council cannot act.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whose next review conference is scheduled for 2026, also offers no effective mechanisms to constrain recognized nuclear powers. Article VI of the NPT obliges these powers to "pursue in good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament" — a vaguely formulated obligation, never enforced, and regularly cited by non-nuclear states as the perfect example of great-power hypocrisy. China can invoke this article by arguing that it is always open to negotiations — while systematically refusing to engage in concrete discussions on limiting its arsenal.

Academic and Track 2 initiatives — the last diplomacy

In the absence of governmental progress, several Track 2 diplomacy initiatives — involving academics, former military officials, and policy experts, without official government commitment — have attempted to maintain dialogue on Sino-American nuclear risks. Organizations such as the Stanley Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace facilitate informal exchanges between American and Chinese experts on nuclear doctrines, escalation risks, and potential confidence-building measures. These exchanges are useful, but their impact on real policy decisions is difficult to measure.

SIPRI itself plays a role in this informal diplomacy by providing independent and credible data on arsenals that can serve as a common factual basis for discussions — even when the governments concerned refuse to share their own data. This is a crucial function in a world where strategic opacity is the norm: offering a neutral ground of verified facts on which difficult conversations can take place. But this function, however valuable, does not replace arms control treaties with verification mechanisms. It keeps the conversation alive while waiting for political conditions to allow more.

Economic implications — the cost of nuclear expansion

China's nuclear budget: total opacity

How much does it cost to build 775 silos and expand an arsenal from 600 to 620 warheads in one year? The honest answer is that nobody outside the Chinese government knows with precision. China does not publish detailed data on its nuclear military spending. Its official annual defense budget is approximately $225 billion for 2026 — a figure probably understated according to SIPRI analysts, who estimate real spending could be 1.5 to 2 times higher when counting all off-budget programs. The nuclear component of this budget is impossible to isolate precisely.

Academic estimates based on historical costs of military silo construction and available Chinese industrial data suggest that a DF-41-type ICBM silo costs between $50 and $100 million to build. Across 775 silos, that represents a construction investment of $40 to $80 billion — a significant but perfectly absorbable amount for an economy the size of China's, which represents approximately 17% of world GDP. The question is therefore not whether China can afford this nuclear expansion — it clearly can. The question is why it is making this choice now, and how far it intends to go.

The trade-off between nuclear armament and economic development

One of the great questions of Chinese political economy is the trade-off between military spending and economic development. China faces considerable internal economic challenges: a real estate sector crisis, high youth unemployment, rapid demographic aging, and growing pressure on economic growth. In this context, increased nuclear spending represents a political and economic choice that prioritizes external security over internal social development.

Xi Jinping has explicitly linked military modernization to his vision of the "Chinese dream" and "national rejuvenation." In this vision, nuclear capability is an essential attribute of great-power status — a signal sent as much to the Chinese population as to external adversaries. The political cost-benefit calculation of nuclear expansion is therefore perceived positively by CCP leadership, regardless of economic constraints. This is an internal political logic that is not sensitive to external economic arguments — and is, for that reason, particularly difficult to alter through pressure or diplomacy.

The perspective of non-nuclear states — organized powerlessness

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons — a protest without reach

In response to expanding nuclear arsenals and the failure of the disarmament promised by the NPT, 86 states have signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force in January 2021. This treaty prohibits the production, stockpiling, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons for its signatories. It is remarkably ambitious in its moral scope. It is also completely powerless in its practical effects: no nuclear power is a signatory, no nuclear state has modified its behavior in response, and no enforcement mechanism exists to constrain holdouts.

The TPNW represents the frustration of non-nuclear states with the hypocrisy of nuclear powers — notably the five permanent Security Council members — who accepted in the NPT to "pursue disarmament" while modernizing and developing their arsenals. It is a legitimate protest, clearly expressed, and largely ignored by those it targets. In the context of China's growing arsenal documented by SIPRI, the gap between the TPNW's aspirations and geopolitical reality has never been more visible.

Disarmament as aspiration and as illusion

The international arms control community navigates between two positions difficult to hold simultaneously. On one side, nuclear disarmament remains the official objective of the NPT and the large majority of UN General Assembly resolutions. On the other, current geopolitical dynamics — great-power tensions, the end of New START, the growth of Chinese and North Korean arsenals — make the idea of significant progress toward disarmament very difficult to credibly sustain in the short term. SIPRI, in its 2026 Yearbook, makes no claim to optimism. It observes the facts, documents them with precision, and leaves to readers — and decision-makers — the task of drawing their own conclusions about what to do with these realities.

What these realities say clearly is that the era of progressive nuclear disarmament that followed the end of the Cold War is over. The world has entered a new era of multipolar nuclear competition of which China is the most dynamic actor. Those planning international security — governments, alliances, international organizations — have no choice but to adapt their doctrines, capabilities, and diplomacies to this new reality. Ignoring it for political comfort or analytical paralysis is not an option.

The diplomatic path — what remains possible

Confidence-building measures as a first step

In the short-term impossibility of a comprehensive arms control treaty including China, some experts propose focusing on more limited but more attainable confidence-building measures. These could include: establishing a high-quality direct communication line between American and Chinese military commands to prevent accidental escalations; limited mutual non-targeting agreements for certain categories of objectives; partial exchanges of information on nuclear military exercises; and regular academic discussions on doctrines and escalation risks.

Precedents exist. The South China Sea De-escalation Agreements negotiated between 2022 and 2024 established communication protocols between American and Chinese military vessels to reduce the risk of naval incidents. An equivalent mechanism for the nuclear dimension would be infinitely more difficult to negotiate — but not impossibly more difficult. Political will is the limiting factor, not diplomatic ingenuity.

Including China in any future arms control framework

Any future nuclear arms control agreement that does not include China will be fundamentally insufficient. This is a consensus among domain experts. The United States has conditioned negotiations on a New START successor on including China in the discussions — a condition Moscow has used as an additional argument for not engaging in bilateral negotiations, and one Beijing has systematically rejected. This blocked diplomatic triangle is one of the most dangerous geopolitical configurations in the current world: three major nuclear powers, none of which wants to take the first step toward constructive dialogue, each waiting for the others to move first.

SIPRI does not propose solutions in its yearbook — that is not its mandate. It provides data that allows others to propose solutions. That data, in 2026, draws a worrying picture: a world with more nuclear weapons than five years ago, fewer control agreements than ten years ago, and great-power tensions that make future negotiations increasingly difficult. If these trends are not reversed, the question of whether the world can continue to manage a global nuclear arsenal of 12,000 warheads without catastrophe becomes progressively less theoretical.

Lessons for the West — acting before the catastrophe

Intellectual rearmament before material rearmament

Faced with the growth of China's nuclear arsenal documented by SIPRI, the West's first urgency is not to build more bombs. It is to think differently about deterrence in a tripolar world. Cold War-era doctrines — built on an American-Soviet bipolarity that no longer exists — do not directly apply to a world where three major nuclear powers must simultaneously deter the other two. Investment in nuclear strategic research, multi-actor war games, and new extended deterrence architectures is a prerequisite for any credible diplomatic engagement with Beijing and Moscow.

American nuclear modernization — the LGM-35A Sentinel program, the Columbia-class submarines, the B-21 Raider bomber — is necessary to maintain the credibility of the extended deterrence on which Japan, South Korea, Australia, and European allies depend. But this material modernization must be accompanied by an equally ambitious diplomatic strategy to create the conditions for a trilateral nuclear dialogue with Moscow and Beijing. One without the other — modernization without diplomacy or diplomacy without deterrence credibility — is an incomplete strategy.

The necessity of a trilateral nuclear dialogue

The closest positive precedent to a trilateral nuclear dialogue is the P5 Process — informal discussions among the five permanent Security Council members on nuclear doctrines and risks, held between 2009 and 2019 before being suspended. Its relaunch, even in a limited format, would be a significant diplomatic signal. More modest confidence-building measures — prior notifications of missile tests, a non-interference agreement on nuclear command systems, exchanges on nuclear safety doctrines — are attainable if political will exists on both sides.

China has in the past participated in informal discussions on nuclear risks with American researchers in Track 2 dialogue frameworks. These engagements produced better mutual understanding of doctrines and red lines, even without formal agreement. Building these into a Track 1.5 dialogue — involving retired officials acting in a personal capacity — is a possible step under current political conditions, before a shift in geopolitical context permits more formal governmental commitments.

Conclusion: 620 warheads and a world without a safety net

The 620 warheads in their historical context

620 Chinese nuclear warheads. That is fewer than America's 5,550 or Russia's 5,580. It is also more than any nuclear power except those two. And above all, it is 620 warheads on an expansion trajectory that has shown no sign of slowing, in a geopolitical context that produces no mechanism to constrain it. SIPRI's 2026 Yearbook does not predict nuclear war. It documents an environment in which the risk of miscalculation, unintentional escalation, and accidental catastrophe has measurably increased compared to previous decades. It is a difference of degree that could become a difference of kind.

Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea — these friction zones between the United States and China are not nuclear conflicts waiting to happen. They are contexts in which a conventional conflict could, under particularly unfavorable circumstances, approach the nuclear threshold. The larger China's arsenal, the more these unfavorable circumstances produce potentially catastrophic consequences. This is the direct link between the 620 warheads documented by SIPRI and the security of Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the entire Indo-Pacific peace architecture.

What liberal democracies must do now

The answer to China's 620 warheads is not to build 620 more. It is to build the diplomatic framework that will, over time, limit and reduce all arsenals — including China's. This framework requires robust lines of communication, mechanisms for partial transparency, and the political will to sit at the table even when the table is uncomfortable. The modernization of Western nuclear forces — necessary to maintain deterrence credibility — must be accompanied by an equally serious diplomatic strategy to create the conditions for a gradual reduction of risks. One without the other is not strategy. It is hope without a safety net.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning

I am a columnist and analyst, not a nuclear security expert. My analysis relies on reputable academic and journalistic sources, not on classified government briefings. I acknowledge the limits of my expertise in a domain as technical and sensitive as this. My editorial positions — clearly identified in the editorial passages — are pro-Western and pro-disarmament: I believe that the nuclear arsenals of all powers should be reduced, and that transparency is a necessary condition for any progress in that direction. I am deeply concerned by the growth of China's nuclear arsenal, which I regard as a threat to international stability.

Methodology and sources

All figures on nuclear arsenals come from the SIPRI 2026 Yearbook, published on June 8, 2026, which constitutes the world's most reliable reference source for this data. Doctrinal analyses are based on peer-reviewed publications and reports from recognized research organizations. No figure was invented or extrapolated without an explicit factual basis.

Nature of the analysis

This analysis is a journalistic reading of the SIPRI 2026 data, placed in geopolitical and strategic context. It does not constitute an official military assessment or intelligence analysis. Its objective is to make important nuclear security data accessible to the English-speaking reader — data that deserves greater public attention.

Sources

Primary sources

SIPRI — Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks — Press release — June 8, 2026

South China Morning Post — China adds warheads as nuclear powers walk away from disarmament: SIPRI — June 8, 2026

SIPRI Yearbook 2026 — Summary — Official PDF — June 2026

Secondary sources

Military Times — China's nuclear expansion continues at record pace, SIPRI finds — June 2026

Foreign Policy — The Nuclear Picture Is Getting Darker — June 2026

Asia Times — SIPRI data shows China's nuclear race accelerating in Indo-Pacific — June 2026